People v. Nelson CA2/1

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Filed 1/31/25 P. v. Nelson CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B334415

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA019560)
v.

SERGIO DUJUAN NELSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Chung L. Mar, Deputy
Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________________________
Defendant Sergio Dujuan Nelson appeals from an order
denying his motion for a hearing under People v. Franklin
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), to make a record of information
relevant to a future youth offender parole hearing. He contends
that the statute that excludes him from such proceedings violates
his constitutional rights to equal protection of the laws and the
guarantees against cruel or unusual punishment. We reject
these contentions and affirm the court’s order.

FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Our Supreme Court summarized the facts of this case as
follows: “On September 11, 1993, [defendant] resigned from his
job at Target after failing to receive a promotion. Shortly before
4:00 a.m. on October 2, 1993, he shot and killed Robin Shirley,
the woman who received the promotion [defendant] believed he
had deserved, and Lee Thompson, a coworker who had defended
Shirley when [defendant] harassed her about her promotion.
[Defendant] knew Shirley typically waited in the parking lot
for the store to open. He rode to the Target parking lot on his
bicycle, armed with a loaded gun. Shirley and Thompson were in
the front seat of Thompson’s car. [Defendant] parked his bicycle,
approached the car on foot from behind and fired several shots
into the car through an open rear window, then started to walk
away before returning and firing again into the car. (People v.
Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 522 (Nelson I).)
In August 1995, a jury convicted defendant of two counts
of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187)1 and found true special

1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

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circumstance allegations that he committed multiple murders
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and committed them while lying in wait
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)). The jury also found that he personally
used a firearm in committing each murder. (Former § 12022.5,
subd. (a).) The court sentenced him to death.
In 2016, the California Supreme Court held that the
evidence was insufficient to support the lying in wait special
circumstance finding and, on that basis, reversed his death
sentence. (Nelson I, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 549–550, 574.)
On the date set for defendant’s resentencing, defendant
filed a motion for relief under the California Racial Justice Act
(Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1, p. 3706) (CRJA). The court denied
the motion and sentenced defendant on count 1 to prison for life
without the possibility of parole (LWOP) based on the multiple
murder special circumstance finding, plus the upper term of
five years on the firearm enhancement. The court sentenced
defendant on count 2 to a consecutive prison term of 25 years
to life, plus a consecutive five years on the firearm enhancement.
Defendant appealed. In an unpublished opinion, we
rejected his challenge to the court’s denial of his CRJA motion,
but held that the post-sentencing enactment of Senate Bill
No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) § 2, required reversal of the upper
term sentence on the firearm enhancement. (People v. Nelson
(Feb. 2, 2023, B313825) [nonpub. opn.] (Nelson II).)
After remand, defendant filed a motion in the trial court
under Franklin, seeking a hearing for the purpose of preserving
mitigating evidence for use in a future youth offender parole
hearing. Defendant also requested the appointment of counsel.
He supported the motion with his declaration stating that he was

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under 26 years old when he committed the murders and he
received a sentence of more than 15 years.
On August 18, 2023, the court summarily denied the
motion because he was over the age of 18 years when he
committed the murders and was sentenced to LWOP.
Defendant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
A. Equal Protection
Under section 3051, a person who commits a crime when he
or she is under 18 years of age and is sentenced for that crime to
LWOP is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing and eligible
for release on parole after 25 years of incarceration. (§ 3051,
subd. (b)(4).) In Franklin, our state Supreme Court established
that defendants who are entitled to receive a youth offender
parole hearing in the future have the right presently to make a
record of information that may be relevant to that future parole
hearing. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.) Courts refer to
this information-preserving opportunity as a “Franklin hearing.”
(In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 459; People v. Mason (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 411, 414 (Mason).)
Section 3051 “shall not apply to cases in which . . . an
individual is sentenced to [LWOP] for a controlling offense that
was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age.”
(§ 3051, subd. (h).) Defendant murdered his victims when he
was 19 years old. He is thus statutorily excluded from the benefit
of a youth offender parole hearing and, therefore, not entitled
to a Franklin hearing. Defendant contends that denying these
procedures to him deprives him of equal protection of the laws
under the federal and state Constitutions because, as a young

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adult sentenced to LWOP, he is treated differently than juvenile
offenders sentenced to LWOP.2
Defendant and the Attorney General agree that the
test for evaluating the defendant’s equal protection challenge
is whether there is a rational basis for the Legislature’s
disparate treatment of individuals serving LWOP terms who,
like defendant, committed their crimes when they were adults
and those who committed their crimes as juveniles. (Cf. Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 851.)
The Courts of Appeal that have considered this issue
have unanimously upheld the disparate treatment defendant
challenges. In People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, the
court explained that “[t]he Legislature had a rational basis to
distinguish between offenders with [LWOP sentences] based on
their age. For juvenile offenders, such a sentence may violate the
Eighth Amendment. [Citations.] But the same sentence does not
violate the Eighth Amendment when imposed on an adult, even
an adult under the age of 26.” (Sands, supra, at p. 204.) The
Sands court thus concluded “that the Legislature could rationally
decide to remedy unconstitutional sentences but go no further.”
(Ibid.; accord, Mason, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 415; People v.

2 Defendant appears to also argue that treating young
adult defendants who are sentenced to LWOP and young adult
defendants who are not sentenced to LWOP differently violates
equal protection guarantees. But it further appears that he
concedes that this argument is foreclosed by our Supreme Court’s
decision in People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin). If
he is making the argument and not conceding its lack of merit,
we reject it under the controlling authority of Hardin. (See id.
at p. 866.)

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Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, 285–286, review granted
Jan. 11, 2023, S277487, revd. on other grounds by Hardin, supra,
15 Cal.5th 834; In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456, 464;
In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 436; People v. Morales
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 347; People v. Acosta (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 769, 779–780.) We agree with these authorities and
note that defendant does not cite contrary authority or make a
cogent argument for rejecting them. We therefore reject his
equal protection argument.

B. Cruel or Unusual Punishment
Nelson contends that his LWOP sentence violates
the federal and state constitutional bans on cruel or unusual
punishment. He acknowledges that he did not raise this issue
below and that we previously rejected “a somewhat similar
contention” in 2023. (See Nelson II, supra, B313825.)
Nevertheless, he contends that, although his LWOP sentence is
not unconstitutionally cruel or unusual as such, the Legislature
“cause[d]” his sentence to become cruel and unusual when it
granted youth offender parole hearings for some persons—
including persons serving non-LWOP terms who committed their
crimes when they were between 18 and 26 years of age—while
denying that right to him. The Legislature has, he argues, moved
the line that courts had drawn to determine the constitutionality
of LWOP sentences from 18 years of age to 26 years of age.
The argument is made without citation to apposite authority.
Moreover, the legislative acts of lenity in providing youth
offender parole hearings to young adults who committed crimes
punished less severely than LWOP, does not render defendant’s
punishment unconstitutionally cruel or unusual.

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DISPOSITION
The August 18, 2023 order from which defendant appeals is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

BENDIX, J.

WEINGART, J.

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