Wang v. Jiang CA2/4

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Filed 1/29/25 Wang v. Jiang CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

GUI WANG, B324791

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STFL04483)
v.

YUANZHAO JIANG,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Bradley S. Phillips, Judge. Affirmed.
Yuanzhao Jiang, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Lucya Kim and Corilee Racela for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

Appellant Yuanzhao Jiang (Jiang) appeals from the
issuance of a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against
him in favor of respondent Gui Wang, and their daughter,
Mingxin Jiang. He contends the trial court violated his due
process rights when it declined to further continue the hearing
for Jiang to retain a lawyer, and failed to provide him an
adequate opportunity to cross-examine Wang and present
evidence. He further argues the trial court’s order violates his
Second Amendment right to bear arms, and improperly deprives
him of custody of his daughter. We reject these contentions and
affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We summarize here only the facts and procedural history
relevant to our resolution of this appeal.
Jiang and Wang were married for 13 years, and they have
a 14-year-old daughter together. Although Wang filed for
dissolution of marriage on April 25, 2022, the parties continued
to reside together until the incident described below on June 13,
2022.
The following facts are taken from Wang’s testimony at the
hearing on the DVRO. On the morning of June 13, 2022, Wang
and her daughter were sleeping next to each other, and Jiang
was in the other room. Wang then felt someone touching or
groping the inside of her thigh and genitals. She woke up and
saw Jiang standing there touching her, so she tried to push his
hands away. In response, Jiang became very angry and put his

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hands around Wang’s neck to choke her. Wang cried out, which
caused their daughter to wake up. Their daughter then grabbed
Wang’s cellphone underneath the pillow to call 911. Jiang then
“forcibly tried to open [their] daughter’s hands and snatch the
cellphone.” Wang sustained injuries on her neck and their
daughter sustained scratches on her arm.
After Jiang fled the residence with Wang’s cellphone, their
daughter used an alternate cellphone to call the police. The police
arrived and issued an emergency protective order against Jiang.
On June 17, 2022, Wang filed a request for a DVRO against
Jiang and in favor of her and their daughter. The court granted a
temporary restraining order (TRO) pending a hearing on the
DVRO, prohibiting Jiang from, among other things, harassing,
attacking, threatening, assaulting or disturbing the peace of
Wang and their daughter. The TRO also prohibited Jiang from
owning, possessing, receiving, or in any other way getting a gun,
other firearm, or ammunition. The court further granted Wang
legal and physical custody of their daughter, with no visitation
pending the DVRO hearing.
On August 23, 2022, Jiang filed a response to Wang’s
request for a DVRO, which included his 8-page declaration and
71 pages of attached exhibits. He also filed his own request for a
TRO against Wang on August 24, 2022, which the court denied
pending a hearing.
At the August 29, 2022 hearing on Wang’s request for a
DVRO, Jiang appeared without counsel. The court granted
Jiang’s request that the court continue the hearing so he could
retain an attorney. The trial court also continued the hearing on

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Wang’s request for a DVRO until September 28, 2022, and set the
hearing for Jiang’s request for a DVRO on the same date.
On September 28, 2022, Jiang again appeared on behalf of
himself. He stated that most attorneys were not willing to take
his case because of the TRO against him, and the only attorney
willing to represent him is not available “until March next year.”
After informing Jiang that he would have an opportunity to
cross-examine Wang, the court proceeded with the hearing. After
hearing testimony from Wang and Jiang, including Jiang’s cross-
examination of Wang, the court concluded the hearing by stating:
“So the court finds that all the parties have had ample
opportunity to prepare for today’s hearing, including a
continuance that was granted to respondent at the last hearing
at which time the court told the respondent directly that it would
be the only continuance with respect to the hearing. [¶] So the
court, having . . . read all of the papers and having listened to the
testimony of [Wang] and [Jiang], finds that [Wang] easily
satisfied her burden of proving by preponderance of the evidence
that respondent has committed acts of abuse both physical and
emotional against [Wang] and against their daughter, who is
another protected party under the restraining order.” It further
found that Wang was a “very credible witness,” and that Jiang
“[was] not a credible witness.”
Based on these findings, the court issued a five-year DVRO
against Jiang and in favor of Wang and their daughter. The court
further ordered that Jiang “may not own, possess, have, buy, or
try to buy, receive, or try to receive, or any other way get guns or
other firearms or ammunition. The court also ordered that Jiang

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complete a 52-week batterer intervention program and provide
proof of completion of that program to the court. Finally, the
court granted sole legal and physical custody of the child to Wang
pursuant to Family Code section 3044.1 The court ordered no
visitation for Jiang, but informed him that he may apply for a
modification of the no-visitation order upon completion of at least
10 individual therapy sessions with a licensed psychotherapist to
discuss parenting and anger management.
Jiang timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Fundamental Procedural Principles
It is a fundamental rule of appellate review that a trial
court’s order or judgment is presumed correct, and the appellant
bears the burden to demonstrate prejudicial error. “‘All
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on
matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be
affirmatively shown.’” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d
557, 564.) All contentions of error asserted in appellant’s brief
must include coherent analysis and discussion, supported by
pertinent authority reflecting the logical and legal analysis by

1 Family Code section 3044, subdivision (a) provides, in part:
“Upon a finding by the court that a party seeking custody of a
child has perpetrated domestic violence within the previous five
years against the other party seeking custody of the child, or
against the child . . . , there is a rebuttable presumption that an
award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a
person who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to
the best interest of the child . . . .”

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which the appellant reached the conclusions he urges us to adopt.
(Berger v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th
989, 1007.) The appellant’s arguments must “be tailored
according to the applicable standard of appellate review.”
(Sebago, Inc. v. City of Alameda (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1372,
1388), and failure to do so may be considered a concession that an
assertion lacks merit. (James B. v. Superior Court (1995) 35
Cal.App.4th 1014, 1021.)
That Jiang is self-represented does not exempt him from
these rules. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-
1247.) He is entitled to “‘the same, but no greater consideration
than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]’” (Id. at p. 1247;
Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638-639, fn. omitted
[self-represented litigant is bound by the “same restrictive rules
of procedure as an attorney [Citation]”].)

II. Jiang Has Not Met His Burden to Show the Trial
Court Erred by Granting Wang’s DVRO
A. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Jiang’s Due
Process Rights
Jiang contends the trial court did not provide him with
sufficient time to retain a lawyer before the hearing on the
DVRO, and therefore, the court “violated [his] right to ‘due
process.’” For the reasons discussed below, we conclude the trial
court was well within its discretion in declining to further
continue the hearing on the DVRO.
The Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code,
§ 6200 et seq.) “‘provide[s] expedited and simplified procedures
for victims of violence, abuse, and harassment to obtain

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temporary and permanent restraining orders to protect them.’”
(Malinowski v. Martin (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 681, 694.) Under
Family Code section 245, subdivision (b), “[e]ither party may
request a continuance of the hearing, which the court shall grant
on a showing of good cause.”
As discussed above, Jiang filed his response to Wang’s
request for DVRO on August 23, 2022, and the court held the
initial hearing on August 29, 2022. Jiang requested the trial
court continue the hearing, however, so that he could hire an
attorney and for his “health condition [to get] better[.]” In
response to the court’s question regarding what sort of
continuance he was seeking, Jiang backtracked and stated he is
“debating” because if he continues the case too long and Wang is
still “in possession and control of the money” he will not “be able
to afford an attorney . . . [or] get [ ] medical attention . . . .” The
court ultimately continued the hearing for 30 days (i.e., until
September 28, 2022), but warned Jiang that even if he did not
retain an attorney within that time, the court would still proceed
with the DVRO hearing on that date.
By the time of the September 28, 2022 hearing, Jiang had
over three months from the date Wang filed her request for a
DVRO to retain counsel. He claimed, however, that lawyers were
unwilling to take his case because of the TRO against him, except
for one lawyer who would not be available until March of 2023.
He provided no other details regarding the identity of the lawyer
or the lawyer’s supposed scheduling conflicts.
On this record, we conclude Jiang had ample time to retain
counsel, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding

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no good cause existed to grant a further six-month continuance
based on Jiang’s unsubstantiated assertions. (See People v.
Bentley (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 150, 152-153 (Bentley) [“The trial
court has broad discretion to determine whether good cause
exists to continue a hearing date[ ]” and that discretion must not
be disturbed on appeal except “‘“on a showing that the court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.
[Citations.]” [Citation.]’”].)
Jiang next argues the trial court violated his due process
rights for the following additional reasons: the court failed to
provide him an adequate opportunity for cross-examination; did
not allow him to present evidence; did not permit him “to seek
witnesses to testify”; and did not allow him “to make closing
arguments[.]” Our review of the record, however, demonstrates
otherwise.
First, the trial court provided Jiang ample time to cross-
examine Wang and for Jiang to present evidence. With respect to
cross-examination, the court demonstrated great patience with
Jiang when he repeatedly asked Wang questions wholly
irrelevant to the issue of alleged abuse. For example, after
repeatedly reminding Jiang that the focus of his cross-
examination was to address the allegations of abuse against him,
the court again stated: “Sir, let me—let me tell you again. You
need to ask questions relevant to—to the allegations of abuse,
and I’m going to give you another two minutes. [¶] So go ahead.”
Moreover, Jiang submitted his own 8-page, single-spaced
declaration, along with 71 pages of attached exhibits. He argues

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on appeal that if he was represented, the lawyer would “submit
evidence” so that Wang’s “perjury can be easily identified and
overturned.” But Jiang was permitted to submit evidence without
a lawyer. And, as discussed above, the trial court was well within
its discretion in declining to further continue the hearing for
Jiang to retain a lawyer.
We likewise reject Jiang’s argument that he was not
provided an opportunity to subpoena witnesses. He did not
subpoena witnesses prior to the September 28, 2022 hearing.
Rather, while he was testifying at the hearing, Jiang concluded
by stating: “And also I would like the police, the people from [the
Department of Children and Family Services], the teachers, the
doctors, the psychiatrists, I hope they can all come to testify, but
because my English is not good so I don’t know how to ask them
to come here.” The trial court properly exercised its discretion in
declining both to provide Jiang with additional time to subpoena
witnesses, and to set a further hearing on the DVRO. (See
Bentley, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at pp.152-153.)
Lastly, Jiang does not point to any statute or caselaw that
requires a “closing argument” at a DVRO hearing. “‘The essence
of due process is the requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of
serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him and
opportunity to meet it.’” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles
County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 212.) Those
requirements have been satisfied here.2

2 We reject as unfounded Jiang’s claims of judicial bias. In
any event, Jiang’s failure to object in the trial court to the court’s

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B. The Firearms Prohibition Did Not Violate Jiang’s
Constitutional Rights
Jiang next argues the DVRO violated his Second
Amendment right to bear arms because he does not “pose a
‘danger’ to [Wang]” and Wang “forged a domestic violence
restraining order in order to obtain an advantage in divorce.”
Under Family Code section 6389, subdivision (a), a person
subject to a DVRO “shall not own, possess, purchase, or receive
a firearm or ammunition while that protective order is in
effect . . . .” Contrary to Jiang’s assertion, section 6389 does not
violate the Second Amendment. (See e.g. Zachary H. v. Teri A.
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1145 [Family Code section 6389 is
constitutional; recent United States Supreme Court case law (see
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1, 72)
which reaffirmed the guarantee of the Second Amendment right
of “‘law-abiding responsible citizens’” to possess firearms does not
call into question the lawfulness of firearms restrictions imposed
on individuals subject to restraining orders]; see also United
States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. 680, 702 [“An individual found
by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of
another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second
Amendment”].)

alleged bias forfeits the issue on appeal. (See Moulton Niguel
Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1218
[appellants “did not preserve their claim of judicial bias for
review because they did not object to the alleged improprieties
and never asked the judge to correct remarks made or recuse
himself”].)

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To the extent Jiang is arguing that the court’s findings do
not support the issuance of a DVRO, including the prohibition
against possessing firearms, he has forfeited this contention. (See
Ashby v. Ashby (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 491, 512-513 [“‘“‘A party
who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
particular finding must summarize the evidence on that point,
favorable and unfavorable, and show how and why it is
insufficient’”’” and unless “‘“‘this is done the error is deemed
[forfeited]’”’”] (italics omitted).) Jiang’s one-sided narrative,
coupled with repeated claims that Wang lied during her
testimony, does not come close to demonstrating insufficient
evidence supports the trial court’s findings.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Err By Granting Wang
Sole Physical and Legal Custody of Their
Daughter
Although not entirely clear, Jiang’s final argument
regarding the court’s custody order appears to be premised on the
incorrect notion that he was entitled to appointed counsel
because the court “deprived [him] of custody . . . of his daughter.”
We acknowledge that “California statutory law has long required
the appointment of counsel in connection with parental rights
termination proceedings.” (In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 246,
citing Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 317, 317.5, 366.26, subd. (f)(2).) But
here, the trial court did not terminate Jiang’s parental rights.
Rather, the court issued a temporary custody order pursuant to
Family Code section 3044, and the court expressly informed
Jiang of his right to file a request to modify the order upon
completion of 10 therapy sessions.

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Moreover, Jiang’s attempt to analogize DVRO proceedings
to paternity proceedings is unavailing. In Salas v. Cortez (1979)
24 Cal.3d 22, 34 (Salas), our Supreme Court held indigent
defendants in paternity proceedings prosecuted by the state are
constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel. It reasoned: “An
adjudication of paternity may profoundly affect a person’s life. It
may disrupt an established family and damage reputations.
Further, a court’s determination of paternity exposes a defendant
to deprivation of property and, potentially, liberty. It entails the
obligation to support and educate a child [citation], an obligation
that does not end at the child’s age of majority. [Citation.] . . . [¶]
Failure to support a child may also be prosecuted criminally.” (Id.
at pp. 28-29, fn. omitted.) The Supreme Court further explained
the complexity of paternity proceedings: “Without the assistance
of counsel, neither [defendant] was in a position to respond
adequately to the district attorney’s discovery requests nor to
initiate discovery himself. Without the assistance of counsel,
neither was able to procure the assistance of experts to perform
blood group tests which might conclusively have exonerated him.
Each was found to be the father of a child on the basis of (1)
alleged facts which were deemed admitted because not
contradicted, and (2) testimony of the mother which was not
subjected to cross-examination. In short, without the assistance
of counsel, neither appellant was able to defend against the
allegations of the complaint. As a result, each was named the
father of a child by involuntary default.” (Id. at pp. 30-31, fns.
omitted.)

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While we do not discount the fact that a custody order
issued in DVRO proceedings—even one that is temporary and
modifiable—may greatly impact a parent’s life, it has no other
similarities to a paternity judgment. DVRO proceedings are
streamlined and generally not complex: each party had an
opportunity to testify regarding the alleged abuse, and to cross-
examine the other. The trial court then made a credibility
determination based on documentary evidence and testimony at
the hearing. We therefore decline to extend the narrow holding in
Salas to DVRO proceedings.

DISPOSITION

The DVRO issued on September 28, 2022 is affirmed. Wang
is awarded her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

COLLINS, J.

MORI, J.

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