CourtListener 10324163•People v. Bee CA2/1
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Filed 1/30/25 P. v. Bee CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B332306
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA152797)
v.
DRAYON DESHAWN BEE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Teresa P. Magno, Judge. Affirmed as
modified and remanded with directions.
Verna Wefald, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Megan Moine,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant Drayon Deshawn
Bee pleaded nolo contendere to two counts of continuous sexual
abuse of a child, in violation of Penal Code section 288.5,
subdivision (a).1 The trial court sentenced him to a term of
16 years in prison. At the sentencing hearing, the court issued a
10-year criminal protective order pursuant to section 136.2,
subdivision (i)(1) that bars Bee from having any contact with the
two victims, the victims’ mother, and their sister. Bee did not
object to the protective order.
On appeal, the parties dispute whether the victims’ mother
and their sister were properly included in the protective order.
Although the sister was not named as a victim for the instant
offenses, the trial court did not err in designating her as a
protected party because there is evidence Bee perpetrated a
crime against her. Specifically, one of the victims testified at the
preliminary hearing that Bee molested her in the presence of the
sister. Conversely, based on the current record, section 136.2,
subdivision (i)(1) did not authorize the court to designate the
victims’ mother as a protected party because Bee did not
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
Section 288.5, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: “Any
person who either resides in the same home with the minor child
or has recurring access to the child, who over a period of time, not
less than three months in duration, engages in three or more acts
of substantial sexual conduct with a child under the age of
14 years at the time of the commission of the offense, . . . or three
or more acts of lewd or lascivious conduct . . . with a child under
the age of 14 years at the time of the commission of the offense is
guilty of the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child and
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term
of 6, 12, or 16 years.” (§ 288.5, subd. (a).)
2
perpetrate, or attempt to perpetrate, a crime against her. The
Attorney General represents, however, that had Bee timely
objected to the protective order, the prosecution could have
developed the record to provide a sufficient basis for the inclusion
of the victims’ mother in that order.
Consequently, we remand this matter to the trial court to
afford the prosecution an opportunity to demonstrate that the
mother should be designated as a protected party in the order.
We also direct the court to amend the abstract of judgment to
include a restitution order the court issued after it sentenced Bee.
In all other respects, we affirm.
BACKGROUND2
We summarize only those facts relevant to this appeal.
2 We derive our Background in part from admissions made
by the parties in their appellate briefing and assertions made by
the Attorney General that Bee does not contest in his reply brief.
(See Williams v. Superior Court (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 666, 668,
674 (Williams) [“ ‘An express concession or assertion in a brief is
frequently treated as an admission of a legal or factual point,
controlling in the disposition of the case.’ ”]; Artal v. Allen (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 [“ ‘[A] reviewing court may make
use of statements [in briefs and argument] . . . as admissions
against the party [advancing them].’ ”]; Reygoza v. Superior Court
(1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 514, 519 & fn. 4 [criminal case in which
the Court of Appeal assumed that an assertion made by
respondent was correct because “defendant did not dispute
respondent’s claim in his reply”]; Rudick v. State Bd. of
Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89–90 [concluding that the
appellants made an implicit concession by “failing to respond in
their reply brief to the [respondent’s] argument on th[at] point”].)
3
Daphne J. is the mother of C.J., N.F., and D.J. C.J., N.F.,
and D.J. are Bee’s stepsiblings.
In 2010, Bee was convicted of continuously sexually
abusing C.J., in violation of section 288.5, subdivision (a). Bee
admits he was sentenced to a 16-year prison term for that
offense.
In 2019, N.F. and D.J. reported that Bee had sexually
abused them as well.
On October 14, 2021, the People filed an amended
information charging Bee with one count of sexual intercourse or
sodomy with a child 10 years old or younger, in violation of
section 288.7, subdivision (a) (count 1); two counts of oral
copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years old or
younger, in violation of section 288.7, subdivision (b) (counts 2
and 3); three counts of lewd act upon a child, in violation of
section 288, subdivision (a) (counts 4, 5, and 6); and one count of
continuous sexual abuse of a child, in violation of section 288.5,
subdivision (a) (count 7). The People alleged Bee committed
each offense “[o]n or between February 1, 2010 and
August 26, 2010 . . . .” The People averred that Bee committed
counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 against N.F., and that he perpetrated
count 7 against D.J.
Although our record is limited in certain respects because
the case did not proceed to trial, we note the parties do not
dispute that: (1) N.F. was six to seven years old when Bee began
to abuse her; (2) D.J. was 11 to 12 years old when Bee began to
abuse him; and (3) C.J. was nine years old at the time Bee was
arrested for abusing her.
At a May 23, 2023 hearing, Bee informed the trial court
that he accepted a plea offer in exchange for a 16-year prison
4
term. The trial court granted the prosecutor’s motion to amend
the amended information to allege as count 8 that Bee
continuously sexually abused N.F. in violation of section 288.5,
subdivision (a).3 Pursuant to Bee’s plea agreement, he pleaded
nolo contendere to counts 7 and 8. The court found Bee guilty of
those two offenses and granted the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss
all remaining counts.
On June 8, 2023, pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial
court sentenced Bee to the high term of 16 years in prison on
count 7 and a concurrent 16-year prison term on count 8. The
trial court also issued a criminal protective order pursuant to
section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) barring Bee from, inter alia,
having any contact with N.F., D.J., C.J., and their mother,
Daphne J.
Bee timely appealed the judgment on July 17, 2023.
On November 7, 2023, the administrative presiding justice
for our district issued the following order: “This appeal, initiated
by the notice filed on July 17, 2023, is limited to issues that
do not require a Certificate of Probable Cause.”4
3 In moving to amend the amended information, the
prosecutor did not identify the dates on which Bee perpetrated
count 8. The amended abstract of judgment filed on
March 28, 2024 indicates that Bee committed this offense in
2010.
4 In his notice of appeal, Bee checked a box indicating
“[t]his appeal is based on the sentence or other matters occurring
after the plea that do not affect the validity of the plea.” (See also
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(2)(B) [“No certificate of
probable cause is required for an appeal based on or from: [¶] . . .
The sentence or other matters occurring after the plea . . . that
do not affect the validity of the plea . . . .”].)
5
We later appointed counsel to represent Bee on appeal.
Bee’s appointed counsel filed an opening brief in which she raised
no issues, requested that this court independently review the
record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and
represented that counsel remained available to brief any
additional issues upon this court’s request.
We independently reviewed the record and asked the
parties to brief the following two issues:
1. Did the trial court err in issuing a criminal protective
order protecting C.J. and Daphne J., instead of
limiting the scope of the order to the named victims
for counts 7 and 8, to wit, D.J. and N.F.?
2. Should we direct the trial court to amend the abstract
of judgment to reflect the victim restitution order in
the stipulated amount of $14,851 made on
December 7, 2023?5
The parties submitted supplemental briefing on these
questions.
APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
On the date Bee was sentenced, section 136.2,
subdivision (i)(1) provided in pertinent part: “When a criminal
defendant has been convicted of a crime . . . that requires the
defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290,
the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an
order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of
5 In our order requesting supplemental briefing, we took
judicial notice of the minute order for the December 7, 2023
restitution hearing and the amended abstract of judgment that
was filed on March 28, 2024.
6
the crime. The order may be valid for up to 10 years, as
determined by the court. . . . It is the intent of the Legislature in
enacting this subdivision that the duration of a restraining order
issued by the court be based upon the seriousness of the facts
before the court, the probability of future violations, and the
safety of a victim and the victim’s immediate family.”6
(Stats. 2022, ch. 87, § 1.)
“As used in the chapter containing section 136.2,
subdivision (i)(1), ‘ “[v]ictim” means any natural person with
respect to whom there is reason to believe that any crime as
defined under the laws of this state . . . is being or has been
perpetrated or attempted to be perpetrated.’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Delarosarauda (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 205, 211
(Delarosarauda), quoting § 136, subd. (3).) Furthermore, Bee’s
convictions for violating section 288.5 require him to register
under section 290, subdivision (c). (See § 290, subd. (c)(1).)
Issues of statutory interpretation are “ ‘ “questions of law
subject to our independent or de novo review. [Citations.] ‘The
fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the
intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.
[Citations.] In order to determine this intent, we begin by
6 Section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) has since been amended
such that the last sentence of the provision now reads: “It is the
intent of the Legislature in enacting this subdivision that the
duration of a restraining order issued by the court be based upon
the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of
future violations, the safety of a victim and the victim’s
immediate family, and any information provided to the court
pursuant to Section 273.75.” (Stats. 2024, ch. 538, § 1, italics
added.) This legislative amendment has no impact on our
analysis.
7
examining the language of the statute. [Citations.] But “[i]t is a
settled principle of statutory interpretation that language of a
statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would
result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not
intend.” [Citations.] . . . [W]e do not construe statutes in
isolation, but rather read every statute “with reference to the
entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be
harmonized and retain effectiveness.” ’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’
[Citations.]” (See People v. Race (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 211, 217
(Race).)
“With respect to the issuance of a legally authorized
criminal protective order, ‘ “ ‘We imply all findings necessary to
support the judgment, and our review is limited to whether there
is substantial evidence in the record to support these implied
findings.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Race, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th
at p. 217.) Under the substantial evidence standard, “[w]e ‘view
the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may
have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in
the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the
evidence.’ [Citation.]” (See San Diego Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S.
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550, 575–576.) “[I]n determining whether
to issue a criminal protective order pursuant to section 136.2, a
court may consider all competent evidence before it.” (Race,
supra, at p. 220.)
Regardless of the applicable standard of review, however,
“the judgment [or order] challenged on appeal is presumed
correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively
demonstrate error.” (See People v. Sanghera (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573; see also Golden Door Properties,
8
LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467, 554–555
[“ ‘Even when our review on appeal “is de novo, it is limited to
issues which have been adequately raised and supported in [the
appellant’s opening] brief . . . .” ’ [Citation.]” . . . “ ‘It is the
appellant who bears the burden of overcoming th[e] presumption
[that an appealed judgment or order is correct].’ ”].) To overcome
the presumption of correctness, an appellant must supply the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal
analysis and citation to the record. (See People v. Stanley (1995)
10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [“ ‘[E]very brief should contain a legal
argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none
is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as
waived, and pass it without consideration.’ ”]; People v. Flint
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 983, 1006, fn. 17 [noting that an appellate
court may “ ‘decline to consider any factual assertion
unsupported by record citation at the point where it is
asserted[,]’ ” and that “ ‘[a]n appellate court “will not develop the
appellants’ arguments for them” ’ ”].)
DISCUSSION
Although the trial court did not err in designating C.J. as a
protected party in the restraining order, the record does not
support Daphne J.’s inclusion in the order. Additionally, the
parties agree the abstract of judgment should be amended to
reflect the victim restitution order in the stipulated amount of
$14,851.
As a preliminary matter, we note the Attorney General
claims Bee forfeited any challenge to the protective order by
failing to raise any objection to it during the trial court
9
proceedings.7 Bee argues we should exercise our discretion to
determine whether C.J. and Daphne J. were properly included in
the protective order to “forestall a potential claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.” We agree with Bee. (See Race, supra,
18 Cal.App.5th at p. 219, fn. 4 [addressing a forfeited appellate
challenge to a protective order to “forestall [the] defendant’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim”].)
The Attorney General, however, also argues that if Bee had
timely objected to the protective order, “[t]he prosecution could
have developed a record and provided a basis with specific
evidence as to why Daphne J. . . . w[as] properly included” in the
protective order. To ensure the prosecution is not prejudiced by
our excusal of Bee’s forfeiture, we direct the trial court upon
remand to allow the prosecution to offer evidence regarding
whether Daphne J. may be included in the protective order. (See
§ 1260 [providing that a reviewing court has the discretion to
“remand the cause to the trial court for such further proceedings
as may be just under the circumstances”].)
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Including C.J. in the
Protective Order
As for C.J.’s inclusion in the protective order, Bee
maintains, “[A]lthough [C.J.] was a previous victim of [Bee], the
protective order prohibiting him from having contact with her
7 The Attorney General further asserts that Bee “forfeited
any claim regarding the protective order because . . . he expressly
agreed to the protective order.” Assuming arguendo the Attorney
General is correct, we exercise our discretion to excuse Bee’s
forfeiture of his challenge to that order for the reasons stated in
the textual paragraph accompanying this footnote.
10
is . . . invalid. This is because section [136.2,] subdivision (i)(1)
provides for the imposition of the protective order ‘at the time of
sentencing[,]’ ” and Bee had been sentenced in a prior proceeding
to 16 years in prison for continuously sexually abusing C.J. Bee
thus seems to argue that although the court that sentenced him
to 16 years in prison for his previous conviction for continuous
sexual abuse of C.J. could have issued a restraining order
protecting her from Bee, that prior misconduct cannot be the
basis for including C.J. in the instant protective order.
We need not decide whether Bee’s prior conviction for
continuously sexually abusing C.J. supports her designation as a
protected party in the restraining order. As the Attorney General
points out, N.F. testified at the preliminary hearing that on at
least one occasion, C.J. saw Bee force N.F. to copulate orally with
him. The Attorney General correctly observes that by sexually
abusing N.F. in C.J.’s presence, Bee violated section 273g. That
statute provides: “Any person who in the presence of any child
indulges in any degrading, lewd, immoral or vicious habits or
practices, or who is habitually drunk in the presence of any child
in his care, custody or control, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”
(§ 273g.)8 It is undisputed that C.J. and N.F. were minors when
this incident occurred.
Admittedly, Bee did not suffer a conviction for violating
section 273g, and a violation of that statute does not give rise to a
8 In People v. Perreault (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d Supp. 843,
the Appellate Department of the Los Angeles County Superior
Court found that the phrase “habitually drunk” in section 273g is
unconstitutionally “vague, uncertain and ambiguous.” (See
Perreault, supra, 182 Cal.App.2d Supp. at p. 843.) That portion
of the statute is not relevant here.
11
duty to register under section 290, subdivision (c). (See § 290,
subd. (c) [omitting § 273g from the list of registerable offenses].)
These facts are immaterial. “ ‘[F]or purposes of a section 136.2
protective order, “victim” is broadly defined in section 136 as any
person against whom there is reason to believe a crime has been
committed.’ [Citation.]” (Race, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 217–
218, italics added.) Accordingly, “the subject of a protective order
pursuant to section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) need not be a named
victim of one of the offenses for which the defendant st[ands]
convicted; rather, such a protective order could issue with respect
to someone against whom some evidence suggest[s] the
individual ha[s] been ‘targeted or harmed’ by the defendant.”
(See Race, supra, at p. 219.) N.F.’s preliminary hearing
testimony, which shows Bee violated section 273g by forcing N.F.
to copulate orally with him in C.J.’s presence, satisfies that
standard.
In sum, the trial court did not err in designating C.J. as a
protected party because the record contains substantial evidence
that C.J. was a “victim” under section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1).
B. We Conclude That on the Record Before Us, The
Trial Court Lacked Authority To Designate
Daphne J. as a Protected Party
Bee argues that Daphne J. should not have been included
in the protective order “because the record does not show that
[Bee] committed or attempt[ed] to commit a crime against
Daphne J.”
The Attorney General does not contend Bee committed or
attempted to commit a crime against Daphne J. Rather, the
Attorney General maintains, “The named victims’ mother,
Daphne J., suffered emotional harm as a result of [Bee’s]
12
continuous sexual abuse of her three minor children, and was
therefore also properly included in the protective order.” To
support this position, the Attorney General cites People v.
Clayburg (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 86 for the proposition that “ ‘a
person who suffered emotionally and who was traumatized by
[the defendant’s] conduct’ ” may be designated a protected party.
(Citing Clayburg, supra, at pp. 91–92.) The Attorney General
also cites the Court of Appeal’s decision in Race to support the
proposition that, by virtue of Daphne J.’s emotional trauma, she
constitutes “a person harmed in the household” who may be
included in a protective order. (Citing Race, supra,
18 Cal.App.5th at p. 219.)
For the reasons set forth below, we agree with Bee that the
record before us does not show that Daphne J. was a “victim” for
the purpose of section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1).
In Clayburg, the defendant was convicted of two counts of
stalking in violation of section 646.9, subdivision (a). (Clayburg,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 88–89.) “The named victim of one
of the stalking counts was . . . [the defendant’s] former husband
and the father of their [minor] daughter,” and the other victim
was defendant’s former supervisor at work. (See id. at pp. 88–89
& fn. 2.) The record contained evidence showing that the
daughter, who resided with the defendant’s former husband,
“suffered emotionally and . . . was traumatized by” the
defendant’s harassment of her former husband. (See id. at
pp. 89–91.) For instance, on one occasion when the defendant
“pounded a golf club on [her former husband’s] front porch[ ] and
demanded custody of [the] daughter, . . . [the d]aughter ‘saw her
mom and ran to her room, crying.’ ” (See id. at p. 89.)
13
At sentencing, the trial court issued a protective order
pursuant to section 646.9, subdivision (k)(1) barring the
defendant from having any contact with her daughter for
10 years. (Clayburg, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 88–89.) At
that time, subdivision (k)(1) provided in pertinent part: “ ‘The . . .
court . . . shall consider issuing an order restraining the
defendant from any contact with the victim, that may be valid for
up to 10 years, as determined by the court. [(First sentence.)] It
is the intent of the Legislature that the length of any restraining
order be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court,
the probability of future violations, and the safety of the victim
and his or her immediate family. [(Second sentence.)]’ ”
(Clayburg, supra, at pp. 88–89.)
On appeal, a majority of a panel in Division Six rejected the
defendant’s contention that “the order was unauthorized because
[the] daughter was not a named victim of the stalking.” (See
Clayburg, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 86, 88–89, 94 (maj. opn.
of Yegan, J.).) The court “read the two sentences [of
section 646.9, subdivision (k)(1)] together” and held that “a
member of the immediate family of a stalking victim [citation]
who suffers emotional harm . . . is a ‘victim’ for purposes of a
postconviction restraining order.” (See Clayburg, at pp. 88–89,
91.) Clayburg found that “constru[ing] the second sentence so as
to relate only to the length of the restraining order” would “defeat
Legislative intent and defeat justice.” (See id. at p. 91.)
Clayburg is not instructive.
First, whereas the term “victim” for purposes of
section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) is defined in section 136,
subdivision (3) (see Race, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 216–217),
the Clayburg court did not identify a provision defining the term
14
“victim” for purposes of section 646.9, subdivision (k)(1); in fact,
the Clayburg majority suggested no such statutory definition
exists. (See Clayburg, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 88 [noting
“[t]here are situations when the electorate or the Legislature will
supply a definition for the subject provision or statute and there
are times when no specific definition is provided,” and intimating
the Clayburg matter involved “the latter instance”].) Section 136,
subdivision (3) in turn defines “victim” as a “person with respect
to whom there is reason to believe that any crime . . . is being or
has been perpetrated or attempted to be perpetrated”; it does not
define the term to include someone who suffered emotional harm
as a result of a crime committed against another person. (See
§ 136, subd. (3).)
Second, Division Four persuasively explained in
Delarosarauda that the Clayburg majority’s interpretation of
section 646.9, subdivision (k)(1) was erroneous: “We read the
second sentence [of the statute] to mean what it says: the court
should consider, among other factors, the ‘safety of the victim and
his or her immediate family’ in determining the length of the
restraining order authorized in the first sentence. Nothing
suggests the second sentence also modifies the scope of the
restraining order.” (See Delarosarauda, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 205, 211–212.) The Delarosarauda court further
remarked, “As noted by Justice Perren in the Clayburg dissent, if
the term ‘victim’ in the first sentence included a child of the
family, the second sentence would have no need to refer to ‘ “the
victim and his or her immediate family.” ’ [Citation.]”
(Delarosarauda, supra, at p. 212, citing Clayburg, supra,
211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 94–95 (dis. opn. of Perren, J.); see also
Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of
15
Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 783 [“ ‘ “[S]tatutes must
be interpreted, if possible, to give each word some operative
effect[,]” [citation]’ meaning that we should not ‘ “construe
statutory provisions so as to render them superfluous.” ’ ”].)
In sum, Clayburg is inapposite because Division Six
construed a different statute that does not utilize section 136,
subdivision (3)’s definition of “victim,” and we agree with the
Delarosarauda court’s determination that the Clayburg majority
misinterpreted the legislation at issue in that case.
The Attorney General’s reliance on Race fares no better.
We acknowledge that at one point, the Race court remarked:
“[T]he term ‘victim’ pursuant to section 136.2 criminal protective
orders must be construed broadly to include any individual
against whom there is ‘some evidence’ from which the court could
find the defendant had committed or attempted to commit some
harm within the household.” (Race, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at
p. 219.)
Yet, Race recognized section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1)
employs section 136, subdivision (3)’s definition of “victim.” (See
Race, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 216–218.) Race held that
statutory definition is “broad enough . . . to include a victim of a
charged count of which defendant does not stand convicted . . . .”
(See id. at p. 216.) Specifically, the Court of Appeal held that
upon the defendant’s plea of no contest to attempted lewd and
lascivious acts for which the defendant’s niece was the named
victim, section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) authorized the trial court
to issue an order protecting the defendant’s niece and his
daughter, given there was evidence the defendant had sexually
assaulted his daughter. (See Race, at pp. 213, 219–220.)
Accordingly, it is apparent that the Race court’s use of the phrase
16
“some harm” was merely a shorthand for section 136,
subdivision (3)’s expansive definition of “victim,” and not a
holding that individuals who do not meet that definition may also
be designated as protected parties. (See In re H.E. (2008)
169 Cal.App.4th 710, 721 [“ ‘Language used in any opinion is of
course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue
then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a
proposition not therein considered.’ ”].)
We thus reject the Attorney General’s argument that on
this record, section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) authorizes
Daphne J.’s inclusion in the protective order. On remand, the
prosecution shall be afforded an opportunity to show Daphne J.
constitutes a “victim” who may be designated a protected party
pursuant to that statute.
C. We Direct the Trial Court To Amend the Abstract of
Judgment To Reflect the Restitution Order
The parties agree, as do we, that the abstract of judgment
should be amended to reflect the victim restitution order in the
stipulated amount of $14,851. We thus direct the trial court,
upon remand, to amend the abstract of judgment accordingly.
(See Williams, supra, 226 Cal.App.2d at p. 674 [holding that a
reviewing court may rely upon the parties’ concessions].)
17
DISPOSITION
We remand the matter to the trial court with directions to
(1) afford the People an opportunity to demonstrate that
Daphne J. was properly included in the criminal protective order,
(2) amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the victim
restitution order in the stipulated amount of $14,851, and
(3) conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion. As
modified, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
WEINGART, J.
18
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