People v. Seiden CA4/3

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Filed 2/25/25 P. v. Seiden CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062706

v. (Super. Ct. No. M-19948)

JOSEPH JEREMY SEIDEN, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Robert Goodkin, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Rachel Varnell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Jennifer B. Truong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Joseph Jeremy Seiden appeals from the trial court’s order
denying his petition to terminate his sex offender registration under Penal
Code section 290.5, subdivision (a) (all undesignated statutory references are
to this code). Seiden argues the trial court abused its discretion in evaluating
the statutory factors to determine “whether community safety would be
significantly enhanced by requiring continued registration.” (§ 290.5, subd.
(a)(3).) We agree and reverse the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Over 21 years ago, Seiden pleaded guilty to certain sex crimes,
triggering a duty to register as a sex offender under section 290. In August
2022, Seiden filed a petition to terminate his sex offender registration
pursuant to section 290.5. He alleged he was a “[t]ier 1” offender and had
registered for at least 10 years, making him eligible for terminating his
registration requirement. The prosecution responded to the petition. It
objected to granting the petition and requested a hearing because
“[c]ommunity safety would be significantly enhanced by the petitioner’s
continued registration.” It also filed an opposition with supporting
documents. Seiden filed a response to the opposition with supporting
documents.
At the hearing in May 2023, the trial court denied the petition,
but allowed Seiden to petition for termination again in one year. In making
its determination, the court considered the evidence and the seven factors set
forth in section 290.5, subdivision (a)(3).
The trial court analyzed the first factor, “the nature and facts of
the registrable offense” (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(3)), counting 15 incidents (and
possibly more) involving Seiden and the victim over a nine-year period. The
court described the conduct as “egregious.” It took into account statements by

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Seiden shortly after his arrest: Seiden, who was 19 years old at that time,
told police officers he was aware of his wrongdoing and afraid of its impact on
his reputation. One police officer responded, “‘What about [the victim]’s
reputation . . . [?]’” Seiden replied “he was concerned about that as well, but
was more concerned about himself because he was trying to get his life on
track and that would ruin his life.” Seiden said, “‘I’m not trying to weasel my
way out of something[.] I did this with [the victim],’” and “‘I always have this
in me.’” Seiden admitted looking at pictures of nude boys online, and said “his
sexual triggers were boys ages 8 to 15.” The court found the first factor
weighed in favor of denying the petition, notwithstanding the registrable
offenses happening approximately 20 years before the petition hearing.
As for the second factor, “the age and number of victims” (§ 290.5,
subd. (a)(3)), the trial court stated the abuse began when the victim was 6
years old and lasted until he was 15 years old. There were no other victims.
The court determined the second factor weighed in favor of denying the
petition, because of the victim’s young age, the repeated abuse, and “five
separate counts of [section] 288” to which Seiden pleaded guilty.
The trial court found the third factor, whether the “victim was a
stranger at the time of the offense” (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(3)), weighed in favor of
granting the petition. It recognized the victim was not a stranger and, at the
time of the offenses, Seiden and the victim lived in the same house.
The trial court examined the fourth factor, “criminal and relevant
noncriminal behavior before and after conviction for the registerable offense.”
(§ 290.5, subd. (a)(3).) It considered the child pornography on Seiden’s
computer. It cited statements by Seiden’s mother around the time of his
arrest: she described Seiden as always being “‘the Pied Piper’ . . . to children,”
and believed Seiden would not be able to change his behavior and would

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harm another child. The trial court also recognized Seiden was convicted for
driving under the influence in 2011 and for public intoxication in 2015.
The trial court’s main concern was that Seiden was diagnosed
with “the worst type of bipolar disorder one can have” when he was 12 years
old. It stated Seiden needs to take medication for his bipolar disorder, citing
the 2003 probation report. In that report, Seiden said he could not take the
medication while drinking alcohol. The trial court continued, “So the Court’s
concern is that if he’s -- if during those two time periods, he’s not managing
his sobriety [(a reference to his misdemeanor convictions in 2011 and 2015)]
and therefore not -- I think the reasonable inference is [he is] not taking his
medication . . . .” It noted, “[S]ince 2017 Mr. Seiden has been . . . living in a
sober living home and . . . dealing with his sobriety. He does admit that he is
an alcoholic.” The trial court concluded, “[T]he Court’s concern is that [the
misdemeanor convictions are] recent enough and they involve alcohol, which
causes the Court the concern that he’s not taking his medication for the
bipolar as well, which causes multiple areas of concern. So [f]actor 4 factored
in favor of denial.”
The fifth factor, “the time period during which the person has not
reoffended” (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(3)), weighed in favor of granting the petition,
as Seiden had not been “accused, arrested, or convicted, of any sex related
crimes in the past 20 years.”
The trial court evaluated the sixth factor, “successful completion,
if any, of a Sex Offender Management Board-certified sex offender treatment
program.” (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(3).) It acknowledged Seiden intentionally failed
to complete such a program while on probation and, due to this failure, he
was imprisoned “for refusing or failing to do the sex offender treatment
program.” It recognized Seiden completed a sex offender treatment program

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through parole. Nonetheless, the trial court found the sixth factor “slightly”
weighed in favor of denying the petition, because he “knowingly fail[ed] to
complete the treatment program” on probation.
The seventh factor, “the person’s current risk of sexual or violent
reoffense, including the person’s risk levels on SARATSO static, dynamic,
and violence risk assessment instruments, if available” (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(3)),
weighed in favor of granting the petition.1 The trial court determined: “It is
the People’s burden to provide evidence of his current risk and the People
could have sought a current risk assessment based on that burden.”
In denying the petition and setting the time to re-petition to one
year, the trial court noted “it was a really close case.” It explained several
factors weighed in favor of granting the petition and several in favor of
denying it. But “[t]he final determinative factor that slightly favored in terms
of denying the petition was the concerns of his bipolar diagnosis, early
childhood onset for that, and that he had continued after the date of
conviction, seven years and then twelve years later to have alcohol related
convictions and offenses.”
DISCUSSION
Section 290 et seq. requires a person convicted of certain sex
crimes to register as a sex offender. Originally, all sex offenders were subject
to a lifetime registration requirement. Effective January 1, 2021, section 290

1 SARATSO denotes “State-Authorized Risk Assessment Tool for

Sex Offenders.” (§ 290.04, subd. (a)(1).) Beginning on January 1, 2007, the
SARATSO for adult male registrants has been the Static-99 risk assessment
scale. (§ 290.04, subd. (b)(1).) “‘The Static-99R is a revised version of the
Static-99 that takes into account the age of a sexual offender based on
statistics showing the risk of sexual reoffense decreases as the offender
ages.’” (People v. LaBlanc (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1067–1068, fn. 6.)

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was restructured to provide for three tiers of registration for sex offenders,
based primarily on the offense. (Stats. 2017, ch. 541, § 2.5.) Registration
requirements can now be for 10 years (tier one), 20 years (tier two), or a
lifetime (tier three). (§ 290, subd. (d).) Seiden is a tier one sex offender,
required to register for 10 years. (§ 290, subd. (d)(1); see § 290.5, subd. (a).)
Section 290.5 permits sex offenders in tiers one and two to
petition the trial court to terminate their registration requirement. The
prosecution may request a hearing and “present evidence” to demonstrate
“community safety would be significantly enhanced by requiring continued
registration.” (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(2)–(3).) In other words, the prosecution has
the burden of producing evidence to establish “terminating the registration
requirement considerably raised the threat to society because” a petitioner
is “currently likely to reoffend.” (People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427,
433 (Thai).)
In making its decision, the trial court must consider: “the nature
and facts of the registerable offense; the age and number of victims; whether
any victim was a stranger at the time of the offense (known to the offender
for less than 24 hours); criminal and relevant noncriminal behavior before
and after conviction for the registerable offense; the time period during which
the person has not reoffended; successful completion, if any, of a Sex Offender
Management Board-certified sex offender treatment program; and the
person’s current risk of sexual or violent reoffense, including the person’s risk
levels on SARATSO static, dynamic, and violence risk assessment
instruments, if available.” (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(3).) If the trial court denies the
petition, it must “set the time period,” ranging from one to five years, “after
which the person can [re-petition] for termination,” and provide its reasons.
(§ 290.5, subd. (a)(4).)

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“An appellate court reviews the trial court’s ruling on a petition
for termination from the sex offender registry for abuse of discretion.
[Citation.] To establish an abuse of discretion, a defendant must demonstrate
the trial court’s decision fell outside the bounds of reason, i.e., was arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd. [Citation.] [¶] ‘The abuse of discretion
standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according
to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings
of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only
if arbitrary and capricious.’ [Citation.] A trial court abuses its discretion
when its factual findings are not supported by the evidence, or its decision is
based on an incorrect legal standard.” (Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 433.)
The Attorney General argues the trial court properly weighed the
statutory factors. Seiden argues insufficient evidence supports the denial of
his petition and we should reverse the denial in accordance with Thai.
In Thai, the petitioner masturbated a 12-year-old boy and
pleaded guilty to “committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under
the age of 14 years” under section 288, subdivision (a). (Thai, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 430.) More than 23 years later, the petitioner filed a
petition to terminate his sex offender registration. (Ibid.) “The trial court
stated it considered ‘each and every one of the factors’ and although not
considering the circumstances of the offense alone, it was ‘weighing that
heavily’” in denying the petition. (Id. at p. 431.) The appellate court held:
“[I]nsufficient evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion community safety
would be appreciably increased by requiring Thai to continue to register for
five years. The prosecution failed its burden to produce evidence establishing
that terminating the registration requirement considerably raised the threat

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to society because 64-year-old Thai was currently likely to reoffend.” (Id. at
p. 433.)
Here, the trial court “committed the sin condemned in Thai.”
(People v. Franco (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 184, 194 (Franco).) The prosecution
failed to provide any evidence demonstrating Seiden, “at the time of the
hearing, ‘was currently likely to reoffend.’” (Franco, at p. 194.) The Attorney
General is correct the trial court here was not “singularly focused” on the
facts of the offenses as in Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at page 434.2 The trial
court emphasized not only the facts but also Seiden’s past behavior. However,
as we explain below, the facts of the offenses and Seiden’s past behavior, in
light of the entirety of the record here, have no bearing on his risk to
community safety today.
In denying the petition, the trial court gave weight to the first,
second, fourth, and sixth statutory factors. The first and second factors—“the

2 The Attorney General points out three additional factual

distinctions between Thai and the present case, none of which are relevant to
deciding this case. First, the Attorney General suggests the facts of the
offense in Thai were less severe than the present case, and references
Seiden’s attempts to contact the victim after his conviction. But the facts of
the offenses and the behavior were far enough removed from the date of the
hearing, and did not indicate Seiden was likely to reoffend today. Second,
whereas the trial court in Thai allowed the petitioner to re-petition for
termination in five years, the trial court here permitted Seiden to re-petition
in one year. This factual distinction does not directly concern our review of
the trial court’s evaluation of the statutory factors. Finally, the Attorney
General asserts the trial court here thought the seventh factor’s STATIC-99
risk assessment “could be the most compelling evidence in deciding [Seiden]’s
petition,” but that this assessment “did not factor into the Court of Appeal’s
ultimate decision” in Thai. This assertion is based on a misreading of Thai.
The lack of a current risk assessment contributed to the appellate court’s
decision. (Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 434.)

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nature and facts of the registerable offense” and the age of the victim (§
290.5, subd. (a)(3))—concerned the circumstances of the offenses. The trial
court appeared to understand the underlying offense alone was insufficient to
show Seiden posed a risk to the community today. (See Thai, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 434 [“facts [of underlying offense] alone do not demonstrate
Thai was a risk to the community over 24 years later”].)
While analyzing the fourth factor, “criminal and relevant
noncriminal behavior before and after conviction for the registerable offense”
(§ 290.5, subd. (a)(3)), the trial court focused on evidence of Seiden’s behavior
around the time of the arrest, including a letter written by Seiden’s adopted
mother. That sheds no light on Seiden’s current risk to community safety
today. (See Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 433.)
Moreover, the trial court stated Seiden was diagnosed with
bipolar disorder when he was 12 years old and convicted for misdemeanors in
2011 and 2015. It expressed concern that, due to these “recent” alcohol-
related misdemeanors, he was not taking medication for bipolar disorder,
which, according to a statement by Seiden in the 2003 probation report, could
not be taken with alcohol. This inference is problematic for a few reasons.
At the time of the hearing, nearly eight years had passed since his last
alcohol-related misdemeanor. The prosecution also did not provide any
evidence Seiden continued to consume alcohol after his 2015 offense and up
to the time of his hearing. Indeed, the trial court recognized he had been
living in a sober living home since 2017. Additionally, the prosecution failed

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to present any evidence Seiden was still required to take that same
medication.3 Thus, insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s inference.
In examining the sixth factor, “successful completion, if any, of a
Sex Offender Management Board-certified sex offender treatment program”
(§ 290.5, subd. (a)(3)), the trial court underscored Seiden refused or willfully
failed a sex offender treatment program during probation. But his state of
mind and failure to complete such a program around the time of the offenses
does not show how Seiden presents a risk to the community today.
Furthermore, it appears Seiden completed a sex offender treatment program
while on parole.
We agree with the trial court’s analysis that the remaining
factors weigh in favor of granting Seiden’s petition.
In sum, the prosecution failed to present evidence demonstrating
“terminating the registration requirement considerably raised the threat to
society because” Seiden “was currently likely to reoffend.” (Thai, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 433.) Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in
denying Seiden’s petition to terminate his sex offender registration under
section 290.5, subdivision (a).

3 We need not resolve the dispute whether Seiden has severe

bipolar disorder.

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DISPOSITION
The order is reversed, and the matter is remanded with
directions to grant Seiden’s petition.

MOTOIKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

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