CourtListener 10320013•People v. Trujillo CA5
Texto completo
Filed 1/23/25 P. v. Trujillo CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087464
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF120858B)
v.
JOSE ANDRES PINEDA TRUJILLO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. David E. Wolf,
Judge.
Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Canzoneri and Barton
Bowers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Appellant Jose Andres Pineda Trujillo appeals following his sentencing on a
second degree murder conviction imposed on remand pursuant to disposition instructions
from this court after appellant prevailed on a prior writ of habeas corpus. Appellant
contends the trial court failed to fully follow this court’s instructions on remand because
it resentenced appellant without conducting an evidentiary hearing under Penal Code1
section 1172.6 and thereby failed to sentence appellant under existing ameliorative
changes in the law. We find no error and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant’s case returns to this court after a unique procedural trail. In a prior
opinion, this court resolved both a petition for writ of habeas corpus and an appeal
following the denial of a resentencing petition under section 1172.6. Appellant’s writ
petition successfully demonstrated his then-existing convictions for first degree murder
and attempted murder could not be sustained under two postconviction changes in the
law as embodied in People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 and People v. Canizales (2019)
7 Cal.5th 591. These errors resulted in this court vacating appellant’s convictions but
providing the People an opportunity to elect whether to retry appellant under a currently
valid theory of liability and a prior binding determination in appellant’s trial that he was
not the actual killer and did not act with an intent to kill in the underlying crimes. If the
People chose not to retry appellant, and in line with appellant’s arguments and the
relevant case law in the appeal, this court ordered that his conviction be modified to
second degree murder and he be resentenced accordingly.
In the appeal related to appellant’s request for resentencing on his first degree
murder and attempted murder convictions pursuant to section 1172.6, this court dismissed
the appeal as moot. We noted that appellant no longer stood convicted of the crimes for
which he requested resentencing and, therefore, no relief could be granted. Importantly,
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
all parties and this court acknowledged that appellant would not be barred from filing a
new petition for resentencing upon the imposition of a sentence for whichever new
conviction might be obtained upon remand. (See People v. Trujillo (June 7, 2023,
F081571) [nonpub. opn.].)
The hearing on remand occurred on January 12, 2024. Appellant’s counsel opened
that hearing by stating she would “be submitting on the probation report. This is a case
where there was an appeal, it was a remittitur in this case where … the Court found that
the [first] degree murder was invalid. This is just a resentencing on [second] degree.”
The court asked counsel specifically if the hearing should consider a resentencing “at the
same time or do you just want to do this?” In response, counsel cited directly to this
court’s opinion and stated they were there “just to enter the judgment on the [second]
degree [murder conviction].” The court then concluded by noting, “I just didn’t know if
that’s something you want to do today? But why don’t we just do the resentencing. And
then if … he wants to do something in the future, you can do that.”
Following this discussion, the trial court proceeded to sentence appellant as if he
had been convicted of second degree murder while also taking into account those
remaining convictions that were not affected by the prior writ proceedings. This resulted
in a sentence of 15 years to life on the second degree murder conviction, plus six years
eight months for the additional nonstayed charges, to be served consecutively. Appellant
received 5,993 days of credit for time served. Although the petition is not contained in
the record, the minute orders following remand show that appellant filed and the court
received a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 on November 17, 2023.
This appeal timely followed.
DISCUSSION
At the outset of this case, it is important to note what is and is not being argued.
Appellant requests this court remand for further proceedings, claiming an evidentiary
hearing under section 1172.6 should have been held and implying that the trial court
3.
would have concluded appellant was eligible for relief from any second degree murder
conviction because of this court’s determination he did not have the requisite intent to kill
required under the law as it now stands. Appellant does not contend, however, that the
trial court could not enter the conviction for second degree murder despite this court’s
specific instructions on remand or that there was any sentencing error if the trial court
were properly sentencing appellant for a second degree murder conviction. Further,
although implying substantial evidence does not support the conviction under current law,
appellant does not directly appeal his conviction for second degree murder as improper.
As such, we focus only on whether the trial court erred by not considering section 1172.6
when imposing the sentence in this case.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Once a remittitur issues, “ ‘the trial court is revested with jurisdiction of the case,
but only to carry out the judgment as ordered by the appellate court.’ [Citation.] Stated
another way, ‘[u]pon issuance of the remittitur, the trial court’s jurisdiction with regard to
the “remitted action” is limited solely to the making of orders necessary to carry the
judgment into effect. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] ‘[T]he terms of the remittitur define the
trial court’s jurisdiction to act. “The order of the appellate court as stated in the
remittitur, ‘is decisive of the character of the judgment to which the appellant is
entitled.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Hargis (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 199, 204, first and fourth
bracketed insertions added.)
“Whether the trial court correctly interpreted our opinion is an issue of law subject
to de novo review.” (Ayyad v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 851, 859.)
The trial court’s interpretation of the remittitur is not binding on this court. Rather, “[w]e
look to the wording of our directions to determine whether the trial court’s order
comports with them. [Citation.] When, as in this case, the reviewing court remands the
matter for further proceedings, its directions must be read in conjunction with the opinion
as a whole.” (Ibid.)
4.
“Senate Bill [No.] 1437 [(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)] created a special procedural
mechanism for those convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the
law as amended. [Citations.] Under newly enacted section 1172.6, the process begins
with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility
are met [citation], including that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019,’ the effective date of Senate Bill [No.] 1437.” (People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 708, fifth bracketed insertion in original.) After this filing, the trial court
that previously sentenced the petitioner determines whether an evidentiary hearing is
required and eventually proceeds through a resentencing procedure if appellant is
eligible. (Id. at pp. 708–709; see § 1172.6, subd. (b)(1) [noting the petition “shall be filed
with the court that sentenced the petitioner”].)
“ ‘A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise “claims involving the trial
court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices” if the
party did not object to the sentence at trial. [Citation.] The rule applies to “cases in
which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which
the court purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor,
misweighed the various factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number
of valid reasons .…” ’ ” (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 406.) “Strong policy
reasons support this rule: ‘It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on
appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily
corrected or avoided. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘ “The law casts upon the party the
duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s attention to any
infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be
careful to be silent as to his objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the
result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114, second bracketed insertion added.)
5.
The Trial Court Properly Sentenced Appellant Without Considering Section 1172.6
In various ways, appellant contends that the trial court could not sentence him
pursuant to his second degree murder conviction because section 1172.6 provides some
potential ameliorative relief to that sentence. In response, the People contend any
argument requesting relief under section 1172.6 has been forfeited, while acknowledging
that appellant is free to file a motion for resentencing to make these arguments now that
he has been sentenced.
Upon review of our orders on remittitur and the nature of our opinion, we
conclude that the trial court acted properly in its sentencing decision. Notably, in
appellant’s prior writ proceedings, this court was aware of the potential conflict between
relief in the form of reducing a first degree murder conviction to second degree murder
and the ameliorative changes underlying the resentencing statute. (See People v. Trujillo,
supra, F081571.) Despite that conflict, and in line with appellant’s request for relief, the
court ordered that appellant be resentenced as if convicted of second degree murder
because section 1172.6 remained a viable avenue for retroactive application of those
ameliorative changes after resentencing.
When this matter returned to the trial court on remand, the court asked appellant
how to proceed. In line with the arguments made in the prior appeal and appellant’s
counsel’s own reading of our remand instructions, appellant requested sentencing on a
conviction of second degree murder with the ability to then challenge that sentence under
section 1172.6. This was a correct reading of our instructions and of the underlying
reasoning of our opinion. Accordingly, not only did appellant’s counsel properly
understand and the trial court properly follow our instructions, but appellant’s counsel
affirmatively forfeited any argument that appellant could not be sentenced for
second degree murder prior to any application for relief under section 1172.6 being
considered.
6.
We note that appellant’s case presents a unique and complex situation given the
substantial changes in the law that have occurred both with respect to substantive aspects
of his case and the procedural mechanisms for enforcing those changes. We thus
conclude by specifically recognizing that the People have conceded appellant remains
eligible to petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, now that he has a sentence to
challenge, and that this court considers the ability to file such a petition to conform to the
relief ordered when this court denied appellant’s prior resentencing petition appeal as
moot.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
FRANSON, J.
PEÑA, J.
7.
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