CourtListener 10335821•People v. Burns CA1/5
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Filed 2/19/25 P. v. Burns CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A166535
v.
MICHAEL BURNS, (Contra Costa County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. 022200401)
The trial court found Michael Burns incompetent to stand trial and
subject to involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication in special
proceedings under Penal Code sections 1367 et seq. and 2603.1 On appeal,
Burns argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion to replace his counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118
(Marsden) and that his counsel’s conduct violated his state and federal
constitutional right to counsel. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On June 20, 2022, Burns was charged with felony resisting an officer
(§ 69; count 1); felony attempted removal of a firearm from a peace officer
(§ 148, subd. (d); count 2); misdemeanor resisting, obstructing, or delaying a
peace officer or an emergency medical technician (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 3);
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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misdemeanor carrying a switchblade knife (§ 21510, subd. (b); count 4); and
two misdemeanor counts of elder or dependent elder abuse (§ 368, subd. (c);
counts 5, 6). The following day, Burns refused to appear at his arraignment.
Despite Burns’s failure to appear, his initial public defender expressed a
doubt as to his competency to stand trial and the trial court accepted. The
court suspended criminal proceedings and transferred the case to another
department for appointment of doctors and further proceedings.
On June 23, the trial court appointed another attorney from the Contra
Costa Public Defenders, a mental health public defender, to represent Burns
in the involuntary medication and competency proceedings.
On June 29, the trial court set a competency hearing date for August 10
and appointed three doctors to evaluate Burns’s competency to stand trial:
Dr. Kaur, Dr. Siggins, and Dr. Griffith.
On July 31, Dr. Kaur attempted to examine Burns during an in-person
visit, but Burns refused to meet with her. In her report, dated August 8,
Dr. Kaur stated that she could not offer a conclusive determination of Burns’s
competency due to his refusal to be examined but opined it was “likely that
he is unfit to proceed given his recent mental state, as reported/documented
by collateral sources of information.”
Dr. Kaur’s report included a section of behavioral observations based on
a call initiated by Burns’s mental health counsel, who provided the following
information about him. The attorney informed Dr. Kaur that Burns was her
client eight to nine years before, in a misdemeanor driving under the
influence case, and she was on the fence about declaring doubt as to his
competency then. She suspected Burns was mentally ill due to a “ ‘budding
persecutory complex,’ ” a manic presentation, and constant paranoid beliefs.
Burns recognized her when she began representing him in the current case
2
and initially declined to meet with her and requested a new lawyer. As they
kept working together, Burns discussed aspects of his previous case as if it
were current, making it impossible to hold a conversation with him because
he talked “ ‘at’ ” her and left her few opportunities to interject. Additionally,
Burns left her long, rambling voicemails about paranoid and persecutory
beliefs, such as “ ‘MK ultra’ being used on him by the government”; being
framed by the government in a conspiracy; invisible hands around his neck in
his booking photo; and his mother and father’s being “ ‘hooked up to his head,
and threatening to kill him.’ ” Counsel expressed concern that Burns could
not adequately assist in his defense because of the above noted symptoms.
Dr. Kaur also reviewed Burns’s hospital records and police reports.
Based on those records, Dr. Kaur noted that Burns had evidenced
disorganized and delusional beliefs within the prior six months, including the
following bizarre statements during an evaluation dated March 10, 2022:
“ ‘I am suing the military. All of this medical bullshit that they have conjured
up is to try to cover up the voice of skull stuff. . . . I dont [sic] have any type
of mental issues.’ ” “ ‘The government owes me money they stole my
intellectual property.’ ” “ ‘I saw 5000 people get killed the other night,
interdimensionally. The army stalks my parents’ house. It may sounds crazy
. . . I can see in to other dimensions.’ ” (Sic.) During his current
incarceration, Burns continued to display disorganized and prominent
delusional beliefs, stating: “ ‘I have Department of Justice security clearance.
I have Interpol Security Clearance. I have tried to tell you about these inter-
dimensional invisibles. It has to do with the special forces . . . I’m above the
law. I’m protected by assassins. I’m the most highly protected man in the
universe.’ ” “ ‘I’m gonna live eternally. I’m God.’ ”
3
Dr. Siggins was scheduled to meet with Burns on August 2, but Burns
failed to attend the appointment. Based on his review of the trial court’s
order and 200 pages of Burns’s mental health records, Dr. Siggins, in his
report dated August 2, opined that Burns was not competent to stand trial.
On August 8, Dr. Griffith met with and examined Burns. In her report,
dated August 9, Dr. Griffith stated: “[Burns] immediately began yelling that
he did not have to talk to me and did not need to be examined. He demanded
to know my name, date of birth, social security number, and address. His
speech was loud and pressured. He yelled various delusional ideas, that I
was a terrorist, that everyone were [sic] terrorists, and that he had
restraining orders against my family, the federal government, military,
Interpol. He expressed grandiose delusions about being the most powerful
man in the universe. He stated that he did not have to show for court. He
read from a stack of detention slips and papers that he claimed to show that
he was above the law. I terminated the interview as he continued to yell
nonsensically.” In preparation for her report, Dr. Griffith also reviewed the
felony complaint; her previous evaluation of Burns from May 30, 2020; and
his medical records from Contra Costa Regional Medical Center.
On August 10, the trial court held a section 1368 competency hearing.
Burns again refused to appear at the hearing. Counsel for Burns stated that
given Burns’s refusal to come to appear at the hearing and to meet with the
doctors, she believed it was important to go forward with submission in his
absence. The parties stipulated to submit the issue of Burns’s competency to
stand trial based on the reports of the three doctors, and the court found
Burns incompetent to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence. The
court referred the case to the Contra Costa County Conditional Release
Program (CONREP) for a recommendation of Burns’s placement.
4
On August 30, county counsel filed an application under section 2603
for authority to involuntarily administer medication to Burns.
On September 6, the trial court committed Burns to the State
Department of State Hospitals for a maximum of two years for competency
restoration treatment based on the placement evaluation and
recommendation by CONREP. Again, Burns refused to appear at the
hearing. The court asked Burns’s counsel whether her client would consent
to medication. Since counsel could not give an answer at that time, the court
found that Burns did not consent to medication.
On September 30, the trial court held a contested section 2603 hearing
for an order authorizing involuntary treatment with psychotropic medication.
After testimony from three witnesses, the court granted the involuntary
medication application.
Immediately after the section 2603 application was granted, Burns
requested to replace his counsel and the trial court held a Marsden hearing.
During the Marsden hearing, Burns stated he did not agree with his counsel’s
trial strategy. He also asserted that he was unable to meet with her before
the involuntary medication hearing and generally had a hard time reaching
her by phone or meeting with her in person. Additionally, Burns stated that
he wanted a male attorney because he had “trust issues with females.”
During the Marsden hearing, Burns’s counsel explained that she met
with him once and attempted to meet with him other times but was unable to
because it was difficult to access his “module.” She also noted that she
received six voicemails from Burns the day before the hearing and offered to
visit him again. The court inquired multiple times about specific issues that
Burns was having with his counsel, explaining that he needed appropriate
legal grounds for a replacement. The trial court denied the motion, finding
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there was not a “sufficient basis to remove her” as she was “doing what she
should be doing” by communicating and meeting with Burns at that moment.
DISCUSSION
I. Marsden Motion
Burns argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
Marsden motion, after his section 2603 motion, based on his counsel’s
disclosure of privileged and confidential information to one of the court-
appointed doctors. According to Burns, the court was obligated to inquire
further into any potential conflict of interest based on Dr. Kaur’s inclusion of
counsel’s statement in her section 1368 report. We disagree.
“We review the denial of a Marsden motion for abuse of discretion.
[Citation.] Denial is not an abuse of discretion ‘unless the defendant has
shown that a failure to replace counsel would substantially impair the
defendant’s right to assistance of counsel.’ ” (People v. Taylor (2010) 48
Cal.4th 574, 599.) When the trial court fails to allow the defendant to state
his or her reasons for a request, however, the “usual case” requires reversal
because an inadequate record denies meaningful appellate review. (People v.
Lopez (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 801, 814–815.)
“Under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as
applied to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment [citations] and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution
[citations], a defendant in a criminal case has a right to the assistance of
counsel. [¶] The constitutional guaranty ‘entitles the defendant not to some
bare assistance but rather to effective assistance.’ [Citations.] [¶] Included in
the right to effective assistance of counsel is ‘a correlative right to
representation that is free from conflicts of interest.’ ” (People v. Bonin (1989)
47 Cal.3d 808, 833–834 (Bonin).)
6
To safeguard this right, a defendant represented by an appointed
attorney may request that the court discharge the attorney and substitute
new counsel on the basis that the defendant’s right to counsel would be
substantially impaired by continuing with the original attorney. (Marsden,
supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123; People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 694; see
People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 419 [Marsden was intended to
provide protection to the right to counsel].) This request may be made at any
stage in the criminal proceedings—including during competency
proceedings—and the court must promptly conduct a Marsden hearing.
(People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 89; People v. Solorzano (2005) 126
Cal.App.4th 1063, 1069.)
“When a defendant seeks substitution of appointed counsel pursuant to
[Marsden], ‘the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of
his contention and to relate specific instances of inadequate performance.
A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the appointed
counsel is not providing adequate representation or that defendant and
counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that
ineffective representation is likely to result.’ ” (People v. Taylor, supra, 48
Cal.4th at p. 599.)
Here, the trial court conducted a Marsden hearing and allowed Burns
to explain the basis of his contention and relate specific instances of
inadequate performance. Burns fully expressed his dissatisfaction with
counsel, from his disagreement with her trial strategy and the lack of
communication to his discomfort with women in general. The court asked
Burns multiple times if there were any other reasons he was dissatisfied with
counsel. No more is required under Marsden.
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Burns suggests the trial court had a duty to inquire into the potential
conflict of interest caused by counsel’s conversation with Dr. Kaur, relying
heavily on Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d 808.
In Bonin, the defendant in a multiple murder action moved to
substitute his counsel on the day trial was scheduled to begin. (Bonin, supra,
47 Cal.3d at pp. 820, 825.) The prosecution opposed the motion based on,
among other things, a potential conflict of interest on behalf of the substitute
counsel, who had possibly represented a key prosecution witness. (Id. at
p. 825.) The parties disagreed on whether substitute counsel developed an
attorney–client relationship or communicated significant information with
the witness. (Id. at p. 827.) It was “plain,” however, that the witness sought
professional services from substitute counsel and they communicated about
the matter of representation and the facts of the case to some extent. (Ibid.)
The Bonin court identified “certain essentially prophylactic rules”
which “safeguard a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to the assistance
of conflict-free counsel . . . .” (Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 836.)
Particularly, a trial court is required to inquire into the possibility of a
conflict of interest on the part of defense counsel when it knows or reasonably
should know of a potential conflict. (Ibid.) A trial court “can be held to have
knowledge or notice of the possibility of a conflict only when . . . it is provided
with evidence of the existence of a conflict situation . . . .” (Id. at p. 838.)
“When in violation of its duty the trial court fails to inquire into the
possibility of a conflict of interest or fails to adequately act in response to
what its inquiry discovers, it commits error . . . .” (Id. at p. 837.) To obtain
reversal, the defendant “must show that an actual conflict existed and that
that conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance.” (Ibid.) There, the
court found the prosecution’s conflict of interest objection “triggered the
8
court’s duty to inquire into the possibility of a conflict” but held reversal was
not required because there was no adverse effect on substitute counsel’s
performance. (Id. at pp. 840, 843.)
Burns’s reliance on Bonin is inapposite because he failed to articulate
any potential conflict of interest on behalf of his counsel as the basis for
granting his Marsden motion. Here, unlike Bonin, Burns never provided the
trial court with evidence of the existence of a possible conflict of interest as
part of his Marsden motion. On multiple occasions, the trial court asked
Burns to explain his dissatisfaction with counsel but never discussed her
potential conflict of interest based on her communications with Dr. Kaur.
Contrary to Burns’s argument, the trial court’s receipt of Dr. Kaur’s
report at the competency hearing did not trigger a duty to inquire into a
possible conflict several weeks later when Burns sought to replace his counsel
during or after an involuntary medication hearing. Dr. Kaur’s report was
considered by the court on August 10, 2022, as part of Burns’s competency
hearing. The Marsden hearing did not occur until September 30, more than a
month and a half later, during the involuntary medication hearing. The
issue of competency—to which Dr. Kaur’s report was relevant—was no longer
before the court. The court cannot reasonably be expected, upon a request to
substitute counsel, to independently recall and raise a potential conflict of
interest based on a report that was before the court over a month before.
Thus, the court did not have, nor reasonably should have had, knowledge or
notice of a potential conflict of interest to trigger the court’s duty to inquire.
II. Constitutional Claims
Additionally, Burns argues that even outside the Marsden setting, the
disclosure of confidential information created an actual conflict which would
9
undermine counsel’s loyalty to Burns in violation of his state and federal
right to counsel.2
“The constitutional guarantee of due process forbids a court from trying
or convicting a criminal defendant who is mentally incompetent to stand
trial. (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 194 [citations]; U.S. Const., 14th
Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15.) Section 1367 of the Penal Code,
incorporating the applicable constitutional standard, specifies that a person
is incompetent to stand trial ‘if, as a result of mental disorder or
developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of
the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a
rational manner.’ (Id., subd. (a); see Dusky v. U.S. (1960) 362 U.S. 402
[4 L.Ed.2d 824, 80 S.Ct. 788] [competence requires ‘ “sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding” ’ and ‘ “a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him” ’].)” (People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 230–
231.) “The sole purpose of competency proceedings is to protect the accused.”
(People v. Jernigan (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 131, 136 (Jernigan).)
A section 1368 hearing, in which a judge asks the defense attorney
whether the defendant is mentally incompetent, does not violate attorney–
client privilege because the statute does not require disclosure of confidential
communication. (People v. Bolden (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 375, 378 (Bolden).)
Particularly, an attorney’s observations of the client are not always
privileged, and giving an opinion of the client’s competency does not reveal
2 The People argue Burns’s evidentiary privilege claim has been
forfeited because he failed to make a timely and specific objection to the
inclusion of counsel’s statements in Dr. Kaur’s report. We exercise our
authority to reach this issue. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161–
162, fn. 6.)
10
any protected information. (Ibid.) Additionally, when defense counsel and
the defendant have opposite positions in a competency proceeding, it does not
cause a conflict bearing upon counsel’s ability to represent defendant.
(Jernigan, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at pp. 136–137 [“Counsel’s interest in
seeking to prove that defendant is incompetent is presumably based upon her
judgment that it is in his best interest to do so. . . . Thus, although there is a
conflict between client and counsel as to how to proceed, there is no actual
conflict affecting counsel’s ability to advocate for her client’s best interests”].)
“The determination of the defendant’s competence to stand trial goes to
the fundamental integrity of the court’s proceedings; and once the court
declares a doubt exists, a section 1368 hearing must be held and defendant
may not waive a hearing. [Citation.] Often knowledge of facts calling into
question defendant’s competence are exclusively within the defense counsel’s
knowledge. [Citation.] If counsel were compelled to accede to defendant’s
desire not to initiate section 1368 proceedings, even though counsel has a
bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s competence, the court might never be
informed that the defendant’s competence is in issue, and the result could be
that the defendant’s due process rights are violated [citation]. Defense
counsel’s ultimate responsibility to his client is to ensure that those due
process rights are not violated.” (People v. Harris (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 984,
994–995.)
Here, counsel’s conversation with Dr. Kaur did not create a conflict of
interest or violate Burns’s constitutional right to effective representation.
Counsel had essential knowledge of Burns’s capacity to assist her “in the
conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” (§ 1367, subd. (a).) Such
information was “exclusively within the defense counsel’s knowledge,” and
Burns’s capacity went to the “fundamental integrity of the court’s
11
proceedings.” (People v. Harris, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 994.) Counsel’s
decision to share her opinion of Burns’s paranoid and persecutory beliefs and
her observations of Burns based on her past and current representation to
show that he was incompetent to stand trial were “in his best interest” and
therefore did not create a “conflict affecting counsel’s ability to advocate for
her client’s best interests . . . .” (Jernigan, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 136;
see People v. Harris, at p. 995; Bolden, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d at p. 380.)
This is particularly so because an incompetent defendant “is not
capable of acting in his or her best interest . . . .” (T.M. v. Superior Court
(2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 664, 685 (T.M.).) Thus, if defense counsel “ ‘ “doubts
the present [competency] of his [or her] client, he [or she] may assume his [or
her] client cannot act in his own best interests and may act even contrary to
the express desires of his [or her] client . . . .” ’ ” (People v. Masterson (1994) 8
Cal.4th 965, 971.) “Whether or not the client objects, counsel must be
allowed to do what counsel believes is best in determining the client’s
competence” (id. at p. 973)—including making decisions about “how the
proceedings should be conducted” (People v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 115,
fn. 4). Courts have therefore held that defense counsel in a competency
hearing may waive, over his or her client’s objections, his or her client’s
“rights to a jury trial, to present oral testimony and to confront and cross-
examine witnesses.” (Masterson, at p. 972.)
And because “[d]efense counsel’s ultimate responsibility to his [or her]
client is to ensure that [the client’s] due process rights are not violated”
(People v. Harris, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 995), counsel has a duty to
ensure that the expert evaluators have all the relevant information they need
to determine whether the client is competent to stand trial (see T.M., supra,
104 Cal.App.5th at p. 685 [“there is a strong public policy interest in ensuring
12
that courts have access to all information relevant to the competency
determination”]). Indeed, counsel acts “irresponsibly” if he or she leaves “to
defendant the task of deciding which information the psychiatrists should
review in preparation for the competence hearing.” (People v. Samuel (1981)
29 Cal.3d 489, 496.) Courts have therefore held that defense counsel may
furnish an illegally obtained confession to an expert evaluator “who considers
that confession in forming an opinion of the defendant’s mental condition.”
(Id. at p. 495.) And when, as here, defense counsel has only provided
information to the expert evaluator that is “ ‘directly relevant to’ the
competency evaluation” (T.M., at p. 686), counsel has not violated his or her
client’s constitutional right to counsel (see People v. Harris, at p. 994
[“defense counsel does not provide ineffective assistance of counsel . . . by
seeking to prove the defendant’s incompetence over the defendant’s
objections”]).3
Burns suggests that counsel’s statements made to Dr. Kaur and
memorialized in Dr. Kaur’s report are equivalent to counsel’s making the
statements in open court. However, a document submitted by a court-
appointed psychiatrist during a competency proceeding is presumptively
confidential. (Pen. Code, § 1369.5, subd. (a).) Additionally, a statement made
“in confidence of a communication that is protected” by the attorney–client
privilege does not waive the privilege when its disclosure is “reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer . . . was
consulted . . . .” (Evid. Code, § 912, subd. (d).) Here, counsel was consulted to
assist Burns and protect his interests, including making sure his due process
3 “Confidential communication between a defendant and his lawyer is
itself not a separate ‘right’ that the federal constitution guarantees, but
rather an aspect of ensuring fulfillment of the right to assistance of counsel.”
(People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 887–888.)
13
rights are not violated. The disclosure of Burns’s communications to counsel
regarding his paranoid and persecutory beliefs was reasonably necessary to
ensure his due process rights were not violated, and the disclosure was made
in confidence to a court-appointed psychologist whose reports are
presumptively confidential.
Lastly, even if counsel’s disclosures to Dr. Kaur were improper, Burns
cannot establish the prejudice necessary for a Sixth Amendment violation.
(See People v. Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 427 [counsel’s failure to object to
improper evidence in competency hearing was not prejudicial when three
experts independently arrived at the same conclusion].) In Bolden, supra, 99
Cal.App.3d 375, the defendant argued that the court-appointed psychiatrist
improperly based his competency opinion on specific communications with
the defendant’s prior counsel. (Id. at p. 379.) The psychiatrist testified that
defendant’s former counsel revealed defendant’s belief that the aliens
inhabiting his father’s body were from outer space. (Ibid.) The court,
assuming defendant’s former counsel revealed privileged information to the
psychiatrist, found no prejudice to defendant where he also told the
psychiatrists, and testified in court, that alien imposters had taken over the
bodies of his family and others. (Ibid.)
Here, as in Bolden, Burns cannot show he was prejudiced by counsel’s
disclosure because the record is replete with additional examples of Burns’s
mental illness. For example, Burns’s medical records, which were reviewed
by all three doctors, also showed that he had a history of grandiose and
persecutory beliefs along with auditory hallucinations. Additionally, Burns
personally shared many similar paranoid and persecutory beliefs directly
with Dr. Griffith, the only psychiatrist who met with him. Based on this
information, Dr. Griffith and Dr. Siggins each independently arrived at the
14
opinion that Burns was mentally incompetent without relying on any of the
information provided to Dr. Kaur by counsel. On this record, Burns cannot
show prejudice.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
Jackson, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
Burns, J.
Chou, J.
A166535/People v. Michael Burns
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