People v. Alamillo CA2/6

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Filed 1/27/25 P. v. Alamillo CA2/6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B333228
(Super. Ct. No. CR34740)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

EVERARDO MEZA
ALAMILLO,

Defendant and Appellant.

A jury found Everardo Meza Alamillo guilty of two counts
of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) The jury
also found multiple aggravating circumstances (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421), and that Alamillo personally used a firearm
(Pen. Code, § 12022.5, subd. (a)). The trial court found true a
multiple murder special circumstance for each count of murder.
(Id. § 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) The court sentenced Alamillo to two
life terms without the possibility of parole plus 10 years.
We strike one of the two multiple murder special
circumstances. In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTS
On October 14, 1993, at 4:18 a.m., the police responded to a
call from a house in Santa Paula. Police found the bodies of
Armando Cauich and Adriana Meza lying on a bed. The two-
year-old daughter of Meza and Alamillo was crying and trying to
get Meza to hold her. Meza and Alamillo were married but
separated. Meza had been shot three times in the back at close
range. Cauich had been shot twice in the head at close range.
There was no sign of a struggle or forced entry. The back
door was partially open. Alamillo’s fingerprints were found on
the doorknob. Alamillo’s car was parked nearby. It would not
start because its battery was dead. Two unfired .22-caliber
bullets were found in Alamillo’s home. The bullets were of the
type recovered from Meza’s and Cauich’s bodies.
On October 12, 1993, Alamillo withdrew $1,000 from his
savings account and cashed two checks worth $1,097. Alamillo
had not shown up for work since the murders, did not pick up his
paycheck, cash in his vacation hours, or retrieve money from his
retirement account. At the time, Alamillo had been living with
his cousin. The last time his cousin saw him was between 7:00
p.m. and 8:00 p.m. the night before the murders. Alamillo was
arrested in Mexico in November 2015.
1991 Battery
David Kemp was a police officer with the City of Santa
Paula in 1991. On October 29, 1991, he went to an apartment in
Santa Paula responding to a dispatch “in reference to a battery.”
Meza let him in. Kemp asked Meza to identify her husband.
Meza identified Alamillo. Alamillo sat at the kitchen table
eating. He did not get up to greet Kemp, nor did he act surprised
that Kemp was there. As Kemp spoke with Meza, he noticed she

2
had some redness on her cheek and some swelling. Kemp did not
take pictures because usually that type of injury will not show up
until the next day.
Martha Macias
Martha Macias and her family were good friends with
Cauich and his family. Meza had recently separated from
Alamillo and needed a place to live. In July 1993, Meza and her
daughter moved in with Macias and her family. Meza and her
daughter lived in one bedroom of Macias’s Santa Paula home,
and Macias and her family lived in the other bedroom. Alamillo
came to visit his daughter often. Cauich frequently came by to
give Meza a ride to Round Table Pizza where they both worked.
In August 1993, on two occasions, Macias heard Alamillo
shout at Meza. Alamillo threatened to kill Meza and Cauich if he
saw them together. He said their families would be crying “tears
of blood.”
Macias recalled that on one occasion Meza and Cauich told
her that Alamillo had hit the car they were in with his car. They
both appeared nervous and afraid when they told her. The
incident happened a few minutes before Meza and Cauich told
Macias.
Jooley Pena
Jooley Pena worked with Meza and Cauich at Round Table
Pizza. Shortly after Meza and Alamillo were married in 1991,
Pena began noticing Meza had injuries, including a black eye and
bruises. Pena and another coworker urged Meza to leave
Alamillo because of her injuries.
After Meza and Alamillo separated, Meza told Pena about
an incident the day after it happened. Alamillo was driving Meza
and their daughter on Highway 126 toward Filmore. Alamillo

3
started driving at about 100 miles per hour. He said they were
going to die together. He said he was going to kill her and that if
he could not have her no one would have her. Meza appeared
afraid and crying as she told this to Pena.
Pena would often see Alamillo outside of Round Table Pizza
when she was working with Meza and Cauich. Cauich told Pena
of about 10 to 15 instances when Alamillo was following him and
Meza.
Cauich told Pena that one night he stood guard outside of
Meza’s house to make sure Alamillo did not show up to harm
Meza and their daughter.
Dwylene Zapparelli
Dwylene Zapparelli and Meza were good friends.
Zapparelli worked with Meza and Cauich at Round Table Pizza.
Zapparelli testified that in August 1993 Meza called her to pick
her up at Meza’s mother’s house. When Zapparelli arrived,
Alamillo was yelling at Meza. Meza was terrified. She was
crying and shaking and desperate to get away. Meza took her
daughter and got into Zapparelli’s car.
When they were driving away, Meza told Zapparelli what
happened. Alamillo drove on Highway 126 with Meza and their
daughter in the car. Alamillo drove about 100 miles per hour and
taking corners very fast. He told Meza he was going to kill her
and that if he could not have her nobody could. Meza got
Alamillo to calm down by telling him they would get back
together. They ended up at Meza’s mother’s house. Meza told
Zapparelli about the incident the night it happened, not the next
morning.
Zapparelli recalled that around September 1993, Alamillo
knocked on the door of Round Table Pizza before it opened.

4
Zapparelli refused to let him in. Alamillo yelled at Meza while
Zapparelli was standing there. At least three to five times
Zapparelli saw Alamillo parked outside Round Table while Meza
was at work.
Antoinia Cauich
Antoinia Cauich is Cauich’s mother. Cauich and Meza told
her they were afraid of Alamillo. Cauich told his mother that
Alamillo had threatened him. One day Cauich and Meza came
running home. They appeared scared. They said Alamillo chased
them in his car all the way to the city of Fillmore.
After Meza and Alamillo separated, Cauich’s mother saw
Alamillo drive by her house several times.
Jose Anaya
Jose Anaya is an accountant. He also helps people fill out
paperwork, including divorces. Meza told Anaya she was afraid
of Alamillo and that he was constantly following her. She wanted
a divorce. Anaya suggested that she also get a restraining order.
Meza was supposed to meet with Anaya on October 14, 1993, to
finalize the paperwork. Meza never appeared.
Marina Castanon
Marina Castanon is Meza’s sister. She is also married to
Alamillo’s cousin. On October 13, 1993, Castanon and her
husband were planning to move into the Santa Paula house
where the murders would occur the next morning. At about 9:00
p.m. Alamillo knocked on the window of the place where the
Castanons were staying. Castanon’s husband went outside to
talk to Alamillo. Castanon did not go outside with him. When
Castanon’s husband returned, he told her they were not moving
into the Santa Paula house. He did not give a reason.
Castanon’s husband did not allow her to call Meza that night. He

5
said she could call Meza the next day. The next morning the
police arrived and told Castanon that Meza had been killed.
Castanon’s husband did not appear surprised.
Defense
Alamillo chose not to testify on his own behalf. His counsel
conceded Alamillo killed Meza and Cauich, but argued it was
heat of passion manslaughter.
Some of Meza’s closet friends did not know Meza and
Cauich were in a romantic relationship. Alamillo’s counsel
argued that on the last day prior to the shootings, Meza spent
time with Alamillo and seemed happy with him.
A coworker of Alamillo testified that a couple of days after
the $2,000 bank withdrawal, Alamillo planned to test-drive a car
for a possible purchase, but did not show. Officer Kemp testified
that sometimes people carry guns to protect large sums of cash.
Castanon did not report her husband’s conversation with
Alamillo until October 2016.
DISCUSSION
I. Retrial on First Degree Murder Was Not Barred
Alamillo contends his retrial on first degree murder was
barred because the jury found him not guilty of that charge in the
first trial.
(a) Background
After two days of deliberation, the jury sent a note to the
court stating it was having difficulty moving forward. In the
presence of the jury, the court asked the foreperson if the jury
was deadlocked at present. The foreperson responded that it
was. The trial court suggested that the jury take a break and
resume deliberations the next morning.

6
The jury resumed deliberations the next day and sent the
trial court several notes relating to second degree murder and
voluntary manslaughter. The court answered the jury’s
questions.
Later that day, the jury sent the trial court a note stating it
was unable to reach a unanimous decision. In the presence of the
jury, the foreperson stated there were three “formal votes” which
were 11 to one, and that had not changed for a day. The other
jurors agreed that the deliberations had remained static for at
least a day. The court asked if there was anything the court
could do to assist deliberations. The jurors indicated that there
was not. The court declared a mistrial and dismissed the jury.
After the jury was dismissed, the prosecutor moved for a
retrial. Defense counsel stated he wanted to know the direction
of the 11-to-one split. The trial court apologized because it said it
would ask the jury but forgot to do so. The court asked the bailiff
to get the foreperson. When the foreperson returned to court, the
court asked which way the 11 to one split went. The foreperson
replied that there were 11 votes for second degree murder and
one for manslaughter. The court then asked if there was a
unanimous decision on first degree murder. The foreperson
replied yes; Alamillo was not guilty of first degree murder.
Defense counsel moved that any retrial exclude first degree
murder. The prosecutor objected that the jury had not filled out
a verdict form acquitting Alamillo of first degree murder. The
trial court deferred ruling until the next day.
Defense counsel sent the trial court an email asking that it
reconvene the jury. The prosecutor objected that the court lacked
jurisdiction to reconvene the jury because it had been dismissed.
The prosecutor stated that the prosecutorial team had

7
discussions about the foreperson’s statements with eight jurors
who stayed behind after the jury had been dismissed. The jurors
stated that the evidence could have supported a finding of first
degree murder, and the discussion of second degree murder was
an attempt to reach a compromise.
The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion for a
retrial and denied the defense motion to exclude first degree
murder. The court noted that the foreperson was not under oath
when she said that the jury unanimously agreed that Alamillo
was not guilty of first degree murder. The court also found it was
not clear whether the foreperson’s statement was the result of
her own assessment of the jury’s votes. The court excluded the
foreperson’s statement and the prosecutor’s statement about
what the eight jurors told him. The court found that the jurors’
notes were consistent with an attempt to reach a compromise
verdict. Finally, the court assumed that the jury had followed its
instructions and did not return a verdict form because it did not
reach a verdict on first degree murder.
(b) Double Jeopardy
Both the United States and California Constitutions
provide that a person may not be twice placed in jeopardy for the
same offense. (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)
Both provisions permit retrial following discharge of a jury that
has been unable to agree on a verdict. (People v. Fields (1996) 13
Cal.4th 289, 300.)
Alamillo’s double jeopardy claim is based on the
foreperson’s statement that the jury agreed he is not guilty of
first degree murder. Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a)
provides: “Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict, any
otherwise admissible evidence may be received as to statements

8
made, or conduct, conditions, or events occurring, either within or
without the jury room, of such a character as is likely to have
influenced the verdict improperly. No evidence is admissible to
show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event
upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from
the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was
determined.”
The foreperson’s statement, having been made after the
jury was discharged, was unsworn. (See People v. Bonillas (1989)
48 Cal.3d 757, 771 [regardless of whether the discharge may be
erroneous, once the jury is discharged, the jurors are free from
any official obligations].) An unsworn statement is not
admissible under Evidence Code section 1150 to impeach the
jury’s verdict. (People v. Bryant (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1457,
1468.) Evidence that violates Evidence Code section 1150 is not
only inadmissible, but also irrelevant and of no jural
consequence. (People v. Johnson (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 486,
494.) In other words, the foreperson’s statement is a nullity.
Moreover, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 640,
which provides in part:
“If all of you cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty
of first degree murder, inform me that you cannot reach an
agreement and do not complete or sign any verdict forms [for that
count]. [¶] . . . [¶]
“If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first
degree murder but cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty
of second degree murder, complete and sign the form for not
guilty of first degree murder and inform me that you cannot
reach further agreement. Do not complete or sign any other
verdict forms for that count.”

9
We presume the jury followed the trial court’s instructions.
(People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 205-206.) Following the
court’s instructions, the jury did not return any verdict form
because it could not agree whether Alamillo was guilty of first
degree murder. Had the jury agreed Alamillo was not guilty of
first degree murder, it would have returned a verdict form so
stating.
As our Supreme Court stated in People v. Aranda (2019) 6
Cal.5th 1077, 1095, there is a reason why we have statutes that
formalize the receipt of a verdict. A report by any juror may
merely reflect his or her impressions, gleaned from discussions.
(Ibid.) Standardized instructions provide a framework for
securing a formal response from the jury to facilitate the receipt
of partial verdicts. (Ibid.) That the jury did not return a formal
verdict of not guilty here shows the foreperson’s statement
merely reflected her impressions gleaned from discussions.
(c) Abuse of Discretion
Alternatively, Alamillo contends the trial court abused its
discretion in declaring a mistrial and discharging the jury.
Alamillo argues that Evidence Code section 1150 expressly
excludes the prosecutor’s hearsay statement that eight jurors told
him that the jury did not reach an agreement on first degree
murder. But the trial court excluded the prosecutor’s statement.
The trial court found that “[t]he Evidence Code precludes
the admission and consideration of [the prosecutor’s] statements
about what was conveyed to him by jurors . . . .”
Contrary to Alamillo’s argument, the prosecutor’s
statement did not affect the trial court’s ruling excluding the
foreperson’s statement. The court excluded the foreperson’s

10
statement because it was unsworn and contradicted by the jurors’
notes and the jury instructions.
Alamillo argues that Evidence Code section 1150 does not
support denying the defense motion to reconvene the jury. But
the trial court’s denial of the motion was not based on Evidence
Code section 1150. It was based on the discharge of the jury.
The trial court loses control over a jury as soon as the jury is
discharged. (People v. Bonillas, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 770-772.)
Once the jury is out of the court’s control, the court has no
jurisdiction to reconvene the jury. (People v. Jones (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 1344, 1348.) Reconvening the jury was simply
beyond the power of the trial court.
Alamillo argues the trial court’s conduct was not in
accordance with Penal Code sections 1023, 1140, 1163, and 1164.
Penal Code section 1023 does nothing more than codify the
double jeopardy rule.
Penal Code section 1140 provides in part: “Except as
provided by law, the jury cannot be discharged after the cause is
submitted to them until they have agreed upon their verdict and
rendered it in open court, . . . unless, at the expiration of such
time as the court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that
there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree.”
Here, after three days of deliberation, the jury reported it
was unable to reach a verdict and there was nothing the trial
court could do to assist. The court was well within its discretion
in declaring a mistrial and discharging the jury.
Penal Code section 1163 provides: “When a verdict is
rendered, and before it is recorded, the jury may be polled, at the
request of either party, in which case they must be severely
asked whether it is their verdict, and if any one answer in the

11
negative, the jury must be sent out for further deliberation.” No
verdict was rendered and neither party asked that the jury be
polled. The court need only inquire of the foreperson and the jury
as a whole whether the jury is deadlocked; the court need not poll
each juror individually. (People v. Rojas (1975) 15 Cal.3d 540,
546.)
Penal Code section 1164, subdivision (b) provides in part:
“No jury shall be discharged until the court has verified on that
record that the jury has either reached a verdict or has formally
declared its inability to reach a verdict on all issues before it,
including, but not limited to, the degree of the crime or crimes
charged . . . .”
Alamillo argues that the jury did not formally declare its
inability to reach a verdict on all the issues including the degree
of the crime. But here the foreperson told the trial court that the
jury had taken three “formal votes” and were unable to agree.
Neither the foreperson, nor any other juror, mentioned any votes,
formal or otherwise, in which the jury was able to agree that
Alamillo was not guilty of first degree murder.
The trial court has no duty to inquire about the possibility
of a partial verdict unless the jury has given some affirmative
indication that it has acquitted on a greater offense but
deadlocked on a lesser offense. (People v. Aranda, supra, 6
Cal.5th at p. 1094.) Here the jury gave no such affirmative
indication. In fact, the jury pursuant to the court’s instructions
returned no verdict form.
The trial court fulfilled its statutory duties before
discharging the jury. Alamillo cites no authority requiring the
trial court to inquire about the direction of the jury’s 11-to-one
vote split.

12
(d) Counsel’s Representation
Alamillo contends he received ineffective assistance of
counsel.
In assessing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we
must determine whether counsel’s representation fell below the
standard of reasonableness under prevailing norms. (Strickland
v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688.) If counsel’s
performance was ineffective, we must determine whether there is
reasonable probability that absent the error the defendant would
have obtained a more favorable result. (Id. at p. 695.)
Alamillo argues that competent counsel would have
ensured the trial court inquired as to the direction of the jury’s
vote prior to discharge. But defense counsel asked the trial court
to inquire, and the trial court forgot to do so. Ordinarily it is not
essential that the inquiry into the jury’s split vote be made prior
to discharge. That information is usually available after
discharge by directly asking the jurors. Prior to the jury’s
discharge, counsel could not have known the foreperson would
assert after discharge that the jury agreed Alamillo was not
guilty of first degree murder. The foreperson had just minutes
before informing the court that the jury could not agree. Defense
counsel did remind the court to inquire of the foreperson as to the
11-to-one vote split.
Alamillo argues that the jury’s notes to the trial court
inquiring about the difference between second degree murder and
manslaughter made it especially important to inquire about the
direction of the jury’s split vote. But the notes to the trial court
show only that some members of the jury were considering
second degree murder and manslaughter. They do not show the
jury agreed on anything. Counsel could reasonably rely on 1) the

13
jury’s pre-dismissal assertion that it was unable to agree on a
verdict and, 2) the court’s instructions requiring a not guilty
verdict form as to first degree murder.
(e) Harmless Error
There is no evidence that the jury found Alamillo not guilty
of first degree murder. Nevertheless, Alamillo argues that errors
by the trial court and the incompetence of his counsel mandate
his first-degree murder conviction be overturned. There was no
error by the court or incompetence of his counsel. But if there
were such errors and the errors were prejudicial, the remedy
would be a new trial. (See 6 Witkin, Cal. Criminal Law (5th ed.
2024) Criminal Appeal, § 189, p. 452 [“A general reversal of a
judgment of conviction sends the case back for a new trial”].)
Alamillo has had a new trial. He cites no authority for
dismissing his first degree murder conviction based on alleged
errors that occurred in a previous trial.
Alamillo’s reliance on People v. Verducci (2016) 243
Cal.App.4th 952 is misplaced. Three prior trials of the defendant
resulted in mistrials because the jury was deadlocked. Prior to
the fourth trial, the defendant moved for dismissal on due process
grounds. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury convicted
the defendant of first degree murder. The court also denied a
post-verdict dismissal motion. On appeal, the defendant claimed
his right to due process was violated because through the
sequence of trials the prosecution learned the defense strategy
and was able to fine-tune its case to obtain a conviction. The
Court of Appeal stated, “We will assume without deciding that
the trial court had direction to dismiss the action against [the
defendant].” (Id. at p. 967.) Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal

14
determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to dismiss. (Ibid.)
People v. Verducci, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th 952 does not
stand for the proposition that the courts have discretion to
dismiss the case. The Court of Appeal expressly refused to decide
the matter. Even if we have discretion, Alamillo presents no
grounds for dismissing his first-degree murder conviction.
II. Hearsay
Alamillo contends the trial court erred in admitting
inadmissible hearsay.
Evidence Code section 1200, subdivisions (a) and (b)
provide:
“(a) ‘Hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a statement that was
made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and
that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.
“(b) Except as provided by law, hearsay evidence is
inadmissible.”
Evidence Code section 1240, subdivisions (a) and (b) state
the “spontaneous statement” exception to the hearsay rule as
follows:
“(a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act,
condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and
“(b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.”
The spontaneous statement exception requires: “ ‘ “(1)
there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this
nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and
unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has
been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous
excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective

15
powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to
the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.” [Citations.]’ ”
(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 925.)
Evidence Code section 1250, subdivisions (a) and (b) state
the declarant’s existing mental or physical state exception in part
as follows:
“(a) [E]vidence of a statement of the declarant’s then
existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation (including a
statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or
bodily health) is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule
when:
“(1) The evidence is offered to prove the declarant’s state of
mind, emotion, or physical sensation at that time or at any other
time when it is itself an issue in the action; or
“(2) The evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or
conduct of the declarant.
“(b) This section does not make admissible evidence of a
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed.”
The trial court’s decision to admit evidence under an
exception to the hearsay rule is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Kopatz (2015) 61 Cal.4th 62, 85.) The
abuse of discretion standard requires a showing that the court’s
ruling was arbitrary, capricious, and exceeding the bounds of
reason. (People v. Torres (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 984, 988-989.)
(a) 1991 Battery
Alamillo contends Officer Kemp’s testimony that he
responded to a dispatch “in reference to a battery” constitutes
double hearsay: what Meza told dispatch and what dispatch told
Kemp. But the statement was not introduced for the truth of the

16
matter. It was introduced to show why Kemp went to Meza’s
apartment.
When Kemp arrived, he testified that he could see that
Meza had been the victim of a battery. Her cheek was red and
swollen. The marks were too fresh to be visible on a photograph.
That Alamillo ignored Kemp shows Alamillo knew why Kemp
was there. If it was error to admit the phrase “in reference to a
battery,” it was harmless by any standard. There had clearly
been a battery.
(b) Meza’s Statements to Anaya
Alamillo contends Meza’s statements to Anaya are
inadmissible hearsay.
First, Meza’s request to Anaya for help in obtaining a
divorce and restraining order is not hearsay. “Because a request,
by itself, does not assert the truth of any fact, it cannot be offered
to prove the truth of the matter stated.” (People v. Jurado (2006)
38 Cal.4th 72, 117 [request to provide a gun is not hearsay].)
Second, statements by Meza to Anaya that she was afraid
of Alamillo are admissible under Evidence Code section 1250 as a
statement of a declarant’s existing mental feeling.
It appears Alamillo’s real objection is relevance. He argues
that seeking a divorce and requesting a restraining order are
irrelevant absent evidence showing that he knew Meza was
seeking a divorce and restraining order. Similarly, Alamillo
argues that Meza’s mental feeling is not at issue in this case.
Assuming the evidence was inadmissible, the error was
harmless by any standard. There was admissible evidence that
Alamillo battered Meza, threatened to kill her, took her and their
daughter on a nightmare 100-miles-per-hour car ride, and was
stalking her. The jury would not have been surprised to learn

17
that Meza was afraid of Alamillo and seeking a divorce and a
restraining order.
(c) Castanon’s Testimony
Alamillo contends that Castanon’s testimony about her
husband’s conversation with him on the night of the murders is
inadmissible hearsay.
Castanon testified that after her husband spoke to Alamillo
at around 9:00 p.m. on the night of the murders, her husband
told her they were not moving into the house where Meza and
Cauich were staying, and that she could not call Meza until the
next day. The statements were not introduced for the truth of
the matter asserted, but to show that Alamillo planned the
murders. Thus, they were not hearsay.
Alamillo argues that Castanon’s statements were implied
hearsay, citing People v. Morgan (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 935, 943.
If so, they were implied by Alamillo. Such statements are
admissible against the defendant. (Evid. Code, § 1220; People v.
Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 535.)
(d) Alleged Wrong Analysis
Alamillo contends the trial court used the wrong analysis in
admitting other hearsay statements.
Alamillo argues the trial court misinterpreted People v.
Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758 to conclude that hearsay
statements were admissible because the victims were under
stress and fear for the entire period. We agree that Riccardi does
not stand for the proposition that hearsay is admissible simply
because the victims were under stress and fear for a period of
time. But the trial court did not entirely rely on its
interpretation of Riccardi. If that were the case, the court would
have admitted into evidence all of the prosecution’s proffered

18
hearsay evidence. Instead, the court rejected at least one of the
prosecution’s proffered hearsay statements as lacking sufficient
foundation to qualify under Evidence Code section 1240. We
presume the trial court knows the applicable law. (People v.
Rodriquez Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 176.) At least two
of the statements challenged by Alamillo as admitted under the
wrong analysis clearly qualify as spontaneous statements under
Evidence Code section 1240.
(d)(1) Highway 126 Incident
Zapparelli testified Meza and her daughter were trapped in
a car being driven by Alamillo at around 100 miles per hour while
Alamillo threatened to kill Meza.
Anyone would be highly traumatized by such an incident
and the trauma would not soon dissipate. Zapparelli testified she
picked up Meza and her daughter on the night of the incident and
not the next morning. Zapparelli could hear Alamillo still yelling
at Meza when she arrived. Meza was crying, shaking, and
desperate to get away. Meza told Zapparelli about the incident
as they were driving. The trauma was severe and continuing.
Meza had no time to reflect and contrive a story.
Alamillo’s reliance on People v. Ramirez (2006) 143
Cal.App.4th 1512 is misplaced. In Ramirez, the victim met the
defendant at a party. The victim left the party with the
defendant and two of the defendant’s friends in a car. Because
they had been drinking, they decided to rent a hotel room. The
victim passed out in the car and the defendant raped her between
2:00 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. Prior to 4:30 a.m., the victim and the
defendant returned to the hotel room. The victim was clearly
upset but said nothing about the rape to the friends who were
staying in the room. The victim went into the bathroom and

19
showered for about 10 minutes. The victim and the defendant
returned to the car at about 5:00 a.m. so the defendant could
drive her home. The victim fell asleep in the car and awoke at
7:00 a.m. in a strange apartment. The aunt of the owner of the
apartment arrived. The victim told the aunt that she had been
raped. The aunt wanted to call the victim’s brother, but the
victim told her not to because her brother would kill her.
The majority of the appellate court in Ramirez determined
that it was error for the trial court to admit the aunt’s testimony
under Evidence Code section 1240, that the victim told her she
had been raped. Among the reasons, the majority stated that the
victim’s plea not to contact her brother showed that she engaged
in a deliberate process. (People v. Ramirez, supra, 143
Cal.App.4th at p. 1525.) Although the majority determined it
was error to admit the aunt’s testimony, the error was deemed
harmless. A concurring opinion disagreed with the majority’s
determination of error, as not giving sufficient deference to the
trial court’s findings. (Id. at pp. 1534-1535.)
We might be inclined to agree with the concurring opinion
in People v. Ramirez, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th 1512, but it would
be beside the point. The facts in Ramirez bear no relationship to
the facts here. When Zapparelli arrived at Meza’s mother’s
house, Alamillo was yelling at Meza. The trauma was ongoing.
Meza was crying and shaking and desperate to get away. She
told Zapparelli about the incident as they drove. Meza did not
take a shower or sleep for hours between the incident and its
telling. Nor did Meza tell Zapparelli not to tell anyone else.
Pena also testified that Meza told her about the Highway
126 incident the next day. Even assuming Pena’s testimony
about the Highway 126 incident does not qualify under Evidence

20
Code section 1240, any error was harmless. Pena’s testimony
about the incident was substantially the same as Zapparelli’s
testimony. Zapparelli’s testimony about the incident was
uncontroverted.
(d)(2) Car Collision
Macias testified that Meza and Cauich told her that
Alamillo hit the car they were in with his car. Both Meza and
Cauich were nervous and afraid. It happened a few minutes
before they told her. It is reasonable to conclude Meza and
Cauich were still under the influence of a traumatizing event
that occurred a few minutes before and had no time to reflect
before speaking.
Alamillo argues the incident never occurred. There was no
sign of damage to his car. But lack of a sign of damage goes to
the weight of the evidence.
(e) Harmless Error
The People concede that the trial court erred in admitting
some hearsay evidence concerning Meza’s and Cauich’s general
fear of Alamillo. But even if the trial court erred in admitting all
of the evidence challenged as admitted under an invalid theory;
and even if, as Alamillo contends, the trial court’s rulings were
unbalanced, any error would be harmless. The evidence against
Alamillo is overwhelming.
Defense counsel admitted Alamillo killed Meza and Cauich.
The only question was Alamillo’s state of mind.
In August 1993, on two occasions, approximately two
months before the murders, Macias heard Alamillo tell Meza that
he would kill her and Cauich if he saw them together. That alone
is overwhelming evidence of premeditation.

21
In addition, Alamillo was stalking Meza and Cauich.
Coworkers of Meza and Cauich testified that they saw Alamillo
on a number of occasions outside Round Table Pizza. On one
occasion Alamillo knocked on the door before Round Table Pizza
was open and demanded to speak to Meza. Cauich’s mother also
testified that she saw Alamillo drive by their home on a number
of occasions.
Castanon testified that at about 9:00 p.m. on the night
before the early morning murders, Alamillo came by her house to
speak to her husband. After speaking with Alamillo, Castanon’s
husband told her they were not moving into the house where
Meza was staying, and that she could not call Meza until the next
day. The only reasonable conclusion is that Alamillo was
planning the murders for that night or early the next morning.
Finally, Alamillo did not just happen to run into Meza and
Cauich when he shot them. He deliberately entered the room
where they were sleeping. He had no legitimate reason for
entering the room, no less for entering the room with a gun. The
only reason Alamillo had for entering the room with a gun was to
carry out his plan to kill Meza and Cauich, as he had threatened
to do.
III. Vulnerable Victim Instruction
Alamillo contends the trial court erred in refusing his
request to modify the particularly vulnerable victim instruction.
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3226
as follows: “Particularly vulnerable includes being defenseless,
unguarded, unprotected, or otherwise susceptible to the
defendant’s criminal act to a special or unusual degree.” Alamillo
requested the court to add to the end of the sentence, “to an
extent greater than other cases,” in accordance with People v.

22
Smith (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 433. Alamillo points out that the
current version of the instruction includes a similar phrase.
But the phrase “to the extent greater than other cases” is
redundant. The instruction used the term “[p]articularly
vulnerable.” (CALCRIM No. 3226.) That is plain English. Even
the case on which Alamillo relies, People v. Smith, supra, 94
Cal.App.3d 433, finds no problem with the unadorned term
“[p]articularly vulnerable.” The Court of Appeal stated: “We find
no vagueness in the term ‘particularly vulnerable’ and no
difficulty in applying it here. Particularly, as used here, means
in a special or unusual degree, to an extent greater than in other
cases. Vulnerability means defenseless, unguarded, unprotected,
accessible, assailable, one who is susceptible to the defendant’s
criminal act. An attack upon a vulnerable victim takes
something less than intestinal fortitude. In the jargon of football
players, it is a cheap shot.” (Id. at p. 436.)
Moreover, the phrase requested by Alamillo creates the
possibility of confusion. It presumes the jurors are familiar with
“other cases.”
That the current version of CALCRIM No. 3226 contains a
phrase similar to the phrase requested by Alamillo is irrelevant.
The version given by the trial court is entirely adequate (People v.
Smith, supra, 94 Cal.App.3d at p. 436), and it does not require
the jury to compare the facts of this case with “other cases.”
Moreover, any error was harmless. The jury found three
other aggravating circumstances to be true: “that the crimes
involved great violence, great bodily harm, and other acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and callousness
(Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 4.421(a)(1)); appellant was armed with
and used a weapon (ibid.); the manner in which the crimes took

23
place involved planning, sophistication, and professionalism (id.,
subd. (a)(8)).
IV. Multiple Murder Special Circumstances
Alamillo contends one of the two multiple murder special
circumstances must be stricken. The People concede the issue.
No matter how many people are murdered, only one multiple
murder special circumstance applies. (People v. Anderson (1987)
43 Cal.3d 1104, 1150.)
DISPOSITION
One of the two multiple murder special circumstances is
stricken. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

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David R. Worley, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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