CourtListener 10337356•People v. Saez CA4/1
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Filed 2/21/25 P. v. Saez CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084813
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
(Super. Ct. No. FWV030830)
ALFREDO SAEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Daniel Detienne, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Michaela Dalton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Michael D. Butera, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Alfredo Saez appeals from an order of the trial court denying his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1170.95 (now section
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1172.6).2 Saez was charged with murder and, in 2006, he pled guilty to
voluntary manslaughter and admitted allegations that he personally used a
firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury. Saez contends the trial
court erred by denying his petition for resentencing on that conviction at the
prima facie stage in 2023, because the court improperly relied on the
preliminary hearing transcript and mistakenly believed that its finding that
he was the actual killer precluded resentencing under section 1172.6. On our
own independent review, we conclude the record of conviction does not
conclusively establish that Saez is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as
a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand
with directions to the court to issue an order to show cause.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The People charged Saez with one count of murder with malice
aforethought in the killing of his girlfriend, Rhonda McNamara, in April
2004. The trial court held a preliminary hearing and, after hearing from
several witnesses, concluded there was sufficient evidence to hold Saez to
answer on the charge of murder.
In April 2006, Saez pled guilty to the lesser and necessarily included
offense of voluntary manslaughter in violation of section 192, subdivision (a).
He also admitted that he inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances
involving domestic violence as described in section 12022.7, subdivision (e),
and that he personally used a firearm in the commission of the crime as
described in section 12022.5, subdivision (a). The court noted that the
2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was recodified without
substantive change in section 1172.6, pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 200
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.). (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to the
current codification throughout this opinion.
2
preliminary hearing “support[ed] a factual basis for taking of the plea and for
the admissions,” and counsel “[s]o stipulated as to Count 1 [the voluntary
manslaughter plea] and People v. West[3] as to the two admissions.” As set
forth in the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Saez to 26 years in
prison, comprised of 11 years for the manslaughter conviction, plus an
additional 5 years for the great bodily injury enhancement, and 10 years for
the firearm enhancement.
In October 2022, Saez filed a petition for resentencing under now
current section 1172.6. He declared, per the standard form petition, that the
information filed against him “allowed the prosecution to proceed under a
theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime,” and that he
“accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which [he] could have been convicted
of murder,” and that he “could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of the changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and
189, effective January 1, 2019.”
The trial court appointed counsel for Saez and permitted briefing on
the petition. Saez did not directly dispute that he was the actual killer, but
instead asserted “that he lacked the requisite intent or did not act in a
manner that would make him liable under still-valid murder theories.”
The People submitted the felony complaint, the preliminary hearing
transcript, the felony information, the change of plea form, and the transcript
from the change of plea hearing in opposition to the petition. They asserted
each of these documents were part of the “record of conviction” the trial court
3 People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595 (West).)
3
could review at the prima facie stage, but conceded the court should not
engage in factfinding, such as weighing evidence or making credibility
findings as to unresolved factual issues.
Accordingly, the People presented facts “from the preliminary hearing
transcript which was the stipulated factual basis for the plea of voluntary
manslaughter.” McNamara’s daughters testified about statements Saez
allegedly made informing them that McNamara was dead and stating that he
did not need the police, that he “just did what she asked,” and that he “tried
to carry her down so [he] could burn her like she wanted.” One of the
daughters directed police to Saez’s brother’s house. Saez ran when he saw
the police and they found him hiding under some bushes. A forensic
pathologist conducted an autopsy on the body and opined that the cause of
death was homicidal asphyxia and the mechanisms were a combination of
suffocation and strangulation. The People asserted the foregoing evidence
from the preliminary hearing and the admissions in the change of plea form
demonstrated Saez was the actual killer and, therefore, Saez had not made
the requisite prima facie showing under section 1172.6.
At the hearing on the petition, Saez’s counsel objected to the use of the
preliminary hearing transcript at the prima facie stage. He argued the
parties stipulated to the transcript as demonstrating a factual basis for the
plea, but not to the truth of every statement therein. The People responded
that it was appropriate for the court to consider the preliminary transcript to
the extent it set forth the factual basis for the plea of voluntary
manslaughter, and to the extent it demonstrated Saez was the sole person
charged in the murder and “there was no felony murder theory” or “natural
and probable consequences theory involved.” Defense counsel argued further
that there was no mention of a firearm in the preliminary transcript and
4
asserted that allegation “was basically a legal fiction to get at a number,” and
“certainly should not be used to foreclose [Saez’s] petition.”
The trial court relied on People v. Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476,
to conclude that the preliminary hearing transcript could be part of the
record of conviction if stipulated to by the defendant. The court noted further
that it could not consider any hearsay in the preliminary hearing transcript
but that, here, all of the witnesses testified to their own direct knowledge.
The court went on to discuss several statements from witnesses at the
preliminary hearing, before concluding: “Looking at that record of conviction,
it shows that the defendant was the actual killer, there was no felony
murder, no natural and probable consequences theory. To put it another
way, [Senate Bill No.] 1437 changed the law related to accomplice liability.
And there’s no, in the record of conviction, no accomplice liability at all here.”
Based on those findings, the trial court summarily denied the petition
for resentencing.
Saez filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Brief Summary of Section 1172.6
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), which narrowed the scope of liability for felony
murder, abolished liability for murder based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, and eliminated convictions for murder based on
imputing malice predicated solely on a person’s participation in a crime. (See
§ 1172.6; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) Senate Bill
1437 did this by amending section 188, which defines malice, and section 189,
which defines the degrees of murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2 & 3.)
5
Amended section 188 states: “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of
Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall
act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
Amended section 189 states: “A participant in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death
occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The
person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but,
with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder
in the first degree. [¶] [or] (3) The person was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 775) “ ‘[c]larifie[d] that persons who were convicted of attempted
murder or manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural
[and] probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those
persons convicted of murder under the same theories.’ ” (People v. Birdsall
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 859, 865, fn. 18; People v. Vizcarra (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 377, 388.) “In its current form, section 1172.6 applies to those
who pled guilty to manslaughter after being charged with murder and who
would have been subject to prosecution for murder under a felony murder
theory, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory of
imputed malice. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)” (People v. Gaillard (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211 (Gaillard).)
Senate Bill 1437 also established resentencing relief for eligible
defendants. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–
6
708.) Under current subdivision (a), “[a] person convicted of felony murder
or murder under a natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file a petition” with
the sentencing court to have his or her “murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts when all of the following conditions apply: [¶] (1) A complaint,
information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a
crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder,
or manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted
murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019” under Senate Bill 1437.
“Upon receiving a petition in which the information required by this
subdivision is set forth or a petition where any missing information can
readily be ascertained by the court, if the petitioner has requested counsel,
the court shall appoint counsel to represent the petitioner.” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(b)(3).) After the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefing, with the
aid of counsel, the trial court must evaluate the petition to determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief, and if so, to
issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
7
“[T]he parties can, and should, use the record of conviction to aid the
trial court in reliably assessing whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
case for relief.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) However, “[i]n reviewing
any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court
should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’ [Citation.]. [T]he ‘prima facie bar was intentionally
and correctly set very low.’ ” (Ibid.) At the prima facie stage, the trial court
“must accept as true a petitioner’s allegation that he or she could not
currently be convicted of a homicide offense because of changes to section 188
or 189 . . .unless the record conclusively establishes every element of the
offense.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463 (Curiel).)
The court may appropriately deny a petition at the prima facie stage
only if the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (See Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 450 [the court may dismiss the petition at the prima
facie stage, “ ‘[i]f the petition and record in the case establish conclusively
that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the
petition’ ”].) If, on the other hand, petitioner has made a “prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief” (ibid.), “the court shall issue an order to
show cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
We review the trial court’s decision to deny a section 1172.6 petition at
the prima facie stage de novo. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45,
52; People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545.) We affirm if the
judgment is correct, regardless of the trial court’s reasoning. (People v.
Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 976 (Eynon) [“even if the reason given by
the trial court was erroneous,” the judgment will be affirmed on appeal if the
denial of the petition at the prima facie stage was correct]; People v. Smithey
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 972 [if the court’s decision was correct under any legal
8
theory, “ ‘ “ ‘it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may
have moved the trial court to its conclusion’ ” ’ ”].)
B. Analysis
Saez asserts the trial court erred by relying on the preliminary hearing
transcript to conclude he was the actual killer, because doing so necessarily
required impermissible factfinding at the prima facie stage, and by
concluding that he was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 if he
was the actual killer.
To determine whether Saez established a prima facie case for relief
under section 1172.6, we examine his record of conviction,4 and consider
whether it conclusively demonstrates that he could be convicted of murder or
attempted murder under the amended murder statutes. (People v. Flores
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 987 (Flores).) It is well established that the
charging document, the plea form, and plea colloquy are part of the record of
conviction. (See, e.g., People v. Verdugo (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320, 329–330;
People v. Saavedra (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 444, 448.)
The charging documents allege that Saez unlawfully murdered
McNamara, with malice aforethought, in violation of section 187, subdivision
(a). They do not reference any other defendant or any other related felony,
but they are nevertheless insufficient on their own to foreclose a theory of
either felony murder or natural and probable consequences murder. (People
v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 338 (Estrada).) “ ‘[I]t has long been
the law in this state that an accusatory pleading charging murder need not
specify degree or the manner in which the murder was committed.’ ” (Ibid.)
4 Pursuant to People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 223, the record of
conviction consists of “those record documents reliably reflecting the facts of
the offense for which the defendant was convicted.”
9
“Nor does an accusatory pleading need to ‘specify the theory of murder on
which the prosecution relies at trial.’ ” (Ibid.) Further, the charging
document does not exclude the possibility that other people participated in
the killing but were not named in the charges. (Estrada, at p. 339
[prosecutors are not required to try all codefendants together, “so this single
charging document does not foreclose the possibility of other people having
been charged for related crimes].”) Accordingly, the charging documents do
not render Saez ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.
We turn next to Saez’s plea form and the associated colloquy. Saez pled
guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Manslaughter is “the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice.” (Pen. Code, § 192.) A defendant lacks malice
and is guilty of voluntary manslaughter when they kill another, acting with
either the intent to kill or a conscious disregard for life, but in a sudden
quarrel or heat of passion, or unreasonable self-defense. (People v. Blakeley
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89–91; People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 109–110.)
By entering a plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter, Saez admitted all the
elements of voluntary manslaughter, but not to any particular theory. (See
People v. Cisneros-Ramirez (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 393, 405 [guilty plea is an
admission of all elements essential to a conviction]; Eynon, supra, 68
Cal.App.5th at pp. 977–978 [“By pleading guilty, the defendant admitted
every element of the charged offense. But the defendant did not admit facts
supporting liability on any particular theory”].) Voluntary manslaughter, by
definition, does not require malice, and the plea does not preclude the
possibility that Saez could have been convicted under a felony murder or
other natural and probable consequences theory. (See Gaillard, supra, 99
Cal.App.5th at p. 1212 [generic plea of voluntary manslaughter following
murder charge does not preclude a natural and probable consequences
10
theory].) Thus, Saez’s plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter also does not
render him ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.
As part of the plea, Saez also admitted that he personally used a
firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim under
circumstances involving domestic violence in the commission of the felony,
voluntary manslaughter. Although Saez affirmatively admitted both
allegations on the record, his counsel clarified that he entered the admissions
pursuant to West, supra, 3 Cal.3d 595, i.e., without admitting the factual
truth of the allegations. Accordingly, Saez now asserts that the admissions
do not constitute factual admissions that this court can consider at the prima
facie stage of a section 1172.6 analysis. (See, e.g., People v. Alazar (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 1100, 1111 [“A West plea does not admit a factual basis for the
plea”], review granted Dec. 31, 2024, S287917.)
As to the firearm enhancement, we note there is no other mention of a
firearm anywhere in the record, including in the preliminary hearing
testimony. Saez’s counsel asserted it “was basically a legal fiction to get at a
number.” The People do not contend otherwise. Regardless, neither
admission (to the use of a firearm or inflicting great bodily injury) precludes
relief. Neither constitutes an admission of malice, neither is inconsistent
with the voluntary manslaughter plea, and Saez did not admit any additional
facts in association with either. (See, e.g., Gaillard, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1209, 1213 [plea to voluntary manslaughter with admissions of personal
use of a deadly weapon and infliction of great bodily injury did not
conclusively establish ineligibility for resentencing at the prima facie stage];
Estrada, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 338 [bare admissions of personal use of
a deadly weapon and infliction of great bodily injury do not preclude a theory
of imputed malice].)
11
This leaves us with the preliminary hearing transcript. As the parties
acknowledge, there is currently a split of authority on “the import of the
preliminary hearing transcript in determining whether a petitioner has made
a prima facie case for resentencing,” where the transcript is used as the
factual basis for the plea. (See Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 989.) The
issue is pending review by the California Supreme Court. (See People v.
Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649 (Patton) [whether a trial court
impermissibly engages in factfinding by relying on the preliminary transcript
to summarily deny a section 1172.6 petition], review granted June 28, 2023,
S279670; People v. Pickett (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 982 (Pickett) [“deferred
pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in Patton”], review
granted Oct. 11, 2023, S281643; People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158
(Mares) [“deferred pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in
Patton”], review granted May 1, 2024, S284232; see also Flores, at pp. 987–
992 [preliminary hearing transcript used as the factual basis for the murder
plea, but because defendant never admitted the truth of the testimony, it was
not part of his record of conviction].)
Here, the trial court relied on the preliminary hearing transcript to
conclude that Saez “was the actual killer, [and that] there was no felony
murder, no natural and probable consequences theory.” Saez asserts this
was error, that the trial court engaged in impermissible factfinding at the
prima facie stage, and that stipulating to the preliminary hearing transcript
as the factual basis of the plea does not equate to an admission as to the
truth of every statement made at the hearing.
Section 1192.5, subdivision (c) requires that a trial court taking a plea
“cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself that the plea is
freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the plea.”
12
The trial court may examine the defendant regarding the factual basis for the
plea, or “counsel may stipulate to a particular document that provides an
adequate factual basis, such as a complaint, police report, preliminary
hearing transcript, probation report, grand jury transcript, or written plea
agreement.” (People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432, 442.) In either case,
“[t]he factual basis required by section 1192.5 does not require more than
establishing a prima facie factual basis for the charges.” (Holmes, at p. 441.)
The court does not need to be convinced of the defendant’s guilt and does not
need “to interrogate the defendant about possible defenses to the charged
crime.” (Ibid.) Thus, a plea will be upheld even where the factual inquiry
“left some ambiguity as to the mental state for the charged offense.” (Id. at
p. 442.) Here, even if we were to consider the preliminary hearing transcript,
there is ample ambiguity regarding the precise details of Saez’s involvement
in McNamara’s death, his associated mental state, and whether anyone else
was involved in the killing.
The People assert the preliminary hearing transcript conclusively
establishes Saez “admitted to the victim’s daughters that he personally and
purposefully killed [McNamara].” We disagree. One of McNamara’s
daughters testified that Saez told her over the phone that her mother,
McNamara, was dead. She asked what Saez did to her, and Saez responded,
“ ‘No, no. You know, your mom, she was into some witchcraft,’ or something
like that.” Another of McNamara’s daughter called Saez soon thereafter.
Almost immediately upon answering, Saez said, “I don’t need the police. I
just did what she asked.” When the daughter asked Saez what happened,
Saez said, “Your mom has all these books about prophets and spirituality.”
Saez also mentioned some letters and stated, “I tried to carry her down so I
could burn her like she wanted.”
13
In our view, Saez’s alleged statements as testified to in his preliminary
hearing do not conclusively establish that he could be convicted under a
currently valid theory of murder. Rather, they were ambiguous as to his
exact involvement, whether third persons may have been involved in the
killing, and his mental state at the time of McNamara’s death. They do not,
as the People assert, amount to an admission that Saez personally or
purposefully killed McNamara with malice, and they do not preclude the
possibility that someone else was involved. Indeed, at the conclusion of the
preliminary hearing, defense counsel asserted there was no evidence that
Saez was directly involved in McNamara’s death, and that the alleged
statements to McNamara’s daughters did not prove that he did anything.
The trial court agreed that Saez did not make a direct “as in he said he did
it . . . confession,” but found sufficient circumstantial evidence to hold him
over.
Further, neither the description of McNamara’s injuries nor the
pathologist’s stated opinion that her death was caused by homicidal asphyxia
shed any light as to the precise nature of Saez’s or anyone else’s involvement
in the death. Likewise, while running from the police is often considered
evidence of consciousness of guilt, the fact that Saez did so does not
conclusively establish that he was the actual killer of McNamara or that he
acted with malice. Accordingly, we cannot agree with the trial court’s
conclusion that the preliminary hearing transcript—if it can be considered as
part of the record of conviction in the first instance—establishes that Saez
was the actual killer, or that it precludes a theory of felony murder.
This case is unlike those pending review with respect to the import of
the preliminary hearing transcript. In Patton, the preliminary hearing
transcript established video footage of Patton shooting the victim. (Patton,
14
supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 652, rev. granted.) In Pickett, two witnesses saw
Pickett fire a shot into the air near the victim, and then heard one or two
more shots as they ran away. (Pickett, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 986, rev.
granted.) Finally, in Mares, one witnesses heard Mares fighting with the
victim and another saw Mares stab the victim “three or four times in the face
and abdomen.” (Mares, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1162, rev. granted.) By
contrast here, there were no direct witnesses, no direct evidence establishing
Saez was the sole actor, and nothing to establish his mental state.
Thus, we need not determine whether the preliminary hearing
transcript is appropriately considered as part of the record of conviction.
Regardless of whether we include the preliminary hearing transcript, the
record of conviction is not sufficient to refute the allegations in the petition as
a matter of law.
Because we find that the preliminary hearing transcript was not
sufficient, even if considered, to establish that Saez was the actual killer, or
that he acted with the requisite intent, we need not address Saez’s additional
argument that he is eligible for relief based on a second-degree felony murder
theory even if the record of conviction conclusively establishes that he was
the actual killer.
15
DISPOSITION
The order denying Saez’s section 1172.6 petition is reversed. The trial
court is directed to issue an order to show cause and conduct the proceedings
required by section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
16
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