CourtListener 10324846•In re X.A. CA2/1
Texto completo
Filed 1/31/25 In re X.A. CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re X.A. et al., B338604
Persons Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP00758)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SARAH M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark A. Davis, Judge. Conditionally reversed
and remanded with instructions.
Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Sarah M.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and David Michael Miller, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Appellant Sarah M. (Mother) challenges the juvenile court’s
order under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26
terminating her parental rights to minors X.A. (born 2019) and
E.A. (born 2021) in favor of a plan involving a maternal relative
adopting the children. Mother argues the juvenile court erred in
finding the beneficial relationship exception to termination of her
parental rights inapplicable. That exception applies when a
parent shows all of the following three elements: (1) the parent
has consistently visited with the child; (2) “the child has a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent”; and
(3) adoption would be detrimental to the child because the
benefits the child enjoys from their relationship with the parent
outweigh the stability and permanence of adoption. (In re Caden
C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636 (Caden C.); see § 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i).) Because Mother had the burden of proof below, her
burden on appeal is to show that, as a matter of law, the facts
compel the conclusion that she has proven all three elements.
Because Mother has failed to make such a showing as to the
second element, we must affirm. We need not and do not
consider the remaining elements.
1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
We agree, however, with Mother and DCFS that DCFS and
the child welfare agency in another county where the case
originated failed to adequately inquire whether the children were
“Indian children” as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). On this basis, we
conditionally reverse the court’s order terminating Mother’s
parental rights as well as those of Luis A. (Father).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Father did not actively participate in the proceedings below
and is not a party to this appeal. We confine our discussion of the
factual and procedural background to the portions of it relevant
to Mother’s appeal.
A. Proceedings in Kern County
On October 29, 2021, the Kern County Department of
Human Services (KCDHS) filed a section 300 petition on behalf of
X.A. and E.A. alleging that on October 27, 2021, Mother was
found in a car intoxicated and passed out, slumped over in the
passenger seat, with the children in the back seat unsecured.
The car was at a stop light, running and in drive, with the driver
also passed out. Mother was aware the driver had been drinking
and there were open cans of alcohol within reach of X.A. KCDHS
also alleged that Mother drank alcohol daily and her substance
abuse placed the children at risk. KCDHS asserted claims under
subdivision (b) of section 300 that Mother failed or was unable to
supervise or protect the children adequately, Father willfully or
negligently failed to supervise or protect the children adequately
from Mother’s conduct, and Mother and Father were both unable
to provide regular care for the children due to their substance
abuse.
3
The Kern County juvenile court detained the children on
November 1, 2021. On January 10, 2022, the court found the
allegations against Mother and Father true and asserted
jurisdiction over the children.
On February 23, 2022, the court ordered the case
transferred to Los Angeles County where Mother resided and
where the children had been placed with maternal grandfather
(MGF). In a report prepared for the transfer-out hearing, a
KCDHS social worker stated that Mother had been regularly
visiting the children.
B. The Los Angeles County Juvenile Court Accepts the
Case and Proceeds to Disposition
On March 9, 2022, the Los Angeles County juvenile court
accepted the transfer. Mother reported that Father was
incarcerated in Kern County. The children remained placed with
MGF.
In a jurisdiction/disposition report filed on April 13, 2022,
DCFS informed the court that Father’s scheduled release date
was in July 2022. According to Mother, she and Father
separated when the dependency case initiated. Mother was
participating in a substance abuse program. She had refused to
take an alcohol/drug test on March 8, but had a negative drug
test on March 26.
At the disposition hearing on April 26, 2022, counsel for
DCFS and the minors contended the court should remove the
children from Mother due to Mother’s history of alcohol abuse.
Mother requested the children be returned to her at MGF’s home,
pointing to her consistent compliance with services and
programs. Based on the severity of the October 2021 incident,
and the relatively short period Mother had been working to
4
achieve sobriety, the court declared the children dependents
under section 300, and removed them from Mother and Father,
finding by clear and convincing evidence that remaining in either
parent’s custody would pose a substantial danger and risk of
detriment to the children, and that DCFS had made reasonable
efforts to prevent removal. The court ordered DCFS to provide
reunification services and visitation for Mother for a minimum of
six hours per week. The court ordered Mother to participate in a
drug/alcohol program and submit to weekly drug/alcohol testing.
C. Family Reunification Period
In preparation for the section 366.21, subdivision (e) six-
month review hearing, DCFS submitted reports informing the
court that the children were placed in a foster home in mid-June.
Mother visited the children each week on Wednesday and
Saturday for three hours at a time. The monitors stated the
visits were going well. Mother would bring snacks, activities, and
games, and was attentive and playful with the children. X.A. was
excited to visit with Mother and would constantly ask where
Mother was, and at times would cry when the visits were ending
and not cooperate in getting in the car to leave. When Mother
redirected X.A. during visits, X.A. would become upset and hit
Mother on her hands and face. E.A. did not become upset when
the visits ended. Mother was observed to be patient and caring
towards the children.
Mother tested positive for alcohol on June 21, 2022, and in
July called a social worker to disclose that she had relapsed on
three occasions. In August and September, Mother’s alcohol/drug
tests were all negative.
In last minute information for the court (LMI) reports filed
on October 20 and 25, 2022, DCFS notified the court that Mother
5
was hospitalized on October 1 due to a fall. While at the hospital
she was placed on an involuntary hold under section 5150, and
she was released on October 13. Mother had felt overwhelmed
and hopeless, was diagnosed with major depression, and was
prescribed Zoloft. Mother was considering entering an inpatient
program for depression, anxiety, and substance abuse.
The juvenile court held the six-month review hearing on
October 25, 2022. Mother did not oppose continued court
jurisdiction and placement of the children with the foster
parents. The court found continued jurisdiction necessary and
that returning the children to Mother’s custody would create a
substantial risk of detriment. The court ordered continued
reunification services for Mother but terminated reunification
services for Father.
In a December 22, 2022 filing, DCFS reported the children
remained with the same foster family. X.A. stated she was
“happy” living with the foster parents. Mother was participating
in a drug/alcohol abuse program and was testing negative for
drugs and alcohol. Mother’s visitation had increased from two to
three days per week, and she was consistent with visitation. The
foster mother reported that the visits she monitored went well;
Mother played with the children and attended to their needs, and
the children appeared to be enjoying themselves. Social workers
reported that the visits they monitored went well; Mother
brought activities, such as games, paints, and toys, fed the
children healthy meals, and was caring and attentive. The
children appeared to be happy during visits. X.A. decreased in
hitting Mother and being upset when leaving visits; she smiled
and responded “yes” when asked if she liked seeing Mother.
6
At the permanency hearing on January 9, 2023, Mother did
not oppose continued court jurisdiction and placement of the
children with the foster parents. The court found continued
jurisdiction necessary and ordered continued reunification
services. The court liberalized Mother’s visits to unmonitored
day visits up to three hours.
In a concurrent planning assessment completed on
January 23, 2023, DCFS recommended placing the children with
maternal uncle Ruben D. and his wife Jessica R.2 as legal
guardians if Mother was unable to reunify. The couple lived in
Utah. Ruben D. expressed an interest in being a legal guardian
but not adopting the children.
On June 20, 2023, DCFS filed a status review report
indicating that, according to the foster mother, Mother’s
visitation was inconsistent. She would sometimes be late, failed
to show up for three visits, and failed to timely confirm leading to
four cancelled visits. When Mother failed to attend a scheduled
visit, X.A. would become upset and cry, and be easily agitated
and physically aggressive for a couple of days. Mother explained
that she was working the swing shift and would sometimes
oversleep. A social worker attended two visits and observed
Mother being attentive and caring towards the children,
engaging in activities with the children, and being affectionate;
the children appeared happy and excited to spend time with
Mother and displayed affection towards her. Mother did not
support placing the children with any of her family members,
stating she was estranged from them due to conflict, dysfunction,
2 Jessica R. is also identified in the record as Jessica G.
7
and mental health. Mother tested positive for alcohol three times
in March and April 2023.
In a July 5, 2023 LMI report, DCFS notified the court that
Mother had failed to comply with a request for a sample from her
alcohol/drug abuse program on May 25, 2023, and had tested
positive for alcohol at a high level on June 13, 2023. Mother now
wanted the children placed with Ruben D. and Jessica R. in
Utah. On July 6, the court ordered DCFS to initiate an interstate
compact on the placement of children for placement with
Ruben D.
At the section 366.22 permanency review hearing on
August 14, 2023, Mother did not oppose termination of
reunification services. The court found continued jurisdiction
necessary and terminated reunification services. The court
scheduled a section 366.26 hearing to select a permanent plan for
the children.
D. The Permanency Plan Selection Hearing
On November 28, 2023, DCFS filed a report in preparation
for the permanency plan selection hearing. Mother had
monitored visits three times a week; according to the foster
mother, the children appeared happy and excited to spend time
with Mother and displayed affection towards Mother. The
children were having weekly video chats with Ruben D.,
Jessica R., and their two-year-old son, and according to the foster
mother the chats were helping to build a relationship among
them.
With its report, DCFS submitted concurrent planning
assessments for the children completed in July 2023. In those
assessments, DCFS recommended adoption by Ruben D. and
Jessica R.; the couple now wanted to adopt instead of being legal
8
guardians so that the children could “be raised together with
family permanently with love and stability.”
On January 23, 2024, DCFS filed a status review report in
which it indicated that all licenses and approvals had been
obtained to allow DCFS to move the children to Utah. Mother
agreed with the plan for Ruben D. and Jessica R. to adopt the
children. Mother continued to have monitored visits three times
per week; she was observed to be attentive and caring towards
the children, having planned activities, and bringing food and
gifts; the children appeared happy and excited to spend time with
Mother and displayed affection to her through hugs and kisses.
During a visit to the foster home, a social worker observed X.A.
refuse to speak to Mother on the phone and throw the phone.
X.A.’s therapist noted that X.A. engaged in physical aggression
and tantrums after visits with Mother.
On January 30, 2024, the court authorized DCFS to
transport the children to Ruben D.’s and Jessica R.’s home in
Utah. DCFS transported the children to Ruben D.’s and
Jessica R.’s home on February 23, 2024.
On February 13, 2024, the court held a permanency
planning review hearing. The court found continued jurisdiction
necessary, and that adoption was the appropriate permanent
plan. The court rescheduled the section 366.26 permanency plan
selection hearing, which was eventually held on June 10, 2024.
E. Basic Legal Principles Governing the Beneficial
Relationship Exception
As we discuss below, at the permanency plan selection
hearing Mother opposed termination of her parental rights based
on the beneficial relationship exception. We provide a brief
9
overview of the exception here to assist in understanding the
parties’ arguments and the juvenile court’s ruling.
“ ‘ “At a permanency plan hearing, the court may order one
of three alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long-term foster
care. [Citation.] If the dependent child is adoptable, there is a
strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency
plans.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 303, 316.) If adoption is ordered, the court must
terminate parental rights. (Ibid.)
Section 366.26, subdivision (c) states several exceptions to
this rule, among them the beneficial relationship exception,
which applies if “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for
determining that termination would be detrimental to the child
due to . . . [¶] . . . [t]he parents hav[ing] maintained regular
visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
In Caden C., our Supreme Court held that a parent must
prove three elements for the beneficial relationship exception to
apply. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) Specifically, a
parent must show by a preponderance of the evidence (1) “regular
visitation and contact with the child, taking into account the
extent of visitation permitted”; (2) “the child has a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of
attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing
the relationship”; and (3) “terminating that attachment would be
detrimental to the child even when balanced against the
countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 636.)
10
F. DCFS’s Report in Preparation for the Permanency
Selection Hearing
On May 24, 2024, DCFS filed a supplemental report for the
section 366.26 permanency plan selection hearing. Mother had
relocated to Utah in early March 2024 to be near the children and
continue in-person visits. Under an agreement with Ruben D.
and Jessica R., Mother participated in family outings with them
and the children during the week, and additionally visited with
the children on Saturdays if her work schedule permitted.
Jessica R. reported that Mother’s participation in family outings
was consistent.
DCFS stated in the report, “The children were [two and a
half years] and [seven] months . . . old when they were detained
from [Mother]’s custody. The children were detained at an age
where attachment to a parent/caregiver is typically established.
[Mother] has continued to visit the children for the past [two and
a half] years and has formed a relationship with the children.
However, the relationship is not of a typically child-parent [sic]
due to [Mother]’s lack of responsibilities, and having limited
interactions with the children.” DCFS further stated, “[Mother]
has been observed as becoming i[m]patient at times when the
children do no[t] follow directions and become restless. [Mother]
continues to struggle with her own mental health and substance
issues, individual needs, and triggers and lacks effective coping
skills to be an active, healthy, and responsible parent.”
Jessica R. reported that Mother was affectionate towards
the children, and the children appeared happy and excited to
receive gifts from Mother; however, Mother did not call the
children to check how they were doing or ask to speak to them.
In addition, Mother was 30 minutes late for visits which made
11
the children anxious. Sometimes at the end of the visits X.A. had
difficulty detaching from Mother, but the situation was
improving. X.A. had a history of struggling to regulate her
emotions, but she had been receiving therapy to address this.
The children did not ask to call or visit with Mother. A social
worker asked X.A. about her visits with Mother and how she felt
about Mother, and X.A. responded, “walk at the park, run
around, I get toys, fun.” Jessica R. reported that E.A. enjoyed
visits with Mother and did not display any emotional upset at the
end of the visits.
The children were adjusting well to living with Ruben D.
and Jessica R., “developing a sense of stability, building trust,
feel[ing] secure, and loved.”
DCFS stated, “[Mother] has a history of mental health
issues and alcoholism that put the safety and well-being of her
young and vulnerable children at risk for serious injuries and
death. [Mother] continues to struggle with mental health issues
and alcoholism and never mitigated the issues in the longevity of
the case. In recent conversations with family members in Utah,
it is reported that [Mother] continues to consume alcohol, arrives
to work smelling of alcohol, and was observed passed out with
alcohol cans around her bed on [May 6, 20]24. [Mother]
continues to lack insight as to her alcoholism and appears in
denial of her substance abuse.”
DCFS recommended the court terminate Mother’s parental
rights so that the children could be adopted.
G. The Permanency Plan Selection Hearing
At the permanency plan selection hearing, counsel for
DCFS and the children urged the court to follow DCFS’s
recommendation to select adoption and terminate Mother’s
12
parental rights. Mother opposed terminating her parental rights,
contending the beneficial relationship exception applied. Mother
did not testify at the hearing or call any witnesses, relying
instead on the various reports introduced by DCFS. Mother’s
counsel argued, “I think that my client has demonstrated a bond,
and she has fulfilled the role of a parent. She’s not just a play
date, not just a friend. The children know her as their mother.”
In rebuttal, counsel for DCFS conceded that Mother had visited
with the children consistently, but contended the detriment to
the children from termination of Mother’s parental rights was
outweighed by the benefit of adoption. DCFS’s counsel noted that
the children were detained from Mother at a young age, that
Mother exhibited impatience at recent visits, and that Mother
continued to struggle with alcohol abuse which would negatively
impact the children.
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that it
would be detrimental for the children to be returned to Mother,
and that the children were adoptable. The court concluded that
Mother had not established the beneficial relationship exception,
finding she had not maintained regular visitation with the
children, had not established a substantial bond with the
children, and that any benefit accruing to the children from their
relationship with Mother was outweighed by the benefits of
adoption. The court stated, “Ultimately [Mother] still continues
to struggle with mental health issues and alcoholism and never
has mitigated the issues in the longevity in this case. She
continue[s] to lack insight as to her alcoholism and appears to be
in denial of her substance abuse. The kids have been in their
home for awhile[;] they’re happy, comfortable, and secure, and
they’re making significant progress in the developmental
13
milestones and seem to be thriving in their new environment.
For those reasons, the court finds it in the best interest of the
children to leave them where they are.” The court thus
terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father and ordered
that the permanent plan for the children was adoption.
H. ICWA Compliance
KCDHS alleged in its petition that both Mother and Father
denied the children might be Indian children under ICWA. Both
Mother and Father filed documents with the Kern County
juvenile court disclaiming any Native American heritage, and at
the detention hearing the court found the children were not
Indian children. The record does not disclose any additional
efforts by KCDHS or the Kern County juvenile court to inquire
whether the children might be Indian children.
While the case was pending in Los Angeles County juvenile
court, DCFS repeatedly asked Mother whether she or the
children had any Native American heritage, and Mother denied
any such heritage. Nothing in the record indicates that DCFS or
the juvenile court inquired of any extended family members
whether the children might be Indian children.
At the permanency plan selection hearing, the court asked
counsel whether “any other family members” had been identified
who should be interviewed regarding the children possibly being
Indian children, and counsel all responded they were unaware of
any relatives that needed to be interviewed or reinterviewed.
The court then found that ICWA did not apply.
DISCUSSION
We first address Mother’s contention the juvenile court
erred in finding the beneficial relationship exception did not
14
apply. We then turn to Mother’s argument, and the concession
by DCFS, that there was inadequate inquiry as to whether the
children were Indian children under ICWA.
A. Standard of Review for the Beneficial Relationship
Exception
For the beneficial relationship exception to apply, a parent
must show by a preponderance of the evidence (1) “regular
visitation and contact with the child, taking into account the
extent of visitation permitted”; (2) “the child has a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of
attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing
the relationship”; and (3) “terminating that attachment would be
detrimental to the child even when balanced against the
countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) We review the first two elements or
prongs of the test for substantial evidence and the third for an
abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 639-640.)
“The substantial evidence standard of review takes on a
unique formulation where, as here, ‘the trier of fact has expressly
or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof
did not carry the burden and that party appeals.’ [Citations.]
‘[W]here the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial,
the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence
compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.’
[Citation.] Specifically, we ask ‘whether the appellant’s evidence
was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654,
671.)
15
B. The Evidence Does Not Compel the Conclusion that
the Children Had a Substantial, Positive, and
Emotional Attachment to Mother
We only address the second prong of the Caden C. test, as it
is dispositive here.
To establish the second prong, a parent must show
“something more than the incidental benefit a child gains from
any amount of positive contact with [his or] her natural parent.”
(In re Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 318.) “The
significant attachment from child to parent results from the
adult’s attention to the child’s needs for physical care,
nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation. [Citation.] The
relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship
and shared experiences. [Citation.] The exception applies only
where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or
developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child
to parent.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
Evidence that a parent is “a mere ‘friendly visitor’ ” is
insufficient. (See In re Katherine J., supra, at p. 319.)
In determining whether a child has this specific type of
beneficial, “substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the
parent” that the parental benefit exception requires, courts
consider that “the [parent-child] relationship may be shaped by a
slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the
child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or
“negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the
child’s particular needs.’ [Citation.]” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 632, 636.) In addition, “courts often consider how
children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their
parents.” (Id. at p. 632.)
16
Although Mother points to evidence supporting a
conclusion that she shares a positive emotional connection with
her children, we cannot say the evidence compels a finding as a
matter of law that the children’s attachment to her was so
substantial and of such a nature that it satisfies the second prong
of the Caden C. test. The children had been detained from
Mother at relatively young ages—X.A. was just over two years old
and E.A. was seven months old. X.A. had spent more than half of
her life, and E.A. most of her life, placed with others. Mother did
not introduce any evidence of her relationship with the children
before detention.
Rather, Mother relies on conclusory statements in DCFS
reports that she and the children appeared to have “a family
bond” or “a strong bond.” The evidentiary facts reflected in these
same DCFS reports are that, during their visits in the
dependency case, Mother and the children enjoyed themselves,
shared activities, and exhibited affection towards each other. For
example, in May 2024, X.A. described her visits with Mother by
stating, “walk at the park, run around, I get toys, fun.” But such
facts do not prevent a reasonable fact finder from concluding that
the children do not have the specific type of substantial
attachment to Mother that would satisfy the beneficial
relationship test. To be sure, the reports suggest there is love
and affection between Mother and her children. Particularly
considering the record as a whole, however, the reports do not
compel us to conclude Mother was more than “a mere ‘friendly
visitor’ ” with the children, or that Mother’s relationship with the
children benefitted them in a manner beyond “the incidental
benefit a child gains from any amount of positive contact with
17
[his or] her natural parent.” (In re Katherine J., supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at pp. 318, 319.)
Mother argues that DCFS’s report for the permanency plan
selection hearing addressed several factors the Supreme Court
disapproved of in Caden C., including that Mother was not
responsible for day-to-day custodial responsibilities and was not
the primary caregiver for the children, Mother could not provide
the children with permanency as could Ruben D. and Jessica R.,
Mother still struggled with her mental health and alcohol abuse,
and Mother would be allowed contact with the children post-
adoption.3 This argument is unavailing, as there is no indication
in the record that the court relied on any of these factors except
for one on which the court could properly rely.4 As to that
factor—Mother’s continuing struggles with mental health and
alcohol abuse—the court’s consideration of this evidence was
proper under Caden C. because it was relevant to show that
Mother’s relationship with the children sometimes had a negative
effect on them. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 637 [“A
3 DCFS’s report repeatedly stated that the prospective
adoptive parents were planning to allow Mother access to the
children post-adoption. This information is irrelevant to the
beneficial relationship analysis. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 633.) At the permanency plan selection hearing, DCFS’s
counsel noted on the record that whether the prospective
adoptive parents intended to continue to allow Mother access to
the children was irrelevant and should not be considered, and
there is no indication the court disregarded the law.
4 The record does not support Mother’s assertion that the
juvenile court “adopted the DCFS analysis” and did not
undertake its own analysis.
18
parent’s continued struggles with the issues leading to
dependency” may be properly considered if, for example, they
show “that interaction between parent and child at least
sometimes has a ‘ “negative” effect’ on the child”].)
Mother further argues that the juvenile court failed to
distinguish between Mother and Father in its ruling. Not so.
The court’s statements on the record expressly referenced
Mother, and the court’s minute order regarding the beneficial
relationship exception necessarily related to Mother as she was
the only parent relying on the exception.
Mother lastly argues that adoption offered “little benefit” to
the children when compared with legal guardianship. This
argument is relevant solely to the third factor in the Caden C.
analysis, which we need not reach. Absent a finding of a
substantial, positive parental attachment under the second
prong, the statutory preference for adoption applies. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 630; see § 366.26, subds. (b) & (c).)
Because the evidence does not compel a finding that Mother and
the children shared the type of substantial, emotional attachment
that would satisfy the second prong of the Caden C. analysis, the
court did not err in concluding the parental benefit exception did
not apply.
C. DCFS Failed to Comply with Its Duty to Inquire
whether the Children were Indian Children
“Under ICWA’s state analogue, the California Indian Child
Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA; . . . § 224.2 et seq.), courts and child
welfare agencies are charged with ‘an affirmative and continuing
duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child’
in dependency cases. (. . . § 224.2, subd. (a).) Child welfare
agencies discharge this state law duty by ‘asking the child,
19
parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party
reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian
custodian is domiciled.’ ([Id.], subd. (b).)” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16
Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. omitted.)
Mother contends KCDHS and DCFS failed to comply with
their duty of inquiry under Cal-ICWA because they relied
entirely on the denials by Mother and Father regarding possible
tribal affiliation, and did not interview any extended family
members, several of whom attended hearings, had been contacted
by the agencies, or were otherwise available. DCFS concedes it
failed to comply fully with its duty of inquiry.
Based on the available record regarding the proceedings in
Kern County, we agree with Mother that KCDHS failed to
comply with its duty of inquiry under Cal-ICWA. We also agree,
and accept DCFS’s concession, that DCFS failed to comply with
its duty of inquiry. Therefore, we must remand and direct the
juvenile court to ensure DCFS makes proper and adequate
further inquiry to conclude whether ICWA applies. Because we
conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s order terminating
Mother’s parental rights pending DCFS’s and the juvenile court's
compliance with ICWA and related state law, we also
conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s order terminating
Father’s parental rights. (See In re A.L. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th
75, 80 [“with some exceptions, . . . a court may not terminate the
parental rights of only one parent”]; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.725(a)(1).)
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights to the children X.A. and E.A. is
conditionally reversed, and the case is remanded with
instructions to ensure compliance with the inquiry requirement
under ICWA and related California law. If that inquiry reveals
evidence of tribal affiliation, then the court is to ensure
compliance with ICWA’s corresponding notice requirements. If it
does not and the court finds DCFS has complied with its inquiry
duties, the order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental
rights shall be reinstated forthwith.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
KLATCHKO, J.*
*Judge of the Riverside County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
21
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