CourtListener 10331081•People v. Debato CA2/7
Texto completo
Filed 2/11/25 P. v. Debato CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B335444
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA034413)
v.
HANEZE L. DEBATO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Hector E. Gutierrez, Judge. Affirmed.
John Steinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Chung L. Mar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Heneze Debato appeals from a postjudgment order denying
his Penal Code former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6)1 petition
with respect to his convictions for one count of first degree
murder and three counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated
attempted murder. Debato contends the superior court erred in
denying his petition at the prima facie stage because the jury
could have convicted him “based upon a theory of imputed
malice.” We reject his contention and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Evidence at Trial3
“Leuders Park Piru and Elm Lane Piru are Blood street
gangs claiming territory within the City of Compton. Blood gang
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2 The People filed a request for judicial notice of the clerk’s
transcript from Debato’s direct appeal and portions of Debato’s
trial transcript. The People argue these records are “relevant to
[h]is appeal because [they] explain[] the circumstances and
findings related to [Debato’s] . . . convictions.” Because we reach
the same conclusion as the People without considering these
records, we deny the People’s request as unnecessary.
3 We recite facts from the opinion on Debato’s direct appeal.
(People v. Debato (Sept. 3, 1997, B104425) [nonpub. opn.].) We
provide a summary of the relevant facts for background purposes
only. (See People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988 [“the
factual summary in an appellate opinion is not evidence that may
be considered at an evidentiary hearing to determine a
petitioner’s eligibility for resentencing” under § 1172.6]; People v.
2
members wear red to denote their gang affiliation. Southside and
Santana Block are rival Crip street gangs also claiming territory
in Compton. An ‘O.G.,’ or original gangster, member of Elm Lane
Piru was killed during the summer of 1995. The Blood gangs
suspected a Southside Crip was responsible for the killing. In
August 1995, several shootings occurred involving members of
the Leuders Park Piru, Elms Lane Piru and the Southside Crips.
“[Debato] is a member of the Leuders Park Piru.
“On the night of August 21, 1995, Donnell Perry, a Santana
Crip gang member, was walking in the area of Alondra and Mayo
in Compton. Two cars approached—a burgundy Cutlass with a
white top followed by a gray Toyota. All of the occupants of
both cars were wearing red. Perry recognized [Debato] in the
gray car and ‘Tricon,’ another member of the Leuders Park Piru,
in the burgundy Cutlass. The cars made U-turns and drove
toward Perry. Perry began to run. [Debato] fired several shots at
Perry as he fled. Perry was not hit.
“Perry ran toward Stefan Stokes and Corey Cotton. Perry
yelled out a warning that ‘Lenders Park Piru was coming and
they just shot at me.’ Perry ran into some bushes and hid.
“The gray Toyota approached Stokes and Cotton who were
standing side by side on the sidewalk. The Toyota stopped about
two feet away. [Debato], who was seated in the rear of the
vehicle, leaned over and said, ‘Check it out, homie.’ [Debato]
pointed a .380 caliber revolver and began firing in the direction of
Stokes and Cotton. Stokes and Cotton ran. They were not hit by
the shots.
Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1183 [“By logical extension, the
factual summary also may not be used to determine a petitioner’s
eligibility at the prima facie stage” under § 1172.6].)
3
“After the shooting the gray car appeared to break down.
Its occupants exited the car and fled on foot. Police arrived
shortly thereafter. Police made sure no one was hurt and
arranged to have the gray car towed away. Neither Perry,
Stokes, nor Cotton spoke to police at the scene.
“The next day on August 22, 1995, Perry returned to the
scene of the shooting around 9:00 p.m. to meet some friends. He
recognized the same burgundy Cutlass with the white top he saw
the night before make a U-turn at Alondra and Mayo. Perry
walked to the corner of Mayo and Alondra and saw the Burgundy
Cutlass make another U-turn in order to drive toward the
location where Perry’s friend, Maurice Miles, stood. Perry
heard shots coming from the location where Miles had been
standing. Perry heard as many as ten shots fired from an
automatic weapon. Perry ducked into some bushes. The
burgundy Cutlass turned the corner past Perry at Alondra and
Mayo. From Perry’s vantage point he saw two people inside the
car. He saw [Debato] sitting in the front passenger seat holding a
black semi-automatic 9 millimeter gun on his lap.
“Schemaj Gray, a Front Hood Compton Crip gang member,
was standing several feet from Maurice Miles. Gray saw
[Debato] and another person drive past. He saw [Debato] lean
his upper torso out of the passenger side window and fire several
shots at Maurice Miles.
“Gray and Perry ran to Miles’ assistance. Miles had been
hit several times by the gunfire. Miles’ friends took him to the
hospital where he died of multiple gunshot wounds.
“Police investigators found several 9 millimeter shell
casings and bullet fragments at the scene.
4
“Several weeks later Perry gave a taped interview to police
investigators. At the interview he identified the shooter as
‘Haneze from Leuders Park Piru.’ ” (People v. Debato, supra,
B104425.)
B. Relevant Jury Instructions
The trial took place in 1996. As relevant here, the trial
court instructed the jury with CALJIC Nos. 8.20 (deliberate and
premeditated murder), 8.25.1 (drive-by murder), 8.66 (attempted
murder), 8.67 (premeditated attempted murder), 3.00 (definition
of principals), 3.01 (aiding and abetting), and 17.19 (personal use
of a firearm). The court also instructed the jury on the special
allegation that Debato discharged a firearm from a vehicle with
the intent to inflict great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.55).
CALJIC No. 8.20 provided, in relevant part: “All murder
which is perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing with express malice aforethought is murder
of the first degree.”
Former CALJIC No. 8.25.1 (5th ed., 1994) provided:
“Murder which is perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm
from a motor vehicle intentionally at another person outside of
the vehicle when the perpetrator specifically intended to inflict
death, is murder of the first degree.”
CALJIC No. 8.66 provided, in relevant part: “In order to
prove [the crime of attempted murder,] each of the following
elements must be proved[:] [¶] 1. A direct but ineffectual act was
done by one person towards killing another human being; and [¶]
2. The person committing such act harbored express malice
aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill unlawfully another
human being.”
5
CALJIC No. 8.67 provided, in relevant part: “It is also
alleged in Counts Two, Three, and Four [(the attempted murder
counts)] of the information that the crime attempted was willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder. If you find the defendant
guilty of attempt to commit murder, you must determine whether
this allegation is true or not true. [¶] [¶] If you find that the
attempt to commit murder was preceded and accompanied by a
clear, deliberate intent to kill, which was the result of
deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed
upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of
passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it is
attempt to commit willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder.”
Former CALJIC No. 3.00 (5th ed., 1988) provided: “The
persons concerned in the commission or attempted commission of
a crime who are regarded by law as principals in the crime thus
committed or attempted and equally guilty thereof include: [¶]
1. Those who directly and actively commit or attempt to commit
the act constituting the crime, or [¶] 2. Those who aid and abet
the commission or attempted commission of the crime.”
Former CALJIC No. 3.01 (5th ed., 1988) provided, in
relevant part: “A person aids and abets the commission or
attempted commission of a crime when he or she, [¶] (1) with
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and [¶]
(2) with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or
facilitating the commission of the crime, by act or advice aids,
promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”
C. Verdicts, Sentence, and Appeal
The jury found Debato guilty of first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a), count 1) and three counts of premeditated attempted
6
murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a), counts 2-4). As to count 1, the
jury found Debato inflicted great bodily injury and death as a
result of discharging a firearm from a vehicle (§ 12022.55), and
that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). As to
counts 2 through 4, the jury found Debato personally used a
firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Debato
to 31 years to life in prison on count 1, consisting of 25 years to
life for the first degree murder and six years for the section
12022.55 firearm enhancement.4 As to counts 2, 3, and 4, the
court imposed concurrent sentences of life imprisonment and
imposed, but stayed, four-year sentences for each of the section
12022.5, subdivision (a) firearm enhancements.
On direct appeal, this court concluded it was error for the
trial court to fail to instruct the jury that Debato had to
“personally” discharge the firearm from the vehicle before the
jury could find the section 12022.55 allegation true. However, we
concluded the error was not prejudicial and affirmed the
judgment. (People v. Debato, supra, B104425.)
D. Section 1172.6 Proceedings
On December 20, 2022, Debato filed, pro se, a petition for
resentencing under former section 1170.95 as to his attempted
murder and murder convictions. The People opposed, and
Debato, then represented by counsel, filed a reply.
The superior court denied the petition at the prima facie
stage, finding that “[t]he jury was not instructed as to the natural
4 Based on the limited record before us, it appears the court
did not address the section 12022.5, subdivision (a), firearm
enhancement as to count 1. We assume the court imposed and
stayed the sentence.
7
and probable consequences or felony murder. [Debato] was
prosecuted as a principal, either a direct perpetrator or an aider
and abettor. There is nothing in the instructions which would
allow the jury to impute malice to [Debato] based solely on his
participation in the crimes.” The court noted it did not consider
the section 12022.55 allegation “because once the appellate court
found that the jury was not properly instructed as to that
allegation, [I] must treat it as though it was never proved.” It
also noted it did not consider the section 12022.5 allegation
“because a personal use finding within the meaning of this code
section is not synonymous with personally discharging a firearm
causing death.”
Debato timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Senate Bill 1437 and Section 1172.6
Effective 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
(SB 1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984; People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843 (Gentile)) and narrowed the
felony-murder rule (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People
v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448-449 (Curiel); People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957 (Lewis)). Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits
imputing malice based solely on one’s participation in a crime
and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder,
except under the revised felony-murder rule in section 189,
subdivision (e). The latter provision requires the People to prove
that the defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); an
8
aider and abettor to murder who had the intent to kill (id., subd.
(e)(2)); or a major participant in an underlying felony listed in
section 189, subdivision (a), who acted with reckless indifference
to human life as described in subdivision (d) of section 190.2.
(§ 189, subd. (e)(3); see Curiel, at p. 448; People v. Wilson (2023)
14 Cal.5th 839, 868-869; Strong, at p. 708; Gentile, at pp. 842-
843.) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (SB 775)
subsequently clarified the amendments to sections 188 and 189
also apply to attempted murder convictions. (People v. Coley
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 544 (Coley).)
SB 1437 also provided a procedure (codified in
section 1172.6) for “[a] person convicted of felony murder[,]
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, [or] attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine” to
petition the superior court to vacate the convictions and be
resentenced on any remaining counts if the petitioner could not
now be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of the
changes to sections 188 and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, the sentencing court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner if requested. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A),
(3); see also Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962-963.) The
prosecutor must then file a response to the petition, the
petitioner may file a reply, and the court must hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) If the petitioner makes that showing, the court must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to
9
determine whether to vacate the attempted murder or murder
convictions and resentence the petitioner on any remaining
counts. (Id., subds. (c), (d)(1).)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, “ ‘ “the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 971; see Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460.) The court may
consider the record of conviction, which will “necessarily inform
the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6],
allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit
from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at p. 971; see
Curiel, at pp. 463-464.) “In reviewing any part of the record of
conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not
engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 972; see People v. Eynon
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975.)
“Nevertheless, the court may appropriately deny a petition
at the prima facie stage if the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. ‘ “[I]f the record, including the court’s own
documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner,’ ” ’ thereby deeming the
petitioner ineligible.” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
45, 52; see Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460; Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) “We review de novo whether the trial court
conducted a proper inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c).”
(People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251; see People
10
v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14 [denial at the prima facie
stage “is appropriate only if the record of conviction demonstrates
that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law,”
which “is a purely legal conclusion . . . we review de novo”].)
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Denying Debato’s
Section 1172.6 Petition
The trial court instructed the jury on two theories of
liability for both first degree murder and willful, deliberate and
premeditated attempted murder: (1) direct perpetrator (CALJIC
Nos. 8.20, 8.25.1, 8.66-8.67) and (2) direct aiding and abetting
(CALJIC Nos. 3.00-3.01). The court did not instruct the jury on
felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Debato asserts that “[t]he instructions, as a whole,
permitted the jury to convict [him] as an aider and abettor
without finding that he acted with malice. The instructions
therefore failed to ‘conclusively negate’ the possibility that the
jury convicted based upon a theory of imputed malice.” However,
the jury instructions and verdicts conclusively demonstrate that
the jury did not convict Debato on a now-invalid theory of
imputed malice.
1. Debato’s convictions for attempted murder are
ineligible for resentencing
As discussed, SB 1437 and SB 775 eliminated the natural
and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to attempted
murder. (People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191, 193 [SB
775 “clarified SB 1437 by amending section [1172.6] to make
clear the natural and probable consequences doctrine no longer
supplies accomplice liability to attempted murder”].) Section
1172.6 relief is available only for persons whose convictions for
11
attempted murder could have been based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a) [“A person
convicted of . . . attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine . . . may file a petition”]; Coley,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548 [section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1)
“applies by its terms only to attempted murders based on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine”]; People v. Lovejoy
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865 [“[f]ollowing the passage of [SB]
775 in 2022, it is now clear that defendants . . . convicted of
attempted murder are potentially eligible for relief under section
1172.6 if the conviction could have been based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine”].)
Because the trial court did not instruct Debato’s jury on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, he is not eligible for
relief under section 1172.6 on his attempted murder convictions
as a matter of law. (See Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548
[“The jurors in this case were not instructed on [the natural and
probable consequences] doctrine. . . . The court was not required
to grant resentencing on this [attempted murder] count.”]; People
v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 599 [“if the jury did not
receive an instruction on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, the jury could not have convicted the defendant on that
basis, and the petition should be summarily denied”].)
2. Debato’s conviction for first degree murder is
ineligible for resentencing
Debato is also ineligible for relief as to his first degree
murder conviction because the jury instructions on direct aiding
and abetting foreclose the possibility that the jury convicted
Debato of murder based on imputed malice. Former CALJIC
No. 3.01 required the jury to find the aider and abettor “by act or
12
advice” aided the commission of the crime “with knowledge of the
unlawful purpose of the perpetrator” and “with the intent or
purpose of . . . encouraging . . . the commission of the crime.”
When the aiding and abetting instruction given to a jury includes
such language, the jury may find a defendant guilty under this
theory only if it finds the aider and abettor shares the
perpetrator’s specific intent. (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th
1111, 1118 (McCoy) [the aider and abettor shares the specific
intent of the perpetrator “ ‘when the accomplice “knows the full
extent of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose and gives aid or
encouragement with the intent or purpose of facilitating the
perpetrator’s commission of the crime” ’ ”].)
Here, the instructions on first degree murder required the
perpetrator to harbor “express malice aforethought” (CALJIC
No. 8.20 [standard first degree murder]) and “inten[t] to inflict
death” (CALJIC No. 8.25.1 [drive-by murder]). Thus, whether
the jury found Debato guilty as the direct perpetrator or the aider
and abettor, it necessarily found Debato harbored express malice
aforethought, making him ineligible for resentencing. (Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 848 [SB 1437 “does not eliminate direct
aiding and abetting liability for murder because a direct aider
and abettor to murder must possess malice aforethought”]; People
v. Lopez (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1248 [“An accomplice who
directly aids and abets the perpetrator in committing murder is
liable for murder [following SB 1437] just as he or she was liable”
before its enactment].)
Debato argues the record of conviction “does not
conclusively eliminate the possibility” Debato was convicted of
first degree murder “based upon a theory of imputed malice.”
Specifically, Debato points to three jury instructions that he
13
claims “permitted the jury to convict [Debato] as an aider and
abettor without finding that he acted with malice”: CALJIC
Nos. 3.01, 3.00 and 8.25.1.5 We are not persuaded by his
arguments and conclude none of these instructions permitted the
jury to convict Debato on a now-invalid theory of liability.
Starting with former CALJIC No. 3.01, the instruction
required the jury to find the aider and abettor encouraged “the
crime,” intended to encourage “the crime,” and knew the
perpetrator’s “unlawful purpose.” Debato argues that by failing
to define “the crime” as murder, the jury could have found him
guilty of aiding and abetting “any act.” However, the only crimes
charged were murder and attempted murder. And, as the jury
was instructed, for those crimes, the perpetrator had to have
either “express malice aforethought” (CALJIC No. 8.20 [first
degree murder]), the “inten[t] to inflict death” (CALJIC
No. 8.25.1 [drive-by murder]), or “a specific intent to kill”
5 Debato relies on People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972
(Langi) to argue the jury instructions failed to rule out the
possibility the jury convicted Debato based on a theory of
imputed malice. However, Debato’s reliance on Langi is
misplaced. The Langi court’s analysis and conclusion depended
on Langi having been convicted of second degree murder based on
a theory of aiding and abetting implied malice murder. (Id. at
p. 981.) Here, the jury convicted Debato of first degree murder
and premeditated attempted murder, neither of which could be
based on implied malice. Thus, the concern in Langi is not
present here. (See People v. Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1191
[“We note in Langi . . . the concern centered on the fact that the
direct perpetrator of an implied malice murder . . . need not
harbor an intent to kill. [Citation.] That concern is not present
[in this case], which required the perpetrator of the attempted
murder to ‘harbor[] express malice aforethought’ ”].)
14
(CALJIC No. 8.66 [attempted murder]). Because the jury was not
instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, the jury would have no basis to believe
that it could find Debato guilty as an aider and abettor based on
his commission of some other non-charged target offense. Thus,
the jury could not have found Debato “knowingly and
intentionally help[ed] another commit an unlawful killing
without acting with malice” because “[t]he only unlawful purpose
charged here was unlawful killing” or attempted unlawful killing.
(McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1123; People v. Cortes (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 198, 206 [where jury was instructed on liability as
either a direct perpetrator or direct aider and abettor, petitioner’s
“mere speculation that the jurors convicted him of murder and
attempted murder because he committed some other unidentified
and uncharged crime, contrary to the trial court’s instructions,
does not overcome the presumption that the jury properly
performed its duty”].)
Turning to former CALJIC No. 3.00, the instruction told
the jury that “principals in the crime,” including those who
“directly” commit the crime and those who “aid and abet” the
crime, are “equally guilty.” Debato claims the language “equally
guilty” is “ambiguous” and “permitt[ed] the jury to convict based
on the intent of the perpetrator,” not on Debato’s own intent. Our
Supreme Court in People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 640-
641 stated that the reference in former CALJIC No. 3.00 to
principals being “equally guilty” “generally stated a correct rule
of law,” but “the instruction could be misleading” if the jury could
have understood the “equally guilty” language “to allow them to
base defendant’s liability for . . . murder on the mental state of
the actual shooter, rather than on defendant’s own mental state
15
in aiding and abetting the killing.”6 Notwithstanding the
instruction’s potential to mislead in some circumstances, there is
no possibility the jury here could have convicted Debato without
finding Debato himself harbored express malice. As noted, the
jury was instructed on direct aiding and abetting with CALJIC
No. 3.01. Thus, the jury had to find Debato himself shared the
perpetrator’s intent. (See People v. Amezcua Flores (2019)
6 Cal.5th 886, 917-919 [any potential misdirection from the
“equally guilty” language in CALJIC No. 3.00 was cured by
CALJIC No. 3.01 because CALJIC No. 3.01’s “requirement that
the aider/abettor know of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose,
intend to facilitate that purpose, and do an act that assists or
facilitates the purpose, sufficiently explained the required mens
rea”]; Johnson, at pp. 640-641 [nothing in the jury instructions
suggested that the jurors may have believed the “equally guilty”
language in former CALCRIM No. 400 required them to
determine defendant’s liability based on the perpetrator’s mental
state, rather than defendant’s own mental state, because the
court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 401, “which sets out
the requirements for establishing aider and abettor liability” and
“cleared up any ambiguity arguably presented by former
CALCRIM No. 400”].)
Finally, CALJIC No. 8.25.1 instructed the jury that murder
is of the first degree when it is “perpetrated by means of
6 In 2010, the Judicial Council modified former CALJIC
No. 3.00, “making the ‘equally guilty’ language optional.” (People
v. Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 640, fn. 5.) The Judicial
Council also revised former CALCRIM No. 4.00, the analogous
CALCRIM instruction, “by removing the word ‘equally’ from the
phrase ‘equally guilty.’ ” (Id. at p. 640.)
16
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle” and “the perpetrator
specifically intended to inflict death.” Debato argues that by
referring only to “the perpetrator,” “the instruction did not
require the jury to find that the aider and abettor intended to
inflict death.” But, as noted, the jury could only convict Debato
as an aider and abettor of drive-by murder if, as instructed with
CALJIC No. 3.01, Debato shared the perpetrator’s intent—which,
in a drive-by murder is “specific[] inten[t] to inflict death.”
(Former CALJIC No. 8.25.1; see McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
p. 1118.)
In sum, because the jury instructions given in Debato’s case
required the jury to find Debato harbored an intent to kill, his
convictions are ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The court
did not err in denying his petition without issuing an order to
show cause.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Debato’s petition for resentencing is
affirmed.
STONE, J.
We concur:
FEUER, Acting, P. J. PULOS, J. *
Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
17
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