CourtListener 10324160•People v. Limon CA2/8
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Filed 1/30/25 P. v. Limon CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B328655
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA094106)
v.
GLORIA FELIZ MARIE LIMON
et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Deborah S. Brazil, Judge. Affirmed with directions.
Tanya Dellaca, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant Gloria Feliz Marie Limon.
Carlo Andreani, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Crystal Marlene Mejia.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
Defendants and appellants Gloria Feliz Marie Limon and
Crystal Marlene Mejia appeal from the orders denying, at the prima
facie stage, their respective petitions for resentencing pursuant to
Penal Code section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95).
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In 2012, defendants Limon and Mejia, along with three other
codefendants, were found guilty by jury of numerous felonies
arising from a coordinated attack on a female victim in April 2011.
Limon and Mejia were each found guilty of conspiracy to commit
murder and robbery (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a); count 1), first
degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 3), unlawful driving or
taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 4), and
kidnapping to commit robbery (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1);
count 5). (People v. Mejia (Mar. 16, 2015, B243500) [nonpub. opn.].)
As to counts 1, 3 and 5, Limon and Mejia were each found to have
used a deadly weapon and inflicted great bodily injury in the
commission of the offenses. (Ibid.) Limon and Mejia were acquitted
of attempted murder (count 2). (Ibid.)
As relevant to this appeal, the court sentenced Limon on
count 1 (conspiracy to commit murder), to 25 years to life (Pen.
Code, § 182), plus three years for the great bodily injury
enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and one year for the personal
use enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Also as to count 1, the
court imposed and stayed an upper term of six years for conspiracy
to commit robbery. The court imposed sentences on the other
counts but it is unnecessary to recite the terms of those sentences
here. The court awarded Limon 552 days of custody credits.
(People v. Mejia, supra, B243500.)
As relevant here, Mejia admitted a prior strike, and the court
sentenced her as a second-strike offender. As to count 1 (conspiracy
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to commit murder), the court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life
(Pen. Code, § 182), doubled due to the strike, plus five years (§ 667,
subd. (a)), plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and one year for the personal use
enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Also as to count 1, the court
imposed, and stayed pursuant to section 654, an upper term of
six years, doubled due to the strike, for conspiracy to commit
robbery. The court imposed sentences on the other counts but it is
unnecessary to recite the terms of those sentences here. The court
awarded Mejia 552 days of custody credits. (People v. Mejia, supra,
B243500.)
In 2015, this court modified defendants’ judgments of
conviction. As to both defendants, we vacated the determinate
terms imposed on count 1 for conspiracy to commit robbery and
stayed the sentences imposed on counts 3 and 5 pursuant to Penal
Code section 654. We otherwise affirmed the judgments of
conviction as to both defendants in their entirety. (People v. Mejia,
supra, B243500.)
After defendants’ judgments were final, the Legislature
passed Senate Bill 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) amending Penal
Code sections 188 and 189 to narrow accomplice liability for felony
murder and eliminate the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as it relates to murder. Senate Bill 1437 also added
section 1172.6 which set forth a procedure for individuals convicted
of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable
consequences theory to petition for resentencing. The amendments
to sections 188 and 189 went into effect January 1, 2019.
(Stats. 2017, ch. 1015, § 3.)
In 2021, Senate Bill 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) was passed
which expanded the scope of those entitled to seek relief pursuant
to Penal Code section 1172.6 to defendants convicted of attempted
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murder under a natural and probable consequences theory and
voluntary manslaughter.
Limon filed a petition for resentencing in March 2022, and
Mejia filed a petition for resentencing in May 2022. The trial court
appointed separate counsel for each defendant. The People filed
opposition to both petitions, arguing neither defendant was eligible
for relief.
The trial court summarily denied both petitions on the same
ground. The court ruled that neither defendant had established a
prima face case for relief, explaining that defendants were “not
convicted of murder, attempted murder or manslaughter” but
rather conspiracy to commit murder pursuant to Penal Code
section 182, and relief under section 1172.6 was limited to
defendants convicted of murder, attempted murder or
manslaughter as defined in the statute.
This appeal followed. We grant Mejia’s request for judicial
notice.
DISCUSSION
1. Defendants’ Petitions for Resentencing Were Properly
Denied.
Mejia contends the trial court erred in denying her petition at
the prima facie stage and that a remand for further proceedings
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 is warranted. She contends
she is eligible for relief because her conviction for conspiracy to
commit murder is a conviction for murder on a theory “under which
malice is imputed to a person” and that People v. Whitson (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 22 (Whitson), which holds otherwise, was wrongly
decided. Limon joins in all of Mejia’s arguments.
“We review de novo a trial court’s prima facie determination
that a petitioner is ineligible for [Penal Code] section 1172.6 relief
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as a matter of law.” (People v. Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389, 395;
accord, People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.)
Penal Code section 1172.6, subdivision (a) identifies, and
limits, the individuals who “may file a petition” seeking
resentencing to those persons “convicted of felony murder or murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on
that person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter.”
(Ibid.)
Limon and Mejia were convicted of conspiracy to commit
murder (Pen. Code, § 182), an offense which requires proof of
express malice. (People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 607.)
Neither defendant was convicted of murder, attempted murder or
voluntary manslaughter. Therefore, they are not eligible for
resentencing.
Whitson, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 22, concluded that an
individual convicted of conspiracy to commit murder is ineligible to
seek relief under Penal Code section 1172.6. People v. Lovejoy
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860 (Lovejoy), following Whitson on this
point, explained the rationale. “To begin with, the express terms of
section 1172.6 provide the potential for resentencing relief only for
persons convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter.
Conspiracy to murder is not mentioned in the statute. As the court
explained in [Whitson], one key purpose of Senate Bill 775 was to
‘include convictions for attempted murder and manslaughter in the
list of crimes subject to petition.’ (Whitson, at p. 34.) Whitson found
it ‘particularly significant’ that ‘the Legislature had the opportunity
to extend [resentencing] relief to conspiracy to murder convictions
alongside attempted murder and manslaughter convictions, but did
not.’ (Id. at pp. 34–35.) As a result, [Whitson] concluded, section
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1172.6 ‘does not permit a challenge to a conviction for conspiracy to
murder.’ (Whitson, at p. 35.)” (Lovejoy, at p. 870.)
Lovejoy explained this limitation in the statutory language “is
entirely consistent with the legislative purposes in enacting both
Senate Bills 1437 and 775—‘to ensure, with certain exceptions
related to felony murder that “a conviction for murder requires that
a person act with malice aforethought,” and that “culpability for
murder [is] premised upon that person’s own actions and subjective
mens rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (g).)’ ” (Lovejoy, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at p. 870, quoting Whitson, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th
at p. 35.) Lovejoy explained that conspiracy to commit murder
requires proof of express malice and therefore was reasonably
excluded from the scope of Penal Code section 1172.6 both when it
was initially enacted and when it was subsequently amended.
(Lovejoy, at p. 870.)
We agree with Whitson and Lovejoy and conclude that based
on the statutory language and the legislative history and purpose of
Penal Code section 1172.6, defendants Limon and Mejia are not
eligible for relief and their petitions were properly denied at the
prima facie stage as a matter of law.
2. The Clerical Error in Mejia’s Abstract of Judgment
Must Be Corrected.
The People concede that clerical errors may be corrected at
any time. Mejia’s abstract of judgment contains a clerical error. It
fails to indicate the sentence on count 3 (robbery) was ordered
stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654 by this court in 2015.
(People v. Mejia, supra, B243500.) On remand, the superior court is
directed to prepare and forward a corrected abstract of judgment for
defendant Mejia which accurately states the stayed sentence on
count 3.
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DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant and appellant Gloria Feliz
Marie Limon’s petition for resentencing is affirmed. The order
denying defendant and appellant Crystal Marlene Mejia’s petition
for resentencing is affirmed.
On remand, the superior court is directed to prepare and
forward to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation a
corrected abstract of judgment as to Crystal Marlene Mejia which
accurately reflects the fact that the sentence on count 3 (robbery)
was stayed.
GRIMES, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
WILEY, J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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