CourtListener 10332838•People v. Gutierrez CA2/8
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Filed 2/13/25 P. v. Gutierrez CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B326642
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA247389-01)
v.
JUAN CARLOS GUTIERREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Norm Shapiro, Judge. Affirmed.
Waldemar D. Halka, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, a jury found Juan Carlos Gutierrez guilty of first
degree premeditated murder, second degree robbery, and
attempted second degree robbery, with true findings on gang
enhancements and principal-use firearm enhancements. In 2021,
Gutierrez filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code1
section 1172.6. Following a hearing, the superior court denied
the petition, finding that Gutierrez was not entitled to relief
because he was the actual killer, he directly aided and abetted
the murder, or he was a major participant in an underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. On
appeal, Gutierrez argues the superior court erred in denying his
petition. We conclude Gutierrez was ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 as a matter of law because his record of conviction
establishes that he was not convicted of murder under a theory of
imputed malice, but rather was convicted as either the actual
killer or a direct aider and abettor. We accordingly affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A portion of the factual and procedural background is taken
from this court’s prior opinion. (People v. Gutierrez (Jan. 7, 2009,
B175361) [nonpub. opn.] (Gutierrez I).) On our own motion, we
take judicial notice of this opinion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.)
1. Guiterrez’s 2004 conviction for murder
1.1 Evidence at trial
The murder victim in this case, Edgar Canuto, was fatally
shot while sleeping on the porch of a house. On the night of the
1 Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
2
shooting, Abraham Martinez and Genaro Martinez2 were at that
house to attend a party. After the party, the men stayed drinking
on the porch with several other guests, including Emilio Perez.
At Gutierrez’s trial, Abraham, Genaro, and Perez each testified
about the events that led to the shooting.
While the men were drinking on the porch, there was a
discussion about gangs during which Perez claimed he was a
former member of the 18th Street gang. Because Abraham and
Genaro did not believe his claim, Perez said he was going to call
his “homeys” to prove he was a gang member. Perez went inside
the house to use the phone. When he returned, Perez said his
“homeys” were on the way.
A short time later, Gutierrez and an unidentified man
approached the house. Gutierrez asked Abraham and Genaro
whether they had a problem with his “homeys,” and where they
were from. Genaro told Gutierrez they were not gang members.
In response, Gutierrez hit Abraham in the face, and demanded
both men hand over their property. While Genaro said he did not
have anything, Abraham gave Gutierrez his money and jewelry.
According to Genaro, Gutierrez then told his companion to get a
gun and said, “We going to shot [sic] those motherfuckers . . . .”
Both Abraham and Genaro went inside the house, and
Genaro told one of the occupants to call the police. While they
were inside, the men heard gunshots. Perez then came inside the
house and called the police. When Genaro went back outside, he
saw Canuto had been shot. Genaro testified that Canuto had
2 Because Abraham Martinez and Genaro Martinez share
the same last name, we refer to these individuals by their first
names for clarity and convenience.
3
been asleep on the porch the entire time, and had not argued
with anyone.
Perez testified that, after Gutierrez arrived at the house, he
asked the men where they were from, punched one of them in the
face, and ordered that man to hand over his property. Gutierrez
next approached Perez’s uncle and tried to take a chain from his
neck, but Perez intervened. Perez asked Gutierrez for a share of
the property he had taken from the men, and Gutierrez gave him
a ring. Gutierrez then left, but returned a few minutes later with
a gun. Gutierrez asked Perez where his friends were, and Perez
told him they were inside the house. Gutierrez saw Canuto
sleeping on the porch. Gutierrez said, “[Y]ou have so many
friends here, I think I going [sic] to take revenge on this one.”
Gutierrez shot Canuto five or six times and then ran away.
Perez further testified that he originally had been charged
with the same offenses as Guiterrez. Under a plea agreement,
Perez pled guilty to robbery and attempted robbery, and admitted
a gang enhancement allegation with respect to each offense.
He received a suspended 15-year sentence and was placed on
probation for five years. As part of his plea agreement, Perez
promised to testify truthfully at Gutierrez’s trial.
1.2 Jury verdict and sentencing
The jury found Gutierrez guilty of the first degree murder
of Canuto (§ 187, subd. (a)), the second degree robbery of
Abraham (§ 211), and the attempted second degree robbery of
Genaro (§§ 664, 211). As to each count, the jury found the gang
enhancement allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) to be true. As to
the murder count, the jury also made true findings on the
enhancement allegations that a principal personally used and
discharged a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53,
4
subdivisions (b), (c), (d), and (e)(1). However, the jury found the
enhancement allegations that Gutierrez personally used and
discharged a firearm under the same section 12022.53 provisions
to be not true.
The trial court sentenced Gutierrez to a total term of
65 years and eight months to life in state prison.
1.3 Prior appeal
Gutierrez filed an appeal from his judgment of conviction.
In September 2005, this court issued an opinion, striking the
gang enhancement sentence imposed on the robbery count, but
otherwise affirming the convictions. (People v. Gutierrez (Sept.
28, 2005, B175361) [nonpub. opn.].) Relying on the California
Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th
1238, we rejected Guiterrez’s argument that his right to a jury
trial was violated by the trial court’s finding of aggravating
factors at sentencing.
In February 2007, the United States Supreme Court issued
an order in this case granting certiorari, vacating the judgment,
and remanding to this court for further consideration in light of
its decision in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270,
which overruled People v. Black, supra, 35 Cal.4th 1238. Under
the mandate of the United States Supreme Court, we recalled the
remittitur and allowed supplemental briefing on the aggravating
factor issue.
On January 7, 2009, after granting Gutierrez’s petition for
rehearing, this court issued the opinion in Gutierrez I, supra,
B175361, in which we again rejected Gutierrez’s aggravating
factor claim, struck the gang enhancement imposed on the
robbery count, and otherwise affirmed the judgment of conviction.
5
2. Guiterrez’s 2021 petition for resentencing
On July 26, 2021, Gutierrez filed a petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95, which was later renumbered to
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) In his form petition,
Gutierrez checked the boxes alleging he was convicted at trial of
first or second degree murder under the felony-murder rule or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, and he could not
now be convicted of that offense because of changes made to
sections 188 and 189. The superior court appointed counsel to
represent Gutierrez and then set the matter for a hearing on the
petition.
In a written response, the People asked the superior court
to deny the petition following an evidentiary hearing. The People
argued Gutierrez was not entitled to resentencing because he was
convicted of murder as the actual killer. The People supported
their response with a copy of this court’s September 2005 opinion,
along with the reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts from Gutierrez’s
trial.
In his written reply, Gutierrez asserted the jury’s not-true
findings on the enhancement allegations that he personally used
and discharged a firearm showed that the jury did not believe he
was the actual killer. Gutierrez also argued the jury may have
convicted him of murder based on a theory of imputed malice.
Gutierrez asked the court to find the evidence at trial did not
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of murder
under current law.
After granting several continuances, the superior court
held a hearing on the petition on November 8, 2022. Neither the
prosecution nor the defense offered any new evidence at the
hearing, but rather focused their arguments on the evidence
6
presented at trial and the jury’s verdicts. Based on the testimony
of Genaro and Perez, the prosecutor argued the evidence proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that Gutierrez was the actual killer.
Defense counsel asserted that, because Perez was the only
witness who identified Gutierrez as the shooter, the jury’s
findings that Gutierrez did not personally use or discharge a
firearm meant the jury did not believe Perez’s testimony. In
response, the prosecutor asserted that, even if Gutierrez was not
the actual killer, he was guilty of murder as a direct aider and
abettor who shared the intent to kill, and thus, was ineligible for
resentencing.
After hearing the argument of counsel, the superior court
denied the petition, stating: “The cases in the appellate courts
tell us not to be fact finders. However, [defense counsel], you’re a
very good lawyer and a pretty good fact finder. Aside from that
comment, the court believes, and has always believed, Gutierrez
was the actual killer. However, in the face of the jury’s finding of
not true on the (c) and (d) sections of 12022.53[ ], the court also
feels that the defendant . . . was a major participant, present,
aiding and abetting, shared the specific intent to kill, and acted
with reckless indifference for human life; therefore, the court is
going to deny the petition.”
Gutierrez filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Gutierrez challenges the superior court’s denial
of his petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 on various
grounds. We conclude Gutierrez was not entitled to resentencing
because the record of conviction conclusively establishes that he
was not convicted of murder under a theory of imputed malice.
Rather, he was convicted of first degree premeditated murder as
7
either the actual killer or a direct aider and abettor who acted
with the intent to kill. Gutierrez therefore was ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
1. Governing law
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) to amend murder
liability under the felony-murder rule and natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
448 (Curiel); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
It narrowed the application of the felony-murder rule by adding
section 189, subdivision (e), which provides that a participant in
the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a qualifying felony
is liable for felony murder only if the person: (1) was the actual
killer; (2) was not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill,
acted as a direct aider and abettor in the murder; or (3) was a
major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life. (Curiel, at p. 448.) In
addition, it eliminated liability for murder as an aider and
abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine by
adding section 188, subdivision (a)(3), which states that malice
shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime. (Curiel, at p. 449.)
Senate Bill 1437 also created “a procedure for convicted
murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended
to retroactively seek relief.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.)
Under section 1172.6, a person may file a petition with the
superior court for resentencing if he or she: (1) was charged with
murder or attempted murder by means of a charging document
that allowed the prosecution to proceed under the felony-murder
rule, natural and probable consequences doctrine, or other theory
8
of imputed malice; (2) was convicted of murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter; and (3) could no longer be convicted of
murder or attempted murder due to the changes to sections 188
and 189 effectuated by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Upon receiving a facially sufficient petition, the superior
court must appoint counsel if requested (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3)),
and determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
case for relief (id., subd. (c)). If the petitioner makes a prima
facie showing, the court must issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing. (Id., subds. (c), (d)(1).) At that
hearing, the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder or
attempted murder under California law as amended by the
changes to sections 188 and 189. (Id., subd. (d)(3).) If the
prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the court must
vacate the conviction and any allegations and enhancements
attached to it, and must resentence the petitioner on the
remaining counts. (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
The court may deny a section 1172.6 petition at the prima
facie stage only if the record of conviction conclusively establishes
that the petitioner is ineligible for relief. (People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) Thus, in evaluating whether a petitioner
has made a prima facie showing, the court “is entitled to review
the record of conviction, which includes the jury summations,
jury instructions, verdict forms, and prior appellate opinions.”
(People v. Gudiel (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 848, 858; see Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971–972.) However, “[i]n reviewing any
part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, [the]
court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of
evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 972.) The
9
court also “ ‘should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations
on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary
hearing.’ ” (Id. at p. 971.) “ ‘[T]he prima facie bar was
intentionally and correctly set very low.’ ” (Id. at p. 972.)
We independently review whether the superior court
conducted a proper inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c).
(People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 337.)
2. Gutierrez was not entitled to relief under
section 1172.6 as a matter of law
The parties dispute whether the superior court’s denial of
Gutierrez’s petition at the November 8, 2022 hearing took place
at the prima facie stage under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), or
at an evidentiary hearing under subdivision (d). Gutierrez
argues the court made its ruling at the prima facie stage,
requiring reversal because the record does not conclusively
establish that he was ineligible for relief. The People assert the
court denied the petition after holding an evidentiary hearing,
and in any event, Gutierrez cannot show prejudicial error
because he failed to make a prima facie case for relief.
We agree with the People. Although the superior court
never issued an order to show cause or made an express finding
as to whether Gutierrez satisfied his prima facie showing, it
appears both the court and the parties treated the November 8,
2022 hearing as an evidentiary hearing. At that proceeding, the
prosecution and the defense each centered their arguments on
what the evidence at trial showed about Gutierrez’s culpability,
and whether it established beyond a reasonable doubt that he
was guilty of murder under current law. In denying the petition,
the court found that Gutierrez was the actual killer, and even if
he was not, he was still liable for murder as either a direct aider
10
and abettor who had the intent to kill or a major participant who
acted with reckless indifference to human life. Yet, regardless of
the stage at which the court made its ruling, Guiterrez failed to
make a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6 because
the record of conviction establishes that he was ineligible for
relief as a matter of law. (People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
198, 204; People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 745.)
In its verdict, the jury found Gutierrez guilty of the first
degree murder of Canuto. The record of conviction reflects that
the jury was not instructed that it could convict Gutierrez of this
offense under the felony-murder rule, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or any other theory in which malice is
imputed to the defendant based solely on his or her participation
in a crime. Rather, the jury was instructed that to convict
Gutierrez of first degree murder, it had to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Gutierrez actually committed or directly
aided and abetted a premeditated and deliberate murder. Under
either theory of murder, the jury was required to find that
Gutierrez acted with the intent to kill.
The jury was instructed on first degree murder with
CALJIC Nos. 8.10, 8.11, and 8.20. As relevant here, CALJIC
No. 8.10 instructed the jury that the “defendant is accused in
count 1 of having committed the crime of murder,” and “[e]very
person who unlawfully kills a human being with malice
aforethought is guilty of the crime of murder.” CALJIC No. 8.11,
which defined malice aforethought, explained that “[m]alice may
be either express [] or implied,” and “[m]alice is express where
there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human
being.” CALJIC No. 8.20 stated that “[a]ll murder which is
perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated
11
killing with express malice aforethought is murder in the first
degree.” It further provided that “[i]f you find that the killing
was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on
the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result of
deliberation and premeditation[,] . . . [it] is murder in the first
degree.”
The jury also was instructed on direct aiding and abetting
liability with CALJIC Nos. 3.00 and 3.01. CALJIC No. 3.00
stated, in relevant part, that “[e]ach principal, regardless of the
extent or manner of participation is equally guilty,” and defined
principals as “those who directly and actively commit or attempt
to commit the act constituting the crime,” or “those who aid and
abet in the commission or attempted commission of the crime.”
CALJIC No. 3.01 instructed the jury that “[a] person aids and
abets the commission or attempted commission of a crime when
he or she [1] with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator[,] and [2] with the intent or purpose of committing or
encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime, and [3]
by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages, or instigates the
commission of the crime.”
Consistent with these instructions, the prosecution
primarily argued to the jury that Gutierrez was guilty of murder
because he was the actual killer. The prosecution asserted that
“Gutierrez is the one that pulled that trigger, absolutely,” and
that the murder was premeditated because he “left the scene of
the crime” and “had to come back to kill” Canuto. The
prosecution further argued that, even if Gutierrez was not the
shooter, he was still guilty of murder as an aider and abettor
because he directed his companion to “ ‘go get a gun’ ” and
announced “ ‘[w]e are going to shoot these motherfuckers,’ a clear
12
expression of his intent.” In describing this theory of liability, the
prosecution told the jury: “[L]et’s look at it in regards to the law
of aiding and abetting. ‘Go get a gun. We are going to shoot
these motherfuckers.’ [¶] What happens if somebody says, ‘all
right,’ goes and gets a gun, and shoots those ‘motherfuckers’?
You guilty? You bet you’re guilty. You tell somebody, ‘We are
going to go get a gun and shoot somebody to death,’ and they do
it, you know what you are? You’re an aidder [sic] and abetter.”
Gutierrez contends he may have been convicted of murder
under a theory of imputed malice because the jury was given a
natural and probable consequences instruction for the purpose of
determining whether Perez was an accomplice to murder. At
trial, the parties disputed whether Perez was an accomplice to
the crimes committed by Guiterrez, in which case his testimony
would require corroboration. The prosecution argued Perez was
not an accomplice because he did not aid or abet the robbery or
attempted robbery, and the murder of Canuto was not a natural
and probable consequence of those crimes. The defense, on the
other hand, argued Perez was an accomplice whose testimony
lacked corroboration. In addition to providing the standard
instructions on accomplice testimony, the trial court gave a
modified version of CALJIC No. 3.02, which stated: “One who
aids and abets another in the commission of a crime or crimes is
not only guilty of that crime or those crimes, but is also guilty of
any other crime committed by a principal which is a natural and
probable consequence of the crimes originally aided and abetted.
[¶] In order for the witness Emilio Perez to be guilty under this
theory of the crime of murder, as charged in count 1, it would
have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that [1] the crimes
of robbery and attempted robbery were committed; [2] that
13
Emilio Perez aided and abetted those crimes; and [3] that a co-
principal in that crime committed the [crime] of murder; and
[4] the crime of murder was a natural and probable consequence
of the commission of the crimes of robbery and attempted
robbery.”
Contrary to Gutierrez’s claim on appeal, this instruction
did not allow the jury to convict Guiterrez of murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. The instruction
specifically referred to “the witness Emilio Perez,” and explained
the elements that would have to be proven for Perez to be found
liable for murder under this theory. In discussing the instruction
in closing argument, the prosecution stated that Perez was “not
on trial here, but this would be the law you would see at his
trial.” Gutierrez nevertheless contends the jury may have
considered CALJIC No. 3.02 in determining his guilt for murder.
However, the version of CALJIC No. 3.02 given to the jury was
not directed to Gutierrez’s guilt at all. The trial court never
instructed the jury that it could find Gutierrez guilty under a
natural and probable consequences theory, and the prosecution
never argued that theory to the jury. Rather, taken as a whole,
the instructions only permitted the jury to convict Gutierrez of
murder if it found he was the actual killer or a direct aider and
abettor who acted with the intent to kill. We presume the jury
understood and followed the court’s instructions. (People v.
Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 948; People v. Cortes, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 205–206.)
Gutierrez also argues the jury’s not-true findings on the
personal-use-firearm enhancements constituted an affirmative
finding that he was not the actual killer, which must be given
preclusive effect under principles of double jeopardy, collateral
14
estoppel, and due process. Several appellate courts have
concluded that the constitutional right against double jeopardy
does not apply at a section 1172.6 proceeding. (See, e.g., People v.
Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 589; People v. Hill (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1068; People v. Flint (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
607, 618; People v. Hernandez (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 94, 111.)
Some courts, however, have applied the collateral estoppel
doctrine to hold that a jury’s prior findings generally preclude a
trial court from making a contrary finding at a section 1172.6
evidentiary hearing. (See, e.g., People v. Arnold (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 376, 386–387; People v. Henley (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1020.) But even assuming that the jury’s
not-true findings in this case must be given preclusive effect at
the prima facie stage, they do not establish that Gutierrez made
a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6. At most, these
findings demonstrate that the jury may have decided Gutierrez
was guilty of murder as a direct aider and abettor rather than as
the actual shooter.
Direct aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of
murder under current law. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 462;
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 848, abrogated by statute
on another ground as stated in People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th
839, 869.) As our Supreme Court explained, “Senate Bill 1437
does not eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability for murder
because a direct aider and abettor to murder must possess malice
aforethought.” (People v. Gentile, at p. 848.) Accordingly, even if
the jury found that Gutierrez was a direct aider and abettor to
murder rather than the actual killer, it necessarily found that he
acted with the requisite malice for murder. And where, as here,
the record establishes that the defendant’s conviction was based
15
on a theory of liability that remains valid under Senate Bill 1437,
the defendant is not eligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter
of law. (See, e.g., People v. Estrada, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
p. 945 [defendant ineligible for relief as a matter of law where
record establishes he was convicted of first degree murder as an
aider and abettor with intent to kill]; People v. Cortes, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 204 [defendant failed to make a prima facie
case for relief because record of conviction demonstrates he was
convicted of murder either as a direct perpetrator or direct aider
and abettor]; People v. Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177, 186
[defendant’s conviction for first degree murder under a direct
aiding and abetting theory rendered him ineligible for relief].)
Gutierrez’s remaining arguments concern the superior
court’s factual findings at the November 8, 2022 hearing.
In particular, Gutierrez asserts that (1) to the extent the court
conducted an evidentiary hearing, it failed to apply the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard of proof; (2) the court erred in finding
that Guiterrez was a direct aider and abettor because there was
no substantial evidence that he acted with an intent to kill; and
(3) the court erred in finding that Gutierrez acted with reckless
indifference to human life because it failed to consider his age at
the time of the killing. In light of our holding that Gutierrez
failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief, we
need not address these arguments. “[W]e review the trial court’s
ruling, ‘not the court’s reasoning and, if the ruling was correct on
any ground, we affirm.’ ” (People v. Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th
77, 123; see People v. Cortes, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 204
[declining to address trial court’s reasons for denying a section
1172.6 petition, “as we may affirm a ruling that is correct in law
on any ground”].) Because the record of conviction conclusively
16
establishes that Gutierrez was not convicted of murder under a
theory of imputed malice, he was ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
17
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