CourtListener 10324842•People v. Om CA2/4
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Filed 1/31/25 P. v. Om CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B332863
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA107732)
v.
MORRIS OM,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Chet L. Taylor, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded.
Randy S. Kravis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2017, defendant and appellant Morris Om shot and
killed two rival gang members during a physical confrontation
inside a liquor store. Defendant was arrested two weeks later
after engaging in a high-speed police pursuit with a five-year-old
child in his car. Defendant was convicted, among other offenses,
of two counts of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a)),1 fleeing a pursuing police vehicle (Veh. Code, § 2800.2),
and misdemeanor child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (b)).
Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of evidence
supporting these (or other) convictions on appeal. He instead
raises seven contentions challenging the exclusion of evidence,
various jury instructions, a remark by the prosecutor during
closing argument, and several portions of his sentence.
Recognizing most of these contentions were not raised below,
defendant argues trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object.
We affirm defendant’s convictions but remand the matter
for a full resentencing hearing.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We limit our factual background to facts relevant to
defendant’s contentions and to provide necessary context.
A. Prosecution Evidence
1. The Liquor Store Shooting
The shooting in this case occurred at a liquor store in an
area of Long Beach known as Cambodia Town. Among the
various gangs claiming territory in Cambodia Town were the
1 Subsequent unspecified references to statutes are to the Penal
Code.
2
Asian Boyz Gang (ABZ) and the Tiny Rascals Gang (TRG).
According to Long Beach Police Department Detective Udom
Sawai, an expert on local gangs, ABZ and TRG were “major
rivals” at the time.
On the evening of October 10, 2017, Detective Oscar
Valenzuela responded to a shots-fired call at the liquor store.
Detective Valenzuela obtained video surveillance from the liquor
store and surrounding areas. Footage capturing the
confrontation and shooting was played for the jury.2
Around 9:23 p.m., Dallas Som and Danny Bunthung exited
a pickup truck and walked to the store entrance where
Savannara Sok and defendant were standing. Defendant and
Sok were members or associates of TRG. Som and Bunthung
were members of ABZ. The four men were captured “madd-
dogging or staring down” one another outside the store.3
Together, the four men entered the liquor store. Sok
entered first, followed by Bunthung, defendant, and then Som.
Inside the store were a store clerk and customer. After the four
men walked through the entryway, they engaged in a “two
against two” fistfight. Sok tackled Bunthung to the ground while
defendant wrestled with Som nearby. Moments later, defendant
and Som were fighting outside the entryway doors. Defendant
lost his eyeglasses during the skirmish.
2 The appellate briefs refer to various portions of surveillance
footage, which we have independently reviewed.
3 Defendant testified he was a recording artist who sang about
TRG gang culture. He believed ABZ called him “The Singing Roach.”
At the time of incident, defendant and Sok wore clothing associated
with TRG. Defendant wore a black jacket and grey t-shirt. Sok wore a
Las Vegas Raiders hat.
3
Once outside, Som disengaged from defendant and ran back
to assist Bunthung inside the store. Standing alone outside,
defendant reached into his waistband to retrieve a handgun.
Defendant then walked back into the liquor store.
Detective Valenzuela testified as to what happened next:
“That is going to be, again, the defendant after he ran back inside
with a gun. We’ve got Mr. Bunthung on the ground looking in his
direction. Then you have [Mr.] Som in the background, and then
Savannara Sok [on the right] getting out of the way.” Defendant
fired the gun while “standing over the victims” and while Sok was
“getting out of the way.” Ricocheted projectiles hit the clerk and
customer. Defendant and Sok ran away, fleeing the area around
9:24 p.m.
Bunthung and Som died from multiple gunshot wounds. A
pathologist who conducted autopsies of both victims testified
Bunthung sustained four gunshot wounds to the right eye socket,
mouth, right abdomen, and thigh. Som sustained four gunshot
wounds to the back of the head, upper back, and a fragment
injury to his thigh. The wound to Bunthung’s eye socket
contained stippling, suggesting defendant’s firearm was
“probably within the range of six inches to a foot” away when
firing. Defendant’s eyeglasses, nine expended cartridge cases
from a 9-millimeter firearm, and various projectiles were
collected from the scene.
2. The High-Speed Chase and Subsequent Investigation
While conducting surveillance around 9:45 a.m. on
October 26, 2017, officers watched defendant leave a house and
get into a vehicle with a small child, who was later identified as
his girlfriend’s son. Defendant drove away in the car with the
4
child sitting in the back seat. An officer activated his car’s police
lights and sirens. Several police cars followed defendant as he
drove at high rates of speed on highways and streets. Defendant
ran several red lights and stop signs and was seen going “well
over 45 to 50 miles an hour” on a residential street. Following a
five-to-ten-minute pursuit, defendant’s vehicle ran a red light on
Pacific Coast Highway and struck another vehicle before coming
to rest. Defendant was arrested without further incident.
During a recorded interview with police, defendant
displayed his gang-related tattoos and admitted he was a former
member of TRG. Defendant denied any involvement in the liquor
store shooting.
Officers searched the home from which defendant was seen
leaving and recovered parts of a disassembled 9-millimeter Glock
handgun. A criminalist reassembled the gun, analyzed the
expended cartridge cases collected from the liquor store, and
determined each had been fired from the gun. Another
criminalist found defendant’s DNA on the recovered eyeglasses.
Detective Sawai testified the liquor store shooting was gang
related. Members of ABZ and TRG were taught to engage in
fights, stabbings, shootings, and murders with rivals “on site,
meaning, it could be anywhere, in the store, in public, driving, it
could be anywhere, . . .” Detective Sawai testified it would not be
unreasonable to expect members of TRG or ABZ to be armed in
public, placing everyone in danger of great bodily injury or death.
B. Defense Evidence
Defendant testified in his own defense. He admitted
shooting Som and Bunthung but claimed he did so in self-defense
and in defense of Sok. After initially entering the liquor store,
5
defendant heard someone behind him say, “Roach Killer.”4
Knowing the term referred to ABZ members who kill rivals,
defendant feared someone was prepared to kill him. Defendant
turned and saw two unknown men (Som and Bunthung) “mad-
dogging” him. Defendant believed one of the men reached for his
waist. Anticipating an imminent attack, defendant decided to
“throw a couple punches and get out of there.” At the time,
defendant “wasn’t thinking” about using his gun “in that kind of
[violent] manner.”
When fighting with Som, defendant lost his glasses and
could not see clearly. Defendant felt a metal object hit his head
and “felt, like, a jacket wrapped around [his] neck almost,” but
was able to “break away” from Som outside the store. Defendant
knew Som did not have a gun or weapon in his hand.
While outside the store, defendant “really couldn’t see”
anything but believed Som went back to “hurt” Sok. Fearing for
his friend, defendant went back inside the store despite having
the ability to leave. Without seeing either victim with a gun or
weapon, but fearing they might be armed, defendant “got a little
close” before chambering a round in his gun and firing. Every
time he pulled the trigger, defendant feared for Sok’s life but not
his own.5 Defendant maintained he was fearful for Sok’s life
4 Officer Sawai testified members of ABZ referred to those
affiliated with TRG as a “roach.”
5 Asked why he fired his gun on direct examination, defendant
testified: “Because they were attacking [Sok], and I was trying to save
him.” On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked if defendant was
afraid for his own life when he prepared his gun for firing. Defendant
replied, “No, sir. For [Sok’s] life.” Defendant continued to fire shots
“because [he was] terrified that [his] friend, Savannara Sok, is in
imminent danger. . . .”
6
despite surveillance footage placing Sok away from both victims
before the shooting.
Defendant also testified about two prior shootings by
members of ABZ in 2008 and 2016. In 2016, defendant was
approached by an ABZ member who called out, “Roach Killer,”
before fighting and then shooting defendant. In 2008, defendant
was shot outside a restaurant claimed by ABZ.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
By amended information, defendant was charged with two
counts of murder (§ 187, subd. (a); counts 1–2), two counts of
premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a); counts 3–
4), fleeing a pursuing police vehicle (Veh. Code, § 2800.2; count
5), felony child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a); count 6), felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 10), and two
counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 22–
23). The information contained special circumstance allegations
(§ 190.2, subds. (a)(3), (a)(22); counts 1–2), firearm enhancement
allegations (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d); counts
1–4, 22–23), gang enhancement allegations (§ 186.22, subds.
(b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(B); counts 1–4, 22–23); and prior conviction
allegations (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (d), 1170.12, subd. (b); counts
22-23).6
The matter proceeded to trial in January and February
2023. During deliberations, the court granted the prosecution’s
motion to dismiss the felony child abuse count on count 6 and
proceed on the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor child
6 The amended information charged Sok with several offenses.
Sok was not tried alongside defendant.
7
abuse (§ 273a, subd. (b)). The jury acquitted defendant of both
attempted murder counts, convicted him on all other counts,
found both murders to be of the second degree, and found all
sentence enhancement allegations true.7 The prosecution
dismissed the gang enhancement allegations previously
bifurcated by the court.
Defendant was sentenced to 80 years to life plus a
consecutive determinate term of 11 years eight months in prison.
DISCUSSION
A. Forfeiture and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant acknowledges most of his appellate contentions
were not raised below. We briefly discuss the law on forfeiture
and the doctrine upon which defendant relies in the alternative,
ineffective assistance of counsel, before addressing each
contention below.
“In order to encourage prompt detection and correction of
error, and to reduce the number of unnecessary appellate claims,
reviewing courts have required parties to raise certain issues at
the time of [trial and] sentencing. In such cases, lack of a timely
and meaningful objection forfeits . . . the claim.” (People v. Scott
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351 (Scott).)
This principle generally applies to the contentions raised
here. (See People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 143 [instructional
error]; People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820 [prosecutorial
misconduct]; Scott, supra, at p. 351 [sentencing]; Evid. Code,
§ 354, subd. (a) [exclusion of evidence].)
7 The jury found both special circumstance allegations under
section 190.2, subdivisions (a)(3) and (a)(22), not true.
8
A criminal defendant “may not, . . . transform a forfeited
claim into a cognizable claim merely by asserting ineffective
assistance of counsel.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616,
654, fn. 15.) An ineffective assistance claim “is different from a
claim of the underlying forfeited error” (ibid.) and requires the
defendant to demonstrate (1) deficient trial counsel performance
and (2) resulting prejudice. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466
U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) The former component requires
showing “counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms.
(Id. at p. 688.) The latter component requires establishing a
reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have
been different but for trial counsel’s errors. (Id. at p. 694.)
Given these requirements, “rarely will an appellate record
establish ineffective assistance of counsel.” (People v. Thompson
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122 (Thompson).) In conducting any
ineffective assistance analysis, we defer to trial counsel’s
reasonable tactical decisions. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th
876, 925.) “Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make frivolous
or futile motions” (Thompson, supra, at p. 122), or for failing to
object when “there was no sound legal basis for objection.”
(People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 616.)
B. Exclusion of Evidence
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in
excluding evidence that one of the murder victims (Bunthung)
possessed a firearm during a police interview in 2015. We
disagree.
9
1. Relevant Background
During its case-in-chief, the prosecution called Sergeant
Ricardo Solario to testify about a 2015 conversation in which
Bunthung admitted he was a member of ABZ. Prior to calling
Sergeant Solario to testify, the prosecutor moved to exclude
evidence Bunthung possessed a firearm during the interview.
The prosecutor argued Bunthung’s firearm possession was
irrelevant because (1) there was no evidence Bunthung was
armed during the liquor store shooting; and (2) there was no
evidence defendant knew Bunthung or his prior firearm
possession. Defense counsel argued the evidence was relevant to
defendant’s “knowledge” that ABZ members carried firearms.
The court excluded evidence of Bunthung’s firearm possession
but permitted questioning on ABZ and its members carrying
firearms.
2. Analysis
Defendant contends the court’s exclusion of Bunthung’s
prior firearm possession violated Evidence Code section 1103,
subdivision (a)(1). That provision furnishes an exception to the
character evidence rule in criminal actions if “[o]ffered by the
defendant to prove conduct of the victim in conformity with the
character or trait of character.”
The Attorney General contends defendant forfeited this
contention by failing to object on this ground below. We agree.
“A party cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an
analysis it was not asked to conduct.” (People v. Partida (2005)
37 Cal.4th 428, 435; see Evid. Code, §§ 353–354.)
Even on the merits, we discern no error in excluding
evidence of Bunthung’s prior firearm possession. Under Evidence
10
Code section 1103, subdivision (a)(1), such evidence would be
relevant only to demonstrate (1) defendant’s knowledge of
Bunthung’s firearm possession affected his mental state; or (2) if
defendant did not have personal knowledge, the evidence tended
to show Bunthung was “‘probably the aggressor.’” (People v.
DelRio (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 47, 55–56 (DelRio).) Neither
scenario applies in this case.
It is undisputed defendant did not know Bunthung or of his
prior contact with law enforcement. As such, Bunthung’s firearm
possession could not be relevant to defendant’s own state of mind.
(People v. Tafoya (2004) 42 Cal.4th 147, 165.)
Nor has defendant demonstrated how the evidence was
relevant to show Bunthung was “probably the aggressor” of the
physical confrontation or subsequent shooting. (Delrio, supra, 54
Cal.App.5th at p. 55.) Unlike the scenario presented in Delrio, on
which defendant principally relies, this is not a case in which
“[w]e are uncertain what happened at the scene.” (See id. at
pp. 56–57 [“Who drew [their gun] first? That question is key”].)
Nothing in the surveillance footage suggests Bunthung (or Som)
initiated the physical confrontation or deadly force. “If it clearly
appears that the defendant was the aggressor . . . , evidence of
prior acts of violence . . . by the deceased is not admissible.”
(People v. Soules (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 298, 307 (Soules).)
Defendant’s unsupported statements that one of the
victims (presumably Bunthung or Sok) reached for or used a
weapon did not support the exception codified in Evidence Code
section 1103, subdivision (a)(1). Under this limited exception,
“‘[t]here must be some evidence of some overt act on the part of
deceased, of such character as would per se be indicative of
dangerous intentions, or it must be shown affirmatively to have
11
been done under circumstances such as to have reasonably led to
a belief that it was of that character.’” (Soules, supra, 41
Cal.App.2d at p. 307.) Defendant has not identified any such
evidence in this case.
On a more fundamental level, we fail to see how
Bunthung’s prior firearm possession tended to prove his
character for violence. Bunthung indisputably did not carry or
wield a firearm or weapon inside the liquor store. It thus follows
that the proffered evidence (i.e., Bunthung’s prior firearm
possession) could not be used to “prove conduct of [Bunthung] in
conformity with” this character trait (i.e., possessing a firearm).
(Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (a)(1).) Even assuming it could, the
evidence established Bunthung’s propensity to carry a firearm. It
did not tend to prove that Bunthung had a propensity to engage
in “two against one” fistfights as defendant argues on appeal.
(See also Staples v. U.S. (1994) 511 U.S. 600, 611 [“despite their
potential for harm, guns generally can be owned in perfect
innocence”]; § 667.5, subd. (c) [possession of firearm not among
crimes defined as “violent felonies”].)
The cases on which defendant relies apply Evidence Code
section 1103, subdivision (a)(1), when the prior violent act(s)
parallel the circumstances under which the defendants claimed
self-defense. (See, e.g., DelRio, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 54–
56 [prior domestic violence including use of a firearm relevant to
victim’s propensity to initiate gunfight]; People v. Shoemaker
(1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 442, 449 [prior attack relevant to theory
victim “attacked [the defendant] in the bedroom”].) As discussed,
Bunthung’s prior firearm possession did not relate to defendant’s
offer of proof. We decline to apply Evidence Code section 1103
beyond this limited circumstance.
12
We thus conclude the court acted within its discretion in
excluding evidence of Bunthung’s prior possession of a firearm.
As such, we further conclude defense counsel was not ineffective
for failing to object under Evidence Code section 1103. (See
Thompson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 122.)
C. Claims of Instructional Error
Defendant challenges three CALCRIM instructions given to
the jury: No. 3471 (Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or
Initial Aggressor); No. 3472 (Right to Self-Defense: May Not Be
Contrived); and No. 250 (Union of Act and Intent: General
Intent). We address the first two instructions on the right to self-
defense before addressing the third instruction on general intent.
1. CALCRIM Nos. 3471 and 3472
Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury with bracketed language in CALCRIM Nos.
3471 and 3472 on the victim’s sudden escalation of deadly force.
Defendant argues the bracketed language was warranted
because he engaged in nondeadly behavior that was met by life-
threatening escalation by Bunthung and Som. We disagree.
a. Relevant Background
Defendant offered two defense theories at trial. He argued
the need to employ physical and deadly force was necessary to
defend his own life and to protect Sok’s life.8 With defense
8 Defendant’s appellate briefs conflate these two theories without
explanation. Defendant’s briefs do admit, however, that defendant
shot both victims “because they were attacking Sok, and [defendant]
13
counsel’s approval, the court instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 3471 as follows:
“A person who engages in mutual combat or
who starts a fight has a right to self-defense only if:
[¶] 1. He actually and in good faith tries to stop
fighting; [¶] 2. He indicates, by word or by conduct, to
his opponent, in a way that a reasonable person
would understand, that he wants to stop fighting and
that he has stopped fighting; [¶] AND [¶] 3. He gives
his opponent a chance to stop fighting. [¶] If a person
meets these requirements, he then had a right to self-
defense if the opponent continued to fight.”
The court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No.
3472, which provided: “A person does not have the right to self-
defense if he or she provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to
create an excuse to use force.” In addition, the court instructed
the jury on principles of homicide and murder (CALCRIM Nos.
500, 520–522), justifiable homicide based on self-defense or
defense of another (CALCRIM No. 505), and voluntary
manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense or defense of
another (CALCRIM No. 571).
Addressing both instructions at issue in opening and
rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor argued defendant was
not entitled to self-defense because the victims “were not the
aggressors” and the evidence failed to establish any escalation of
force. The prosecutor also argued imperfect self-defense “does not
apply when the defendant, through his own wrongful conduct has
created circumstances that justify his adversary’s use of force.
feared that Sok was going to be killed or gravely injured if he
(appellant) did not intervene with deadly force.”
14
Him and Sok started a fist fight. You don’t get to shoot people
you started a fist fight with. [¶] [CALCRIM No. 571], imperfect
self-defense: Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter
how great or how likely the harm is believed to be.”
Defense counsel discussed both self-defense and defense of
another in closing. Counsel argued defendant “believed [Som]
had a weapon, the metal object. He has past experience with
[ABZ] that they will escalate a fight to a shooting. . . .
[Defendant] believed Som and Bunthung were going to inflect
[sic] great bodily injury on or kill Savannara Sok. Why wouldn’t
they? They are [ABZ].”
During deliberations, the jury submitted a question
requesting clarification of the term “‘lawful excuse’ in reference to
the phrase ‘he killed without lawful excuse?” In response, the
court referred the jury to CALCRIM Nos. 500, 505, and 571.
b. Governing Law: Self-Defense and Defense of
Another
“We begin by reviewing the related concepts of self-defense
and defense of others. . . . For perfect self-defense, one must
actually and reasonably believe in the necessity of defending
oneself from imminent danger of death or great bodily injury.
[Citation.] A killing committed in perfect self-defense is neither
murder nor manslaughter; it is justifiable homicide. [Citations.]”
(People v. Randle (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987, 994 (Randle), overruled
on another ground in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172.) For
imperfect self-defense, one must “actually, but unreasonably”
believe in the necessity of defending oneself from imminent death
or great bodily injury. (Id. at p. 995.) A killing committed in
imperfect self-defense negates malice and may result in a
15
conviction “‘of no crime greater than voluntary manslaughter.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) “For either perfect or imperfect self-defense,
the fear must be of imminent danger to life or great bodily
injury.” (People v. Chavez (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 663, 689
(Chavez); accord, In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 771.)
“For the same reason[s], one who kills in imperfect defense
of others—in the actual but unreasonable belief he must defend
another from imminent danger of death or great bodily injury—is
guilty only of manslaughter.” (Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th at
p. 997.) For this theory to apply, the “defendant must . . .
actually believe the immediate use of deadly force was necessary
to defend another person against the danger of being killed or
suffering great bodily injury.” (Chavez, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at
p. 659.) “Imperfect defense of others, like imperfect self-defense,
is not a true defense, but a shorthand description for a form of
voluntary manslaughter.” (People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th
227, 271.)
Our Supreme Court has long explained the self-defense
doctrine “may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his
own wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical attack or
the commission of a felony), has created circumstances under
which his adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally justified.”
(People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 761.)
c. Analysis
Defendant contends the trial court erred by instructing the
jury with CALCRIM Nos. 3471 and 3472 without bracketed
language concerning the right to self-defense if an opponent
suddenly responds to a nondeadly physical confrontation with
16
deadly force.9 Without this bracketed language, defendant
argues the jury was “misled into thinking [he] was unduly
restricted in his ability to claim self-defense.”
The Attorney General contends defendant forfeited this
contention for the failure to request the language to amplify or
clarify each instruction. We agree. (See People v. Jennings
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 671; People v. Eulian (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 1324, 1334 (Eulian).) Anticipating this result,
defendant contends his trial counsel was ineffective for not
requesting the bracketed language.
Defendant’s argument primarily relies on People v. Ramirez
(2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 940 (Ramirez). There, two codefendants
and another gang member instigated a fistfight with seven-to-
eight rival gang members. (Id. at p. 944.) One of the
codefendants testified that when he saw one rival member draw
an object that appeared to be a gun, he pulled out his own
firearm and fatally shot the rival member in self-defense. (Ibid.)
During closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly misstated
the law by arguing CALCRIM No. 3472 precluded the shooter’s
claim of self-defense even if he sought only to engage in a
fistfight. (Id. at pp. 943, 946–949.)
Over a lengthy dissent, the majority in Ramirez held the
“blanket rule” in CALCRIM No. 3472 did not accurately state the
law “under the facts before the jury.” (Ramirez, supra, 233
9 The bracketed language in CALCRIM Nos. 3471 and 3472
provides: “However, if the defendant used only non-deadly force, and
the opponent responded with such sudden and deadly force that the
defendant could not withdraw from the fight, then the defendant had
the right to defend (himself/herself) with deadly force and was not
required to try to stop fighting.”
17
Cal.App.4th at p. 947.) Without the bracketed language on the
escalation of deadly force, the court found the instructions
“established as a matter of law that defendants were not entitled
to imperfect self-defense if they contrived to use any force, even
nondeadly force, but that was a question for the jury to decide on
its own evaluation of the facts.” (Id. at p. 953.)
Defendant misapplies Ramirez to the facts and theories of
this case. In Ramirez, the “court was concerned with a
defendant’s use of deadly force in self-defense.” (Eulian, supra,
247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1334.) The instruction it analyzed
(CALCRIM No. 3472) was given because the evidence warranted
the self-defense instruction.
In this case, defendant’s excuse for employing deadly force
was not based in self-defense. The only evidence offered to
support defendant’s shooting was “[b]ecause they [(the victims)]
were attacking Mr. Savannara, and I was trying to save him.”
Throughout trial and as acknowledged on appeal (see fns. 5, 8
ante), defendant’s claimed need to shoot the victims was to save
Sok’s life, not his own. As defendant does not explain why the
self-defense instructions in this case (CALCRIM Nos. 3471-3472)
warranted language on the escalation of force when his sole
theory was employing deadly force in defense of another, we join
the breadth of cases cabining Ramirez to its own facts. (See
People v. Gray (2023) 15 Cal.5th 152, 169, fn. 5 [“‘“[i]t is
axiomatic that cases are no authority for propositions not
considered”’”].)
Defendant raises no challenges to the instructions given on
perfect or imperfect defense of another. (See CALCRIM Nos. 505,
571, 3474.) He notes that one of these instructions (CALCRIM
No. 505 [Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of
18
Another]) did instruct the jury on the escalation of force, though
it did not extend escalation of force to defense of another.10 The
jury was directed to this instruction when seeking clarification on
“‘lawful excuse’ in reference to the phrase ‘he killed without
lawful excuse?’”
In light of the foregoing, we discern no error in omitting the
bracketed language in CALCRIM Nos. 3471 and 3472. We thus
discern no error or resulting prejudice in defense counsel’s failure
to request it.
2. CALCRIM No. 250
Defendant contends the court erred by listing child abuse
as a general intent crime in CALCRIM No. 250 (Union of Act and
Intent: General Intent). Defendant argues the only theory of
child abuse applicable in this case was indirect child abuse,
which required the additional finding of criminal negligence.
Again, we discern no error.
a. Relevant Background
Defendant was charged with felony child abuse (§ 273a,
subd. (a)) for placing a young child in danger of serious harm
10 CALCRIM No. 505 provided, inter alia: “A defendant is not
required to retreat. He or she is entitled to stand his or her ground
and defend himself or herself and, if reasonably necessary, to pursue
an assailant until the danger of death or great bodily injury has
passed. This is so even if safety could have been achieved by
retreating. [¶] If the victim responds with a sudden escalation of force
the aggressor may legally defend against the use of force. [¶] The
doctrine of self-defense is available to insulate one from criminal
responsibility where his or her act, justifiably in self-defense,
inadvertently results in the injury of an innocent bystander.”
19
during the high-speed police chase. Both parties argued this
theory at trial.
The jury received three instructions on the union of act and
intent: CALCRIM Nos. 250, 251, and 253.
The first instruction informed the jury on the union of act
and general intent as follows:
“The crimes of Child Abuse, Possession of
Firearm by a Felon, and Assault with a Firearm,
require proof of the union, or joint operation, of act
and wrongful intent. [¶] For you to find a person
guilty of any of these crimes, that person must not
only commit the prohibited act, but must do so with
wrongful intent. A person acts with wrongful intent
when he or she intentionally does a prohibited act.
The act required is explained in the instruction for
that crime . . . .” (CALCRIM No. 250.)
The second instruction informed the jury on the union of
act and specific intent for various offenses not relevant here.
(CALCRIM No. 251.)
The third instruction informed the jury on the union of act
and criminal negligence as follows:
“For you to find a person guilty of the crime of
Child Abuse, a person must do an act with criminal
negligence. [¶] Criminal negligence is defined in the
instructions on that crime.” (CALCRIM No. 253.)
For the particular charge of child abuse, the court
instructed the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 821 (felony child abuse)
and 823 (misdemeanor child abuse). The latter instruction
provided:
“Child abuse in violation of Penal Code section
273a(b), a misdemeanor, is a lesser offense of [felony
20
child abuse] in violation of Penal Code section
273a(a). [¶] To prove that the defendant is guilty of
this crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The
defendant, while having care or custody of a child,
willfully caused or permitted the child to be placed in
a situation where the child’s person or health was
endangered; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendant was
criminally negligent when he caused or permitted the
child to suffer, be injured, or be endangered. [¶] . . .
[¶]
“Criminal negligence involves more than
ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in
judgment. A person acts with criminal negligence
when: [¶] 1. He or she acts in a reckless way that is a
gross departure from the way an ordinarily careful
person would act in the same situation; [¶] 2. The
person’s acts amount to disregard for human life or
indifference to the consequences of his or her acts; [¶]
AND [¶] 3. A reasonable person would have known
that acting in that way would naturally and probably
result in harm to others.”
The court instructed the jury to consider “all of these
instructions . . . together” and follow the definitions provided in
them. (CALCRIM No. 200; see also CALCRIM Nos. 220, 3519.)
During deliberation, the jury submitted the following
question: “In regards [sic] to count 6 [felony child abuse,] if we all
agree the defendant is guilty of a misdemeanor but can’t agree on
the felony—do we convict on the lesser count or find undecided?”
In response, the prosecutor moved to dismiss the felony charge
and proceed on the misdemeanor offense. The court dismissed
the felony charge before answering the jury’s question as follows:
“Count 6, the felony, P.C. 273a(a) has been dismissed and is no
21
longer before you; only the lesser offense, Penal Code 273a(b), the
misdemeanor is before you for your consideration.”
b. Governing Principles of Child Abuse
“Section 273a encompasses a wide variety of situations and
includes both direct and indirect conduct. [Citations.] When the
harm to a child is directly inflicted, the requisite mental state for
the section 273a offense is general criminal intent. [Citations.]
When that harm is indirectly inflicted, the requisite mental state
is criminal negligence. [Citations.]” (People v. Burton (2006) 143
Cal.App.4th 447, 454; see also People v. Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th
1206, 1219–1220.)
“In criminal law, there are two descriptions of criminal
intent: general intent and specific intent. ‘“A crime is
characterized as a ‘general intent’ crime when the required
mental state entails only an intent to do the act that causes the
harm; a crime is characterized as a ‘specific intent’ crime when
the required mental state entails an intent to cause the resulting
harm.”’” (People v. Nicolas (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1172–1173
(Nicolas).) “Criminal negligence is a separate mental state that is
distinct from either general or specific intent.” (Id. at p. 1173,
italics added.) Whenever a charged crime requires criminal
negligence, “the trial court should instruct the jury on the union
between the act and a defendant’s criminal negligence.” (Ibid.)
c. Analysis
Defendant contends CALCRIM No. 250 improperly listed
child abuse as a general intent crime because the “the type of
child abuse [he] allegedly committed was indirect.”
22
The Attorney General contends defendant forfeited this
contention for failing to object at trial or request a curative
instruction. We agree. (See People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th
398, 469 [defendant must request clarifying language for any
instruction he believed was unclear].)
Even on the merits, we discern no instructional error. As
discussed, we must consider the challenged instruction “‘in the
context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to
determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury
applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.)
We conclude there is no reasonable likelihood the jury
followed CALCRIM No. 250 in a manner that removed criminal
negligence from its consideration and finding. CALCRIM No. 250
is not a self-supporting instruction. Despite generally requiring
the joint operation of “act and wrongful intent” for child abuse,
the instruction did not define the act required for the offense, and
instead directed the jury to the “instruction for that crime.” This
direction to the “instruction for that crime” appears again in
CALCRIM No. 253, another introductory instruction on the union
of act and criminal negligence for child abuse, and in CALCRIM
No. 225 on the intent and mental state required for each offense.
After dismissing the felony child abuse charge during
deliberations, the court directed the jury to consider “only the
lesser offense, Penal Code 273a(b), the misdemeanor . . . .” The
instruction “on that crime”—CALCRIM No. 823—required both
an intentional act and criminal negligence.
Assuming the jury recognized a conflict between CALCRIM
No. 250 and the more precise, CALCRIM Nos. 253 and 823 (see
Nicolas, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173), we find no reasonable
23
probability it would have concluded the single, more general
instruction prevailed over the numerous and more specific
instructions. (See Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 581–582
[reviewing courts consider instructions that “more specifically”
address legal concept than more generalized instructions]; accord,
id. at pp. 581–582; People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 873–
874.)
D. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct
by telling the jury in rebuttal closing argument: “Every time you
hear a guilty verdict in a criminal case, this flag represents
something.”
The Attorney General contends, defendant concedes, and
we agree defendant’s direct claim of error is forfeited. (See People
v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 612 (Davis).)
Defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective in failing
to object to this statement. We disagree.
Claims of prosecutorial misconduct implicate different
standards under federal and state law. (People v. Wallace (2008)
44 Cal.4th 1032, 1070.) “Under the federal Constitution, a
prosecutor commits reversible misconduct only if the conduct
infects the trial with such ‘“unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process.”’ [Citation.] By contrast, our
state law requires reversal when a prosecutor uses ‘deceptive or
reprehensible methods to persuade either the court or the jury’
[citation] and ‘“it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the defendant would have been reached without the
misconduct”’ [citation].” (Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 612.)
24
Like claims of instructional error, claims of prosecutorial
misconduct in closing argument must be viewed “in the context of
the argument as a whole.” (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th
468, 522.) We shall not “‘lightly infer that a prosecutor intends
an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that
a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that
meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations.’”
(People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1225, fn. 21,
superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Steele
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 682.)
Here, defendant challenges an isolated statement in the
following portion of rebuttal argument:
“I know at some point, especially during jury
selection, there was a little bit of humor and release.
. . . Please do not take the laughs or jokes as signs of
disrespect. . . .
“You all received jury summons. I know, some
of you, it is your first time. I hope you do walk away
with a greater appreciation of this system, of the
process, of all the lengths we go through. Every time
you hear a guilty verdict in a criminal case, this flag
represents something. I know there is a lot of
heartbreaking news out there. Things are not
perfect, but this system works, and we could not do it
without you.
“People think, in criminal law, everything is
hate, like, adversarial between the prosecution and
defense. I hope you also see the criminal law
practice . . . is a very small group of attorneys that do
this. There is a high level of respect. We may
disagree [on] the outcomes, but I hope you get to see,
we’re not fighting over money here.” (Italics added.)
25
Defendant contends the italicized statement appealed to
the passion and prejudice of the jury. (Citing People v. Young
(2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1195 [prosecutor may not inflame or
arouse passion or prejudice of the jury]; United States v.
Weatherspoon (9th Cir. 2005) 410 F.3d 1142, 1149 [prosecutor
may not argue “potential social ramifications of the jury’s
reaching a guilty verdict”].) Viewed properly in context, we
disagree.
The prosecutor’s remarks sought to dispel any appearance
of disrespect or incivility between counsel. The remarks also
expressed gratitude to the jury for facing “the onerous task . . . in
applying the law and in fulfilling its important function.” (People
v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 91–92 [no misconduct when
commenting on rule of law and jury service], disapproved on
another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390.)
To the extent the isolated remark was unduly suggestive of
patriotism, the jury was instructed not to let “bias, sympathy,
prejudice, or public opinion influence [its] assessment of the
evidence or [its] decision.” (CALCRIM No. 200.) We presume the
jury followed this instruction. (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11
Cal.5th 1, 30.)
State v. Perez-Mejia (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) 143 P.3d 838
(Perez-Mejia), on which defendant relies, is both nonbinding and
inapposite. (See T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4
Cal.5th 145, 175.) In that case, the prosecutor told the jury in
summation:
“Send a message to [one of the
defendants,] to other members of his gang . . .
and to all the other people who choose to dwell
in the underworld of gangs. That message is
we had enough. We will not tolerate it any
26
longer. That we as citizens . . . , we have the
right to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness and we will no longer allow those
who choose to dwell in the underworld of gangs
to stifle our rights. And that message begins
now. [¶] It begins now by finding that the
defendant was involved in the death of [an
innocent bystander]. That message can be sent
by holding the defendant responsible for his
actions, for his involvement in the gang.”
(Perez-Mejia, supra, 143 P.3d at p. 844.)
The court in Perez-Mejia found these comments “improperly
invoked the jurors’ patriotic sentiments and, having done so, cast
the defendant as an oppressor of the inalienable rights listed in
our nation’s Declaration of Independence.” (Perez-Mejia, supra,
143 P.3d at p. 844.) In so finding, the court reasoned the
argument “needlessly injected the sensitive issues of nationality
and ethnicity into a case where the defendant and his associates
were alleged members of a Central American gang, many of
whom, including [one defendant who] required Spanish language
interpreters during the trial.” (Id. at p. 844.)
The prosecutor’s remark in this case was not directed at
defendant, his nationality, ethnicity, or membership in a gang.11
The prosecutor’s generalized statement, made in context of a
11 When discussing the prohibition against appealing to
“patriotism,” the Perez-Mejia court cited analogous cases prohibiting “a
prosecutor to ‘direct the jurors’ desires to end a social problem toward
convicting a particular defendant.’” (Perez-Mejia, supra, 143 P.3d at
p. 843, fn. 8, quoting United States v. Solivan (6th Cir. 1991) 937 F.2d
1146, 1148, 1153 [prosecutor requested sending a message to the
defendant “and all of the other drug dealers like her . . . [t]hat we don’t
want that stuff in Northern Kentucky”].)
27
larger discussion on jury service and civility, was not a plea to
patriotic sentiment like that in Perez-Mejia. We discern no
prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance.
E. Claim(s) of Sentencing Error
Defendant raises two claims of sentencing error. He first
contends the trial court erroneously imposed consecutive
sentences on count 5 (evading a pursuing vehicle) and count 6
(misdemeanor child abuse). He also contends the court abused
its discretion in refusing to dismiss the firearm enhancements on
counts 1, 2, 22, and 23 in furtherance of justice (§ 1385, subd. (c)).
The Attorney General concedes error in the former
argument. We accept the concession.
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “An
act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law may be punished under either of such
provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished
under more than one provision.”
Whether a defendant may be subject to multiple
punishments under section 654 “requires a two-step inquiry,
because the statutory reference to an ‘act or omission’ may
include not only a discrete physical act but also a course of
conduct encompassing several acts pursued with a single
objective.” (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311
(Corpening).) We consider whether the different crimes “were
completed by a ‘single physical act.’ [Citation.] If so, the
defendant may not be punished more than once for that act.
Only if [the court] conclude[s] that the case involves more than a
single act—i.e., a course of conduct—do[es it] then consider
28
whether that course of conduct reflects a single ‘“intent and
objective”’ or multiple intents and objectives.” (Ibid.)
Here, the parties agree defendant’s convictions on counts 5
and 6 were based on the same course of conduct of evading the
police while having a young child in his car. Neither of these
crimes were completed before the other and instead comprised a
continuous act. We agree section 654 precluded multiple
punishment. (See Corpening, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 313–315.)
The parties further agree, as do we, that we must remand
the matter for the trial court to exercise its discretion under
section 654, which “creates sufficiently ‘“changed circumstances’”
[citation] to warrant a full resentencing.” (People v. Jones (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 37, 46, quoting People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th
857, 893.) In light of our conclusion, we need not decide
defendant’s latter claim of sentencing. On remand, defendant
may request, and the court may consider, striking the firearm
enhancements in furtherance of justice. (See People v. Walker
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024 (Walker).12
12 Absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety on
remand, the trial court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss
enhancements, “provided that it assigns significant value to the
enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present.
[Citation.] In other words, if the court does not find that dismissal
would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated
mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an
enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible
evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize
even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that
dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’
[Citation.]” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1029; accord, id. at
pp. 1036, 1037.)
29
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s convictions are affirmed. Defendant’s sentence
is vacated and the matter is remanded for full resentencing. We
express no opinion on the court’s exercise of discretion on
remand. Following resentencing, the court shall prepare an
amended abstract of judgment and forward a copy to the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
MORI, J.
We concur:
CURREY, P. J.
ZUKIN, J.
30
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