CourtListener 10325186•Hardy v. Forest River, Inc.
Texto completo
Filed 1/9/25; Modified and Certified for Pub. 1/31/25 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
JEAN M. HARDY, B331450
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22NWCV01656)
v.
FOREST RIVER, INC., et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lee W. Tsao, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Lawrence J. Hutchens and Shay Dinata-Hanson for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Phillips, Spallas & Angstadt, Michael R. Halvorsen and
Matthew A. Gardner for Defendants and Respondents.
_________________________
A California consumer enters into an agreement with an
RV manufacturer that all legal disputes regarding the sale will
be resolved in Indiana, governed by Indiana law. Upon the
consumer’s filing of a lawsuit in California under the Song-
Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly Act) (Civ. Code,
§ 1790 et seq.), the RV manufacturer files a motion to stay or
dismiss the action on forum non conveniens grounds, contending
that the exclusive jurisdiction for this case is Indiana. The
manufacturer further argues that to “allay” any concerns that
plaintiff’s “essentially unwaivable” rights under the Song-Beverly
Act will be forfeited if the case is resolved in Indiana, it will
stipulate that California law will apply to plaintiff’s warranty
claims and will not oppose a request that the Indiana court “use
Song-Beverly to adjudicate those allegations.”
This case raises the question whether, in the face of an
unconscionable agreement, a trial court may correct the problem
by staying the action so that, “should the Indiana court decline to
apply the Song-Beverly Act, then plaintiff can move to lift the
stay on this matter.”
We conclude that the lower court erred in its application of
the legal standard and in its conclusion that a stipulation to
apply California law and concomitant stay of the action would
remedy the waiver of non-waivable rights.
For these reasons, we reverse and remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jean Hardy filed a complaint for damages against Forest
River, Inc. and related defendants (Forest River) on December 19,
2022. The complaint alleged a single cause of action under the
Song-Beverly Act. Hardy alleged that she purchased a
2
motorhome 1 at the retail price of $130,543.61, but that Forest
River and its authorized repair facilities failed to either perform
all necessary repairs to correct its defects or replace it, thereby
breaching the express and implied warranties of merchantability.
Forest River then filed a motion to stay or dismiss the
action on the ground of forum non conveniens, contending that
exclusive jurisdiction for the case was in the state of Indiana.
Specifically, Forest River contended that in the Limited
Motorized Warranty applicable to this sale, there was a forum
selection clause that advised purchasers, in all caps, that
“exclusive jurisdiction for deciding legal disputes relating to the
limited warranty, an alleged breach of warranty, breach of
implied warranties, or representations of any kind must be filed
within the state of Indiana.”
In its motion, Forest River initially cited the wrong
standard for ruling on a forum selection clause, using the general
standard rather than the standard that applies when the claims
at issue are based on unwaivable rights created by California
statutes. However, it conceded later in its brief that “Plaintiff
may fear she could lose rights she might have asserted under
Song-Beverly if the forum selection clause in Forest River’s
Limited Warranty is enforced.” Forest River recognized that
“the California Legislature made, with certain exceptions, a
buyer’s rights under Song-Beverly essentially unwaivable.
[Citation.] Therefore, to allay any concerns in that regard,
Forest River will stipulate by this motion that Song-Beverly will
apply to plaintiff’s warranty claims pursued in an action in
1 We use the term “motorhome” and “RV” interchangeably,
as do the parties.
3
Indiana and that it will not oppose a request that the Indiana
court use Song-Beverly to adjudicate those allegations.”
Prior to a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted a
motion for trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure section
36, subdivision (e).
Hardy opposed the motion to stay the action, pointing out
that the correct standard for ruling on such a motion in the
context of a case involving unwaivable rights created by
California statutes placed the burden of proof on the defendant,
not the plaintiff. Hardy also argued that the warranty contained
unfair and unconscionable provisions that violated California
law. In addition to the forum selection and choice of law
provisions, which were in the document shown to plaintiff, Hardy
claimed there were additional unconscionable provisions in the
warranty and that it was not shown to her until after she had
signed the sales documents and taken possession of the
motorhome.
Specifically, Hardy argued that the warranty contained a
90-day statute of limitations (in contrast to four years under
California law); required the consumer to deliver the RV to
Forest River in Indiana for service if repairs are not adequately
completed by the seller or local authorized dealer; required an
exhaustion of remedies prior to bringing suit which was more
onerous than that required by the Song-Beverly Act; and
contained a disclaimer from incidental or consequential damages
inconsistent with the Song-Beverly Act.
Finally, plaintiff argued that Forest River’s offer to
stipulate to apply California law did not cure the unenforceability
of the choice of law and forum selection clause. Both in her
4
opposition and at oral argument, Hardy’s counsel stated that she
did not accept the stipulation.
In reply, Forest River again cited to cases holding that the
plaintiff had the burden to show the forum selection clause to be
unenforceable and argued that Hardy had not met her burden
here. Forest River also argued that even if, arguendo, “certain
provisions of the limited warranty might be unenforceable,
plaintiff ma[de] no showing that those provisions cannot be
severed from the limited warranty—including the mandatory
forum selection clause.”
The trial court granted the motion. In the section
addressing the legal standard, the court followed Forest River’s
lead in stating the general rule that places “a substantial burden
on a plaintiff seeking to defeat” a forum selection clause,
requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that the “forum selected
would be unavailable or unable to accomplish substantial justice”
and placing the burden of proof on the party opposing the
enforcement of the clause. However, in the section entitled
“Enforceability,” the trial court correctly noted that the “burden
is reversed when the claims at issue are based on unwaivable
rights created by California statutes.”
The trial court concluded that Forest River had met its
burden “because Plaintiff signed the forum selection clause, the
forum selection clause is not unconscionable, and Plaintiff’s Song-
Beverly rights can be readily preserved.” Responding to Hardy’s
contention that the warranty clause was “unconscionable because
Plaintiff was not given a copy of the limited warranty to review
prior to signing and agreeing to the limited warranty,” the court
concluded that she “did sign a separate page with only the forum
selection clause.” Finally, the court concluded that Hardy’s
5
concern about whether California law will be applied in Indiana
could “be remedied by staying this matter while the Indiana case
is pending and should the Indiana court decline to apply the
Song-Beverly Act, then Plaintiff can move to lift the stay on this
matter.”
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
We review an order enforcing a forum selection clause for
abuse of discretion. (America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court
(2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 (America Online); Verdugo v.
Alliantgroup, L.P. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 141, 148 (Verdugo).)
However, a discretionary order based on an application of
improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise
of informed discretion and is subject to reversal. The question of
whether a trial court applied the correct legal standard to an
issue in exercising its discretion is a question of law, which is
reviewed de novo. (Eneaji v. Ubboe (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457,
1463.)
“ ‘California favors contractual forum selection clauses so
long as they are entered into freely and voluntarily, and their
enforcement would not be unreasonable. . . .’ [¶] However,
‘California courts will refuse to defer to the selected forum if to do
so would substantially diminish the rights of California residents
in a way that violates our state’s public policy.’ [Citations.]”
(G Companies Management, LLC v. LREP Arizona, LLC (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 342, 350.)
Thus, while ordinarily the party opposing enforcement of a
forum selection clause bears the “ ‘ “substantial” burden’ ” of
proving why it should not be enforced, that burden is reversed
6
“when the claims at issue are based on unwaivable rights created
by California statutes.” (Verdugo, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at
p. 147; Wimsatt v. Beverly Hills Weight etc. Internat., Inc. (1995)
32 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1521-1522 (Wimsatt).)
It is undisputed that the Song-Beverly Act is a California
statute that has created unwaivable rights and thus, the burden
is on the party seeking to enforce the forum selection clause.
(Civ. Code, § 1790.1 [“Any waiver by the buyer of consumer goods
of the provisions of this chapter, except as expressly provided in
this chapter, shall be deemed contrary to public policy and shall
be unenforceable and void”]; Rheinhart v. Nissan North America,
Inc. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1034 (Rheinhart) [finding that
the Song-Beverly Act has a broad anti-waiver provision and
applying the standard articulated in Verdugo and Wimsatt].)
Where unwaivable claims are at issue, a defendant has the
burden “ ‘to prove that enforcement of the forum selection clause
would not result in a significant diminution of rights to California
consumers.’ [Citation.]” (Verdugo, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at
p. 150; see also Rheinhart, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1034-
1035.) To meet this burden, Forest River had to show that the
Indiana court would provide “ ‘the same or greater rights than
California’ or would ‘apply California law on the claims at
issue.’ ” (Lathrop v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 808, 818 (Lathrop); Verdugo, at p. 157.)
II. The Lower Court Erred in its Application of the
Correct Legal Standard in Exercising its Discretion
The lower court here set forth both the general rule as well
as the exception to the rule that applied where, as here, the
claims at issue were based on unwaivable rights. We find that
the court correctly put the burden on Forest River, but it
7
subsequently used the wrong standard in assessing whether
Forest River met that burden.
In its ruling, the court held that “Defendant has met its
burden of proving that the forum selection clause is enforceable
because Plaintiff signed the forum selection clause,[ 2] the forum
selection clause is not unconscionable, and Plaintiff’s Song-
Beverly Act rights can be readily preserved.” But the question
when dealing with a forum selection clause in the context of
unwaivable rights is whether the Indiana court would provide
“the same or greater rights than California” or would “apply
California law on the claims at issue.” 3
The lower court then turned immediately to the stipulation
offered by Forest River: “Plaintiff argues that a stipulation to not
2 Although Hardy argued below that she had not freely and
voluntarily signed the forum selection agreement, she does not
make that argument on appeal so we do not further discuss it.
3 The ruling that the forum selection clause was not
unconscionable was error even if it had been the appropriate
starting point. When combined with the choice of law provision,
the agreement purported to foreclose unwaivable rights. Since
any attempt to do so is void under California law, that made the
clause substantively unconscionable. As a contract of adhesion,
it was also at least somewhat procedurally unconscionable
(although not per se unenforceable). (Armendariz v. Foundation
Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114-115
(Armendariz); Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61
Cal.4th 899, 915.) Indeed, Forest River did not dispute the fact
that, as written and unless modified, the forum selection and
choice of law provisions could potentially waive plaintiff’s
unwaivable rights under the Song-Beverly Act.
8
oppose applying the Song-Beverly Act in Indiana will not
preserve Plaintiff’s rights because the Indiana court must
determine whether to apply California Song-Beverly Act [sic] to
the matter in Indiana. However, this concern can be remedied by
staying this matter while the Indiana case is pending and should
the Indiana court decline to apply the Song-Beverly Act, then
Plaintiff can move to lift the stay on this matter.”
At first blush, this appears a fair resolution. However, we
conclude that this conclusion does not withstand scrutiny as it is
directly contrary to California public policy.
III. The Stipulation and Stay of the Action Do Not Cure
the Defect
Our colleagues in Division Seven recently confronted a
similar (although not identical) set of facts in Lathrop, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at page 820. As the court did there, we start
with the principle that the request to stay the action pending
transfer to Indiana to allow the Indiana court to apply California
law is effectively a request to sever the choice of law provision
from the agreement (and multiple other provisions that adopted
terms contrary to California law) and enforce the forum selection
clause. We turn then to caselaw on the severance of
unconscionable terms in contracts, many of which arise in the
arbitration context.
A. The post-dispute agreement to use California
law is an attempt to rewrite the contract and
violates public policy.
First, our Supreme Court has instructed that the time to
look at a contract for unconscionability is as of the date it is
written. (Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024)
16 Cal.5th 478, 503 (Ramirez) [“[W]hether a contract ‘works
9
unconscionable hardship is determined with reference to the time
when the contract was made’ and cannot be resolved in hindsight,
‘considering circumstances of which the contracting parties were
unaware.’ ”].) Thus, a court may not “rewrite the contract to
avoid the unconscionability embedded in its unambiguous terms.”
(Id. at p. 512.)
Whether Forest River is willing now to abide by the Song-
Beverly Act, does not change the fact that the warranty as
written, choosing Indiana law, is void and against public policy as
to California consumers, and hence substantively unconscionable.
Our Supreme Court has held that such willingness “ ‘can be seen,
at most, as an offer to modify the contract; an offer that was
never accepted. No existing rule of contract law permits a party
to resuscitate a legally defective contract merely by offering to
change it.’ ” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 125.)
Our colleagues in Division 4 recently relied upon these
same principles to reverse an order enforcing a forum selection
clause, finding that a purported stipulation not to enforce a jury
waiver was an unaccepted offer, and “a court order could not
transform it into a binding modification or stipulation.”
(The Comedy Store v. Moss Adams LLP (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th
784, 794 (The Comedy Store).)
However, our Supreme Court has also advised that in
determining whether to sever an unconscionable provision,
“the court should also ask whether the unconscionability should
be cured through severance or restriction because the interests of
justice would be furthered by such actions.” (Ramirez, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 516.) “This part of the inquiry focuses on
whether mere severance of the unconscionable terms would
function to condone an illegal scheme and whether the defects in
10
the agreement indicate that the stronger party engaged in a
systematic effort to impose arbitration on the weaker party not
simply as an alternative to litigation, but to secure a forum that
works to the stronger party’s advantage. [Citation.] If the
answer to either of these is yes, the court should refuse to enforce
the agreement.” (Id. at pp. 516-517, italics added.)
As the court put it in Armendariz, “the doctrine of
severance attempts to conserve a contractual relationship if to do
so would not be condoning an illegal scheme. [Citations.] The
overarching inquiry is whether ‘ “the interests of justice . . . would
be furthered” ’ by severance.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
p. 124.) Referring specifically to a clause in the agreement that
limited damages in the context of severance, the Supreme Court
went on to explain that “[a]n employer will not be deterred from
routinely inserting such a deliberately illegal clause into the
arbitration agreements it mandates for its employees if it knows
that the worst penalty for such illegality is the severance of the
clause after the employee has litigated the matter. In that sense,
the enforcement of a form arbitration agreement containing such
a clause drafted in bad faith would be condoning, or at least not
discouraging, an illegal scheme, and severance would be
disfavored unless it were for some other reason in the interests of
justice.” (Id. at p. 124, fn. 13.)
The Supreme Court in Ramirez similarly touched on this
issue, explaining that “[i]n conducting this analysis, the court
may also consider the deterrent effect of each option . . . .
[S]evering multiple unconscionable provisions from an agreement
and enforcing the remainder could ‘create an incentive for an
employer to draft a one-sided arbitration agreement in the hope
employees would not challenge the unlawful provisions, but if
11
they do, the court would simply modify the agreement to include
the bilateral terms the employer should have included in the first
place.’ Although there are no bright-line numerical rules
regarding severance, it is fair to say that the greater the number
of unconscionable provisions a contract contains the less likely it
is that severance will be the appropriate remedy.” (Ramirez,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 517.)
And the Supreme Court in Ramirez further cited Civil Code
section 3513 for the proposition that “ ‘[a]nyone may waive the
advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit. But a law
established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a
private agreement.’ ” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 503.)
Here, we conclude that even if the court had the power to
accept a one-sided “stipulation” after a dispute has arisen to use
California law in Indiana, to do so would violate California public
policy for the reasons explained in Ramirez and Armendariz.
For while an order to ensure the use of California law in the
Indiana court “protects the rights of the plaintiffs who are savvy
enough to obtain experienced legal representation, file in
California, and argue the forum selection clause implicates their
unwaivable statutory rights, other California consumers,
compelled by the forum selection clause, may file suit in Indiana
and only later discover that Indiana’s lemon law does not cover
motorhomes and that they have given up unwaivable California
statutory rights. Still others may be deterred from pursuing
their claims at all.” (Lathrop, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 821.)
Accepting the proposed stipulation “would also create an
incentive for [the defendant] to continue to include admittedly
unenforceable provisions in its warranties and would deter [it]
from revising its warranty to comply with California law.” (Ibid.)
12
In short, severance of the unconscionable terms (here, the
choice of law provision as well as the other three referred to by
Hardy) would function to condone an illegal scheme and the
multiple defects in the agreement indicate that the stronger
party engaged in a systematic effort to secure a forum that would
work to its advantage.
There is a split of authority in the federal courts when
California district judges have been presented with the identical
issue raised here: forum selection and choice of law clauses for
resolution of the Song-Beverly Act claims associated with the
purchase of a motorhome. After careful review of all of those
decisions, we note that those that have enforced the clauses
(at times, by approving similar one-sided stipulations by the
defendant as that accepted by the court here) have generally
1) cited federal law for the standard on enforcement of forum
selection clauses, which puts the burden on the party resisting
the motion, and 2) failed to cite to either Armendariz or Ramirez
or to conduct the required analysis above. (See Torres v. Jayco,
Inc. (C.D. Cal., Mar. 6, 2024, No. EDCV 24-0065-KK-SHKx) 2024
WL 1559730; Frisby v. Thor Motor Coach (C.D. Cal., Jan. 24,
2023, No. CV-22-2047-MWF (SHKx)) 2023 WL 1420434; Jung v.
Thor Motor Coach, Inc. (C.D. Cal., Jan. 20, 2023, No. EDCV 22-
1763 JGB (KKx) 2023 WL 1475109; Zastawnik v. Thor Motor
Coach, Inc. (C.D. Cal., Jun. 16, 2023, No. CV-22-08663-PSG-AS)
2023 WL 5167363; Pinkevich v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. (C.D.
Cal., Nov. 16, 2022, No. 2:22-cv-05985-ODW (Ex)) 2022 WL
19333282; Derosa v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. (C.D. Cal., Sept. 30,
2020, No. 2:20-cv-04895-SVW-PLA) 2020 WL 6647734; Carreon v.
Nexus RVS, LLC (E.D. Cal., July 20, 2020, No. 2:20-cv-00722-
JAM-KJN) 2020 WL 4059546; Baxter v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc.
13
(E.D. Cal., Apr. 20, 2020, No. 2:19-cv-01532 JAM-CKD) 2020 WL
1911549.)
Those that have declined to enforce the forum selection
clause or accept the proposed stipulation, by contrast, have, while
still citing federal law, all cited to the very public policy concerns
cited above. (See Waryck v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. (S.D. Cal.,
Jan. 13, 2023, No. 22-cv-1096-L-MDD) 2023 WL 3794002, *5
[citing Armendariz and holding that “enforcing the forum-
selection clause, in combination with the other clauses, would
contravene strong California public policy. Moreover, severing
the other clauses or accepting Thor Motor’s proposed stipulations
would likewise contravene California public policy because it
would not deter the drafter from including such a clause”]; Gorga
v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Feb. 6, 2024, No. 23-cv-
03603-RFL) 2024 WL 1090650, *2 [same]; Scott v. Airstream, Inc.
(S.D. Cal. 2024) 715 F.Supp.3d 1295, 1301 [same].)
Forest River (and many of the manufacturers in the federal
cases cited above which enforced the forum selection clauses) rely
heavily on the case of Verdugo, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th 141,
which discussed the possibility a defendant might be able to
stipulate to apply California law. However, the discussion of a
possible stipulation in Verdugo is clearly dicta, as the court did
not reach the issue of whether an actual stipulation made the
forum selection clause enforceable. Instead, in Verdugo, the court
noted that the defendant there “could have eliminated any
uncertainty on which law a Texas court would apply by
stipulating to have a Texas court apply California law in deciding
Verdugo’s claims, but Alliantgroup did not do so.” (Verdugo,
at p. 158.)
14
Two recent cases have similarly concluded that Verdugo’s
discussion of the absence of a stipulation is dicta. (See Lathrop,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 824 [Verdugo did not have occasion to
decide whether such a stipulation would have met the
defendant’s burden to show litigating in the different forum
would not diminish the plaintiff’s unwaivable rights]; The
Comedy Store, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 793 [Verdugo did not
hold that a stipulation to apply California law satisfied a party’s
burden to demonstrate that a foreign court would apply
California law].) “A case is not authority for a proposition not
considered therein or an issue not presented by its own particular
facts.” (McConnell v. Advantest America, Inc. (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 596, 611.)
Moreover, Verdugo considered, and rejected, an argument
that is even more similar to the one made here by Forest River.
The court in Verdugo noted that “at oral argument, Alliantgroup
argued we should affirm the trial court’s ruling because the court
stayed rather than dismissed the action, and therefore the trial
court retains jurisdiction to lift the stay if the Texas court refuses
to apply California law. According to Alliantgroup, the ability to
resume the action if ‘something goes awry’ is the reason
California trial courts generally are required to stay rather than
dismiss an action when ordering parties to litigate their dispute
in a foreign jurisdiction under the forum non conveniens
doctrine.” (Verdugo, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 161.)
Rejecting that argument, the court noted that defendant
“overstate[d] a trial court’s authority to resume an action after
staying it on forum non conveniens grounds.” (Verdugo, supra,
237 Cal.App.4th at p. 161.) The court first raised a concern
whether the court could lift the stay if the Indiana court declined
15
to apply California law, given existing law. (Id. at p. 161.)
The court went on to note that “[i]f the trial court sought to
resume proceedings every time the foreign jurisdiction made an
adverse ruling, the unseemly conflicts among jurisdictions that
the forum non conveniens doctrine is designed to eliminate would
be commonplace.” (Id. at p. 162.) It concluded: “Accordingly, the
possibility the trial court could resume proceedings on Verdugo’s
claims fails to establish enforcing the forum selection clause
would not diminish Verdugo’s unwaivable statutory rights under
the Labor Code.” (Ibid.) 4
Similarly, in America Online, the Court of Appeal rejected a
similar plea from the defendant that the lower court erred “in not
granting AOL’s request for a stay of the California action to allow
the Virginia court to determine whether the relief available to
[plaintiff] i[s] consistent with California consumer law.”
(America Online, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 20.) There,
among other concerns, the court noted “AOL suggests no
procedural device which would allow a California court to proceed
with the underlying case after a Virginia court has ruled,” citing
the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.
(Id. at p. 21.)
Thus, even if the court had properly considered the public
policy and deterrence factors that are mandated by Armendariz
and Ramirez, which it did not, we share the concerns in Verdugo
and America Online regarding how, and at what point, the
California trial court would or could entertain a motion to lift the
4 We read this portion of Verdugo to provide further support
that the case does not stand for the proposition that a stipulation
to use California law in a foreign jurisdiction is sufficient to
overcome a waiver of unwaivable rights.
16
stay. The court’s order noted that “should the Indiana courts
decline to apply Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Act rights in their
jurisdiction, Plaintiff may move to lift the stay in this Court.”
Would it be proper to do so whenever the Indiana court made a
ruling that the plaintiff believed contrary to the requirements of
the Song-Beverly Act, even though the Indiana court stated that
it was following California law?
In sum, the seemingly neat solution of allowing the case to
be transferred to Indiana subject to lifting the stay in California
if the Indiana court declines to follow the Song-Beverly Act
neither follows California law regarding when to adjudicate
unconscionability and how to determine whether to sever the
unenforceable provisions of a contract, nor aligns with basic
principles of comity. Accordingly, we conclude the court
improperly applied the correct legal standard and reverse for an
order denying the motion.
The conclusions reached here do not mean that every case
involving the Song-Beverly Act must be heard in California.
We presume that other courts are capable of applying our state
law. (TSMC North America v. Semiconductor Manufacturing
Internat. Corp. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 581, 601.) However, when
reviewing a forum selection clause in the context of unwaivable
rights, a court must first look to whether the forum selection
clause was unconscionable, void, or violated public policy as of
the time the agreement was made. If it was, then the court must
consider whether to sever the unconscionable or void clauses from
the agreement, taking into consideration the factors spelled out
in Ramirez and Armendariz. However, in choosing whether to
sever, unless there is a bilateral stipulation to which all parties
agree, the court may not augment or reform the contract by
17
issuing an order contrary to the agreement actually entered into
by the parties.
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed and remanded. The trial court is
ordered to enter an order denying the motion to dismiss or stay.
Appellant is awarded her costs on appeal.
RICHARDSON, J.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.
STRATTON, J. *
* Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, Division Eight, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
18
Filed 1/31/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
JEAN M. HARDY, B331450
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22NWCV01656)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
FOREST RIVER, INC. et al., AND CERTIFYING OPINION
FOR PUBLICATION
Defendants and Respondents. [No change in the judgment]
IT IS ORDERED that the opinion filed in the above-captioned
matter on January 9, 2025, be modified as follows:
1. On page 3, the words “state of Indiana” are deleted and
replaced with “State of Indiana.”
2. On page 7, second paragraph, last sentence, the citation to
Lathrop v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
808, is modified to read as follows:
“(Lathrop v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
808, 818 (Lathrop), review granted Jan. 15, 2025, S287893,
briefing deferred pursuant to rule 8.512(d)(2), Cal. Rules of
Court; Verdugo, at p. 157.)”
And following this revised citation, a new footnote is added to
read:
“Consistent with California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115
subdivision (e)(1) and accompanying Comment to subdivision
(e)(3), we are citing Lathrop for its persuasive value only
rather than for any ‘binding or precedential effect.’ ”
3. On page 10, second paragraph, last sentence, the citation to
The Comedy Store v. Moss Adams LLP (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 784 is modified to read as follows:
“(The Comedy Store v. Moss Adams LLP (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 784, 794 (The Comedy Store), petn. for review
pending, petn. filed Dec. 20, 2024.)”
4. On page 13, first paragraph, the word “scheme” is deleted
and replaced with “practice” so that the paragraph now
reads:
“In short, severance of the unconscionable terms (here, the
choice of law provision as well as the other three referred to
by Hardy) would function to condone an illegal practice and
the multiple defects in the agreement indicate that the
stronger party engaged in a systematic effort to secure a
forum that would work to its advantage.”
5. On page 13, second paragraph, the citation to Frisby v. Thor
Motor Coach (C.D. Cal., Jan. 24, 2023, No. CV-22-2047-MWF
(SHKx)) 2023 WL 1420434 is modified to read as follows:
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“Frisby v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. (C.D. Cal., Jan. 24, 2023,
No. CV-22-2047-MWF (SHKx)) 2023 WL 1420434.”
The filed opinion was not certified for publication in the Official
Reports. For good cause appearing, and pursuant to California Rules
of Court, rule 8.1105(b) it is ordered that the opinion shall be
published in the Official Reports.
These modifications effect no change in the judgment.
_________________________________________________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J. RICHARDSON, J. STRATTON, J. *
* Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District,
Division Eight, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
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