Harris v. Proskauer Rose LLP CA2/5

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Filed 1/28/25 Harris v. Proskauer Rose LLP CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

JODI C. HARRIS, B325846
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No.
21STCV38781)
PROSKAUER ROSE LLP et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William F. Fahey, Judge. Affirmed.
Krutcik Law Group and James A. Krutcik for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Proskauer Rose, Lary Alan Rappaport, Anthony J. Oncidi,
Philippe A. Lebel, and Christina H. Kroll for Defendant and
Respondent Proskauer Rose LLP.
No appearance by Defendant and Respondent Kate Gold.
Plaintiff Jodi Harris (plaintiff) sued her former employer
and its attorneys, Proskauer Rose LLP (Proskauer) and Kate
Gold (Gold) (collectively, the attorney defendants).1 The trial
court sustained the attorney defendants’ demurrer without leave
to amend for two independently sufficient reasons: because
plaintiff had not alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action
against the attorney defendants and because plaintiff could not
meet certain statutory requirements to assert a cause of action
against an attorney. In this appeal from the trial court’s
judgment of dismissal, we are asked to decide whether the trial
court abused its discretion in striking plaintiff’s late-filed,
proposed first amended complaint and whether (only) one of the
two grounds for sustaining the demurrer is flawed.

I. BACKGROUND
In October 2021, plaintiff filed a form complaint against the
attorney defendants and others: Industrial Manufacturing
Corporation (IMC), Arrowhead Products (Arrowhead), Andrew
Whelan, Mark Davidson, Shannon George, and John Cvetic.
There is little in the complaint about plaintiff’s relationship to

1
Attorneys from Proskauer represented both Gold and the
firm in the trial court and filed documents on behalf of both
clients in this court. On January 8, 2024, Proskauer notified this
court that Gold died on January 3, 2024. Proskauer filed a
respondent’s brief on its own behalf, but no respondent’s brief
was filed on behalf of Gold. “[W]e do not treat the failure to file a
respondent’s brief as a ‘default’ (i.e., an admission of error) but
examine the record, appellant’s brief, and any oral argument by
appellant to see if it supports any claims of error . . . .” (In re
Marriage of Riddle (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1078, fn. 1.)

2
the defendants—only an allegation that “[d]efendants, and each
of them, entered into and/or maintained an agreement for
employment with Plaintiff to handle Human Resources duties at
[d]efendants’ offices . . . .” The complaint also fails to specify the
relationships among the defendants and provides no details
concerning the role of the attorney defendants.
The complaint alleges causes of action for breach of her
employment contract, sexual and other harassment,
discrimination, wrongful termination, “statutory wage violations
and statutory unlawful business practices,” and fraud.2
The attorney defendants filed a demurrer in July 2022,
with a hearing noticed for August 12, 2022. They argued the
complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action
against them because, among other things, there are no
allegations they had an employment relationship with plaintiff
and, in any case, it cannot “be discerned . . . what, if anything, . . .
[the attorney defendants] did, or failed to do, that could give rise
to any of the claims asserted against them.”3 The attorney
defendants further argued it is not clear whether the alleged
employment contract upon which most of the causes of action are

2
The form complaint indicates “[t]he following causes of
action are attached” and lists breach of contract, harassment,
discrimination, wrongful discharge, wage violations, and
intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress. The
attachments do not perfectly correspond to this list.
3
The attorney defendants filed a request for judicial notice
with their demurrer. Among other things, they requested judicial
notice of documents purporting to establish that Arrowhead is
plaintiff’s former employer and the attorney defendants are
outside legal counsel for Arrowhead.

3
based was written, oral, or implied by conduct, and they argued
the complaint is uncertain because it “relies on generic,
boilerplate allegations” and combines multiple claims into single
causes of action.
Later that same month, plaintiff and the attorney
defendants stipulated, “subject to the approval of the [trial
court],” to vacate the hearing on the attorney defendants’
demurrer and to extend the time for plaintiff to file a first
amended complaint from August 1, 2022, to August 31, 2022.
On August 1, 2022, the trial court issued an order vacating
the hearing on the demurrer and extending the time for plaintiff
to file her first amended complaint to August 11, 2022—as
opposed to the August 31, 2022, deadline to which the parties had
agreed. As the trial court explained in a later order, it selected
the sooner August 11 date “so that plaintiff’s amended complaint
could be considered at a previously calendared August 12, 2022[,]
hearing on a motion to compel arbitration.”
As we shall discuss in more detail, plaintiff did not file her
first amended complaint by the August 11, 2022, deadline.
Instead, plaintiff filed a proposed first amended complaint on
August 31, 2022 (the date provided in the stipulation before the
trial court modified and advanced the due date for an amended
complaint). Nothing in the appellate record indicates plaintiff
sought or obtained the trial court’s leave to file the proposed
amended complaint when she did.
As pertinent to this appeal, the first amended complaint
alleges Proskauer “w[ere] the attorneys for, and employees, [ ]
supervisors, an officers, directors, managers and/or agent of

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[d]efendants, including [plaintiff’s] employer[,] [IMC] [sic].”4
Among other things, the complaint alleges Proskauer
“maintained a decades-long, incestuous business relationship
with DEFENDANTS . . . . This lengthy, close relationship
between client and attorney led to the attorneys[’] near-daily
intimidating and confusing presence in the workplace, often
vacillating from employee-friend, mentor, and counselor, to
supervising employee personnel who gave directives, exacted
admonishments, and issued derogatory remarks/notations,
punishments and reprimands to employees,” including by leading
“ineffectual and/or intimidating ‘kangaroo court’ investigations
into workplace violations which did nothing except ratify
unlawful conduct[ ] and encourage/promote hostile,
discriminatory, and harassing workplace practices.” The first
amended complaint includes similar allegations as to Gold,
including that she was “often in charge of [Proskauer’s]
ineffectual and/or intimidating ‘kangaroo court’
investigations . . . .”
The first amended complaint alleges the attorney
defendants “attempted to minimize and hide certain [defendants’]
harassing and unlawful conduct.” In particular, Gold allegedly
“criticized, demeaned, and mocked [plaintiff] and her wardrobe,
work attire, physical appearance, marital status and demeanor”
when plaintiff brought complaints to her. After plaintiff
complained of stalking, Gold allegedly “verbally attacked

4
The first amended complaint alleges causes of action for
breach of contract, sexual and gender harassment/discrimination,
wrongful termination, “statutory wage violations and statutory
unlawful business practices,” fraud, “retaliation and failure to
stop retaliation,” and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

5
[plaintiff], tried to coerce a retraction, and then tried to convince
her that the abuse was inconsequential or worse, her fault.”
In the meantime, the attorney defendants renewed their
demurrer to plaintiff’s original complaint. Plaintiff opposed the
renewed demurrer, arguing it was moot. Specifically, plaintiff
argued the first amended complaint was the operative pleading
because the attorney defendants’ counsel was at fault for her
failure to timely file the amended complaint in the time
permitted by the trial court’s order.5 Plaintiff also requested
“relief provided for by [Code of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 473” but
did not otherwise specify the relief she was requesting.
In a reply brief in support of their demurrer, the attorney
defendants argued plaintiff’s first amended complaint was a
nullity, the demurrer was procedurally proper, and plaintiff
should not be permitted to file the first amended complaint
because, among other things, she had not complied with
gatekeeping requirements set forth in Civil Code section
1714.10.6

5
The reason for plaintiff’s failure to timely file her first
amended complaint does not affect our disposition of this appeal.
But plaintiff’s suggestion in the trial court that defense counsel
engaged in “deceptive” conduct (echoed in the opening brief’s
characterization of the renewed notice of hearing as a “surprise
attack”) is unsupported by the record. As plaintiff’s attorney
ultimately conceded at a hearing in the trial court, “It is not that
I did not read the order that was distributed to me. I did not see
the small annotation on the change of date.”
6
Section 1714.10, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part,
that “[n]o cause of action against an attorney for a civil
conspiracy with his or her client arising from any attempt to
contest or compromise a claim or dispute, and which is based

6
At a hearing on the demurrer in September 2022, the trial
court indicated it was inclined to sustain the demurrer and
explained plaintiff’s “opposing papers [did] not have any
substantive argument” and the “procedural arguments [were] not
persuasive.” In the trial court’s view, plaintiff “had a deadline to
file a first amended complaint and that was missed,” and
“[plaintiff] didn’t seek leave of court to later file a first amended
complaint.” The trial court accordingly struck the first amended
complaint and emphasized that although “the clerk is not
empowered to reject filings, . . . that does not make a received
document in compliance with a court order that was violated.”
The “only [remaining] question” the trial court had was
“whether or not leave to amend should be granted.” After
discussing the applicability of section 1714.10, the trial court
acknowledged the issue “ha[d]n’t been fully briefed” because “it
was only raised in the reply brief.” The trial court asked plaintiff
whether, if granted leave to amend, she would “be tendering the
now stricken first amended complaint or some other first
amended complaint.” Plaintiff’s counsel responded that, “given
the court’s history, my history with this case, the court’s interest
in moving this case along, I probably would just serve that one
again.” The trial court clarified, “So you have not decided
whether you would tender the now stricken first amended

upon the attorney’s representation of the client, shall be included
in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order
allowing the pleading that includes the claim for civil conspiracy
to be filed after the court determines that the party seeking to file
the pleading has established that there is a reasonable
probability that the party will prevail in the action.”
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Civil Code.

7
complaint or draft a new one; is that the short version?”
Plaintiff’s counsel responded, “I would say if the court gave me
leave to file . . . my first amended complaint today, I would do
that with the existing one.”
Following further discussion of whether plaintiff would
adhere to the procedure set forth in section 1714.10 prior to filing
a first amended complaint, the trial court reiterated its
understanding that, “if [the court were to] give leave to amend,
what we’re now hearing . . . [is] it is almost certainly going to be
the first amended complaint probably without a request under
1714.10.” Plaintiff’s counsel did not dispute this summary of his
position.
The trial court then took the matter under submission and
later issued an order sustaining the demurrer without leave to
amend. The court found the original complaint was the operative
complaint and failed to state a cause of action against the
attorney defendants because “the form complaint has no specific
allegations against Proskauer/Gold, but simply makes conclusory
and general allegations against ‘all defendants.’ The demurrer
then argues that the first cause of action [for breach of contract]
fails to allege the parties to the alleged contract, the contract’s
material terms and whether the contract is oral or written.
Without facts showing a contractual relationship between
plaintiff and Proskauer/Gold, the second through fourth causes of
action must also fail. As to the fifth cause of action for fraud, the
complaint fails to allege the requisite ‘who, what, when, how, and
by whom’ of any alleged misrepresentations by Proskauer/Gold.”
With respect to leave to amend, the trial court highlighted
plaintiff’s counsel’s representation that “he would simply refile
the [first amended complaint]” and determined this would not

8
cure the defects in the operative complaint for two independent
reasons. First, “the proffered [first amended complaint] remains
defective as to Proskauer/Gold. The bases for including these
defendants are vague and conclusory assertions of ‘alter ego,’
‘agency’ and ‘aiding and abetting.’ As with the original
complaint, there are no facts showing an employment
relationship between plaintiff and these attorney defendants.
Because the so-called ‘agreement for employment’ allegations are
incorporated by reference in each succeeding cause of action,
there is no factual basis for asserting other theories of liability as
to these defendants. Nor does the [first amended complaint]
contain the required specificity as to the fraud claim.”
Second, and in the alternative, the trial court determined
plaintiff had not satisfied “the gatekeeping provisions of Civil
Code [section] 1714.10 . . . . The statute requires more than
generalized claims of liability before an action may be brought
against an attorney who performed legal services. Instead, a
prima facie showing must first be made by ‘verified petition’ and
‘supporting affidavits’ that the attorney had an independent legal
duty to the plaintiff.” The proposed first amended complaint
“fail[ed] to plead facts showing an independent legal duty owed
by these defendants to plaintiff” and “otherwise . . . ignored the
requirements of Civil Code [section] 1714.10.”

II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in striking her late-
filed first amended complaint and in concluding section 1714.10
justified sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. As we
shall explain, the former argument lacks merit and the latter is

9
ineffectual—addressing only one of two independently sufficient
grounds for the trial court’s ruling on the demurrer.

A. The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion in
Striking the Untimely First Amended Complaint
Plaintiff’s last day to file a first amended complaint was
August 11, 2022—the date set by the trial court in its order
granting the parties’ stipulation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 472, subd.
(a).) As we have already discussed, plaintiff missed this deadline
and filed her first amended complaint on August 31, 2022.
Section 436 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the
trial court may, “upon a motion [to strike] made pursuant to
Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it
deems proper: [¶] . . . [¶] (b) Strike out all or any part of any
pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this
state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” A trial court does not
abuse its discretion in striking pleadings not filed in conformity
with its prior rulings. (Leader v. Health Industries of America,
Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 603, 613.)
Plaintiff argues in a single paragraph that the trial court’s
striking order was error because she was entitled to “recourse,”
“notice,” or an “opportunity to be heard” on the matter. This
argument lacks merit because the trial court’s statutory
authority to strike an unauthorized pleading “at any time in its
discretion” does not require notice or a hearing. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 436, subd. (b).) Indeed, the statute expressly distinguishes this
authority from the trial court’s authority pursuant to a noticed
motion to strike. (Ibid.) Regardless, plaintiff did have the notice
and opportunity to be heard she claims she was owed: she argued
the first amended complaint was properly filed in her opposition

10
to the attorney defendants’ demurrer to the original complaint,
and the court considered that argument in the context of ruling
on the demurrer.

B. Plaintiff Does Not Challenge the Trial Court’s
Finding That the Complaint Fails to State a Cause of
Action Against the Attorney Defendants and the
Proposed First Amended Complaint Does Not Cure
the Defect
Plaintiff attacks the trial court’s reliance on section 1714.10
to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend on multiple
fronts. She contends the statute does not apply, the attorney
defendants waived the issue by raising it for the first time in
their reply in support of the demurrer, and the attorney
defendants’ delay in raising the issue violated meet-and-confer
requirements and deprived plaintiff of notice. We do not address
any of these arguments on the merits because plaintiff does not
challenge the other independently sufficient ground for the trial
court’s order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend:
plaintiff’s failure to state a cause of action against the attorney
defendants in the operative complaint and the proposed first
amended complaint’s failure to remedy this issue.7 Plaintiff
therefore has not affirmatively shown error warranting reversal
even if her section 1714.10 arguments are correct. (Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; see Beverage v. Apple,

7
Proskauer’s respondent’s brief emphasizes plaintiff’s
opening brief “fails to address the first ground on which the court
denied leave to amend: the failure of the proffered [first amended
complaint] to cure the defects of the [operative c]omplaint.”
Plaintiff did not file a reply brief in this court.

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Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 736, 752 [because the plaintiffs
challenged the dismissal of only one cause of action, “they ha[d]
abandoned any claim of error in the other aspects of the trial
court’s ruling on [the defendant’s] demurrer”].)

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Proskauer is awarded costs on
appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM (D.), J.

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