CourtListener 10338278•People v. Torres CA2/5
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Filed 2/24/25 P. v. Torres CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B334460
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. PA042489)
RAY TORRES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William C. Ryan, Judge. Affirmed.
Maria Leftwich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No Appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Ray Torres appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1170.126. The trial court
found that Torres was ineligible for resentencing because he was
armed with a deadly weapon during commission of the offense.
We affirm the trial court’s order.
FACTS2
On October 16, 2002, Torres robbed a Radio Shack. The
following day, in the mid-afternoon, Los Angeles Police
Department Officers Robinson and Lotz were on patrol in Sylmar
when they noticed Torres driving a car without a front license
plate, which was a violation of the Vehicle Code. The officers
activated their lights, intending to conduct a traffic stop. Torres
slowed down, then sped up. The officers turned on their siren.
The officers pursued the car for about two and a quarter miles.
During this pursuit, Torres drove at speeds up to 100 miles per
hour, swerved into oncoming traffic lanes, and ran stop signs and
red lights. He eventually hit a parked car and was arrested.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2003, a jury convicted Torres of second degree robbery
(§ 211, count 1) and evading an officer while driving a motor
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2 The facts are taken from the prior unpublished appellate
opinion in People v. Torres (Feb. 17, 2004, B165871 [nonpub.
opn.]).
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vehicle with willful wanton disregard for persons and property
(Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a), count 2). In a separate bench
trial, the court found true allegations that Torres suffered three
prior convictions under section 667.5, subdivision (b), and
suffered three prior serious or violent felony convictions (§§ 667,
subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced
Torres to a term of 50 years to life in prison under the Three
Strikes law.
In 2017, Torres filed in pro. per. a petition for writ of
habeas corpus in the Superior Court arguing that he was eligible
for resentencing under section 1170.126. The trial court issued
an order to show cause with respect to Torres’s conviction of
evading an officer in count 2 and denied the petition with
prejudice as to Torres’s robbery conviction in count 1.
The People conceded that Torres was eligible for
resentencing on the basis of suitability at the direction of the Los
Angeles County District Attorney in accordance with Special
Directive 20-14. The People also joined in Torres’s request that
all enhancements and allegations be stricken in the interests of
justice, pursuant to Special Directive 20-08.
Subsequently, the People filed a summary of Torres’s
criminal history and discipline as ordered by the court.
Through counsel, Torres filed arguments and exhibits in
support of his section 1170.126 petition, arguing that his
conviction for evading in count 2 was not a serious or violent
felony, there were no other aggravating factors, and he did not
pose a current unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.
The People filed an opposition, arguing that despite their
earlier concession, Torres’s eligibility had not been determined.
The People asserted that Torres was ineligible for resentencing
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because he was armed with a deadly weapon—a motor vehicle—
in the commission of count 2, and because he intended to inflict
great bodily injury upon another person in commission of that
offense.
Torres replied to the People’s opposition, arguing that the
People could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was
armed with a deadly weapon or that he intended to cause great
bodily injury.
The trial court denied Torres’s petition because it found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Torres drove a vehicle in a
manner that would probably result in physical harm. Torres was
therefore “armed with a . . . deadly weapon” during commission of
the offense and ineligible for relief. However, the court rejected
the People’s contention that Torres attempted to cause great
bodily injury.
Torres appealed, and this court appointed counsel to
represent him. After examining the record, Torres’s attorney
filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking that we follow
the procedures set forth in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216 (Delgadillo). We invited Torres to submit a supplemental
brief.
Torres mistakenly filed a supplemental letter brief in the
Superior Court. In the Court of Appeal, the case was dismissed
and the remittitur issued. Torres’s counsel filed a motion to
recall the remittitur that explained Torres’s mistake. We
recalled the remittitur and accepted the brief that Torres had
filed in the trial court as a timely supplemental letter brief in this
appeal.
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DISCUSSION
Section 1170.126 permits persons who are currently
serving an indeterminate life term under the Three Strikes law,
like Torres, to file a petition in the sentencing court seeking to be
resentenced to a determinate term as a second striker.
(§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) If the trial court determines, in its
discretion, that the defendant meets the criteria of section
1170.126, subdivision (e), the court may resentence the
defendant. (§ 1170.126, subds. (f), (g).)
Section 1170.126, subdivision (e), provides that a defendant
is eligible for resentencing if he or she is serving an
indeterminate term of life imprisonment imposed pursuant to
paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of section 667 or subdivision (c) of
section 1170.12 “for a conviction of a felony or felonies that are
not defined as serious and/or violent felonies by subdivision (c) of
[s]ection 667.5 or subdivision (c) of [s]ection 1192.7.” (§ 1170.126,
subd. (e)(1).) The Act makes ineligible for resentencing a person
who “[d]uring the commission of the current offense . . . was
armed with a deadly weapon . . . .” (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iii),
1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii); see § 1170.126, subd. (e).) Our
Supreme Court has defined “ ‘deadly weapon[s]’ to include objects
used in a manner capable of producing and likely to produce
great bodily injury[,]” including motor vehicles. (People v. Perez
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1068 (Perez).)
“[T]he question whether a defendant was armed with a
deadly weapon during his or her current offense [is] a question of
fact.” (Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1066.) “We review the factual
basis for the trial court’s finding of resentencing ineligibility
under the substantial evidence test. We review the whole record
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in a light most favorable to the order to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence, i.e., evidence that is credible and of
solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find
ineligibility by a preponderance of the evidence.” (People v.
Valdez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1338, 1346.) We review questions
of law, including interpretation of the statute, independently.
(Perez, at p. 1067.)
We limit our consideration to the issues raised in Torres’s
brief. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232 [where a
defendant’s attorney finds no arguable issues in an appeal from
the denial of a petition for resentencing and the defendant files a
supplemental brief, “the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate
the specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a
written opinion,” but the question of whether to conduct an
independent review of the entire record is “wholly within the
court’s discretion”].)
Torres contends that he cannot be ineligible for
resentencing because he was not charged with use of a weapon or
assault likely to cause great bodily injury under section 245, and
the jury made no finding regarding the probable consequences of
driving as he did. The contention lacks merit. “[T]he express
statutory language requires the trial court to make a factual
determination that is not limited by a review of the particular
statutory offenses and enhancements of which petitioner was
convicted.” (People v. Bradford (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1322,
1332.)
Torres’s contention that he did not use his vehicle as a
deadly weapon because he did not intentionally hit a person, pet,
or property also fails. Torres’s use of a vehicle in a manner likely
to produce great bodily injury during the commission of the
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offense—speeding excessively, weaving into oncoming traffic,
running stop signs and red lights, and ultimately crashing into
another vehicle—is sufficient to render him ineligible for relief
under section 1170.126. (Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1065.) His
“specific intent . . . is immaterial . . . .” (Id. at p. 1067.) Torres’s
assertion that defendants in cases similar to his have been
resentenced is unavailing. The trial court made a factual
determination that Torres used the vehicle in a manner that
qualified it as a deadly weapon. That determination is supported
by substantial evidence. We will not reweigh the evidence or
second-guess the trial court’s findings. Moreover, while Torres’s
renouncement of all gang affiliation, his positive “chronos,” his
employment in prison, and his expressions of remorse are
laudable, they do not provide a basis for eligibility in light of the
trial court’s ineligibility determination.
Finally, Torres’s arguments that counsel at his 2003 trial
provided ineffective assistance and that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to strike his three strikes convictions, as well
as his complaints regarding the length of his sentence, are issues
that Torres could have raised in a prior appeal. Torres has not
made a showing of justification for the delay, and we will not
address these issues here. (People v. Senior (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 531, 538.)
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Torrez’s Penal Code section
1170.126 petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
BAKER, Acting, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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