People v. Williams CA2/3

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Filed 2/27/25 P. v. Williams CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes
of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B336747

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA458774)
v.

REGINALD WILLIAMS, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lisa B. Lench, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard Lennon and Tanya Dellaca, under appointments
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Reginald Williams, Jr. appeals from the trial court’s denial
of his petition to resentence his 2019 voluntary manslaughter
conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 Pursuant to People
v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), we
independently review the record and Williams’s supplemental
brief and affirm the order denying the petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 31, 2017, along with codefendants and fellow
Fruit Town Brim gang members Qasim Knox, Devonta Willis,
and Christopher Nicholson, Williams shot and killed Whitney
Yorke, who was a member of the rival Rollin’ 30s Harlem Crips
gang.2
On January 29, 2019, Williams entered into a plea
agreement with the District Attorney. In accordance with that
agreement, he pleaded guilty to one count of voluntary
manslaughter of Yorke (§ 192, subd. (a); count 29) and admitted
to personally using a firearm in the commission of the offense
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). He also admitted that the offense was
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association
with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). Finally,
Williams admitted a prior conviction under the Three Strikes law
(§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(e)) and as a prior
serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

2 For this factual background, we refer to the District
Attorney’s response to Williams’s petition for resentencing. A
traditional statement of facts is not relevant to this appeal.

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On April 11, 2019, the trial court sentenced Williams to
47 years in state prison pursuant to the plea agreement.
On January 11, 2022, Williams filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95.3 The petition
alleged that Williams was charged by an information “that
allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” that
he was “convicted of murder” and that he “could [no longer] be
convicted of murder . . . because of changes made to [sections] 188
and 189, effective January 1, 2019.” The trial court appointed
counsel to represent Williams.
On August 16, 2022, the District Attorney filed a response
in which he conceded that a prima facie case for relief had been
made and did not oppose the court issuing an order to show
cause. The District Attorney asserted that he would prove
Williams was not entitled to relief as a matter of law at an
evidentiary hearing.
On August 25, 2022, the trial court accepted the District
Attorney’s concession and found that Williams established a
prima facie showing for eligibility. The court ordered the District
Attorney to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
On January 5, 2024, the District Attorney filed another
response to Williams’s petition, arguing that he was ineligible for
relief because he pleaded guilty and was convicted after Senate
Bill No. 1437 was enacted on January 1, 2019. The District

3 The Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to section
1172.6 without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10, eff.
June 30, 2022.)

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Attorney asserted that he should have opposed the issuance of
the order to show cause because of Williams’s ineligibility.
On January 9, 2024, the District Attorney filed an amended
response, arguing that Williams was ineligible for relief because
he was convicted after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437,
according to People v. Reyes (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 292 (Reyes).
On February 13, 2024, the trial court denied Williams’s
petition.
Williams filed a timely notice of appeal.
On December 12, 2024, Williams’s appellate counsel filed a
brief that raised no issues and requested discretionary
independent review under Delgadillo. On January 10, 2025,
Williams filed a supplemental brief.
DISCUSSION
In accordance with Delgadillo, we evaluate the arguments
that Williams presented in his supplemental brief. (Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) We also grant appellate counsel’s
request to exercise our discretion to independently review the
record. Based on our review, we conclude the trial court’s ruling
was legally correct and no arguable issues exist. (Ibid.)
In his supplemental brief, Williams confirms that on
January 29, 2019, he accepted the prosecutor’s offer to plead
guilty or no contest to voluntary manslaughter. He acknowledges
that the trial court denied his petition based on Reyes, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th 292. But Williams contends that the trial court
should have proceeded with an evidentiary hearing because Reyes
was filed after the superior court issued an order to show cause
on August 25, 2022. He also attempts to distinguish Reyes which
involved a murder charged in 2020, after Senate Bill No. 1437

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took effect. Williams was originally charged with murder in
2017, before the law changed.
We reject both arguments. Reyes and subsequent caselaw
support the trial court’s denial of Williams’s petition because he
was convicted under current law. (Reyes, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th
at p. 296; People v. Lezama (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 583, 590
(Lezama); People v. Gallegos (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 434, 439,
442–443 (Gallegos).)
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 amended
sections 188 and 189 to limit liability for murder under the felony
murder rule and to eliminate liability for murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or any other theory
that imputes malice based solely on participation in a crime.
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 707–708.) Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No.
775 amended former section 1170.95 to include attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
manslaughter under the theories of felony murder or the natural
and probable consequences doctrine as eligible offenses to
petition for resentencing. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a).)
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides relief to a person
convicted of manslaughter when three conditions are met. First,
the prosecutor must have filed a charging document that allowed
proceeding “under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).) Second, the
petitioner was convicted of manslaughter after a trial or upon a
guilty or no contest plea in lieu of a trial at which they could have
been convicted of murder. (Id., subd. (a)(2).) Third, “[t]he

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petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder . . . because
of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective on January 1,
2019.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).)
For a defendant who pleaded guilty to manslaughter, “the
most reasonable reading of the third criterion for establishing
resentencing eligibility is that at the time of the conviction—i.e.,
the time the plea was entered—the only way to a murder
conviction was through an imputed malice theory. As a matter of
law, this cannot be true for a person . . . who pled guilty to
voluntary manslaughter at a time when imputed malice theories
had already been statutorily eliminated.” (Lezama, supra, 101
Cal.App.5th at p. 590; Gallegos, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp.
439, 442–443.) A defendant is thus statutorily ineligible for relief
under section 1172.6 when he has been convicted of voluntary
manslaughter after the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 but even
before Senate Bill No. 775, which added that crime as eligible for
relief under section 1172.6. (Gallegos, at pp. 438–439, 443.)
Williams pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter in
2019, after the Legislature eliminated theories of imputed malice.
The District Attorney could not proceed with any theory of
imputed malice. Williams is unable to show that he could not be
convicted of murder because of the legislative changes to sections
188 and 189, as required under subdivision (a)(3) of section
1172.6. (Lezama, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 590; Gallegos,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 443; Reyes, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
p. 298.) Williams is thus ineligible for resentencing as a matter
of law.

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DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying Williams’s petition for
resentencing.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

HANASONO, J.*

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

ADAMS, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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