CourtListener 10328535•In re Penelope C. CA4/1
Texto completo
Filed 2/6/25 In re Penelope C. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re PENELOPE C., a Person D084630
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH (Super. Ct. No. NJ15853)
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
BRIAN M. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Nadia J. Keilani, Judge. Affirmed.
Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant Brian M.
Mansi Thakkar for Defendant and Appellant Lindsey C.
Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
To establish the parental-benefit exception to adoption, among other
requirements a parent must show “regular visitation and contact” with the
dependent child. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); accord
In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 632 (Caden C.)). In this case, Brian M.
(Father) was absent for most of the dependency of daughter Penelope C.
(Minor). In assessing Father’s contacts for purposes of this exception, the
juvenile court applied what effectively is a “knew or should have known” legal
standard in finding Father did not maintain consistent contact with Minor
during the proceedings. It therefore refused to apply the parental-benefit
exception to Father and terminated his parental rights.
Father, joined by Lindsey C. (Mother),2 argues the evidence does not
support the juvenile court’s finding he failed to maintain regular visitation
and contact with Minor. He further argues he proffered sufficient evidence to
support the additional requirements of the parental-benefit exception—that a
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2 Mother joins in Father’s argument and asserts that reversal of the
order terminating his parental rights requires that order also be reversed as
to her. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(a)(1) [“The court may not
terminate the rights of only one parent under section 366.26 unless that
parent is the only surviving parent; or unless the rights of the other parent
have been terminated by a California court of competent jurisdiction or by a
court of competent jurisdiction of another state under the statutes of that
state; or unless the other parent has relinquished custody of the child to the
welfare department.”].)
2
beneficial relationship existed between him and Minor and the child would
suffer detriment from the loss of that relationship. Alternatively, he seeks
remand for the court to determine whether he satisfied these requirements.
As we explain, we conclude the juvenile court properly evaluated
Father’s contacts with Minor by applying the “knew or should have known”
standard, as there is strong evidentiary support—including the inferences to
be drawn from such evidence—that during the dependency Father knew, or
should have known, of the proceedings and simply chose not to participate.
Because the record does not compel a finding that he maintained regular
visitation and contact with Minor during dependency, we affirm the court’s
order terminating parental rights.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
A. Prelude to Dependency
Respondent San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency
(Agency) received a referral on September 12, 2021, one day after Minor was
born, due to Mother’s positive test for amphetamines. Mother refused to
provide the Agency with any demographic information about Minor’s father.
She explained, however, that Father had dropped her off at the hospital after
initially refusing to drive her. He then went to work.
Minor remained hospitalized until late October 2021, when the hospital
discharged her to Mother’s care. The child is “medically fragile,” nonverbal,
and receives most of her meals through a feeding tube.
At the time of discharge, Mother was residing with Father in a
downstairs apartment below the home of maternal grandparents. A few
3 Because Mother has raised no independent issues, we omit facts and
issues pertaining only to her.
3
months later, Father moved out, although he continued to stop by “often” to
assist Mother.
B. Dependency
Mother next came to the attention of the Agency in late May 2022, after
law enforcement received a call about a reckless driver. Officers contacted
Mother and observed Minor, then about eight-months old, unrestrained in
the back seat of the car. Mother failed a field sobriety test and officers found
methamphetamine in her purse. During an Agency interview a few days
later, Mother stated she had taken Minor to visit the child’s “father” because
Mother did not want Minor “to wonder who he is when she is older.” Roughly
one month later, the Agency filed a petition under section 300, subdivision
(b)(1)(D) (Petition) alleging Minor has suffered, or there was a substantial
risk she would suffer, serious physical harm or illness due to Mother’s
substance abuse.
The Agency’s July 2022 Detention Report listed Father as Minor’s
presumed father and included his address and telephone number. On three
different days in early June, the Agency called and left voicemails for Father.
On June 14, it sent an “unable to locate letter” to his address. Mother
continued to give conflicting statements to the Agency about Minor’s father.
In early July 2022, the juvenile court detained Minor in a confidential
resource family approved home, where Minor has remained throughout
dependency.
The Agency continued its efforts to contact Father. In July 2022, it
called a number beginning with the area code 760 that went straight to
voicemail. The Agency left a message, requesting Father return its call. It
also called another number beginning with a 442 area code. No voicemail
4
was set up for that number and after several rings the call terminated. The
Agency also sent Father a text message.
During another Agency interview, Mother initially claimed she did not
know who the father of Minor was, then stated he “was a bad person and she
did not want him involved” in Minor’s life. She also refused to give any
information about the father when questioned by the juvenile court. In
August 2022, the court made a true finding on the Petition and entered
jurisdictional and dispositional orders removing Minor from Mother’s care.
At the six-month review hearing in March 2023, Mother for the first
time identified Father as Minor’s biological parent. Mother did so only after
the juvenile court had issued a bench warrant when she failed to appear at
an earlier hearing when the court intended to inquire about paternal
parentage. During the March hearing, Mother’s counsel informed the court
that Father allegedly had committed domestic violence against Mother and
“had made himself very clear that he did not want to be part of these
proceedings and had requested that the mother take his name off the petition
or else he would retaliate.” The court thereafter extended Mother’s
reunification services to the 12-month date.
After Mother’s disclosure, the Agency again made several unsuccessful
attempts to contact Father. As part of its ongoing efforts, the Agency located
paternal grandmother. She informed the Agency she had not heard from
Father for more than four years.
1. Father Appears in the Dependency
Father first appeared in the dependency proceedings on August 8,
2023, at the 12-month review hearing. He agreed to take a paternity test,
which subsequently confirmed he was Minor’s biological father.
5
During the hearing, the juvenile court questioned Father about how
and when he learned of the dependency. Father stated Mother had called
him the night before and explained it was possible Minor could be “adopted
out.” Father added, “And I was, like ‘What? Hold on. What’s going on with
this case?’ I had no idea this was here this far. No. No way.” Father
explained he “[s]ort of” knew about the dependency proceedings, adding, “I
know that there was visitation, but I’m not sure – like, I didn’t know it was
like this. I thought everything was being taken care of and [Mother] was
doing everything that she needed to be doing to be getting our daughter
back.” Father claimed to have lived at the same home in San Marcos for
more than five years.
At the continued 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court ordered
Father to have liberal supervised visitation with Minor and the Agency to
provide him with voluntary services. The court set Father’s section 388
petition to vacate the jurisdiction/disposition orders for alleged lack of notice,
and his request for presumed father status, for evidentiary hearing to
coincide with the contested 12-month review hearing.
2. Father’s October 2023 Interview
Between August and October, Father had no contacts with the Agency.
Father explained he could not call the Agency because he used an “ ‘Obama
phone’ ” and the phone no longer worked, which “required him to obtain a
new phone and be assigned a new phone number.” Father denied any prior
involvement with the Agency.4
4 Agency records, however, showed there was an “open investigation”
involving Father’s two younger children from another relationship, and there
had been a past investigation regarding his two older children also from a
different relationship. Agency social workers investigating these other cases
also reported that Father did not return their calls. In fact, the Agency’s
6
Father claimed he first learned of the Agency’s involvement with Minor
in April or May 2023, and in July learned of the upcoming August hearing.
Father told the Agency he had no explanation for why he did not come
forward and contact the Agency sooner. He acknowledged he has remained
in contact with Mother, and sometimes transported Mother to visit with
Minor, adding, “ ‘She is the mother of my child, I will help her out if she
asks.’ ” At the time of the Agency’s October 24 report, Father had just begun
having supervised visits with Minor one day a week for an hour.
3. The Contested Section 388 Hearing
At the December 5, 2023 hearing, Father testified he had mistakenly
believed that maternal grandmother had “custody” of Minor from March 2022
to early August 2023, and that the child lived with maternal grandparents
while Mother lived in the downstairs apartment. He claimed neither the
maternal grandmother nor Mother told him about Minor’s dependency, and
that he first became aware Minor had been removed from Mother’s care when
she called him the night before the August 8 hearing and told him their
daughter could be adopted.
Regarding visitation, Father and Mother had an informal “coparenting
arrangement” in which she would make Minor available when he wanted to
“see” the child. As a result, Father “didn’t feel [he] needed to come to family
court and get anything.” Father estimated he had unsupervised visits with
Minor about five or six times between July 2022 and August 2023. According
to Father, one such visit occurred in about April 2023, when Mother was
having only supervised visitation.
involvement with Father predated Minor’s birth. In February 2020, Mother
and Father were arrested for child cruelty and endangerment after law
enforcement found methamphetamine and heroin within the reach of
Father’s youngest child.
7
After the August 2023 hearing, Father agreed to start treatment for
substance abuse despite his assertion that he was then sober. Father
claimed he would do “anything” for Minor, even though he “didn’t create this
situation.”
In denying Father’s section 388 petition, the juvenile court found that
the Agency exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to locate him.5 The
court expressed “real concerns” about Father’s credibility, including how and
when he learned of the dependency. It observed that while Mother was
pregnant with Minor, he allegedly committed multiple acts of domestic
violence against her, as she stated under penalty of perjury in a court filing.
It further noted that on the day Mother gave birth, Father just “dropped [her]
off [at the hospital] and continued on with his day.” Finally, it found that his
claim of being involved in Minor’s life was belied by the fact that he allegedly
did not realize “for over a year” “that his daughter was the subject of a
dependency proceeding; that she had, in fact, been removed from the mother;
that she was not living with the grandmother; [and] that she was living in
the home of someone entirely different.”
5 Father has not challenged this order on appeal. The issue is therefore
forfeited. (See In re P.L. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 406, 409, fn. 4 (P.L.) [father
forfeited his challenge to juvenile court order when “his opening brief
contain[ed] no argument challenging” it]; In re Daniel M. (2003)
110 Cal.App.4th 703, 707, fn. 4 (Daniel M.) [in an appeal from an order
terminating parental rights, failure to raise an issue in an appellate brief
forfeits the issue].)
8
At the same hearing, the juvenile court denied Father presumed father
status,6 terminated Mother’s reunification services, and set the section
366.26 hearing for April 2024.7 By this time, Father had progressed to two
visits per week with Minor.
C. Selection and Implementation
The Agency’s April 3, 2024 Selection and Implementation Report
recommended termination of parental rights and adoption as the permanent
plan for Minor. It found Minor to be generally and specifically adoptable, as
her current caregivers expressed a willingness to provide her with a loving,
safe, and stable home through adoption.
In recommending termination of Father’s parental rights, the Agency
noted Father had been voluntarily absent for most of Minor’s dependency, as
he reported being in contact with Mother “throughout the case” but denied
being aware of the proceedings. In addition, he waited until the 12-month
review hearing to make his first appearance,8 and did not respond to the
6 A biological father is one whose paternity has been established, but has
not shown he qualifies as the child’s presumed father. (In re T.R. (2005)
132 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209.) The court may, in its discretion, order
reunification services for biological fathers if it determines services would
benefit the child, but is not required to do so. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) In contrast,
presumed father status confers the highest degree of procedural protection.
(T.R., at p. 1209.) For elevation to presumed status, a father must establish
one or more statutory criteria that show he has taken an active familial role
in the child’s life. (Ibid.)
7 Father filed a Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition, challenging the
juvenile court’s orders. We dismissed his petition after appellate counsel
indicated there were no “viable issues for writ review.”
8 See section 361.5, subdivision (a)(1)(B) [when a child younger than
three is removed from parental custody, reunification services are generally
9
Agency despite its myriad attempts to contact him both before and after
August 2023. The Agency also determined that Minor did not have a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to Father, and would not suffer
detriment if the court terminated the parental-child relationship.
In April 2024, Father filed another section 388 petition seeking
placement of Minor with him. The juvenile court set the matter to coincide
with the contested section 366.26 hearing. Minor was then about to turn
three years old and had been in dependency for about 75 percent of her
lifetime.
D. Section 388 Petition and Contested Section 366.26 Hearing
Numerous witnesses testified in the multi-day evidentiary hearing,
which concluded on August 9, 2024. In contravention of a court order, Father
failed to appear for the evidentiary hearing. He also did not respond to the
juvenile court’s “repeated” attempts to contact him that day or to his own
counsel.
As relevant here, Mother testified that in the beginning of dependency
she had not been “dishonest” with the juvenile court and the Agency when
she claimed to not know who Minor’s father was. She communicated with
Father “[a] couple times” about her DUI arrest. Eventually, she told him
about the dependency and how Minor had been removed from her custody
and placed into foster care.
One of Minor’s caregivers, Trisha B., also testified at the hearing. The
child had been in their care for more than two years. Her medical needs
involved numerous appointments and “various therapies” that happened “all
day long every day” in and out of the home. Trisha and her husband wanted
offered to the parents or presumed parents for a maximum of 12 months from
removal].
10
to adopt Minor, as they “love and adore her” and only want the best for her,
which included having a positive relationship with her biological family.9
The juvenile court denied Father’s section 388 petition, finding by clear
and convincing evidence that placing Minor in his care would be “detrimental
to her safety, protection, and physical and emotional wellbeing.”10 In
terminating Father’s parental rights, the court also found he did not have
regular visitation and contact with Minor when he knew, or should have
known, about the dependency but chose not to participate in those
proceedings.11
DISCUSSION
A. Parental-benefit Exception
“ ‘At a permanency plan hearing, the court may order one of three
alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long-term foster care. [Citation.] If
the dependent child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption
over the alternative permanency plans.’ [Citation.]” (In re B.D. (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1224.) Once the juvenile court finds the child is
9 Other witnesses who testified included Dr. Elizabeth Stanton, a clinical
psychologist, who addressed Father’s relationship with Minor; and Agency
social workers Naomi Basile and her supervisor, Cheryland Trice, who
recommended termination of parental rights and adoption as the permanent
plan for Minor.
10 Father on appeal has not challenged the juvenile court’s order denying
his section 388 petition for a change in Minor’s placement. That issue is
therefore forfeited. (See P.L., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 409, fn. 4;
Daniel M., supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 707, fn. 4.)
11 As to Mother, the court found she maintained regular visitation and
contact with Minor but the child did not have a “substantial positive
emotional attachment” to her and would not suffer detriment if her parental
rights were terminated.
11
adoptable, the burden then shifts to the parent to demonstrate that a
statutory exception applies. (Id. at p. 1225; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) If the
parent does not establish an applicable statutory exception, the
juvenile court must terminate parental rights. (In re Katherine J. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316.)
One such statutory exception is the parental-benefit exception.
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) It applies if “[t]he court finds a compelling
reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child”
because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with
the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.”
(Ibid.) This exception requires the parent to prove three elements:
“1) regular visitation and contact, taking into account the extent of visitation
permitted; (2) a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—
the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing
the relationship; and 3) a showing that terminating the attachment would be
detrimental to the child even when balanced against the countervailing
benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (In re M.G. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 836, 847,
citing Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636–637.)
“The first element—regular visitation and contact—is straightforward.
The question is just whether ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account
‘the extent permitted by court orders.’ [Citation.] Visits and contact
‘continue[ ] or develop[ ] a significant, positive, emotional attachment from
child to parent.’ [Citation.] Courts should consider in that light whether
parents ‘maintained regular visitation and contact with the child’ (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) but certainly not to punish parents or reward them for good
behavior in visiting or maintaining contact—here, as throughout, the focus is
12
on the best interests of the child. [Citation.]” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 632.)
B. Standard of Review
Father contends there is insufficient evidence in the record to support
the juvenile court’s finding that he did not maintain regular visitation and
contact with Minor for purposes of the parental-benefit exception to adoption.
But “[i]n the case where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded
that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that
party appeals, it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as
whether substantial evidence supports the judgment. This follows because
such a characterization is conceptually one that allows an attack on (1) the
evidence supporting the party who had no burden of proof, and (2) the trier of
fact’s unassailable conclusion that the party with the burden did not prove
one or more elements of the case.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517,
1528 (I.W.).) “Thus, where the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at
trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence
compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.]
Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was
(1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight
as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to
support a finding.’ ’’ (Id. at p. 1528, italics added; accord, Estes v. Eaton Corp.
(2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636, 651 [“ ‘where the issue on appeal turns on a
failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether
the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law’ ”].)
C. Analysis
In ruling the parental-benefit exception did not apply to Father, the
juvenile court found he did not maintain regular visitation and contact with
13
Minor, as required under Caden C. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 632.) The court instead determined that he visited Minor only
“sporadically” throughout the dependency; that a “caring parent would know
that their child had been removed and was in foster care”; and that he “only
began to see [Minor] consistently” after the selection/implementation hearing
had been scheduled. The court therefore declined to analyze the remaining
elements of the exception as set forth in Caden C. (See id. at pp. 632–633.)
In assessing Father’s contacts with Minor during dependency, it
appears the juvenile court applied a “knew or should have known” legal
standard in determining whether he chose to voluntarily absent himself from
the proceedings. We independently conclude this was the proper standard,
and that Father failed to make any contrary showing. Indeed, the record
fully supports the conclusion that Father knew or should have known of the
dependency, and that he simply chose not to participate. (See In re A.P.
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1143 [“Whether a trial court applied the correct
legal standard in exercising its discretion is a question of law that we review
de novo.”].)
Father admitted he knew of the dependency in about April 2023, about
four months before he made his first appearance in the case and about six
months before he started visiting Minor once a week for an hour. This
evidence alone supports the juvenile court’s finding he did not maintain
“regular visitation and contact” with Minor during the dependency
proceedings. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 632.) In addition, after Mother’s DUI arrest in May 2022 and Minor’s
removal from her care, the Agency attempted to contact Father on multiple
occasions. Father, however, never responded to the Agency, despite the fact
he (1) was still seeing Mother, who was having supervised visits with Minor;
14
(2) himself visited Minor in January 2023, five months into the dependency;
and (3) claimed also to have informally visited Minor about five other times
during reunification.
Father also mistakenly believed that maternal grandmother—and not
Mother—had “custody” of the child during the proceedings. He acknowledged
he “[s]ort of” knew about the dependency, but believed his involvement was
unnecessary because he was “comfortable” with the informal “coparenting
arrangement” he and Mother allegedly utilized. Father thus “didn’t feel [he]
needed to come to family court and get anything.” Even accepting this is
what he subjectively believed, the disconnect between this belief and reality
indicates that Father did not engage in “regular visitation and contact” with
Minor. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 632.)
The record also shows that when Mother disclosed in March 2023 that
Father was Minor’s biological parent, Mother’s counsel informed the juvenile
court that Mother had withheld this information because Father had
threatened to retaliate against her if she involved him in this case. Mother’s
concern was reasonable given that she accused Father of multiple acts of
domestic violence—including physical abuse—while pregnant with Minor, as
set forth in a court filing she made under penalty of perjury in June 2021.12
This evidence further supports the inference that Father made a conscious
decision not to involve himself in Minor’s dependency until it appeared the
child might be “adopted out.”
12 Father himself introduced Mother’s request for a domestic violence
restraining order against him when he unsuccessfully attempted to show that
the Agency allegedly did not act with the requisite diligence in attempting to
locate him.
15
In sum, we conclude the record does not compel a finding (see I.W.,
supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528) that Father maintained “regular visitation
and contact” with Minor for purposes of the parental-benefit exception to
adoption. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 632.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating the parental rights of Father is
affirmed. In light of our decision with regard to Father, we also affirm the
court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
16
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