People v. White CA4/1

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Filed 2/20/25 P. v. White CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083236

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD238601)

DAVID DANIEL WHITE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jeffrey F. Fraser, Judge. Affirmed.
Ava R. Stralla, under the appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Warren J. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Over a roughly 12-hour period in 2011, defendant David Daniel White
and codefendant Terrence Jarvis, both gang members, committed a series of
violent crimes involving multiple victims. White ultimately pleaded guilty to
five charges including attempted murder and was sentenced to state prison.
Nearly a decade later, after significant changes to California’s homicide
statutes, White filed an unsuccessful petition for resentencing pursuant to
Penal Code section 1172.6 seeking to vacate his conviction for attempted

murder.1 The trial court denied relief following an evidentiary hearing,
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that White aided and abetted Jarvis’s
attempted murder of the victim with an intent to kill. We conclude that
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion and, accordingly,
affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The crime spree in this case began one afternoon with the beating of
a former gang member in front of his grandmother’s house on 57th Street
in San Diego. Video evidence showed that White began the assault. That
evening, Jarvis and White robbed one female victim; 90 minutes later they
attempted to rob a second. In each instance, White drove the vehicle from
which Jarvis exited, armed with a shotgun, to assault the victims and
attempt to take their property.
Within minutes of the attempted robbery and only a short distance
away, a male college student G.R. was brutally attacked and suffered severe
head trauma. Compelling circumstantial evidence suggested that Jarvis hit

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code. At the time White filed
his petition, it was authorized by then-section 1170.95. That section has
since been renumbered as section 1172.6. To avoid confusion, we use the
current number throughout this opinion.
2
him multiple times with the butt of the shotgun. Less than 30 minutes after
this assault, Jarvis and White used credit cards belonging to G.R. at two
different gas stations.
A few hours later, White and Jarvis returned to the home of the
grandmother of the first victim, where the first assault took place. Both
defendants fired multiple rounds through the windows of the grandmother’s
house.
Charged with numerous crimes, White agreed to plead guilty to
premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), assault by means
likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), robbery (§ 211),
attempted robbery (§§ 664, 211), and shooting at an inhabited dwelling
(§ 246). The inquiry regarding the factual basis for the plea was perfunctory.
The court asked whether “all parties stipulate to the preliminary hearing

as a factual basis?” Both White and the deputy district attorney agreed.2
White was then sentenced to an indeterminate term of 7 years to life plus
15 years, 8 months in prison.
Nearly a decade later in 2022, White filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6, seeking to invalidate his conviction for attempted
murder. The People stipulated that White had established a prima facie case
for relief, and the matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing in November
2023.

2 With this cursory foundation, we assume the parties were merely
stipulating that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was
sufficient to provide a valid factual basis for a conviction, and not that White
was agreeing that everything testified to at the hearing was true.
3
At the outset of the hearing, the court indicated it had received as

evidence and would consider the preliminary hearing transcript3 and the
record of conviction, including the plea agreement. The parties also agreed
that the court should receive and review four additional exhibits. The first
was a stipulation regarding shotgun shell casings recovered from a residence
on 57th Street (the scene of both the initial assault and the shooting incident
involving an inhabited dwelling) as including DNA from G.R., the victim of
the attempted murder. The remaining three were transcripts of testimony
by three witnesses at the trial of codefendant Jarvis. These included the
neighbor who discovered G.R., the emergency room doctor who treated him,
and G.R.’s mother.
The trial court denied White’s resentencing petition, finding “based on
all of his conduct before, during, and after this crime spree” that White aided
and abetted the attempted murder with a specific intent to kill.

DISCUSSION

By his section 1172.6 petition, White seeks to vacate his conviction for
attempted murder. Section 1172.6 “applies by its terms only to attempted
murders based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (People
v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.) Thus, the parties’ stipulation that
White had established a prima facie case for relief was necessarily based on
the possibility that at the time of his plea, White could have been convicted of
attempted murder on a natural and probable consequences theory. At the
evidentiary hearing, the People bore the burden of proving that White was
guilty of attempted murder without resort to that now-invalid doctrine.

3 The parties acknowledged that section 1172.6 itself generally prohibits
consideration of otherwise inadmissible hearsay testimony elicited at the
preliminary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see § 872, subd. (b).)
4
Because there was no evidence that he inflicted any of the physical
blows, the prosecution had to show that White aided and abetted Jarvis’s

attempted murder and shared his intent to kill the victim.4 Considering the
evidence of White’s conduct “before, during, and after” the series of crimes he
and Jarvis committed, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that
White possessed the intent to kill G.R. On appeal, White contends there was
no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion.
Prevailing on a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is a difficult task.
With considerable deference to the trial court, we review the entire record to
determine if it contains substantial evidence—“evidence which is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value”—that would permit a rational trier of fact to find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26
Cal.3d 557, 578.) We must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to
respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Reilly

4 For the defendant to be “guilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting
that crime, the People must prove that:
“1. The perpetrator committed the crime;
“2. The defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to
commit the crime;
“3. Before or during the commission of the crime, the
defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in
committing the crime;
“and
“4. The defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and
abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.
“Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the
perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or she specifically
intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote,
encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of
that crime.” (CALCRIM No. 401.)
5
(1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425.) Circumstantial evidence often provides adequate
support for factual findings, particularly with respect to a defendant’s state of

mind.5 (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055 (Nguyen).)
Here, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to allow the trial court
to conclude that White assisted in Jarvis’s beating of G.R. with an intent to
kill. The evidence indicated that together, White and Jarvis confronted three
victims within a short period of time for the purpose of robbing them. The
modus operandi in each instance was the same. White drove the vehicle and
stopped near the victim; Jarvis got out, threatened the victim with a shotgun,
and took property.
We do not know why Jarvis chose to beat G.R. but did not injure either
of the first two victims. Whatever the reason, Jarvis administered a brutal
beating. The trauma surgeon who treated G.R. at the hospital testified it was
the worst case of blunt force head trauma he had seen in his 42-year career,
involving four significant injuries caused by at least three different blows
from a hard instrument. Both sides agreed that the entire incident happened
quickly—apparently in less than a minute. Combined with the manner of the
first two robberies, this suggests White watched the beating from a short
distance away and did nothing to stop it or summon assistance for the victim.
Rather, he and Jarvis left G.R. for dead and simply continued their course of

5 We do not rely on the People’s argument that there is direct evidence of
White’s mental state based on his admission that he committed premeditated
attempted murder. An aider and abettor can be subject to an enhanced
penalty based on the premeditation of the direct perpetrator, even if the aider
and abettor did not premeditate a killing. (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th
613, 616, 624.) In effect, White argues he pleaded guilty to premeditated
attempted murder because he aided and abetted an armed robbery, the
natural and probable consequences of which was an attempted murder that
Jarvis premeditated. A plea of guilty to premeditated attempted murder is
not necessarily inconsistent with this theory.
6
illegal conduct. A short time later, White drove to two different gas stations
where the victim’s credit card was used.
The evidence also indicated that White did not merely accompany
Jarvis as a passive accomplice. He personally engaged in violent conduct
both before and after the beating of G.R. Earlier in the day, White initiated
the physical assault on a former gang member in which Jarvis also
participated. And approximately two hours after the assault on G.R., White
and Jarvis fired gunshots through the window of the house on 57th Street
where they believed the former gang member was staying. This is far more
than mere presence at the scene of a crime and/or the failure to take action
to prevent it. (See People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 529–530
[“Mere presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to constitute aiding
and abetting, nor is the failure to take action to prevent a crime, although
these are factors the jury may consider in assessing a defendant's criminal
responsibility.”]; see also Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1054 [presence at
the scene is a factor, among others, to be considered in deciding whether a
defendant aided and abetted the commission of a crime].) The trial court
could fairly infer that White endorsed Jarvis’s violent actions and shared
with him the intent to kill G.R.

DISPOSITION

The order denying White’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

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