People v. Rodriguez CA2/3

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Filed 1/23/25 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B331267

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA115722-02
v.

LUIS ANGEL RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Reversed
and remanded.

Joanna Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Charles S. Lee,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A jury convicted Luis Angel Rodriguez of first degree
murder and found true a lying-in-wait special circumstance.
In 2022, Rodriguez filed a petition for resentencing under the
provisions now found in Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The court
denied the petition at the prima facie stage. The court stated
Rodriguez is not entitled to relief as a matter of law because
the jury determined the murder was of the first degree. On
appeal, Rodriguez argues he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing
because it is possible the jury convicted him of first degree
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying his petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The conviction
The People charged Rodriguez, Fernando Guzman, and
Jesus Trujillo with the first degree murder of Jonathan Escobar
(§ 187, subd. (a)) and shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246).
The People alleged the special circumstance that defendants
intentionally killed Escobar by means of lying in wait (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(15)). The People also alleged firearm and gang
enhancement allegations (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), 12022,
12022.53).
The People jointly tried Rodriguez, Guzman, and Trujillo.
The People presented evidence that Rodriguez, Guzman, and
Trujillo were members of the DMS gang.2 Escobar was affiliated
with a rival gang. The night of November 19, 2010, Rodriguez,

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We recite this evidence not for its truth but for the basis for
Rodriguez’s conviction. (See People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th
448, 459–460.)

2
Guzman, and Trujillo went to Escobar’s apartment building.
Guzman was friends with Escobar and sent him text messages
as a ruse to get him to come outside. When Escobar did,
Rodriguez and Trujillo fired shots at him. Escobar suffered
two bullet wounds, one of which was fatal.
The jury convicted Rodriguez as charged. The jury
determined the murder was of the first degree “under the theory
that it was willful, deliberate, and premeditated or by means of
lying in wait.” The jury also found true the special circumstance
allegation that “the defendants intentionally killed the victim by
means of lying in wait,” the gang enhancement allegation, and
allegations that a “principal” personally used and intentionally
discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily injury
and death. The court sentenced Rodriguez to an aggregate term
of 50 years to life.
2. The resentencing petition
In 2022, Rodriguez filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6.3 Rodriguez asserted he is entitled to relief
because the jury convicted him of murder under the felony
murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
He also asserted he could not currently be convicted of murder
because of changes made to sections 188 and 189.
The People filed an opposition brief arguing Rodriguez
is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because he was
the actual killer. In a supplemental brief, the People argued
Rodriguez “was an actual killer, aided and abetted the actual

3 Rodriguez filed his petition under former section 1170.95,
which was later renumbered as section 1172.6. For the sake
of simplicity, we refer only to section 1172.6 throughout this
opinion.

3
killer, and was a major participant and no natural and
probable consequences or felony-murder instruction was given.”
The People argued Rodriguez also is ineligible for relief because
the jury found true the lying-in-wait special circumstance
and concluded Rodriguez willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation committed murder.
The People attached to their opposition the verdict forms
and jury instructions from Rodriguez’s trial. The instructions
revealed that—contrary to the People’s representations—the
trial court had instructed the jury on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. We discuss the instructions in more
detail later in this opinion.
The superior court considered Rodriguez’s petition at
a hearing on May 30, 2023. The People continued to insist
the jury had not been instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. The People also argued Rodriguez is
ineligible for relief because the jury convicted him of first degree
murder under a willful, deliberate, and premediated theory,
or a lying-in-wait theory.
Rodriguez asserted the jury had been instructed on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, and the People
were wrong to claim otherwise. He argued the jury’s finding
on the lying-in-wait special circumstance was not conclusive
because there was an error on the verdict form. Specifically,
the form asked the jury to determine whether the “defendants
intentionally killed the victim by means of lying in wait.”
(Italics added.) According to Rodriguez, the use of the plural
“defendants” allowed the jury to impute to him a codefendant’s
intent to kill.

4
The superior court acknowledged that the jury had been
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Nevertheless, it determined Rodriguez is not entitled to
resentencing as a matter of law and denied the petition.
The court explained that “the defendant is ineligible for relief
under 1172.6, because of the fact that the jury found him guilty
under a direct aiding and abetting theory, not under a felony
murder theory, nor under a natural and probable consequence
theory, because they found him guilty of first.” The court
rejected Rodriguez’s argument that the verdict form’s reference
to “defendants” allowed the jury to impute intent to him.
DISCUSSION
Rodriguez argues the superior court erred by denying
his petition at the prima facie stage on the ground that the jury
convicted him of first degree murder. He contends the record
of conviction does not conclusively rebut his assertion that the
jury convicted him under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, which is no longer a valid theory of murder. Therefore,
Rodriguez argues, he is entitled to a hearing at which the People
have the burden to prove he is guilty of murder under current
law.
1. Aiding and abetting murder
Murder is “the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with
malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice can be either
express or implied. It is express when the evidence shows a
deliberate intention to kill, and it is implied when the defendant
engages in conduct dangerous to human life, knows that the
conduct endangers the victim’s life, and acts with a conscious
disregard for life. (People v. Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24,
30.)

5
“[A] person who aids and abets a crime is guilty of that
crime even if someone else committed some or all of the criminal
acts.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1116–1117.)
“A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when
he or she, (i) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or purpose of committing,
facilitating or encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or
advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission
of the crime.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164.)
“In general, to establish liability for murder under the
theory of direct aiding and abetting, ‘the prosecution must
show that the defendant aided or encouraged the commission
of the murder with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator and with the intent or purpose of committing,
encouraging, or facilitating its commission.’ [Citation.] In
addition, . . . an aider and abettor may be liable for murder
under a theory of implied malice where the aider and abettor
aids in the commission of a life-endangering act, with
‘ “knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act,
intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act,
knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting
in conscious disregard for human life.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Thus, proof
of aider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct
areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed
by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea’
—which here includes knowledge that the direct perpetrator
intends to commit the crime or life-endangering act, ‘and
(c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—conduct by the aider
and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.’ ”
(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 466–467 (Curiel).)

6
At the time of Rodriguez’s trial, an aider and abettor
could also be convicted of murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Under that doctrine, “ ‘an accomplice
is guilty not only of the offense he or she directly aided or abetted
(i.e., the target offense), but also of any other offense committed
by the direct perpetrator that was the “natural and probable
consequence” of the crime the accomplice aided and abetted (i.e.,
the nontarget offense).’ ” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 466.)
Therefore, “a defendant who aided and abetted an intended
assault could be liable for murder, if the murder was the natural
and probable consequence of the intended assault. [Citation.]
The defendant need not have intended the murder or even
subjectively appreciated the natural and probable consequences
of the intended crime.” (Id. at p. 449.)
2. Senate Bill No. 1437
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) took effect on
January 1, 2019. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) The bill limited
accomplice liability under the felony murder rule and eliminated
the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates
to murder. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843
(Gentile); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
The legislation amended “section 188, which defines malice,
and 189, which defines the degrees of murder to address
felony-murder liability, and it add[ed] section [1172.6], which
provides a procedure by which those convicted of murder can
seek retroactive relief if the changes in the law would affect
their previously sustained convictions.” (People v. Gutierrez-
Salazar (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 411, 417.)
Section 1172.6 provides a mechanism by which a person
convicted of murder under the former law may be resentenced

7
if he could no longer be convicted of murder because of the
changes to sections 188 and 189. (People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 708; see generally Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th
at p. 843; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959–960.) Once
a petitioner establishes a prima facie case for relief and the
superior court issues an order to show cause, the matter proceeds
to an evidentiary hearing. (Strong, at pp. 708–709; People v.
Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.) The prosecution has
the burden at the hearing to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the petitioner is guilty of murder notwithstanding the
amendments to sections 188 and 189. (Strong, at pp. 708–709;
Vargas, at p. 951.)
At the prima facie stage, the court takes as true
the petitioner’s factual allegations and assesses whether
the petitioner would be entitled to relief if those allegations
were proved. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) However,
“[t]he record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s
prima facie inquiry under section 117[2.6], allowing the court
to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that
are clearly meritless.” (Ibid.) The jury instructions are part of
the record of conviction. (See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 441
[examining jury instructions to determine whether jury made
findings that conclusively rebutted allegations in a resentencing
petition]; People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 946, 949
[jury instructions showed trial court never instructed the jury on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine; summary denial
of petition affirmed].) The verdicts also are part of the record of
conviction. (See People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 47–
48, 55–56 (Harden) [affirming summary denial of petition; jury
instructions and verdicts irrefutably established as a matter of

8
law that defendant was ineligible for resentencing].) A petitioner
is bound by a jury’s findings for purposes of assessing eligibility
for relief at the prima facie stage. (See Curiel, at p. 441.)
We independently review the superior court’s
determination that Rodriguez failed to make a prima facie
showing. (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251;
Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 52.)
3. The relevant jury instructions
The record of conviction shows the trial court instructed
the jury with CALCRIM No. 400, which stated, “A person
is guilty of a crime whether he committed it personally or
aided and abetted the perpetrator. [¶] Under some specific
circumstances, if the evidence establishes aiding and abetting
of one crime, a person may also be found guilty of other crimes
that occurred during the commission of the first crime.”
CALCRIM No. 401 told the jury, “Someone aids and abets a
crime if he knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he
specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote,
encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that
crime.”
The court instructed the jury that Rodiguez could be
guilty of murder if he committed an assault with a firearm.
The relevant instruction—CALCRIM No. 403—told the jury,
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of
murder, the People must prove that:
“1. The defendant is guilty of assault
with a firearm;
“2. During the commission of assault
with a weapon a coparticipant in that

9
assault with a firearm committed
the crime of murder;
“AND
“3. Under all of the circumstances, a
reasonable person in the defendant’s
position would have known that
the commission of the murder was
a natural and probable consequence
of the commission of the assault with
a firearm.”
As to the degree of the murder, the court instructed the
jury with CALCRIM No. 521. That instruction told the jury,
“The defendant has been prosecuted for first degree murder
under two theories: (1) the murder was willful, deliberate, and
premediated and (2) the murder was committed by lying in wait.”
On the former theory, the court instructed the jury it must find
“[t]he defendant . . . acted willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation.” On the latter theory, the court instructed
the jury it must find (1) the defendant “concealed his purpose
from the person killed”; (2) “[h]e waited and watched for an
opportunity to act”; and (3) “[t]hen, from a position of advantage,
he intended to and did make a surprise attack on the person
killed.”
The court instructed the jury on the lying-in-wait special
circumstance with CALCRIM No. 728. That instruction told
the jury the special circumstance is true if (1) “The defendant
intentionally killed Jonathan Escobar”; and (2) “The defendant
committed the murder by means of lying in wait.” The
instruction explained that a person commits a murder by
means of lying in wait if (1) “He concealed his purpose from

10
the person killed”; (2) “He waited and watched for an opportunity
to act”; (3) “Then he made a surprise attack on the person killed
from a position of advantage”; and (4) “He intended to kill the
person by taking the person by surprise.” The instruction stated
the duration of the lying in wait “must be substantial and must
show a state of mind equivalent to deliberation or premeditation.”
The court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 702
as follows: “If the defendant was not the actual killer, then the
People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that he acted with the intent to kill for the special circumstance
of lying in wait to be true.”
The jury asked the court two questions during
deliberations: (1) “If an individual aids and abets, even
without intent, can that person be guilty of murder or any
other charge[?]” and (2) “Can an individual who does not have
the intent of murder be convicted [of] murder, if he aides and
abets an individual who does have the intent?” The court
responded to both questions by telling the jury, “Please refer
to jury instructions # 400, 401 and 403. If you need anything
further please inform the court.”
4. The superior court erred by concluding Rodriguez is
ineligible for resentencing because the jury convicted
him of first degree murder
Contrary to the People’s argument below, the record of
conviction plainly shows the trial court instructed the jury on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. CALCRIM
No. 403, in particular, told the jury Rodriguez is guilty of murder
if (1) he committed assault with a firearm, (2) a coparticipant in
the assault with a firearm committed murder, and (3) murder
was a natural and probable consequence of the assault with

11
a firearm. The instruction allowed the jury to convict Rodriguez
of murder without finding he personally harbored express or
implied malice. Instead, it allowed the jury to impute malice
to Rodriguez based solely on his participation in an assault with
a firearm, something the current version of section 188 prohibits.
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
The superior court rightly rejected the People’s argument
and acknowledged the jury had been instructed on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. Nevertheless, the court
seemed to believe Rodriguez is ineligible for resentencing as
a matter of law because the jury found the murder was of the
first degree. The court was mistaken.4
In People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu), the
California Supreme Court held an accomplice cannot be convicted
of first degree willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder
under the natural and probable consequence doctrine. (Id. at
pp. 158–159.) Here, however, the jury convicted Rodriguez
in 2012, more than two years before Chiu was decided. At that
time, the law did not prohibit a first degree murder conviction
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (See
ibid.; see also People v. Gastelum (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 757, 765–
769 (Gastelum) [holding the natural and probable consequences
doctrine can support liability for first degree lying-in-wait
murder].)
The trial court’s instructions on first degree murder
reflected the law as it existed before Chiu. CALCRIM No. 521

4 The Attorney General does not address the superior court’s
stated reason for denying Rodriguez’s petition. We take his
silence as an implicit concession that the superior court erred
in that regard.

12
told the jury it could convict Rodriguez of first degree murder
under two theories: (1) if “the defendant murdered while lying
in wait or immediately thereafter”; or (2) if “[t]he defendant . . .
acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.” The court
did not expressly instruct the jury that either theory required
it to find Rodriguez was the actual killer or a direct aider
and abettor.
Nor did the instructions implicitly require the jury to make
those findings. If the jury determined Rodriguez was guilty
of murder as an aider and abettor, it may have understood
“the defendant” in CALCRIM No. 521 to refer to the direct
perpetrator, rather than Rodriguez. If so, to convict Rodriguez
of first degree murder, the jury had only to find the direct
perpetrator committed murder by means of lying in wait, or
the direct perpetrator acted willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation. The jury did not have to make any new findings
about Rodriguez. Accordingly, the jury’s determination that the
murder was of the first degree does not rule out the possibility
that the jury convicted Rodriguez under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (See Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 158,
160–161 [CALCRIM instructions allowed the jury to convict
the defendant of first degree premeditated murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine]; Gastelum, supra,
45 Cal.App.5th at p. 766 [CALCRIM instructions allowed the
jury to convict the defendant of first degree lying-in-wait murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine].)
The same is true of the jury’s finding on the lying-in-wait
special circumstance. The record suggests the jury may have
believed it could find the special circumstance true under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. During

13
deliberations, the jury asked the court, “If an individual aids
and abets, even without intent, can that person be guilty of
murder or any other charge[?]” The court responded by pointing
the jurors to the instructions on aiding and abetting murder,
including the instruction on the natural and probable
consequence doctrine. The jury did not specify what it meant by
“other charge.” However, it is at least conceivable that the jury
was referring to the lying-in-wait special circumstance allegation.
If so, the court’s response may have suggested to the jury that
the natural and probable consequences doctrine applies to the
special circumstance.
We are not persuaded by the Attorney General’s contention
that the jury necessarily would have understood CALCRIM
No. 728 to require it to find Rodriguez was the actual killer or
a direct aider and abettor. That instruction told the jury the
lying-in-wait special circumstance has two elements: (1) “The
defendant intentionally killed Jonathan Escobar”; and (2) “The
defendant committed the murder by means of lying in wait.”
According to the Attorney General, because this instruction
required the jury to find “[t]he defendant intentionally killed”
the victim, the jury must have determined Rodriguez
intentionally killed Escobar.
To the extent the jury concluded Rodriguez was the
actual killer, we agree with the Attorney General that CALCRIM
No. 728 required it to find he intentionally killed Escobar.
However, the Attorney General does not address the possibility
that the jury instead convicted Rodriguez as an aider and abettor.
In that scenario, the jury may have understood CALCRIM
No. 728 to require only that it find the direct perpetrator
intentionally killed Escobar. Such a finding is not necessarily

14
inconsistent with a conviction under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.
The Attorney General also points to CALCRIM No. 702,
which told the jury, “If the defendant was not the actual killer,
then the People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that he acted with the intent to kill for the special
circumstance of lying in wait to be true.” As the Attorney
General notes, this instruction required the jury to find
Rodriguez acted with the intent to kill if he was not the actual
killer. However, our Supreme Court has explained that an
intent to kill standing alone is insufficient to render a person
culpable for another’s acts. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 468.)
Accordingly, the fact that the court instructed the jury with
CALCRIM No. 702 does not establish that the jury convicted
Rodriguez under a currently valid theory of murder.
In sum, we are not persuaded that the jury necessarily
interpreted and applied the lying-in-wait special circumstance
instructions in the manner the Attorney General proposes.
That the Attorney General cannot articulate precisely how the
instructions precluded the jury from convicting Rodriguez under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine significantly
undermines his arguments. On the record before us, we cannot
rule out the possibility that the jury interpreted the instructions
some other way. Given that possibility, the record does not
conclusively rebut Rodriguez’s assertion that he could not be
convicted of murder under current law. Therefore, the superior
court erred by denying Rodriguez’s petition for resentencing
at the prima facie stage.5

5 Because we conclude the instructions did not conclusively
preclude the jury from convicting Rodriguez of murder under

15
DISPOSITION
We reverse the order denying Rodriguez’s petition. On
remand, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold
an evidentiary hearing as required under section 1172.6.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

a presently invalid theory, we need not consider Rodriguez’s
argument regarding an ambiguity in the verdict form.

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