CourtListener 10325191•People v. Welch CA3
Texto completo
Filed 1/31/25 P. v. Welch CA3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yuba)
----
THE PEOPLE, C095476
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CRF1700159)
v.
OPINION ON TRANSFER
CAMERON MICHAEL WELCH,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant Cameron Michael Welch guilty of committing corporal
injury on his spouse, possessing a firearm as a felon, possessing ammunition as a felon,
and failing to appear. The trial court then imposed a sentence that included the upper
term on the corporal injury count. On appeal, Welch claims: (1) the court erred when it
permitted the victim to testify about prior incidents of domestic violence between her and
Welch; (2) his upper term sentence should be reversed and remanded in light of Senate
Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 567); and (3) he received
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ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to object to several fines
and fees under People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157.
In an opinion filed on April 12, 2023, we concluded Welch had not demonstrated
prejudicial error requiring reversal and, accordingly, we affirmed the judgment. The
California Supreme Court granted review and ordered this court to vacate its prior
decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730
(Lynch) and Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821. Having done so, we now
conclude that remand for a resentencing hearing is required. We otherwise affirm the
judgment.
BACKGROUND
Welch was charged with corporal injury on a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd.
(a); count 1),1 possession of a firearm as a convicted felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count
2), possession of ammunition as a convicted felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 3), and
failure to appear while out on bail (§§ 1320.5, 12022.1; count 4). The prosecution also
alleged Welch had a prior strike conviction based on a 2009 conviction for corporal
injury on a dating partner (§ 273.5) with a great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7,
subd. (e)). Welch admitted the prior strike and bail enhancements before trial.
At trial, the victim testified Welch had a history of domestic violence before and
after they were married. The victim had a history of abusing alcohol and self-harm. On
the evening of the charged offense, the victim was upset and wanted to get a drink.
Welch and the victim went for a drive and drank vodka. They returned home eventually,
and the victim remembered entering through the garage, but did not recall anything after
that.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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Before the two had left the house, the house was clean and tidy, and the doors
were intact. The victim was also uninjured. When the victim woke up in the morning,
the house was in disarray. Welch was asleep. There was a shotgun that the victim had
never seen before in the house. The victim had a “flash of memory” from the night
before: she was sitting on the bed and Welch was pressing a handgun against her skin.
The victim looked in a mirror and saw dried blood on her face and several injuries she
did not have before. In particular, she had abrasions or lacerations on her neck, bruising
behind her right ear, dried blood and an abrasion above her eye, and a bruise and
laceration on her thigh. She also had bruises on her torso and hands.
The victim called a friend and said she and Welch had been fighting all night, that
he had weapons in the house, “had been physical with her,” and that she was hiding in a
closet. The victim also sent pictures of her injuries and firearms in the house. The friend
and her boyfriend called law enforcement.
A sheriff’s deputy arrived at the house, but no one answered the door. Dispatch
routed a call from Welch to the deputy, and Welch asked what was wrong with the
victim. The deputy asked him why he would think something was wrong with the victim,
but Welch did not respond. The victim eventually let the deputy into the house. She
appeared to have fresh injuries and the house was in “complete disarray,” with a broken
door near the fireplace. The deputy found a variety of ammunition around the home, but
could not find the shotgun the victim showed him in a photo she had taken earlier that
morning. The victim told the deputy she did not have a specific memory about how she
had been injured, but said Welch had inflicted them. The jury found Welch guilty of all
charges.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel challenged several items in the
probation report, including misstatements about which prior conviction constituted a
prior strike. Defense counsel also objected to the amount of victim restitution. Welch
asked to speak, and then engaged the court in a lengthy exchange in which he
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acknowledged he had been convicted of two felonies before the current offense, admitted
he was on parole at the time of the offense, and said he made a “huge mistake” in
marrying the victim because she had “mental health issues.” The court eventually
ordered Welch removed from the courtroom.
The court imposed an aggregate term of 14 years: eight years (the upper term,
doubled) for count 1, 16 months each for counts 2 through 4, and two years for the bail
enhancement. The court explained it selected the upper term based on Welch’s two prior
felony convictions, prior prison terms, and because he was on parole at the time of the
current offense. The court imposed a $3,600 restitution fine (§ 1202.4) with a matching
parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45), suspended pending parole revocation, and said Welch
“has a limited ability to earn wages while in the Department of Corrections.” The court
also imposed a $160 court security assessment (§ 1465.8) and a $120 criminal conviction
assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373).
DISCUSSION
I
Prior Acts of Domestic Violence
Welch argues the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of his prior acts of
domestic violence toward the victim and a previous girlfriend. In particular, Welch
objects to the number of incidents introduced and argues they were unduly prejudicial
under Evidence Code section 352 because they were uncorroborated by other evidence,
distracted the jury, and were cumulative. We disagree.
A. Background
Before trial, the prosecution filed a motion in limine seeking the admission of
Welch’s prior acts of violence under Evidence Code section 1109. In particular, the
prosecution highlighted an incident in October 2016 where Welch grabbed the victim by
the throat and pinned her against a wall. The prosecution also identified incidents the
victim testified to at the preliminary hearing, including an incident where Welch had tied
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the victim up and threatened to kill her. The motion also highlighted an incident from
2009 with a previous girlfriend in which Welch struck the girlfriend in the face and
strangled her until she lost consciousness.
The court found the 2016 incident admissible under Evidence Code section 1109
and People v. Zack (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 409, in that it showed the “up and downs and
all the violence that is involved in this particular relationship.” The court ruled similarly
as to the other incident with the victim, saying it was included as part of “the totality of
the relationship, the entire relationship between defendant and his spouse.” The court
also determined the prosecution could use certified documents proving the conviction for
the incident with Welch’s prior girlfriend, but that the specific facts would be
inadmissible unless the prior girlfriend testified.
At trial, the victim testified that Welch had been physically violent with her
approximately 10 to 15 times before they married in 2016. She said there was “nothing
. . . off limits,” including “strangulation, slamming my head up against windowsills,” and
hurting her arms and legs. She was frequently injured and would use makeup or clothes
to hide the injuries. After they were married, she estimated he had been violent with her
at least six times.
In particular, she recounted an incident in which Welch held her against a wall by
her neck. She also remembered an incident where Welch choked her to prevent her from
calling police. She briefly mentioned an incident in which Welch shoved her in the
shower when she was getting ready for work and punched her in the legs because she was
talking to someone at work. In one instance, Welch broke furniture. He tied her up and
told her he was going to chop her up and throw her in the river. The victim told a friend
about some of the abuse, but did not disclose the severity to anyone, and did not report
Welch to law enforcement.
During a break in the proceedings, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on
the victim’s testimony, saying the specific number of incidents the victim testified to was
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beyond the scope of the court’s ruling on the motion in limine. The court denied the
motion, citing to Evidence Code section 1109 and People v. Zack, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d
409.
Deputy Phillip Bronson testified that when he spoke with the victim on the day of
the incident, she told him about prior incidents of domestic violence between her and
Welch, including an incident where he grabbed her throat and pinned her against a wall.
Welch also told her he was going to “chop her up into little pieces.”
B. Analysis
Evidence of prior criminal acts is ordinarily inadmissible to show a defendant’s
propensity to commit such acts. (Evid. Code, § 1101.) There is an exception, however,
in cases involving domestic violence. (Evid. Code, § 1109.) Evidence Code section
1109, in effect, “ ‘permits the admission of defendant’s other acts of domestic violence
for the purpose of showing a propensity to commit such crimes.’ ” (People v. Brown
(2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1233.) The admission of prior acts as propensity evidence
encompasses both charged and uncharged acts. (Ibid.)
“Even if the evidence is admissible under [Evidence Code] section 1109, the trial
court must still determine, pursuant to [Evidence Code] section 352, whether the
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the probability the
evidence will consume an undue amount of time or create a substantial danger of undue
prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury.” (People v. Brown, supra,
192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1233.) The law requires “ ‘ “the probative value of the evidence
must be balanced against four factors: (1) the inflammatory nature of the uncharged
conduct; (2) the possibility of confusion of issues; (3) remoteness in time of the
uncharged offenses; and (4) the amount of time involved in introducing and refuting the
evidence of uncharged offenses.” ’ ” (People v. Thomas (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 612, 630,
quoting People v. Culbert (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 184, 192.) “ ‘The principal factor
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affecting the probative value of an uncharged act is its similarity to the charged
offense.’ ” (People v. Hollie (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274.)
The court enjoys broad discretion in making this determination, and the court’s
exercise of discretion will not be disturbed on appeal except upon a showing that it was
exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice. (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 480.) To
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, we must focus on what the court
was made aware of at the time it ruled on the motion; a party cannot argue on appeal that
the trial court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to conduct. (People
v. Fruits (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 188, 208.)
Here, Welch’s acts of prior domestic violence were probative because they
occurred not long before the current offense and tended to show his actions were willful
and intentional. For example, Welch had a history of restraining the victim by the throat
or strangling the victim, which suggested the marks on the victim’s neck were not
accidental or self-inflicted. At trial, Welch explicitly argued the victim’s injuries may
have been caused as a result of the victim’s own actions or as self-harm, and his history
of domestic violence effectively rebutted that claim.
Moreover, the prior acts of domestic violence were not significantly more
inflammatory than the charged offense. Many of the previous incidents were not
summarized in detail, aside from general statements about Welch’s conduct, and the
incidents that were explained involved injuries that were less severe. (See People v.
Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1314.) The evidence did not consume a large
amount of time and was straightforward, avoiding any risk of confusing the issues for the
jury. For the same reasons, we do not agree that the evidence was unduly cumulative.
Welch contends the evidence was not sufficiently corroborated by third-party
testimony or other evidence. Evidence Code section 1109, subdivision (d)(3) states, in
pertinent part: “Subject to a hearing conducted pursuant to [Evidence Code] Section 352,
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which shall include consideration of any corroboration and remoteness in time, ‘domestic
violence’ has the further meaning as set forth in Section 6211 of the Family Code, if the
act occurred no more than five years before the charged offense.” “Consideration” of any
corroboration, however, does not mean that corroboration is required. (People v. Mani
(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 372.) Moreover, the language “any corroboration” implies a
broad interpretation of evidence that could corroborate the victim’s testimony. (Id. at
p. 373.) Here, the victim told Deputy Bronson about at least one incident of domestic
violence, and the victim’s friend noted the victim frequently asked her to cover shifts at
work and she “worried things weren’t right.” (Cf. Id. at p. 373 [concluding
contemporaneous police reports may serve as corroboration of the event].) We do not
agree the court abused its discretion simply because each individual incident the victim
mentioned was not independently corroborated by other evidence.
Nor do we agree the jury might punish Welch for the uncharged acts rather than
the current offense. The court instructed the jury using CALCRIM No. 852A (evidence
of uncharged domestic violence), which cautioned the jury that the prosecution was
required to prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt, the prior acts of domestic
violence were not sufficient by themselves to constitute such proof, and the acts could not
be considered for any other purpose. This instruction guarded against the possibility the
jury would use the evidence for an improper purpose. (People v. Wilson (2008)
44 Cal.4th 758, 803 [jury presumed to follow jury instructions].) And while the potential
for punishment is a legitimate factor for the court to consider in the Evidence Code
section 352 analysis (People v. Tran (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1040, 1047), the minimal
potential for such an effect does not substantially outweigh the probative value we
conclude exists here. (People v. Mani, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 373.)
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the prior
acts evidence.
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II
Senate Bill No. 567
Welch contends the trial court prejudicially erred when it imposed the upper term
on the corporal injury count in violation of Senate Bill No. 567 and section 1170,
subdivision (b).
Senate Bill No. 567 became effective January 1, 2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731; Cal.
Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c).) The legislation generally prohibits a trial court from
imposing an upper term sentence except where there are circumstances in aggravation of
the crime that justify imposing the upper term, and the facts underlying those
circumstances (1) have been stipulated to by the defendant, or (2) have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(1), (2), added by Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) An exception to this rule
authorizes the court to consider Welch’s prior convictions in determining sentencing
based on certified records of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to the
jury. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3), added by Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) We agree with the
parties that Senate Bill No. 567 applies retroactively to Welch’s case. (Lynch, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 749.)
The trial court identified three reasons for imposing the upper term: (1) Welch’s
two prior felony convictions in 2003 and 2009, (2) that Welch served prison terms for
both of those prior felony convictions, and (3) the fact that Welch was on parole when he
committed the current offense. While the 2009 felony conviction was established using
certified records, the 2003 conviction was not.2 During the sentencing hearing, Welch
acknowledged having two prior felony convictions and being on parole at the time of the
2 The certified records of the 2009 conviction are redacted and do not include any
reference to a prison term.
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current offense.3 However, at least some of the factors the court relied on to impose the
upper term—specifically, Welch’s prior prison terms and, arguably, the 2003
conviction—were not found true by a jury or stipulated to by Welch. Therefore, under
section 1170, subdivision (b), the trial court erred in considering these circumstances
when imposing the upper term.
We originally concluded the trial court’s error was not prejudicial because it was
not reasonably probable the jury would have found that Welch did not serve a prior
prison term or did not receive the 2003 conviction. We now conclude remand is
required.
Under section 1170, subdivision (b), “a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when
the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence,
even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.” (Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768.) Such a violation “is prejudicial unless an appellate court can
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the
aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that
those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory
requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman[4]
standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.” (Lynch, at
p. 768.) Accordingly, Welch is entitled to reversal and remand “unless . . . we can
conclude that the omission of a jury trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to
every aggravating fact the trial court used to justify an upper term sentence. . . . In other
words, if ‘ “ ‘[n]o reasonable jury’ ” would have found in favor of the defendant on the
3 Welch agrees he admitted he was on parole, but argues the admission of the prior
convictions is insufficient because it did not include the required plea colloquy.
4 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.
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missing fact, given the jury’s actual verdict and the state of the evidence, the error may be
found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Id. at p. 775.)
Here, the trial court relied on Welch’s prior prison terms to impose an upper term
sentence. Welch did not stipulate to the existence of these terms, nor did a jury find them
true beyond a reasonable doubt. The People argue Welch clearly served prior prison
terms based on his acknowledgment at the sentencing hearing that he was on parole at the
time of the offense. But such a circumstantial inference falls short of the
“ ‘overwhelming evidence’ ” required under Lynch to find harmless error. (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 775.) Moreover, the trial court also noted the specific terms of Welch’s
prior sentences at the sentencing hearing, as well as the crimes with which they were
associated, neither of which would be available to a “reasonable jury” evaluating the
aggravating facts on this record. Consequently, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that a jury would have found true all facts relied upon by the trial court to impose
the upper term, and we must remand the case for resentencing.
Consistent with Lynch, the “proceedings on remand are to be conducted in
accordance with the current statutory requirements and the defendant given the
opportunity for the jury trial, of which he was deprived.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 777.) “On remand, the parties remain free to introduce at trial all relevant evidence to
support or contest the factual support for the aggravating circumstances set out in the
California Rules of Court. The court may rely on any properly proven aggravating facts,
including prior convictions or facts necessarily found by the jury to support a verdict on
underlying counts and enhancements. The court retains its discretion to impose an upper
term sentence if it concludes that one or more properly proved circumstances justify such
a sentence. [Citation.] If it cannot so conclude, it may impose no more than a middle
term . . . .” (Id. at pp. 777-778.)
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Because we have concluded Welch is entitled to a full resentencing, we do not
reach his challenge as to his fines and fees. Welch may raise any such objections, if
desired, at resentencing.
DISPOSITION
The sentence is reversed. The matter is remanded for full resentencing and further
litigation of the aggravating circumstances and for the trial court to exercise its discretion
under the current section 1170, subdivision (b). The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
EARL, P. J.
/s/
RENNER, J.
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