CourtListener 10321042•People v. Smith CA3
Texto completo
Filed 1/27/25 P. v. Smith CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yolo)
----
THE PEOPLE, C100270
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CR-2005-468)
v.
STEVE ALAN SMITH,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Steve Alan Smith beat his wife into unconsciousness in front of their
children and was found guilty of several domestic violence related offenses; he was
sentenced as a third strike offender to an aggregate term of 57 years to life in prison, and
the judgment was affirmed on appeal. (People v. Smith (Apr. 19, 2007, C050287)
[nonpub. opn.] (Smith).)
1
Later, in defendant’s absence, the trial court partially granted his Penal Code
section 1172.751 petition for recall and resentencing, striking several enhancements,
including two no longer valid prior prison term enhancements, but again declining to
strike defendant’s prior strike convictions. The trial court reimposed terms of 25 years to
life on two counts for a total aggregate sentence of 50 years to life.
On appeal, the parties agree, and we concur, that the trial court erred in conducting
the resentencing hearing without defendant present. Because we do not find the
constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we shall reverse and remand for
further resentencing proceedings.
BACKGROUND
A. The Charges, the Verdicts, and the Sentence
We summarize the pertinent facts from our prior opinion in Smith, supra,
C050287. In October 2004, defendant’s wife was living with her two teenaged daughters
in an apartment in West Sacramento. Defendant had been away for a long period of time,
and in the interim, his wife had a boyfriend. After returning and finding letters from the
boyfriend, defendant attacked his wife with a tree branch, choked her, shoved her against
a dumpster, and hit her head against it. Later, while their daughters were present,
defendant repeatedly struck his wife in the face with a phone, causing her to lose
consciousness. As a result of the attack, defendant’s wife suffered a broken nose, missing
teeth, and brain injuries; she had a stroke from an injury to her carotid artery, remained in
the hospital and a nursing home for four months, and continued to experience partial
paralysis at the time of trial.
1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code. This statute was formerly
section 1171.1, but effective June 30, 2022, it was renumbered and amended by
Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) to section 1172.75. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 12.)
2
A jury found defendant guilty of (1) inflicting corporal injury on a spouse
(§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 1), with special findings of great bodily injury involving
domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) and use of a deadly weapon (phone) (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)); (2) misdemeanor assault (§ 240; count 2), as a lesser included offense of
assault with a deadly weapon (tree branch); (3) assault with a deadly weapon (phone)
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3), with a special finding of great bodily injury involving
domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)); (4) two counts of misdemeanor inflicting
mental suffering on a child (§ 273a, subd. (b); counts 4 & 5), as a lesser included offense
of felony child abuse; (5) removing a telephone line (§ 591; count 6); and (6) dissuading
a witness (§ 136.1. subd. (b)(1); count 7). The trial court found defendant had two prior
felony convictions under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, 1170.12) and had served two
prior prison terms.
The trial court imposed consecutive 25-year-to-life state prison terms for the
corporal injury and dissuasion convictions. Defendant received consecutive determinate
terms totaling five years for the enhancements attached to the corporal injury offense,
plus one year each for the prior prison term enhancements. The court imposed jail time
for the misdemeanors but deemed that portion of the sentence already served. Under
section 654, the court stayed the sentences on the assault with a deadly weapon and
removing a telephone line convictions. Defendant’s total aggregate sentence was a
seven-year determinate term and a 50-year-to-life indeterminate term.
B. Subsequent Resentencing Petitions
In April 2022, defendant moved in pro. per. for resentencing under former section
1171.1 (now § 1172.75), which invalidated certain prior prison term enhancements
imposed for nonsexually violent offenses.2 Defense counsel’s subsequent resentencing
2 Defendant’s motion also cited former section 1171, now renumbered to section
1172.7, which, with certain exceptions, invalidated drug enhancements imposed prior to
3
brief asked the trial court to: (1) dismiss his two prior prison term enhancements as
invalid under section 1172.75, subdivision (a); (2) strike his strike priors (a 1976 first
degree robbery conviction and a 1978 conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, which
he committed when he was 19 and 21 years old, respectively) under section 1385,
subdivision (a) and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497; and
(3) dismiss his other enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (c) given the
presence of certain mitigating factors.3
The People filed an opposition brief, agreeing that the trial court should strike the
prior prison term enhancements but asking that the remainder of defendant’s sentence
remain unchanged. In opposing a further reduction, the People cited, among other things,
the nature of defendant’s commitment offenses, his lengthy and violent criminal history,
his lack of rehabilitation appropriate for his domestic violence offenses, and the failure to
prove that any of the cited mitigating factors were connected to the commission of the
offenses. They attached a copy of this court’s opinion in Smith, supra, C050287, as well
as transcripts of the preliminary hearing and the original sentencing hearing, among other
exhibits.
January 1, 2018, pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11370.2. (§ 1172.7, subd.
(a).) No such drug enhancement was imposed in this case, however. Defendant also filed
petitions for resentencing under section 1170.126, a provision adopted in November 2012
as part of Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6,
2012)), and section 1170.18, subdivision (a), adopted by the voters in November 2014 as
part of Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4,
2014)). These petitions are not at issue in this appeal.
3 In 2023, defense counsel also filed a challenge to the validity of defendant’s
convictions under the Racial Justice Act (§ 745, subd. (d)). The parties and the trial court
agreed to bifurcate the Racial Justice Act claim from the resentencing petition under
section 1172.75 and the Romero motion. Defendant’s Racial Justice Act claim is not at
issue in this appeal.
4
In reply, defendant argued striking his strike priors was in the interest of justice
given his youthfulness at the time of the strikes, his mental health during the prior and
current offenses, and his postconviction rehabilitation efforts.
C. Resentencing Hearing
Following multiple continuances, the trial court set a resentencing hearing on
January 5, 2024, and ordered defendant to appear. Defendant did not appear
telephonically from prison for the January hearing as the trial court and counsel
anticipated. Despite his unexplained absence, the court proceeded with the resentencing
hearing.
After considering lengthy written submissions by the parties, and hearing
argument, the trial court declined to exercise its discretion to strike one or more of
defendant’s prior strike convictions and reimposed terms of 25 years to life on the
corporal injury and dissuasion counts. The court struck the two prior prison term
enhancements, and then found that defendant’s evidence in mitigation warranted
dismissing the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) and the weapon
enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), reducing defendant’s sentence to 50 years to life in
state prison.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Both the federal and state Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to
be personally present at trial. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)
This right extends to all “critical stages of the criminal prosecution,” including sentencing
and resentencing hearings. (People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 508 (Nieves); People
v. Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253, 257 [“The People . . . do ‘not dispute that a
defendant has an absolute right to be present at a sentence modification hearing and
imposition of sentence’ ”].) While a defendant may waive the constitutional right to be
present for sentencing, the waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. (Nieves,
5
supra, at p. 508.) Under section 977, a defendant must execute a written waiver or have
previously entered an oral waiver of the right to be present in open court. (§ 977, subd.
(b)(1)-(2).)
Here, it is undisputed that defendant was not present during the resentencing
hearing. Nothing in the record indicates defendant validly waived his right to be present.
Instead, the trial court and the parties anticipated that defendant would participate in the
hearing remotely from prison, but for reasons unknown, defendant did not appear. After
acknowledging defendant would need assistance from prison officials to participate in the
hearing telephonically while incarcerated and that there had been no waiver, the court
proceeded with the resentencing hearing hoping that defendant might join the hearing at
some point. This was an error. We therefore consider whether the error prejudiced
defendant. (Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 508 [defendant’s absence when restitution
fines were imposed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where defense counsel was
present, raised defendant’s inability to pay the restitution fine and disputed payment of
direct victim restitution, and there was nothing in the record to indicate that defendant
would have added any significant information about her inability to pay beyond that
presented by defense counsel].)
The People note that defense counsel was present at the resentencing hearing and
that defendant had submitted extensive materials to the trial court before the hearing,
which the trial court considered before ruling. These included defendant’s social history,
character letters and letters in support of resentencing, Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation records, and a detailed 20-page statement from defendant describing his
remorse, his personal growth while incarcerated, his future plans if released, his plans to
avoid substance abuse relapse and criminality, and his support network. They argue there
was little more defendant could have added at the hearing thus rendering any error
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
6
Defendant contends he is entitled to a new resentencing hearing because the error
cannot be deemed harmless. Relying primarily on People v. Cutting (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 344, 350, defendant asserts that he could have offered other mitigating
factors, shown remorse, or made a plea for leniency that the trial court might have found
compelling had he been personally present at the hearing. In Cutting, the appellate court
held that it could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s presence at
a resentencing hearing would not have influenced the trial court’s exercise of its
discretion, thus potentially affecting the outcome. (Id. at p. 346.) In reversing for further
resentencing proceedings, the court reasoned that the defendant “may have offered
mitigating factors that arose after his original sentencing; he may have expressed
remorse; [or] he may have made a plea for leniency.” (Id. at p. 350.)
We believe defendant has the better argument. While it is true that defendant
submitted detailed information to the trial court before the resentencing hearing, like in
Cutting, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant might not have
offered something additional at the hearing, if he chose to address the court, which might
have persuaded the court to sentence him more leniently. Defendant, however, was never
given an opportunity to make these additional arguments. Remand is, therefore,
necessary to ensure a resentencing proceeding that is just under the circumstances,
including a hearing at which both the People and defendant may be present and advocate
for their respective positions.4 (People v. Cutting, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 350.)
4 We note that during the resentencing hearing the trial court stayed terms on counts
3 and 6 under section 654 without first imposing a term on those counts. Following
remand, the trial court should orally impose a term for each count, and then stay any term
to which it determines section 654 applies. (See e.g., People v. Alford (2010)
180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1469, 1472-1473 [a trial court must impose sentence on all counts
but stay execution of sentence as necessary to prevent multiple punishments under
section 654].)
7
DISPOSITION
The judgment following resentencing is reversed, and the matter is remanded to
the trial court to conduct a resentencing hearing at which defendant is present, unless
defendant waives his right to be present at this critical stage of the proceedings.
\s\ ,
Krause, J.
We concur:
\s\ ,
Hull, Acting P. J.
\s\ ,
Mesiwala, J.
8
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