People v. Houston CA2/3

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Filed 2/21/25 P. v. Houston CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B328812

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A569469
v.

STEPHEN ARTHUR HOUSTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jared D. Moses, Judge. Affirmed.

David R. Greifinger, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Charles S. Lee,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Stephen Arthur Houston appeals from the trial court’s
order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 We affirm because the record of conviction
establishes Houston is ineligible for resentencing as a matter
of law.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Houston shoots and kills his wife Donna
On November 25, 1985, Houston went to his wife’s
workplace in Monterey Park.2 He took with him a 12-gauge
shotgun he’d bought the day before. (Houston I.)
Around 9:00 a.m. that morning, Steven Price, a coworker
of Houston’s wife Donna Johnson, had gone out the rear door
of the office. He was waiting for Johnson to come out; the two
were going to transport copiers that had been loaded into a van.
Seconds later Price heard Johnson yell, “ ‘No, no.’ ” Price then
heard “ ‘a huge explosive sound’ ” and Johnson, who had gone

1 References to statutes are to the Penal Code. Effective
June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered section
1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2 We refer to the factual background from Houston’s trial
only “for background purposes and to provide context for the
parties’ arguments.” (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974,
978, fn. 2.) On September 13, 2023, Houston filed a request to
augment the record on appeal with the reporter’s transcripts,
jury instructions, and verdict forms from his trial. We treated
Houston’s request to augment as a request for judicial notice of
the records in his direct appeal, Case No. B031974, and granted
that request. In addition, we granted the Attorney General’s
“Motion for Judicial Notice” of the 1990 opinion in that direct
appeal, People v. Houston (Jan. 29, 1990, B031974) [nonpub. opn.]
(Houston I).

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out the rear door, fell back into the office. Price ran out the door
and saw Houston holding a shotgun. Price locked eyes with
Houston, “who appeared to be ‘stone cold sober.’ ” Houston
turned and walked away. (Houston I.)
Johnson died from a shotgun wound to the neck. According
to a medical examiner, the fatal blast had been fired from a
distance of three yards. (Houston I.)
2. The charges, trial, verdict, and sentence
The People charged Houston with Johnson’s murder.
The People alleged Houston “intentionally killed the victim
while lying in wait,” and that he personally used a firearm—
a shotgun—in the commission of the crime.
At his trial in 1987, Houston testified on his own behalf.
Houston told the jury he and Johnson had “quite a few” problems
in their marriage. On November 24, 1985, Houston bought a
shotgun. He was going to commit suicide. He “put[ ] a live round
in the chamber of the gun” and put the gun in his van. The
next morning, Houston drove to Johnson’s workplace. He saw
Johnson “in close contact with another man.” Houston told
the jury, “It looked like they were laughing [and] having
a good time.”
Houston testified he “just started getting all these
flashbacks of all these things that had happened and she put
me through and just like an explosion went out in my head.
I didn’t have any control.” When asked on cross-examination
if he had concluded Johnson “deserved to die,” Houston
answered, “At that point I felt she did, yes.” Houston walked
back to his van and “grabbed” his shotgun. He started toward
the back entrance of the building. Then “[t]he door came open

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and my wife came out and I shot her.” Houston got back in his
van and drove away. He later put the shotgun in a dumpster.
Houston also called as defense witnesses at trial a
clinical psychologist who had assessed him in the county jail
and a psychiatrist who had diagnosed Houston with “major
depressive disorder” in 1985.
The trial court instructed the jury with (among other
instructions) CALJIC Nos. 8.00 (Homicide–Defined), 8.10
(Murder–Defined), 8.11 (“Malice Aforethought”–Defined),
8.20 (Deliberate and Premeditated Murder), 8.25 (Murder by
Means of Lying in Wait), 8.30 (Unpremeditated Murder of the
Second Degree), 8.37 (Manslaughter–Defined), 8.40 (Voluntary
Manslaughter–Defined), 8.42 (Sudden Quarrel or Heat of Passion
and Provocation Explained), 8.44 (No Specific Emotion Alone
Constitutes Heat of Passion), 8.50 (Murder and Manslaughter
Distinguished), 8.52 (Murder or Manslaughter–Cooling Period),
8.70 (Duty of Jury as to Degree of Murder), 8.71 (Doubt Whether
First or Second Degree Murder), 8.72 (Doubt Whether Murder or
Manslaughter), 8.73 (Evidence of Provocation May Be Considered
in Determining Degree of Murder), 8.74 (Unanimous Agreement
as to Offense–First or Second Degree Murder or Manslaughter),
8.80 (Special Circumstances–Introductory), 8.81.15 (Special
Circumstances–Murder While Lying in Wait), and 17.19 (Finding
if Defendant Personally Used a Firearm in Commission of a
Felony).
In light of Houston’s testimony and the expert testimony
given by the two medical professionals who had evaluated him,
the court also gave CALJIC Nos. 2.10 (Statements Made by
Defendant to Physician), 2.80 (Expert Testimony), and 3.36
(Evidence of Mental Disease–Received for Limited Purpose).

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The court did not instruct Houston’s jury on felony murder,
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any sort of
accomplice liability.
The jury convicted Houston of first degree murder
and found the lying-in-wait and firearm use allegations true.
The trial court sentenced Houston to two years for the firearm
enhancement and life without the possibility of parole for the
murder. In 1990 another panel of this court affirmed Houston’s
conviction. (Houston I.)
3. Houston’s petition for resentencing
Some 37 years after Houston killed Johnson, Houston—
representing himself—filed a form petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6. Houston checked boxes on the form
stating, (1) “[A]n . . . information . . . was filed against [him]
that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime . . . ,”
(2) he “was convicted of murder . . . following a trial . . . ,”
and (3) he “could not presently be convicted of murder . . .
because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective
January 1, 2019.” Houston also checked a box that stated,
“Having presented a facially sufficient petition, I request that
this Court appoint counsel to represent me.”
The court appointed counsel for Houston. On May 19,
2022, the prosecution filed an opposition to Houston’s petition.
The prosecution contended Houston was ineligible for
resentencing because he was the actual killer. The prosecution
noted the trial court had not instructed Houston’s jury on
felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

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The prosecution stated that, at trial, Houston had “admitted
to shooting” Johnson. Along with its opposition brief, the
prosecution submitted a CD “that contain[ed] all trial transcripts
in this case.”
Houston’s counsel filed a reply on January 18, 2023.
Counsel acknowledged the court’s “perceptive” [sic] that Houston
had been “found to be Killer” [sic]. But, counsel argued, “the
petitioner at an evidentiary hearing can address that he had no
intent to kill under the circumstances.” Counsel also asserted,
“This court should rely on the trial transcripts and trial record
and not necessarily the appellate opinion.”
Counsel appeared before the court on January 18, 2023.3
The court gave counsel its tentative: that Houston was “legally
ineligible for relief.” The court said it had reviewed “the record
of conviction,” and it was “not making any findings of fact”:
“I’m just looking right at the record.”
The court heard argument from counsel. Houston’s counsel
stated,
“I did review the entire record, the assertions
as to the killing, the killing of a wife. And
on its face it would appear that, based on the
record, that the jury did make some findings;

3 Houston apparently was not present, by Webex or
otherwise. There is no indication in the record that Houston’s
counsel asked the court to order Houston out from state prison
for the hearing. Nor did counsel object to proceeding in his
client’s absence. On appeal, Houston has not raised any issue
about the court proceeding without him there. (Cf. People
v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 45, 51, 57–58 [petitioner
has constitutional right to be present at evidentiary hearing
conducted after order to show cause has issued].)

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however, my position is that at least from
Mr. Houston’s standpoint, that determinations
as to specific intent to kill versus heat of
the moment, and that those issues would be
the subject of an OSC.”
The prosecutor said he would “submit on the pleadings.”
The court stated it had “reviewed the record of conviction,
including the minute orders, abstracts of judgment, verdict forms,
jury instructions, and trial transcripts.” The court continued,
“I am not relying upon any appellate opinion or
any recitation of facts in any appellate opinion.
[¶] And I find that Mr. Houston has failed to
make a prima facie showing that he is entitled
to relief under Section 1172.6. [¶] In fact the
record of conviction clearly establishes that
he is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. [¶]
The jury convicted him of first degree murder
of his wife and found true the lying-in-wait
special circumstance. [¶] The jury also found
true a special allegation, firearms allegation
under 12022.5(a), that a person used a shotgun
to kill his wife. And the only theory of first
degree murder that the jury was instructed on
was willful and deliberate and premeditated
murder. There were no co-defendants,
there were no accomplices, there were no
co-conspirators. [¶] The court did not instruct
. . . on aiding and abetting, natural and
probable consequences, or felony murder. [¶]
There is no possible theory in which malice

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could be imputed in this case. He was the
actual and direct perpetrator of a shotgun
murder on his wife. And he testified at trial
and admitted that he shot his wife with a
shotgun. [¶] So the record of conviction clearly
demonstrates that he acted with malice
aforethought when he killed his wife, and,
therefore, is not entitled to relief.”
The court issued a written order the same day saying the
same thing.
DISCUSSION
1. Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437) amended existing law on accomplice liability for murder
“ ‘to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who
is not the actual killer . . . .’ ” (People v. Gutierrez-Salazar (2019)
38 Cal.App.5th 411, 417, quoting Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f);
§ 189, subd. (e)(1).) To accomplish this goal, Senate Bill 1437
limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule and
eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine
as it relates to murder, to ensure a person’s sentence is
commensurate with his individual criminal culpability. (See
generally People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986; People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843; People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 957, 971 (Lewis).) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2022, extended resentencing
eligibility to individuals convicted of murder on any “other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2(a).)

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Senate Bill 1437 also provided an avenue for a person
convicted under the former law to petition the sentencing court
to vacate his conviction and be resentenced if he could no longer
be convicted under the amended law. (People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 708–709; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959–960.)
If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement
to relief, the trial court must issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the prosecution
bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
petitioner is guilty under the amended law. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c),
(d)(3); Strong, at pp. 708–709.)
At the prima facie stage, the trial court takes as true
the petitioner’s factual allegations and assesses whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if those allegations were
proved. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) However, “[t]he
record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s
prima facie inquiry under section 117[2.6], allowing the court
to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that
are clearly meritless.” (Ibid.) The jury instructions are part
of the record of conviction, because the instructions “given at a
petitioner’s trial may provide ‘readily ascertainable facts from
the record’ that refute the petitioner’s showing, and reliance on
them to make the eligibility or entitlement determinations may
not amount to ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence
or the exercise of discretion,’ ” which may not take place until
after an order to show cause issues. (People v. Soto (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055, review granted on other grounds
Sept. 23, 2020, S263939 and held for Lewis, review dismissed
Nov. 17, 2021, and opinion citable to the extent not inconsistent
with Lewis; see People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 949

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[jury instructions showed trial court never instructed the jury on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine; summary denial
of petition affirmed].) The verdicts also are part of the record
of conviction. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 47–48,
55–56 (Harden) [affirming summary denial of petition; jury
instructions and verdicts irrefutably established as a matter
of law that defendant was ineligible for resentencing].)
We independently review the trial court’s determination
that Houston failed to make a prima facie showing. (People v.
Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251; Harden, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 52.)
2. As the actual killer, Houston is ineligible for relief
under section 1172.6 as a matter of law
Section 1172.6 is all about accomplice liability. Here,
there is absolutely nothing in the record of conviction to suggest
Houston acted as an accomplice in his wife’s murder. The court
at Houston’s trial did not instruct the jury on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or on any other theory involving
aiding and abetting or accomplice liability. Houston testified—
at considerable length and in considerable detail—that he bought
a shotgun, drove to his wife’s place of work, returned to his van
when he saw her talking and laughing with a man, “grabbed”
his gun, returned to the building, and shot Johnson when she
came out the door. Houston’s jury convicted him of willful,
deliberate, premeditated murder and found true both lying-in-
wait and personal use of a firearm allegations. As the actual
killer, Houston is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (See
Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 53–54, 56; People v.
Edwards (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 666, 669, 671, 674, disapproved
of on other grounds in Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 963

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[affirming summary denial of resentencing petition where record
of conviction showed petitioner was actual killer]. Cf. People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233 [defendant not entitled
to resentencing because he “was the actual killer and the only
participant in the killing”].)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying Stephen Arthur Houston’s
petition for resentencing.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

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