CourtListener 10321051•People v. Pinto CA2/6
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Filed 1/27/25 P. v. Pinto CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B324271
(Super. Ct. No. 19F-09106)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)
v.
ADRIAN OSWALD PINTO,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant Adrian Oswald Pinto appeals from the judgment
entered after a jury convicted him of forcible rape and sexual
penetration by foreign object. For the reasons set forth below, we
will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant met Lindsey Doe at the tanning salon where she
worked. He came in nearly every day and they frequently
chatted. On Halloween a few months after they met, they
exchanged text messages and met up at a bar called the Frog and
Peach, eventually ending up at a bar called The Mark. Appellant
bought Doe drinks but she did not drink them. When questioned
by the People, she testified she and appellant did not kiss and
appellant did not try to kiss her. When Doe talked to other men
at the bars, appellant became defensive and a “little aggressive”
criticizing the men she chose to talk to. When Doe was talking to
the bartender at The Mark, appellant began shouting and
screaming loudly at Doe. They decided to go outside and talk
about it. Appellant remained upset, “not liking that [Doe] was
talking to people.”
Doe decided to go home. She had planned to take an Uber
but appellant offered her a ride, saying an Uber would not be
safe. She agreed. At first appellant asked Doe several times to
go to his house, but she declined. He drove them to his
apartment anyway, and invited her inside, but she again
declined. They sat in his car for about 30 minutes while he asked
her repeatedly to come in and she repeatedly said she wanted to
go home. He started driving again, and as he drove he put his
hand under her dress and inside her underwear. She could not
push him off as his fingers started to go between her labia. She
froze, told him to stop, and he eventually did. He then drove
down a dark dirt road, said, “No one will see us over here,” and
parked. He climbed over the center console, pulled his pants
down, got on top of her, and put his penis into her vagina. Doe
was telling him to “[s]top, stop, stop.” Appellant was bigger than
Doe and she could not push him off. He eventually stopped.
After appellant dropped Doe at home, she tried calling
everyone in her family, but no one answered. She texted her
mother, “I need your help,” and fell asleep crying. The next day
she awoke to find police and her mother at her front door. She
was interviewed by detectives and agreed to a Suspected Abuse
Response Team (SART) medical exam. In the following days Doe
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noticed pain in her legs and arms and some bruising, which she
photographed.
Defense evidence consisted of the testimony of Ryan
Valliere. Valliere had known appellant for approximately five
years and was with appellant when appellant met Doe at the
Frog and Peach and later went with them to The Mark. He
described Doe’s and appellant’s behavior as “flirtatious,” and that
Doe was being “assertive as far as flirting and holding hands.”
He saw Doe and appellant kissing at both bars and testified Doe
appeared to be drinking at both bars. He never saw them
arguing, or appellant yelling at Doe. He stated he saw a
consensual and sexually charged relationship between Doe and
appellant. He testified he does not drink or use drugs and was
completely sober that evening. He stated appellant called him
the next morning and said he and Doe had “hooked up” and that
“I think it’s going to work out.” Later that day appellant told him
he, appellant, was being accused of rape.
Appellant was charged with one count each of forcible rape
(Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)) and foreign object penetration (id.,
§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A)). Both were alleged serious felonies (id.,
§ 1192.7, subd. (c)) and violent felonies (id., § 667.5, subd. (c)).
The information alleged aggravating factors listed in California
Rules of Court, rule 4.421 (a)(1) [the “crime involved great
violence, great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree
of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness”], rule 4.421 (a)(11) [the
“defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to
commit the offense”], and rule 4.421 (b)(1) [the “defendant has
engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to
society”].
A jury convicted appellant on both counts. There was no
trial on the aggravating factors because the prosecutor did not
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seek an upper term sentence. The court weighed aggravating
and mitigating factors, sentencing him to the low term of three
years on each count, to be served consecutively pursuant to Penal
Code section 667.6, subdivision (d), for a total aggregate term of
six years. He was ordered to pay restitution and register as a tier
three sex offender, subject to lifetime registration. (Pen. Code,
§ 290, subd. (c)(3)(C)(ii).)
DISCUSSION
Exclusion of Prior Sexual Conduct Evidence
California’s rape shield law prohibits a defendant from
admitting evidence of a complaining witness’s prior sexual
conduct to prove consent. But such evidence may be admissible
to impeach witness credibility if its probative value outweighs its
risk of prejudice and the defendant complies with procedures set
forth in Evidence Code section 7821. (§ 1103, subd. (c)(1), (5).)
Section 782 requires a defendant make a written motion
and an offer of proof by affidavit that the proffered evidence is
relevant to attack the complaining witness’s credibility. (Id.,
subd. (a)(1), (2).) If the trial court finds defendant’s offer of proof
is not sufficient, the motion will be denied without a hearing.
(People v. Mestas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1514.) If it finds a
sufficient offer of proof, it shall order a hearing out of the jury’s
presence and allow the complaining witness to be questioned
regarding the offer of proof. (§ 782, subd. (a)(3).) If the court
finds the evidence is relevant under section 7802 and not
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Evidence Code.
2 Section 780 provides that “in determining the credibility
of a witness” the trier of fact may consider “any matter that has
any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of
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inadmissible under section 352, the court may make an order
specifying the evidence that may be introduced by defendant and
the questions permitted. (§ 782, subd. (a)(4); see also People v.
Fontana (2010) 49 Cal.4th 351, 354.) We review a trial court’s
ruling on the admissibility of prior sexual conduct evidence for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Bautista (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th
762, 782.)
1. Exclusion of Evidence to Impeach Witness Credibility
Doe was examined by a SART nurse less than 24 hours
after the incident. She was asked if she had sexual intercourse in
the past five days and if she had oral sex in the past 24 hours.
She answered no to both questions. Testing revealed DNA
samples obtained from her vulvar and mons pubis regions were
consistent with two male contributors.
Defense counsel complied with section 782, moving to
impeach Doe’s credibility with expert testimony regarding the
DNA evidence. The offer of proof indicated the expert would
testify the DNA findings contradicted Doe’s statements to the
SART nurse. The prosecution argued, without support, the
evidence was not relevant because the small amount of DNA
could have come from contact besides vaginal or oral sex and thus
could not prove Doe lied to the SART nurse.
The trial court found there was not “a sufficient showing of
probative value.” It explained, “[W]hat she told the [SART nurse]
[the witness’] testimony.” The section includes a nonexclusive
list of matters that may be considered, including “[a] statement
made by [the witness] that is inconsistent with any part of his [or
her] testimony at the hearing” (id., subd. (h)) and“[t]he existence
or nonexistence of any fact testified to by [the witness.]” (id.,
subd. (i)) and a witness’ “admission of untruthfulness.” (id., subd.
(k).)
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. . . given the limited probative value of the DNA evidence,
doesn’t rise to the level of supporting that exception to Evidence
Code Section 782.” It excluded the evidence “based on [the
limited probative value of the DNA evidence] and . . . Evidence
Code Section 352 . . . .”
Appellant contends the trial court erred when it failed to
hold a hearing for Doe to be questioned about her statement to
the SART nurse. Without a hearing the trial court was
prevented from “learning the full facts associated with Doe’s
statement and what exactly the presence of the second [DNA]
sample might indicate.” Appellant further contends that
exclusion of the DNA evidence and statement to the SART nurse
was error. (People v. Franklin (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 328, 335
[victim’s statement something that is not true is true is
admissible as relevant to the witness’ credibility even if it
concerns the victim’s sexual conduct].)
We need not decide whether the court erred in either
instance, however, because appellant has not shown a
miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; § 354; People v.
Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 173 [erroneous exclusion of
evidence warrants reversal only if it led to a miscarriage of
justice].)
Appellant attacked Doe’s credibility via multiple witnesses
whose description of circumstances that evening were contrary to
Doe’s testimony. For example, Valliere’s testimony regarding
Doe’s conduct prior to the rape differed substantially from Doe’s
own accounts; Nurse Ramirez testified she did not observe any
bruising or injuries to Doe’s arms despite Doe’s report of same;
Detective Wyett testified Doe never told him numerous facts she
later recounted in her testimony and that she made contradictory
statements during their two interviews, including whether she
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drank any of the drinks appellant bought her. Appellant also
cross-examined Doe and elicited differences in her testimony and
what she had reported to detectives about what occurred, giving
the jury an opportunity to evaluate her testimony and credibility.
In light of this evidence, Doe’s possibly false statement to a SART
nurse had limited probative value. “A trial court’s limitation on
cross-examination pertaining to the credibility of a witness does
not violate the confrontation clause unless a reasonable jury
might have received a significantly different impression of the
witness’s credibility had the excluded cross-examination been
permitted. [Citations.]” (People v. Quartermain (1997) 16
Cal.4th 600, 623-624,)
2. Exclusion of Evidence to Explain Bruises
In his opening brief appellant asserts, “[t]he People relied
heavily on the infliction of bruising to Doe’s body to corroborate
her allegations at trial. The jury then was confronted with only
one explanation for the bruising . . . . Given such incomplete
information the jury was invariably guided to believe that
[appellant] was the only possible cause . . . .”
Prior sexual conduct evidence may be admitted when
offered to explain injuries allegedly caused by defendant. (People
v. Fontana, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 363.) However, appellant’s
sole trial argument for admitting the prior sexual conduct
evidence was to attack Doe’s credibility. “‘It is axiomatic that
arguments not raised in the trial court are forfeited on appeal.’”
(People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 798.) We decline
to consider this forfeited argument.
Exclusion of Prior Police Report
Appellant contends the trial court erred in excluding
evidence Doe made a prior false police report concerning an
incident in which she was battered.
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The prosecution sought to exclude this evidence as
irrelevant, arguing it would be an undue consumption of time
and confusing for the jury (§ 352), because the defendant pleaded
guilty and litigating whether the police report was inconsistent
with surveillance video would necessitate a trial within a trial.
After the trial court reviewed the police report and watched
the surveillance video, it found inconsistencies and granted the
prosecution’s request for a section 402 hearing (§ 402). Doe and
the reporting officer both testified. Following argument by the
parties, the trial court found the probative value for impeaching
Doe was “not very high at all” and excluded the evidence stating,
“[A] battery did occur. So it was a report of a battery.” And
“based on what I heard and the possibilities of what happened
one way or the other on two sides of a bar fight” admitting the
evidence would turn into “a bar fight trial within a rape trial.”
Section 352 confers “substantial discretion to exclude
collateral evidence.” (People v. Wall (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 978,
986-987.) “We will not reverse a court’s ruling on such matters
unless it is shown ‘“the trial court exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in
a manifest miscarriage of justice.”’” (People v. Merriman, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 74.) Here, there was no abuse of discretion. The
trial court noted that although there appeared to be
inconsistencies between the video and police report, the video did
not show all that had occurred. The trial court reasonably
concluded allowing questioning regarding what precisely
happened would consume undue time on a matter for which the
evidence was unclear and thus the probative value was low.
We also reject appellant’s claim exclusion of this evidence
violated his Sixth Amendment right to fair trial. As we explained
with regard to the excluded SART statement and DNA evidence,
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appellant presented ample evidence attacking Doe’s credibility.
He was not denied a fair trial. (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th
225, 301 [“[W]e have repeatedly held that ‘not every restriction on
a defendant’s desired method of cross-examination is a
constitutional violation. Within the confines of the confrontation
clause, the trial court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-
examination that is repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the
issues, or of marginal relevance.’”].)
Substantial Evidence Supports a Conviction for Count Two.
Appellant asserts his conviction under count two must be
reversed because evidence failed to show either genital or vaginal
penetration occurred. He “bears a massive burden in claiming
insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions because our role
on appeal is a limited one.” (People v. Akins (1997) 56
Cal.App.4th 331, 336.) We “‘examine the entire record in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, presuming in support of
the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ [Citations.] . . . [I]f the
verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we are bound to give
due deference to the jury and not retry the case ourselves.”
(Ibid.) “Unless it describes facts or events that are physically
impossible or inherently improbable, the testimony of a single
witness is sufficient to support a conviction.” (People v. Elliott
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 585.)
Appellant concedes the law defines penetration as “the act
of causing the penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal
opening of any person . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (k)(1).) Case
law here is settled: sexual penetration “‘however slight, of the
genital . . . opening[]’ refers to penetration of the labia majora
. . . .” (People v. Quintana (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1364.)
Doe testified appellant was “rubbing” her with his hand
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“underneath [her] clothes” and that his fingers “start[ed] to go
between [her] labia.” After listening to and observing her
testimony, the jury found that when appellant’s fingers “start[ed]
to go between [her] labia,” sexual penetration “however slight”
occurred. This is sufficient evidence to support appellant’s count
two conviction.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Appellant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct
by introducing evidence in violation of a specific pretrial evidence
ruling. (People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 629
[eliciting evidence in violation of a trial court ruling is
prosecutorial misconduct].) When a prosecutor’s error is “‘“‘“so
egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make
the conviction a denial of due process,”’”’” (People v. Hill (1998) 17
Cal.4th 800, 819) we evaluate its prejudicial effect under
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705].
Conduct implicating state rights occurs if a prosecutor uses
“‘“‘“deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade
either the court or the jury”’”’” (Hill, at p. 819) and is evaluated
for prejudice under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. We
will not reverse under Watson “unless it is reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been
reached without the misconduct.” (People v. Crew (2003) 31
Cal.4th 822, 839.)
Defense counsel agreed to the prosecutor’s introduction of a
recorded statement made when appellant was arrested, but
moved to exclude any references to the kidnap, rape, and murder
of his mother when he was a child. The trial court ordered the
recording redacted and witnesses instructed not to comment on
the issue. Though the transcript was properly redacted, the
recording was not, and a reference to appellant’s mother’s murder
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was played for the jury. During a recess outside the jury’s
presence defense counsel objected to the unredacted portion of
the recording. Concerned about drawing attention to the issue,
he declined a juror admonition and moved for mistrial. The
prosecutor argued it was an inadvertent mistake not rising to the
level of prejudicial error and curable by admonition. The court
found no misconduct and denied the motion for mistrial. Defense
then asked the court to repeat a previous admonition not to read
into or speculate about the redactions in the recording or the
transcript. The court did so, and trial resumed.
We agree the prosecutor’s failure to properly redact the
recording constituted error since it elicited evidence in violation
of the court’s order. But the unredacted portion of the recording
was equivalent to two lines of text in a 70-page transcript. This
minor error did not render the trial so fundamentally unfair that
it constituted prejudice under the federal standard. Nor has
appellant shown it is reasonably probable a more favorable result
would have been reached absent the error. Considering the
evidence of appellant’s guilt and the curative juror admonition,
we conclude the error was harmless.
Consecutive Sentences Are Proper
Penal Code section 667.6 authorizes imposition of full,
separate, and consecutive terms for each sex offense involving
separate victims or the same victim on separate occasions. (Pen.
Code, § 667.6, subd. (d)(1).) “In determining whether crimes
against a single victim were committed on separate occasions . . .
the court shall consider whether, between the commission of one
sex crime and another, the defendant had a reasonable
opportunity to reflect upon [their] actions and nevertheless
resumed sexually assaultive behavior.” (Id., subd. (d)(2).) The
duration of time between crimes is not, by itself, determinative of
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whether the crimes occurred on separate occasions. (Id., subd.
(d)(1), (2).)
Appellant contends “no evidence” supports finding the
forcible penetration and rape occurred on separate occasions. He
relies on People v. Corona (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 13 (Corona)3
and People v. Peña (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1294 (Peña)4, arguing,
“[t]here does not appear in the record any discussion of
measurable or appreciable time elapsing between the cessation of
the alleged penetration and [appellant] raping Doe.”
Appellant’s reliance on Corona and Peña is misplaced.
Neither case holds evidence of a “measurable or appreciable” time
period is required to find the sex offenses occurred on separate
occasions. Rather, both cases provide that unless no reasonable
trier of fact could so conclude, a trial court’s finding the conduct
occurred on separate occasions will be upheld if the trial court
found the time period and circumstances were sufficient for
defendant to stop and reflect on his actions. (People v. Plaza
(1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 377, 385, citing Corona, supra, 206
Cal.App.3d at p. 18, fn. 2, and Peña, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1314.)
Here, the trial court found appellant had a reasonable
opportunity to reflect on his conduct and cease his sexually
assaultive behavior but instead chose to continue. The court
explained, “from the time . . . Doe started telling [appellant], no,
3 In Corona a distinct line was drawn between two sets of
rapes separated in time by the defendant ceasing the sexual
assault while he left the victim in a vehicle, then returning a few
minutes later to resume the sexual assault.
4 In Peña, Penal Code section 667.6, subd. (d) did not apply
because the sexually abusive conduct was continuous.
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and pushing his arm away while he was driving . . . , he had the
chance to stop the conduct. When she told him repeatedly to take
her home and he came to the intersection . . . he had the
opportunity . . . to turn left and drive her home, to stop the
conduct at that time. Instead he decided to pull off and . . . then
to rape her.” Substantial evidence supports this finding.
No cumulative error
Appellant claims cumulative error. We have determined
each of his contentions lack merit. There is no cumulative error.
(People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 608.)
DISPOSITION
Judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P.J.
BALTODANO, J.
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Craig B. Van Rooyen, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
The Law Offices of Jonathan Reza, Jonathan K. Reza;
Action Defense Law, Action Lavitch, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez, and J. Michael
Lehmann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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