In re Greyson C. CA2/2

CourtListener 10318601Calctapp22 de jan. de 2025

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Filed 1/22/25 In re Greyson C. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re GREYSON C. et al., Persons B328509, B333670
Coming Under the Juvenile Court (Los Angeles County
Law. Super. Ct.
No. 23CCJP00546A-B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DARCY P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Brett Bianco, Judge. Affirmed.
Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Bryan Mercke, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******

Appellant Darcy P. (mother) appeals from two juvenile
court orders, the first asserting jurisdiction over her children
Greyson C. and C.C. and the other terminating jurisdiction.
Mother contends the jurisdictional findings are not supported by
substantial evidence, and therefore the orders are erroneous. We
disagree and affirm. Because mother raises no independent
challenge to the order terminating jurisdiction, we affirm that
order as well.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Initiation of dependency proceedings
Greyson, born June 2017, and C.C., born June 2021, are the
children of mother and E.C. (father).1 Greyson has significant
special needs requiring special education, as well as having
severe speech difficulties. Mother thought Greyson had autism
and attention deficit disorder.
In February 2023, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging
physical abuse of five-year-old Greyson. A teacher’s aide at
Greyson’s school observed bruising on his left cheek. Greyson said
mother had slapped him. Law enforcement observed “an

1 Father filed a notice of appeal in B328509, but withdrew it.
His appeal was dismissed on April 24, 2024. He is not a party to
this appeal.

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approximately 3-inch bruise/redness in diameter on nearly the
entirety of [Greyson’s] left cheek.”
When interviewed, Greyson explained mother had slapped
him multiple times in the face while driving him to school that
morning. He told officers this was not the first time mother had
slapped him in the face. Greyson reported being afraid of his
parents and did not want to go home. During the interviews
Greyson was hyperactive and difficult to manage, requiring
constant redirection.
When asked, mother denied hitting Greyson. Later, when
informed the children would be taken into protective custody,
both parents reported having “figured out” what happened,
saying Greyson had been scratched by the family dog.
Two days after the incident, Greyson was examined at a
medical clinic where “fading red parallel linear bruises with
areas central sparing consistent with a hand slap pattern” on
Greyson’s left cheek were observed by the examiner. At the clinic
Greyson stated, “mommy spanked my face.”
During the investigation a toxicology report for father
confirmed high levels of marijuana and alcohol. Father admitted
using marijuana multiple times daily in the “AM, afternoon and
the PM,” which includes when he is providing care for the
children. Father denied being a “stoner.”
Petition and jurisdiction hearing
A dependency petition under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j),2 alleging mother had
physically abused Greyson and father’s substance abuse placed
Greyson and C.C. at risk was filed.

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

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At the jurisdiction hearing on April 11, 2023, the court
found mother’s discipline to be inappropriate and amended the
petition to allege “inappropriate discipline” rather than physical
abuse. The court found it “not possible” that father’s explanation
of drinking one beer could account for his drug and alcohol test
results, which showed substantial use of marijuana and alcohol.
The juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction upon
finding mother had “inappropriately disciplined” Greyson and
father’s drug and alcohol use placed the children at risk,
particularly since he was the primary caretaker. The court
ordered the children to remain in both parents’ care under the
supervision of DCFS.
Subsequent events
The juvenile court thereafter received periodic reports from
DCFS documenting the family’s progress. Both parents were
attending parenting classes, and father had complied with
random drug and alcohol testing.
Following safety assessment indicating no threats to the
children’s safety and a risk assessment of moderate, DCFS
recommended terminating jurisdiction. At the October 2023
review hearing the juvenile court agreed and found the conditions
justifying dependency jurisdiction no longer existed. The court
ordered the case closed, the children released to the parents’
custody, and terminated jurisdiction.
Mother filed timely notices of appeal from both the
jurisdictional (B328509) and termination orders (B333670). This
opinion addresses both appeals.3

3 We grant DCFS’s request to incorporate by reference the
record in case No. B328509 into case No. B333670.

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DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law and standard of review
A juvenile court may assert dependency jurisdiction when
there is a substantial risk a child will suffer serious physical
harm or illness due to a parent’s conduct. (§ 300.) The statute is
designed to prevent harm before it occurs and actual injury need
not be proven. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) The court’s
role is to protect children from risks that are reasonably likely to
occur.
A. Standards for physical harm and inappropriate
discipline
Section 300, subdivision (a) authorizes jurisdiction when a
child has suffered, or there is substantial risk the child will
suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by the
parent. This allows a court to find substantial risk at times based
on the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted, a
history of repeated inflictions of injuries, or other actions
indicating risk of serious harm. (§ 300, subd. (a).)
Even in the absence of physical abuse, inappropriate
discipline can justify jurisdiction for excessive punishment. (In re
D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 641.) Whether discipline
crosses the line into abuse depends on if (1) the parent’s conduct
was genuinely disciplinary, (2) the discipline was warranted by
the circumstances, and (3) the amount of punishment was
reasonable or excessive. (Ibid.) The court is to consider factors
such as the child’s age and the extent of injury. (Gonzalez v.
Santa Clara County Dept. of Social Services (2014) 223
Cal.App.4th 72, 92.) The presence of lasting bruises may support
a finding a parent crossed the line between permissible discipline
and reportable abuse. (Ibid.)

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B. Standards for substance abuse
Under section 300, subdivision (b), jurisdiction may be
based on a parent’s inability to provide regular care to a child due
to substance abuse. The evidence must show (1) the parent
excessively uses drugs or alcohol, (2) rendering the parent unable
to provide regular care, and (3) results in substantial risk of
serious physical harm to the child. (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th
520, 540.) The mere use by a parent of drugs or alcohol alone is
insufficient to meet this standard. However, courts may draw an
inference of an inability to adequately provide care and create the
risk of harm from evidence relating to the substance abuse and
the age and needs of the subject children. (Id. at p. 559.)
C. Standard of review
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings to
determine if substantial evidence supports the order. This
requires us to examine the entire record to determine if
reasonable, credible evidence supports the findings. (In re I.C.
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892.) We do not reweigh evidence or
substitute our own judgment but view the record in the light
most favorable to the juvenile court’s determinations. (In re R.T.
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.)
II. Substantial evidence supports jurisdiction based on
mother’s inappropriate discipline
The juvenile court found mother’s discipline of Greyson to
be inappropriate and placed the children at substantial risk of
serious physical harm. Examining the record in consideration of
the relevant factors, we find substantial evidence exists to
support this finding.

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A. Evidence of inappropriate and excessive
discipline
The evidence showed mother slapped five-year-old Greyson
with enough force to leave visible bruising that prompted medical
experts, two days later, to find the bruising was consistent with a
hand slap pattern. Greyson made consistent comments to
multiple parties, including his teachers, law enforcement and
medical staff that his mother had slapped him. He also reported
his mother had previously slapped him. The physical evidence—
parallel linear bruising with central sparing characteristic of a
slap mark—corroborates his account.
B. Evidence of current risk
The factors that support the juvenile court’s finding of
current risk, include Greyson’s report that this was not the first
time mother had slapped him, suggesting a pattern of
impropriety rather than an isolated incident. Also, mother’s
response suggests a lack of insight into appropriate disciplinary
boundaries. When first confronted she denied hitting Greyson.
Later she claimed the child was scratched by the family dog. This
failure to recognize or even acknowledge the impropriety of her
actions indicates a likelihood she will repeat similar conduct
when faced with future behavioral challenges.
In addition, Greyson’s special needs and behavior issues
create an ongoing risk of him being subjected to inappropriate
discipline. The evidence showed he was hyperactive, difficult to
control, and required frequent redirection. His behavior
challenges and mother’s demonstrated inability to handle them
appropriately create a substantial likelihood she will again resort
to excessive physical discipline out of frustration.
Substantial evidence, therefore, supports the juvenile
court’s determination the requirements of jurisdiction were met.

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III. Substantial evidence supports jurisdiction based on
father’s substance abuse
The juvenile court concluded jurisdiction was also
warranted based on father’s substance abuse and its impact on
his ability to provide regular care for Greyson and C.C. Again
substantial evidence in the record supports this determination.
A. Evidence of excessive substance use
Father admitted daily marijuana use in the morning,
afternoon, and evening, including while he served as the
children’s primary caretaker. Father’s drug test showed high
levels of marijuana metabolites at 1,500 nanograms per milliliter.
He also tested positive for alcohol at 43 milligrams per deciliter, a
level the juvenile court found inconsistent with father’s claim of
consuming just one beer.
Nevertheless, father denied being a “stoner.” When
confronted with high levels of both marijuana and alcohol, father
offered an explanation the juvenile court reasonably dismissed as
“not possible.” Father’s continued substance use after DCFS
initially became involved suggests an inability or unwillingness
to modify this behavior despite its impact on his children.
B. Impact on care and evidence of current risk
While mother worked and attended school, father was the
parent responsible for supervising one-year-old C.C. and five-
year-old Greyson throughout the day, including during periods
when he admitted being under the influence of drugs, alcohol or
both. The evidence of the level and frequency of his substance use
clearly created a substantial risk his judgment, reaction time,
and ability to respond to the children’s needs would be impaired.
The children’s tender ages and Greyson’s special needs
required vigilant supervision. All young children depend on their
caregivers for constant oversight to prevent injury, respond to

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emergencies, and manage behavioral needs. A caregiver’s
judgment and reactions are critical. Father’s admission to using
marijuana throughout the day, including while responsible for
the children, created a substantial risk he would be unable to
provide the level of supervision and care these vulnerable
children required.
Evidence of specific harm is not required because the court
need not wait for actual injury before asserting jurisdiction and
providing protection. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
Here, father, as primary caregiver of these two young children
admitted to regular substance use that would undoubtedly
impair his ability to provide appropriate supervision and care.
Substantial evidence, therefore, supports the finding of
dependency jurisdiction.
IV. Substantial evidence supports jurisdiction over C.C.
based on sibling harm
Section 300, subdivision (j) permits dependency jurisdiction
over a child when their sibling has been abused or neglected and
there is substantial risk the child will suffer similar abuse. The
court must consider the circumstances of the sibling’s abuse, the
age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse, the
parent’s mental condition, and any other relevant factors in
determining risk to the child.
Here, C.C. was just one year old when mother struck
Greyson with enough force to leave visible bruising for days.
Mother’s response to Greyson’s challenging behaviors suggests
she lacked appropriate tools for the task of managing challenging
child behaviors.
C.C.’s very young age made him especially vulnerable. At
one year old, he required constant care and supervision. Mother’s
demonstrated inability to handle Greyson’s behavioral challenges

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appropriately provided substantial evidence C.C. was at
substantial risk of suffering similar abuse, and therefore
warranting dependency jurisdiction.
V. Limited remand is appropriate to correct the
petition
Mother requests the case be remanded for the limited
purpose of correcting an error in the interlineated petition.
Courts have the inherent power to correct clerical errors in their
records in order that records reflect the true facts. (In re
Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705.) This allows appellate courts
that properly assume or retain jurisdiction of a case to correct
clerical errors. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)
At the jurisdiction hearing, the court concluded the case
was one of “inappropriate discipline” and ordered the terms
“physically abused” and “physical abuse” be replaced with
“inappropriately disciplined” and “inappropriate discipline.”
When the petition was interlineated, however, three statements
of “physical abuse” were missed.4 As DCFS agrees to a remand
for this limited purpose, the matter is remanded to allow this
clerical error to be corrected.
VI. No error is shown in the termination of jurisdiction
Mother also appeals from the juvenile court’s October 12,
2023 order terminating dependency jurisdiction. She contends if
we reverse the jurisdictional findings in B328509, we must also
reverse all subsequent orders, including the termination order
that is the subject of appeal B333670. There is no other assertion
of error, and we find no error. We therefore affirm the

4 They are found in the second sentence of counts a-1, b-1,
and j-1, i.e., “Such physical abuse was excessive and caused the
child unreasonable pain and suffering.”

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jurisdictional findings and the termination order in the related
appeal.

DISPOSITION
The juvenile court orders are affirmed, including the
jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders and the order
terminating jurisdiction.
The matter is remanded for the limited purpose of
correcting an error in the record by replacing the words “physical
abuse” with “inappropriate discipline” in the second sentence of
counts a-1, b-1, and j-1, in the interlineated petition.

________________________
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:

________________________
LUI, P. J.

________________________
RICHARDSON, J.

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