CourtListener 10319749•Wicks Brewing Co. v. Boeldt CA4/1
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Filed 1/23/25 Wicks Brewing Co. v. Boeldt CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
WICKS BREWING CO., INC. et al., D083416
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v. (Super. Ct. No. CVRI2301765)
BRYAN J. BOELDT et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Eric A. Keen, Judge. Affirmed.
Worthington Law, Brian P. Worthington; Padilla Law Group, and
Michael D. Padilla, for Defendants and Appellants.
Law Office of Brian C. Unitt, Brian C. Unitt; Law Offices of
Brian C. Pearcy, and Brian C. Pearcy, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Bryan J. Boeldt and Nicole Boeldt (collectively, defendants) appeal the
trial court’s order denying their special motion to strike a complaint filed by
Edmund “Brad” Wicks (Brad) and Wicks Brewing Co., LLC (Wicks Brewing)
(collectively, plaintiffs) as a strategic lawsuit against public participation
(SLAPP). (See Code Civ. Proc.,1 § 425.16.) Defendants contend the court
erred in finding that plaintiffs’ claims do not arise from protected activity.
Defendants also assert that plaintiffs cannot show a probability of succeeding
on their claims.
We conclude that defendants failed to meet their burden of showing
plaintiffs’ claims arise from protected activity under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(3) or (e)(4), because the alleged activity had an insufficient
connection to an issue of public interest. Having concluded that defendants’
motion to strike falls short at the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we
need not reach the question of whether plaintiffs met their second-step
burden of establishing a probability of success on the merits of their claims.
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Accordingly, we affirm the denial of defendants’
motion to strike.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2022, Brad’s son, Ryan Wicks, was allegedly driving drunk
when he collided with Gary Boeldt’s car. Gary was killed in the crash, and
Ryan was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) and murder. Ryan
was employed as a brewmaster at Wicks Brewing at the time, but he was not
on-the-clock when the collision occurred.
Defendants are the decedent’s son and daughter. After the crash, they
learned that Ryan had two prior DUI arrests which had been expunged, and
one prior DUI conviction. “Enraged” that this appeared to be Ryan’s fourth
DUI, and believing that the community should be warned about him,
defendants searched the internet for more information about Ryan. They
found YouTube videos and online articles that led them to conclude that
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
Ryan was the owner or co-owner of Wicks Brewing. Other online articles
published shortly after the crash also described him as an owner of the
brewery. Ryan’s father Brad, however, had been the sole owner of the
brewery since its establishment in 2013, and Ryan never had an ownership
interest in Wicks Brewing.
Defendants allegedly posted on social media and other forums that
Ryan was the owner of Wicks Brewing, was a repeat DUI offender, and had
“killed” their father. Defendants’ posts also described the owner of Wicks
Brewing as a “killer” and “murderer.” Several social media users, some of
whom were defendants’ friends and family members, reposted or responded
to defendants’ posts by stating things like: “Life long ban on Wicks Brewery.
Murderer[]” and “Do not support this business. The owner has had 4 DUIs
and killed someone. I understand this place is for alcohol but they obviously
support drunk driving. Disgusting.” Defendants’ social media posts, and
direct messages defendants sent to accounts that followed the brewery on
social media, encouraged others to stop patronizing Wicks Brewing.
Defendants’ family members also posted reviews of Wicks Brewing saying,
among other things, that Ryan was the brewery’s owner or co-owner and that
he “killed” Gary.
The brewery closed in March 2023 about a year after the collision. In
April 2023, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint against defendants
alleging causes of action for defamation, false light, and negligence.
Plaintiffs alleged that in the several years leading up to the collision, Wicks
Brewing had an “excellent” reputation with a “loyal and enthusiastic
following.” But according to the complaint, defendants’ efforts to “defame and
harm both the business and reputations” of plaintiffs through their social and
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other media posts forced the brewery to close, causing at least $50 million in
damages.
Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that the allegations in
plaintiffs’ amended complaint fell into two categories of protected activity
described in section 425.16, subdivision (e). Specifically, defendants argued
that plaintiffs were suing them for their online posts, which constituted
statements made in a public forum in connection with an issue of public
interest under section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(3) and (e)(4). Defendants also
contended that plaintiffs could not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on
the merits.
After considering the parties’ briefs and holding a hearing, the trial
court denied defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. The court found that
defendants’ statements involved a personal controversy rather than an issue
of public interest. The court then concluded that because the first prong of
the anti-SLAPP statute was not met, there was no need to address the second
prong.
DISCUSSION
Defendants ask us to reverse the trial court’s order denying their anti-
SLAPP motion, arguing that the court erred in finding that plaintiffs’ claims
do not arise from protected activity under either section 425.16, subdivision
(e)(3) or (e)(4). We disagree.
A. Governing Law
The anti-SLAPP statute provides, in relevant part, that “[a] cause of
action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of
the person’s right of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a public
issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike [anti-SLAPP motion],
unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a
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probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd.
(b)(1).) Ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion typically involves two steps. First,
the defendant moving to strike a cause of action must show the act
underlying the claim falls within one of the four categories of protected
activity listed in section 425.16, subdivision (e). (Baral v. Schnitt (2016)
1 Cal.5th 376, 396 (Baral); Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 66 [“only means” by which a moving defendant can
satisfy section 425.16 requirements is “to demonstrate that the defendant’s
conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the
four categories described in subdivision (e) . . . .”]; Bowen v. Lin (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 155, 160 (Bowen).)
The first two categories in subdivision (e) pertain to statements or
writings made before, or in connection with, a “legislative, executive or
judicial body, or any other official proceeding . . . .” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1),
(2).) The third category involves statements or writings made in a public
place or forum, and the fourth category includes other conduct in furtherance
of free speech or the right to petition. (Id., subds. (e)(3), (4).) A public forum
is typically defined as a place that is open and accessible to the general public
“for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions. Means of communication where access is
selective . . . are not public forums.” (Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110
Cal.App.4th 1122, 1130 (Weinberg) [cleaned up]; see also Clark v. Burleigh
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 474, 482.)
Section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(3) and (e)(4), both require a specific
showing that the alleged speech or conduct was made in connection with an
issue of public interest. (Bernstein v. LaBeouf (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 15, 22
(Bernstein).) Determining whether speech or conduct was made “in
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connection with” an issue of public interest calls for a two-part analysis. (See
FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 149 (FilmOn);
Bernstein, at p. 23, fn. 5 [applying FilmOn’s two-part test to both subdivisions
(e)(3) and (e)(4) of section 425.16].) “First, we ask what public issue or issue
of public interest the speech in question implicates—a question we answer by
looking to the content of the speech. Second, we ask what functional
relationship exists between the speech and the public conversation about
some matter of public interest.” (FilmOn, at pp. 149–150 [cleaned up].)
FilmOn’s “first step is satisfied so long as the challenged speech or
conduct, considered in light of its context, may reasonably be understood to
implicate a public issue, even if it also implicates a private dispute.” (Geiser
v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1253 (Geiser).) In determining what
constitutes a public issue, courts consider various factors, including “whether
the subject of the speech or activity was a person or entity in the public eye or
could affect large numbers of people beyond the direct participants; and
whether the activity occurred in the context of an ongoing controversy,
dispute or discussion, or affected a community in a manner similar to that of
a governmental entity.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 145–146 [cleaned
up].)
FilmOn’s second inquiry requires us to determine whether a functional
relationship exists between the speech in question and the public
conversation about the issue of public interest. (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
pp. 149–150.) It is not sufficient that the speech merely “ ‘refer to a subject of
widespread public interest; the statement must in some manner itself
contribute to the public debate.’ ” (Id. at p. 150.) In conducting this inquiry,
we must again “consider the particular context of the speech, including the
speaker’s identity; the ‘purpose’ of the speech; the nature of the audience and
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the intended audience; and the ‘timing’ and ‘location’ of the communication.”
(Murray v. Tran (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 10, 30.)
If we determine that defendants have met both of FilmOn’s
requirements and have therefore satisfied the first prong of the anti-SLAPP
analysis, the burden shifts to plaintiffs to show that their causes of action are
legally sufficient and supported by evidence that, if credited, would sustain a
judgment in their favor. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384, 396; Bowen,
supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 160.) “Only a cause of action that satisfies both
prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or
petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being
stricken under the statute.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89,
italics omitted; accord, Bowen, at p. 160.) The trial court’s decision on both
prongs is subject to de novo review on appeal. (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 1250; Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 796; Starr v.
Ashbrook (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 999, 1018.)
B. Analysis
The parties do not dispute that defendants’ social media statements
were made in a public forum. (See Muddy Waters, LLC v. Superior Court
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 905, 917 [internet postings on websites that are open
and freely accessible to the public satisfy the public forum requirement of
section 425.16].) The parties disagree, however, about whether those
statements had a sufficient connection to an issue of public interest.
Defendants contend that their statements satisfied the first step in FilmOn
because they discussed the dangers of repeated drunk driving, an important
public issue. Defendants further argue their statements alerted customers to
Ryan’s drunk driving so that they could make an informed decision about
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whether to continue patronizing Wicks Brewing if doing so would “encourage
Ryan to believe that there are no real consequences to his actions.”
Deterring drunk driving and warning about its dangers undoubtedly
serve the public’s interests. (See Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321,
1336, 1337 [“[d]runk driving is not merely a crime, it is a serious public safety
problem”].) We recognize that the Supreme Court has broadly categorized
statements made in connection with an issue of public interest to include
those that “may reasonably be understood to implicate a public issue.”
(Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1253.) As the Supreme Court observed in
Geiser, FilmOn’s second step “usually plays the more prominent role in
screening anti-SLAPP motions because caselaw demonstrates that virtually
always, defendants succeed in drawing a line — however tenuous —
connecting their speech to an abstract issue of public interest.” (Geiser,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1250 [cleaned up].)
We are also mindful, however, that “[c]ourts have generally rejected
attempts to abstractly generalize an issue in order to bring it within the
scope of the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Talega Maintenance Corp. v. Standard
Pacific Corp. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 722, 733.) And as the Supreme Court
also noted in Geiser, the second step in FilmOn may overlap with the first
step because “[m]any of the same contextual considerations” apply to both
steps. (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1256; ibid. [“[I]t may be more efficient
to look to the whole context from which the conduct underlying the lawsuit
arises, rather than attempting to parse which considerations fall under which
of FilmOn’s two steps.”].)
Accordingly, even if we assume that defendants’ online statements
“may reasonably be understood to implicate a public issue” in the abstract,
we nevertheless conclude, based on considerations applicable under both
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FilmOn steps, that defendants’ posts about their private dispute with
plaintiffs did not implicate a public issue for anti-SLAPP purposes. (See
Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1253; FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 145–
146.)
First, defendants have not shown a sufficient connection between their
alleged postings and the asserted public interest in deterring drunk driving.
(See FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 140 [defendant’s statements were “too
tenuously tethered to the issues of public interest they implicate, and too
remotely connected to the public conversation about those issues, to merit
protection”]; Weinberg, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132 [“there should be
some degree of closeness between the challenged statements and the asserted
public interest” for anti-SLAPP protection to apply].) Defendants’ posts
described Ryan’s DUI record, said that his drunk driving caused Gary’s
death, and encouraged people to stop patronizing Wicks Brewing because of
Ryan’s connection to the business. Contrary to how defendants characterize
those statements, the posts themselves give no indication that their primary
purpose was to educate the public at large about the dangers of drunk driving
more broadly. The posts, for example, made no reference to educational
materials, resources, advocacy groups, or broader campaigns addressing
drunk driving. Rather, defendants’ statements focused on Ryan’s individual
drunk driving record—and the tragic results of his particular alleged
actions—in an apparent effort “to gather ammunition” for a boycott of Wicks
Brewing. (Woodhill Ventures, LLC v. Yang (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 624, 633
(Woodhill Ventures) [cleaned up]; see Commonwealth Energy Corp. v. Investor
Data Exchange, Inc. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 26, 34 [issue must “go beyond the
parochial particulars of the given parties[]” to qualify as a matter of public
interest].) By calling the owner of Wicks Brewing a “killer” and encouraging
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customers to stop patronizing the business because of its affiliation with
Ryan, defendants’ statements were “aimed to whip up a crowd” against Ryan.
(Woodhill Ventures, p. 632.) Even defendants’ opening brief states that the
posts were “designed to rally the community to send a message to Ryan[.]”
(Italics added.) And although Ryan himself could have been deterred from
driving drunk in the future, given the absence of evidence that the posts had
an impact on the wider community, there is only a tangential connection
between deterring Ryan and a broader deterrent effect on the general public.
Second, neither Ryan nor the parties to this case were in the public eye
to the extent courts have found significant in anti-SLAPP cases. (Cf. Hoang
v. Tran (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 513, 520, 527 (Hoang) [alleged speech
concerned a matter of public interest because it involved a “self-made
billionaire” who co-founded a $14.5 billion-corporation and was “in the public
eye” in the Vietnamese community]; Summit Bank v. Rogers (2012) 206
Cal.App.4th 669, 694 [comments disparaging a bank related to an issue of
public interest because the bank was a publicly traded company with
approximately 200 shareholders, and its chairperson was the subject of media
attention].) Beyond the fact that Wicks Brewing was a local brewery and
Brad was its owner, there is no evidence indicating that either plaintiffs or
defendants had unique standing in the community such that the public would
have “a legitimate interest” in their “doings, affairs or character.” (Hoang, at
p. 528 [cleaned up]; see Woodhill Ventures, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 634
[mere fact that a bakery had two locations in Los Angeles, and was
mentioned in national publications, did not mean the business was “in the
public eye”].) Nor is there evidence that either the collision or the dispute
between the parties generated “extensive media coverage.” (Dubac v. Itkoff
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 540, 549.)
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Third, for similar reasons, there is no evidence that defendants’
warnings about Ryan and Wicks Brewing could affect large numbers of
people or impact the community in a manner like that of a governmental
entity. (Cf. Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628,
650 [lawsuit involved issue of public interest because defendant Church of
Scientology was “a large, powerful organization” that impacted the lives of
many individuals]; see also Donovan v. Dan Murphy Foundation (2012) 204
Cal.App.4th 1500, 1506–1509 [“[T]he fact that the Foundation is one of the
largest charitable organizations in Southern California, subject to public
oversight by the Attorney General, and that it donates a substantial amount
of money every year to persons and entities that affect millions of Southern
Californians . . . [does not] transform a private disagreement among directors
of the Foundation into a public issue”].) As noted, there is no evidence that
Wicks Brewing, Brad, or Ryan had the prominence or stature to impact the
community beyond the brewery’s limited customer base. While the issue of
whether consumers patronized Wicks Brewing in light of Ryan’s DUI charges
was consequential to defendants’ own private interests, defendants have not
adequately explained how that issue impacted the broader community.
Lastly, defendants have put forth insufficient evidence that their posts
contributed to any public discourse concerning drunk driving. Defendants
only point to two instances where members of the public, outside of
defendants’ immediate family and friends, responded to or reposted
defendants’ statements. Even if more people had engaged with the posts, a
private dispute does not become a matter of public interest merely through
wide communication to the public. (Bernstein, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at
p. 24.) It is not sufficient that the speech merely “ ‘refer to a subject of
widespread public interest; the statement must in some manner itself
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contribute to the public debate.’ ” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150, italics
added, citing Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 898.) There is no
evidence, for example, that defendants’ posts about Ryan’s drunk driving
generated public meetings, petitions, letters, or other broader engagement
from the community. (See, e.g., Golden Eagle Land Investment, L.P. v.
Rancho Santa Fe Assn. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 399, 417 [record included
petitions signed by 130 residents, letters from neighboring HOAs opposing
the development at issue, and declaration that project generated significant
public interest, “including at public meetings”].) Without such evidence, we
cannot conclude that the statements had any “functional relationship” with a
public issue extending beyond defendants’ private dispute with plaintiffs.
(FilmOn, at pp. 149–150.)
Defendants argue that the $50 million in damages plaintiffs seek
demonstrate that the postings had significant public interest implications.
More specifically, defendants contend that the number of people who had
stopped patronizing Wicks Brewing to cause that amount of loss would have
had to be “staggeringly high.” But defendants provide no authority to
support the idea that the amount of a plaintiff’s requested relief determines
whether speech implicates an issue of public interest. Moreover, plaintiffs
alleged in their complaint that a significant portion of their requested
damages came from the cancellation of a large-scale distribution contract—a
decision which could have been made by only a few individuals sensitive to
bad publicity. While plaintiffs will eventually bear the burden of proving
causation and their entitlement to any amount of damages, at this stage in
the proceeding, we give little weight to the amount of requested relief in our
analysis of whether defendants’ statements constituted protected activity.
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For these reasons, we conclude that defendants have not met their
burden of showing their alleged statements had a sufficient connection to an
issue of public interest, and therefore the statements do not constitute
protected activity under section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(3) or (e)(4). We thus
need not, and do not, consider whether plaintiffs established a probability of
prevailing on its claims. (See City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69,
80–81; Turner v. Vista Pointe Ridge Homeowners Assn. (2009) 180
Cal.App.4th 676, 688.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying the anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. Plaintiffs shall
recover their costs on appeal.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
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