CourtListener 10327821•People v. Hernandez CA4/3
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Filed 2/5/25 P. v. Hernandez CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063302
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF2103919)
JERRY HERNANDEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, Jeffrey M. Zimel, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
Marcia R. Clark, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Britton B. Lacy, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Early one morning on his way to work, Jerry Hernandez noticed
what appeared to be an abandoned car on the side of the road. After
approaching the vehicle, he realized someone was lying on the back seat.
Hernandez drove away, but about 10 minutes later he returned, shot the
stranger twice in the head, and took his wallet. Minutes later Hernandez
boasted about the killing to his brother, who subsequently disclosed
Hernandez’s involvement to the police.
When interviewed by police, Hernandez gave varying accounts
about what happened. At first, he claimed the car was abandoned and he had
only stolen a wallet; he later said he shot the car’s occupant in self-defense
after getting into a verbal and physical alteration. A jury convicted
Hernandez of first degree murder.
Hernandez claims the trial court prejudicially erred by refusing
to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion, and
by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on provocation, which might reduce
first degree murder to second degree murder; he also claims he is owed an
additional day of custody credit. We reject his first two contentions and affirm
the judgment; however, we agree the abstract of judgment needs correction
and therefore remand this matter for further proceedings.
FACTS
Andrew S. sometimes slept in his car if he arrived home late, as
he did not want to disturb his family. He suffered from knee problems, so
when sleeping in his car, he would lie down in the back seat, leave the rear
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door open, fully extend his legs, and let his feet hang out. He also sometimes
smoked marijuana to alleviate his knee pain.
Early one morning in September 2021, at about 1:30 a.m.,
Andrew parked his car across the street from a gym in Perris; he then lay
down to sleep on the back seat. About 15 minutes later, a man driving home
from work became concerned when he noticed feet sticking out of the rear
driver’s side door, and he stopped to make sure the person inside was alright.
Andrew woke up and confirmed he was okay; he was not aggressive in any
way.
At 5:30 that morning, Hernandez shot Andrew twice in the head.
Hernandez later admitted that he shot Andrew, but he provided conflicting
accounts as to why he did so. There was also inconsistent evidence as to
where Andrew was and what he was doing (laying down, sitting in the car, or
outside the car) when Hernandez shot him.
Business records confirm that Hernandez clocked into his job at a
nearby warehouse at 4:54 a.m. but clocked out at 5:00 a.m., claiming his
allergies were giving him breathing problems.
About 20 minutes later, Hernandez parked his van near
Andrew’s car. Surveillance cameras at the gym where Andrew was parked
show a person walking between Hernandez’s van and the passenger side of
Andrew’s car, with what appears to be a flashlight, at 5:19 a.m. The van
drove away two minutes later.
Hernandez’s van returned 10 minutes later at 5:31 a.m. This
second visit lasted about 10 minutes and was also caught on the gym’s
surveillance cameras; what appears to be a flashlight, followed by flashes
consistent with gunfire, are visible between Hernandez’s van and the
passenger side of Andrew’s car. Hernandez’s van drove away at 5:40 a.m.
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Hernandez’s van returned a third time about 15 minutes later.
The surveillance video shows someone exiting the van and walking to the
passenger side of Andrew’s car. The van drove away two minutes later.
According to Hernandez’s brother, B.H., Hernandez returned
home from work unexpectedly that morning around 6:00 a.m., parked his
van, claimed he left work because there was nothing for him to do, and began
pacing back and forth. A few minutes later, Hernandez came into B.H.’s room
and said he had killed someone. B.H. did not believe him, so Hernandez
showed B.H. a wallet and two expended bullet casings. B.H. knew Hernandez
owned a gun; he observed that Hernandez did not appear to be upset.
Hernandez told B.H. it felt good to watch someone die.
B.H. was still in disbelief, so the two men drove to the scene,
which was near their home, at about 6:40 a.m. They parked and walked to
Andrew’s car; B.H. saw the body. Hernandez told B.H. that he had been
passing by and was trying to help the person, but the person was “sketchy” or
“on drugs” and “charged him.” Hernandez explained that he shot the person
twice outside the vehicle and then put the body back in the car; he later
returned and took Andrew’s wallet. As Hernandez and B.H. drove home
together, Hernandez behaved “[l]ike nothing happened.”
Meanwhile, a woman leaving the gym noticed Andrew’s car and
saw his feet sticking out the open rear door. She called 911 to report the car
as a suspicious vehicle.
Responding officers arrived around 7:00 a.m., observed that
Andrew’s rear driver’s side door was open, and found Andrew’s body in the
vehicle. He was positioned on his right side, covered with a blanket and with
his head on a pillow, as if asleep, with a cell phone cradled in his arm.
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Toxicology testing later indicated the presence of marijuana in his blood, but
not alcohol or other drugs.
The entrance wounds indicated the murder weapon was within
18 inches of Andrew’s head when it was fired. Additionally, the blood flow
from Andrew’s wounds, and the absence of blood in certain other parts of the
car, were consistent with him having been shot while lying down with his
head on the pillow, with his phone nestled in his arm. Andrew was found
wearing white socks without shoes, and his socks were clean.
Other than the gunshot wounds, Andrew had no other visible
injuries. No firearms or ammunition were found inside the vehicle, and there
were no signs of a struggle.
Later that morning, Hernandez’s brother, B.H., returned to the
scene and reported Hernandez’s involvement in the killing. Police
apprehended Hernandez shortly thereafter.
When investigators interviewed Hernandez later that day, he
gave conflicting versions of what had transpired that morning. At first, he
claimed he had scoped out an “abandoned” car to “jack something,” found
only a wallet containing $7, returned later to make sure he had not missed
anything, and then went home to go to sleep.
Later in the interview, Hernandez admitted to shooting the car’s
occupant. Hernandez claimed that when he first passed by the car, its
occupant had been sitting in the back seat; Hernandez asked if he was okay
but got no response, so Hernandez went to work. After calling out of his shift,
Hernandez returned to the car “out of curiosity”; when the occupant noticed
“he was getting jacked,” he became “crazy,” was not “in his right mind,” and
said things like, “Get out of here. Fuck you.” Hernandez then decided he “had
to . . . fight back” and thought to himself, “fuck this fool,” “I’m gonna fuck him
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up,” and “I want to fight with him.” Hernandez then punched the person,
grabbed a gun from the car’s passenger seat, and “clipped” the person twice.
He then moved the body to the back seat and took the person’s wallet, the
gun, and a pack of gum. Hernandez added that he had recently “got into a
warehouse fight” at work and was “angry,” but also claimed he acted in “self-
defense.” He maintained he did not shoot to kill, but only to make the
occupant “shut up already.”1
Hernandez was charged with first degree murder (Pen. Code,2
§ 187, subd. (a)) and with personally and intentionally discharging a firearm
causing the victim’s death (§§ 12022.53, subd. (d), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)).
Defense counsel requested jury instructions on both the imperfect
self-defense and heat of passion theories of voluntary manslaughter. After
reviewing Hernandez’s police interview and hearing argument from counsel,
the trial court agreed to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense
(CALCRIM No. 571), but declined to instruct on the heat of passion theory of
manslaughter (CALCRIM No. 570), finding Hernandez’s version of what
occurred was “legally insufficient to constitute provocation.”
The trial court explained its thinking: “although [Hernandez]
does at various times say the word ‘self-defense’ or ‘he was coming at me’ or
‘it was me or him,’ if you follow the story, he makes it pretty clear that
he . . . was stealing the victim’s wallet when . . . the victim first started
saying for him to ‘get out of here’ and telling him ‘fuck you.’ That is when the
1 Hernandez’s description of what happened was not
chronological and was at times rambling and incoherent. Our summary tries
to make some sense of his statement.
2 All further statutory references are to this code.
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statements are of aggressiveness, when the victim is basically noticing that
[Hernandez] is stealing his things, he’s ‘getting jacked,’ as [Hernandez] said.
[¶] Again, if I read this correctly, [Hernandez] left and then came back and
that is when he clipped the victim or shot and killed the victim. And, yes, he
said that ‘he kept talking shit’ and ‘he wouldn’t shut up,’ but, again, I think
those are legally insufficient to constitute provocation.”
The jury deliberated for less than two hours and found
Hernandez guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced him to 50 years to life
in state prison. Hernandez filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Hernandez claims that the trial court prejudicially erred by
refusing his request to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on
heat of passion, and that it further erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the
jury on provocation reducing first degree murder to second degree murder.
Before addressing his arguments, we briefly review the legal concepts of
provocation and heat of passion.
“‘First degree murder is an unlawful killing with malice
aforethought, premeditation, and deliberation’; ‘[s]econd degree murder is an
unlawful killing with malice, but without . . . premeditation and deliberation’;
and voluntary manslaughter is an unlawful intentional killing without
malice, premeditation, or deliberation.” (People v. Nunez (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 362, 368 (Nunez); see People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935,
941-942 (Beltran).)
“Provocation may preclude a defendant from subjectively
premeditating and deliberating and, as a result, may reduce a murder from
first degree to second degree. [Citation.] Likewise, if provocation would cause
a reasonable person to react with deadly passion so as to negate the existence
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of malice, the crime may be reduced from murder to voluntary
manslaughter.” (Nunez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 368.)
Hernandez maintains Andrew provoked him, causing him to act
in the heat of passion, and the jury therefore should have been given an
opportunity to decide whether that provocation reduced his crime from first
degree murder to either second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter.
I.
HEAT OF PASSION INSTRUCTION ON VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
We first consider whether the trial court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion.
According to Hernandez, his statements to police provided sufficient evidence
of provocation to justify an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. He
maintains that whether he acted under the heat of passion was a question for
the jury to decide. We cannot agree.
As our Supreme Court has explained, “Heat of passion is a
mental state that precludes the formation of malice and reduces an unlawful
killing from murder to manslaughter. Heat of passion arises if, ‘“at the time
of the killing, the reason of the accused was obscured or disturbed by passion
to such an extent as would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of average
disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and reflection, and from
such passion rather than from judgment.”’ [Citation.] Heat of passion, then,
is a state of mind caused by legally sufficient provocation that causes a
person to act, not out of rational thought but out of unconsidered reaction to
the provocation.” (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 942, fn. omitted.) The
proper focus is not whether the provoking conduct would cause the average
person to kill, but rather whether the provocation would cause the average
person to have such a passionate response that his reason and judgment are
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obscured and his reaction overrides his ability to think rationally. (Id. at
p. 949.)
“Heat of passion has both objective and subjective components.
Objectively, the victim’s conduct must have been sufficiently provocative to
cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or without due
deliberation and reflection.” (People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 759
(Enraca).) “Subjectively, ‘the accused must be shown to have killed while
under “the actual influence of a strong passion” induced by such
provocation.’” (Ibid.) A trial court must instruct the jury on a heat of passion
theory of voluntary manslaughter “‘only if there is substantial evidence from
which a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant committed the
lesser, uncharged offense, but not the greater, charged offense.’” (People v.
Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 538.)
The Supreme Court has “rejected arguments that
insults . . . would induce sufficient provocation in an ordinary person to merit
an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.” (Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p.
759; see People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 826 (Gutierrez) [“a
voluntary manslaughter instruction is not warranted where the act that
allegedly provoked the killing was no more than taunting words”]; see, e.g.,
People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 586 [evidence that the victim
called the defendant a “‘mother fucker’” and told him to take out his weapon
and use it was “insufficient to cause an average person to become so inflamed
as to lose reason and judgment”].)
Applying those standards here, we conclude the trial court
properly declined Hernandez’s requested instruction because there was
insufficient evidence of either objective or subjective provocation to warrant
an instruction on heat of passion. Considering Hernandez’s varying accounts
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about what happened, nothing that Andrew allegedly said or did “would
cause an ordinary person with an average disposition to act rashly or without
due deliberation and reflection.” (See Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 759.)
That goes for Andrew’s alleged words to Hernandez (e.g., “Get out of here.
Fuck you”). (Ibid. [insults do not warrant heat of passion instruction].) Our
analysis also applies to any physical response Andrew may have had when
Hernandez attempted to steal his wallet. (Id. at p. 760 [“[p]redictable and
reasonable conduct by a victim resisting felonious assault is not sufficient
provocation to merit an instruction on voluntary manslaughter”].) Indeed,
even if the two allegedly exchanged blows, that would not rise to the level of
provocation necessary to support a voluntary manslaughter instruction.
(Gutierrez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 827 [“Simple assault, such as [scratching,
kicking, and grabbing], also does not rise to the level of provocation necessary
to support a voluntary manslaughter instruction”].)
In any event, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(See People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260, fn.7 [the Chapman
harmless error standard3 applies in reviewing failure to instruct on voluntary
manslaughter under a heat of passion theory].) Here, the guilty verdict and
the jury’s finding that Hernandez committed willful, deliberate, and
premeditated first degree murder precluded any possibility of also finding
that Hernandez acted under heat of passion because “voluntary
manslaughter based on heat of passion is ‘manifestly inconsistent’ with
premeditation and deliberation.” (Schuller, supra, at p. 265 (conc. opn. of Liu,
J.); see People v. Wang (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1071-1072 [jury’s finding
that defendant premeditated and deliberated the killing was “manifestly
3 See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.
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inconsistent” with his having acted under the heat of passion, so omission of
heat of passion instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; People
v. Franklin (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 881, 894 [“jury’s finding of premeditation
and deliberation is ‘manifestly inconsistent with having acted under the heat
of passion’ and nullifies any potential for prejudice”].)
The jury rejected Hernandez’s self-defense argument and found
him guilty of first degree murder after deliberating for less than two hours.
Because any evidence supporting a heat of passion instruction “was, at best,
extremely weak,” any instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. (See People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 621.)
II.
PROVOCATION INSTRUCTION ON SECOND DEGREE MURDER
Hernandez next contends the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury on provocation that reduces first degree murder to second
degree murder. Although no provocation instruction was requested at trial,
Hernandez asserts the court had a duty to instruct sua sponte on provocation,
and further that his defense counsel was ineffective in declining to request
the instruction. Again, we are not persuaded.
As noted above, “[p]rovocation may preclude a defendant from
subjectively premeditating and deliberating and, as a result, may reduce a
murder from first degree to second degree.” (Nunez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
p. 368; see CALCRIM No. 522.) For provocation to reduce murder from first
degree to second degree, “a subjective test applies . . . : it inquires whether
the defendant in fact committed the act because he was provoked. The
rationale is that provocation may negate the elements of premeditation,
deliberateness and willfulness that are required for that degree of the crime.”
(People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000.)
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Hernandez claims the trial court should have instructed the jury
on provocation even absent a request from counsel to do so. We disagree.
Instructions on provocation are pinpoint instructions; the court therefore had
no sua sponte duty to give the instruction absent a request. (People v.
Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 384.) Because Hernandez did not request the
instruction, he forfeited the argument.
Hernandez alternatively contends his counsel was ineffective in
failing to request the instruction. Again, we are not persuaded. Defense
counsel could have reasonably concluded that a CALCRIM No. 522
instruction request would have been denied in light of the trial court’s
finding, in connection with Hernandez’s request for a heat of passion
instruction, that Hernandez’s version of what occurred was “legally
insufficient to constitute provocation.”4
For the same reasons the evidence was insufficient to support a
heat of passion instruction, the evidence was also insufficient to warrant an
instruction on subjective provocation under CALCRIM No. 522. As explained
above, not one of Hernandez’s conflicting accounts of what happened show he
subjectively acted because Andrew provoked him. Thus, there is no
reasonable probability Hernandez would have obtained a better result had
the instruction been given.
4 Voluntary manslaughter based upon heat of passion requires
both objective and subjective provocation. (Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 759.) Although the trial court did not say whether it found insufficient
evidence of objective provocation, subjective provocation, or both, defense
counsel could have reasonably determined that the court’s finding was not
limited to objective provocation only but also encompassed the subjective
provocation necessary to support a CALCRIM No. 522 instruction.
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The jury instructions and guilty verdict further support our
conclusion. The trial court instructed the jury that Hernandez was “guilty of
first degree murder if . . . he acted willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation,” and that a decision to kill is “not deliberate and
premeditated” if “made rashly, impulsively, or without careful consideration.”
(CALCRIM No. 521.) In finding Hernandez guilty of first degree murder, the
jury necessarily concluded he acted with premeditation and deliberation—
findings that are inconsistent with Hernandez’s assertion that he was
provoked.
In short, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury
sua sponte with CALCRIM No. 522; defense counsel did not render ineffective
assistance in failing to request that instruction; and, in any event, any
alleged error was harmless.
III.
CUSTODY CREDIT
Hernandez’s final contention is that he is entitled to one
additional day of custody credit because the trial court’s award of 680 days of
actual custody credit failed to factor in the day of his sentencing hearing. The
Attorney General concedes Hernandez is correct. We agree.
“Calculation of custody credit begins on the day of arrest and
continues through the day of sentencing.” (People v. Rajanayagam (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 42, 48.) Police arrested Hernandez on September 9, 2021,
and the trial court sentenced him on July 21, 2023. Accordingly, Hernandez
is entitled to 681 days of actual custody credit, and the abstract of judgment
should be amended to reflect as much.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial
court with directions to prepare an amended abstract of judgment consistent
with this opinion and to forward a certified copy to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
GOETHALS, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P. J.
MOORE, J.
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