CourtListener 10318599•People v. Gowolo CA4/1
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Filed 1/22/25 P. v. Gowolo CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082490
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD288656)
MARTIN GUMALADO GOWOLO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Theodore M. Weathers, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers, Amanda Lloyd, and Alana Cohen Butler, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Martin Gumalado Gowolo of driving under the
influence of alcohol causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 1),
driving with a measurable blood alcohol level of 0.08 or greater causing
injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b); count 2), hit and run with injury (Veh.
Code, § 20001, subd. (a); count 3), hit and run (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a);
counts 4 and 5), driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.2,
subd. (a); count 6), driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152,
subd. (a); count 7), and driving with a measurable blood alcohol level of 0.08
or greater (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b); count 8). The jury additionally
found that Gowolo personally inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code1,
§§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) and drove with a blood alcohol level
of 0.15 or greater (Veh. Code, § 23578) during the commission of
counts 1 and 2.
The trial court found that Gowolo had a serious felony prior conviction
(§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)), and two strike priors (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, 668). In July 2023, the court sentenced Gowolo to
14 years in state prison.
On appeal, Gowolo contends the court abused its discretion in denying
his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which sought to vacate the prior
convictions from 2009 that led to the strike priors. He also argues the court
abused its discretion in failing to consider a presumptive low-term sentence
based on his alleged childhood trauma and mental illness. We disagree and
affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I.
2009 Guilty Plea and Sentencing
On May 5, 2009, Gowolo drank heavily and then tried to stab his wife
with a kitchen knife. He continued to drink the next day and told his wife he
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
2
was going to kill her and then kill himself. He doused her with lighter fluid
but was restrained by two of his sons before he could light her on fire.
Gowolo eventually decided to plead guilty to multiple charges and the
court questioned him as follows:
“Q. Your conviction in this case will be considered to
be a serious felony, in other words, a strike, which
means it will result in a mandatory denial of probation
and substantially increase penalties in any future felony
case.
“Do you understand that?
“A. Yes.
“[Counsel:] And, your honor, he is pleading to two
strikes.
“By the Court:
“Q. That would be considered to be two strikes with
this plea. Do you understand that?
“A. I didn’t get that. What does that mean?
“The Court: Let you talk to your attorney for a moment.
(Brief pause in proceedings)
“The Defendant: Oh, okay.
“By the Court:
“Q. Do you understand that means if you have
another felony conviction, you would face 25 years to life
in prison?
“A. Okay. Yes.”
The court then found Gowolo had made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of his constitutional rights and accepted the plea. It later sentenced
him to four years and eight months in prison.
3
II.
Motion Hearing
In 2020, Gowolo faced new charges related to two instances of drinking
and driving. Prior to trial, he filed a combined motion to strike his prior
strikes pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497,
and motion to vacate his prior convictions (via a writ of error coram nobis).
Therein counsel asserted that during the 2009 case when Gowolo pleaded
guilty to two strikes, he did not understand how strikes worked. Counsel
explained that Gowolo is a refugee from what is now known as South Sudan
and that Gowolo did not have a Bari interpreter to assist him during the 2009
change of plea hearing.
The court denied both motions, and the case proceeded to trial.
III.
Trial
A. Prosecution Evidence
On September 4, 2020, a San Diego Police officer saw Gowolo’s vehicle
swerving on the I-15 freeway and pulled him over after he nearly hit median
barriers while merging onto the I-8 freeway. Gowolo failed a horizontal
nystagmus evaluation and field sobriety tests. He submitted to a preliminary
alcohol screening (PAS) breath test that showed his blood alcohol
concentration (BAC) at 0.17 percent and was arrested. Two subsequent
Intoxilyzer breath tests performed approximately four minutes apart showed
BAC readings of 0.151 percent.
On January 1, 2021, Gowolo was driving down a San Diego city street.
He hit two parked cars and then swerved out and sideswiped the driver’s size
of Marissa S.’s vehicle, which was traveling in the opposite direction.
Marissa pulled over, but Gowolo did not stop. Daniel W. got out of the back
4
seat of Marissa’s car and ran after him. Daniel saw Gowolo strike another
vehicle before colliding with a blue sedan, which then spun out in the
intersection. Gowolo continued driving until his front, driver’s side wheel fell
off, causing his vehicle to stop.
Daniel, who had continued chasing him, found Gowolo revving his
engine in his car, even though it was disabled, and the airbags had deployed.
Other observers called the police, and Daniel and a nearby resident held
Gowolo’s door closed until the police arrived because they were afraid he
would flee the scene.
O.V. was the driver of the blue sedan Gowolo hit. His airbags deployed
and broke both of his arms. He heard a paramedic refer to them as
“spaghetti arms.”
A responding officer testified that Gowolo smelled faintly of an alcoholic
beverage and sat with his face in his hands repeating, “I’m done. I’m done.”
Gowolo agreed to a PAS, and his BAC registered at 0.25. The officer arrested
Gowolo. At the station, Gowolo registered a 0.226 and 0.238 on Intoxilyzer
breath tests.
A police officer who inspected Gowolo’s vehicle discovered a cooler in
the front passenger seat area with an unopened bottle of brandy and two cans
of strawberry margarita. The open trunk area contained an empty can of the
strawberry margarita drink, an empty bottle of brandy, and another alcohol
container.
A DMV employee testified that Gowolo’s driver’s license had been
revoked since 2018 and that Gowolo was aware of that fact.
B. Defense Evidence
Gowolo testified with the assistance of a Bari interpreter as the sole
defense witness. He said that on the evening of the September 2020 incident,
5
he was returning home after dropping off a friend. He thought he was
driving well before the police officer stopped him. Although he told the officer
he had not been drinking, he admitted he had taken a narcotic pain
medication for issues with his right hand and left leg. He did not know how
he did on the field sobriety tests, although he did explain to the officer that
he had issues with his leg.
On January 1, 2021, Gowolo went to his friend’s house where his friend
gave him a birthday gift of alcohol and $20 to buy more alcohol. They drank
together, and then he bought the additional items that were found in the car.
As he was driving home, he said his car started to make a strange sound and
his brakes and steering were not working. The car went left and right and,
after nearly hitting a truck, he found a place to park.
Gowolo said people were running after his car telling him to stop. After
his car stopped, the airbags went off. He said he tried to get out because the
airbag was hot and he thought the car was going to explode, but the people
closed his door and would not let him out. Eventually he got out through the
passenger door and then sat on the sidewalk until the police arrived.
He told an officer he did not know what happened but, “[j]ust seeing
this, that means my life is done.” He said this because he had heard the
“boom sound” as he hit cars in the road and did not know how many cars he
had hit. According to Gowolo, he had only had one shot of brandy and a
strawberry margarita, but he later admitted he was drunk.
IV.
Alleged Childhood Trauma and Mental Illness
Gowolo never mentioned childhood trauma due to war, but his defense
counsel claimed in briefing and argument for the pretrial motions and at
sentencing that Gowolo experienced such trauma. He argued that because
6
Gowolo “was born into the middle of the First Sudanese Civil War,” he “no
doubt . . . suffered ghastly childhood trauma as a result.” He also cited to
statements Gowolo had made regarding his family life, although Gowolo’s
reports to two different probation officers conflicted as to whether he was in
fact emotionally abused by an uncle or uncles who raised him after his
mother died.
Counsel further claimed “Gowolo is haunted by past trauma and drinks
to cope with that trauma.” On appeal, Gowolo asserts that this alcoholism is
recognized as a mental illness and can also be a form of contributing
psychological trauma.
DISCUSSION
I.
Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis
Gowolo contends the court abused its discretion in denying his petition
for writ of error coram nobis. Specifically, he insists that the court’s reliance
on his apparent ability to understand English in 2022 was irrelevant to
whether he required an interpreter in 2009 when he pleaded guilty to the
prior strike convictions.
Although they acknowledge the reasoning behind the court’s denial
could have been better stated, the People argue the court did not abuse its
discretion. We agree.
A. Additional Facts
In the petition for writ of error coram nobis, counsel asserted that
Gowolo had written to the court in October 2009 and specifically claimed that
he did not understand the meaning of his convictions based on a language
7
barrier,2 but that no inquiry into his ability to understand had been made.
Given that Gowolo required an interpreter for the 2022 hearing, counsel
argued it was logical to infer he also required one in 2009.3 Counsel,
therefore, requested that the court find that Gowolo’s plea was not knowing
and voluntary.
In its opposition brief, the prosecution highlighted that Gowolo
appeared to understand and speak English during the May 2009 hearing and
the sentencing hearing and that he had not requested an interpreter at either
or raised concerns about his counsel or plea. The prosecution also provided
the probation officer’s report, reflecting statements Gowolo had made in
English, as well as evidence of the language proficiency requirements for his
employment. Gowolo had told the probation officer he did not have an
opportunity to explain his side of the story or to read the plea agreement, he
was pressured into pleading guilty, and his attorney did not explain the
consequences of pleading guilty. However, the prosecution pointed out that
there is no mention in the report of Gowolo having difficulty understanding
the probation officer or requesting an interpreter.
2 With someone else’s help in writing the letter, Gowolo explained that
only when he saw his “counselor” was he “made fully aware of [his] sentence.”
He wrote that he knew he had pleaded guilty, but that he thought he would
be sentenced to four years and 80 days, not four years and eight months. He
felt his defense attorney “knew I did not ‘completely’ understand him” and
said he “pleaded guilty without understanding the consequences.”
3 We note that the interpreter did not provide simultaneous translation
during the 2022 hearing. Rather, as his attorney explained at the beginning
of the subsequent trial, having the interpreter present during the hearing
was “useful” because it helped “when there [were] discussions about legal
issues, strike priors, that kind of thing. So he kind of interprets. Mr. Gowolo
will ask him questions.”
8
The prosecution went on to argue that a writ of corum nobis was not
appropriate because it could not be used to correct an error of law, and
Gowolo had asserted a violation of his right to an interpreter under the
California Constitution. If anything, the prosecution viewed the proper
remedy as habeas corpus. Should the court disagree, the prosecution
asserted that Gowolo had not met the factors required for granting a writ set
forth in People v. Shipman (1965) 62 Cal.2d 226 (Shipman). As to the
Romero motion, the prosecution argued it was premature.
The original prosecutor, probation officer, and defense attorney all
presented testimony at the November 2022 evidentiary hearing before a
different judge than the one who ultimately presided over Gowolo’s trial.
Gowolo testified that he was not instructed in English while living in Sudan
and did not learn English until he attended a school in San Diego for four
months in 2002. He claimed he asked the public defender for an interpreter
and that the only thing he understood from the attorney’s explanation of the
plea form was that if he did not sign where the attorney indicated, he would
go to jail for 17 years. According to Gowolo, he only heard about strikes after
he was released when his probation officer described them. He could not,
however, explain the significance of a strike during the hearing or how much
time he was facing in the current case.
On cross-examination, Gowolo admitted he had been arrested twice
before the 2009 incident and had signed at least one guilty plea for driving
under the influence. He acknowledged having learned how to say, “I don’t
speak English” but said he did not tell the judge in 2009 that he did not
9
speak English because he thought “the dependent” would do so.4 Although
he told the probation officer he felt forced into taking the plea, he did not tell
that to his attorney or the judge at the sentencing hearing.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the motion to strike
the prior convictions. The court observed that Gowolo had not used the
interpreter during the hearing and, thus, said it was not persuaded that he
needed an interpreter.
B. Legal Principles
“The writ of error coram nobis is a nonstatutory, common law remedy
whose origins trace back to an era in England in which appeals and new trial
motions were unknown.” (People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1091 (Kim).)
“The grounds on which a litigant may obtain relief via a writ of error coram
nobis are narrower than on habeas corpus [citation]; the writ’s purpose ‘is to
secure relief, where no other remedy exists, from a judgment rendered while
there existed some fact which would have prevented its rendition if the trial
court had known it and which, through no negligence or fault of the
defendant, was not then known to the court.’ ” (Ibid.)
“The writ of coram nobis is granted only when three requirements are
met. (1) Petitioner must ‘show that some fact existed which, without any
fault or negligence on his part, was not presented to the court at the trial on
the merits, and which if presented would have prevented the rendition of the
judgment.’ [Citations.] (2) Petitioner must also show that the ‘newly
discovered evidence [does not go] to the merits of issues tried; issues of fact,
once adjudicated, even though incorrectly, cannot be reopened except on
motion for new trial.’ [Citations.] This second requirement applies even
4 Read in context, it appears the interpreter who explained this comment
meant to refer to Gowolo’s attorney when he said, “the dependent.”
10
though the evidence in question is not discovered until after the time for
moving for a new trial has elapsed or the motion has been denied.
[Citations.] (3) Petitioner ‘must show that the facts upon which he relies
were not known to him and could not in the exercise of due diligence have
been discovered by him at any time substantially earlier than the time of his
motion for the writ . . . .’ ” (Shipman, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 230; Kim, supra,
45 Cal.4th at p. 1093 [confirming that the Shipman factors “continue to
outline the modern limits of the writ”].)
As the Shipman factors illustrate, the remedy is quite narrow. It is not
a vehicle for correcting errors of law. (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510,
522 (Vivar).) Moreover, although the allegedly new fact must have been
unknown, it also must have existed at the time of the judgment. (Kim, supra,
45 Cal.4th at p. 1093.) “Finally, the writ of error coram nobis is unavailable
when a litigant has some other remedy at law.” (Ibid.)
We review the denial of a petition for writ of error coram nobis for
abuse of discretion. (Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1095.)
C. Analysis
The People acknowledge that the court’s reasoning—that the fact that
Gowolo did not use his interpreter during the 2022 hearing demonstrated
that he did not previously need an interpreter—may not have been a proper
basis upon which to deny the petition. We agree. However, “ ‘ “[n]o rule of
decision is better or more firmly established by authority, nor one resting
upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision,
itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for
a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it
must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved
the trial court to its conclusion.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Zapien (1993)
11
4 Cal.4th 929, 976.) Here, the People point out that the crux of Gowolo’s
claim was that he had a right to an interpreter so he could enter a knowing
and intelligent plea, which raised an issue of law, not one of fact. Because a
court cannot grant coram nobis relief for errors of law (Vivar, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 522), the People contend the court correctly denied the
petition.
It is true that, to the extent Gowolo argued the unknown facts were
that the court was required under Article I, Section 14 of the California
Constitution to provide him with an interpreter or that his plea was not
knowing and voluntary under federal law because he was not provided an
interpreter to help him understand, these facts raise issues of law not curable
via coram nobis relief. (See Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 522.) However,
even if we reframe them as issues of fact, Gowolo still does not prevail.
In essence, the purportedly unknown facts were that Gowolo did not
know he had the right to make clear to the court that he was not sufficiently
understanding the proceedings, even when his attorney did not do so, or that
the relevant information had to be told to him in a language and a way he
understood. Gowolo argues coram nobis relief is an appropriate remedy in
such circumstances. He maintains that the cases in which a petition for writ
of error coram nobis was granted support his position because they all
involved parties lacking some fundamental competency or capacity to fully
participate in court proceedings and/or whose full participation in court
proceedings had been hindered by the acts of others in the system. He refers
the court to the following list of examples cited in Kim:
“ ‘Where the defendant was insane at the time of trial and
this fact was unknown to court and counsel [citations].
Where defendant was an infant and appeared by attorney
without the appointment of a guardian or guardian ad
litem [citations]. Where the defendant was a feme covert
12
and her husband was not joined [citation]. Where the
defendant was a slave and was tried and sentenced as a
free man [citation]. Where the defendant was dead at the
time judgment was rendered [citations]. Where default
was entered against a defendant who had not been served
with summons and who had no notice of the proceeding
[citations]. Where counsel inadvertently entered an
unauthorized appearance in behalf of a defendant who had
not been served with process [citation]. Where a plea of
guilty was procured by extrinsic fraud [citation]. Where a
plea of guilty was extorted through fear of mob violence
[citations]. Where defendants and their counsel were
induced by false representations to remain away from the
trial under circumstances amounting to extrinsic fraud
[citation]. Where by the failure of the clerk to properly file
an answer the party was deprived of his defense
[citation].’ ”
(Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1094, fn. omitted.) In Gowolo’s view, someone
who does not speak the court’s language and who is not provided an
interpreter fits into this rubric.
The shortcoming of this argument is that the alleged facts must have
“ ‘prevented the rendition of the judgment.’ ” (Shipman, supra, 62 Cal.2d at
p. 230.) Under applicable criminal law at the time the cited cases were
heard, a court could not legally enter a judgment against, to cite a few
examples, someone deemed legally insane, a child without a guardian, or a
deceased person. In other words, these facts went to “the legal competence of
witnesses or litigants, or the jurisdiction of the court.” (Kim, supra,
45 Cal.4th at p. 1103.) Knowledge of these critical facts would have actually
barred the court from rendering judgment.
Here, again, the purportedly unknown facts were that Gowolo did not
know he had the right to tell the court that he was not sufficiently
13
understanding the proceedings and that the court had to explain the relevant
information to him in a language and a manner he understood.5 However,
had these facts been known and had Gowolo received the assistance of a Bari
interpreter, his decision upon receiving a full understanding of the plea
bargain being offered would have been to either agree to the plea deal or go to
trial. Should he have opted for a trial, he would then have received the
assistance of an interpreter and been subject to whatever judgment the jury
or court rendered. In other words, in neither scenario would discovery of the
previously unknown fact of his language barrier have prevented rendition of a
judgment.
In Kim, the defendant had lived in this country legally for decades but
had never become a citizen. (Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1084.) Following
multiple criminal convictions, the federal government sought to deport him.
(Ibid.) Kim petitioned for a writ of error coram nobis, seeking to vacate the
state felony convictions that triggered his federal removal proceedings.
(Ibid.) Our high court determined that Kim was not entitled to writ relief for
procedural reasons and on the merits. (Id. at p. 1096.)
On the merits, the Supreme Court explained that the defendant’s
“allegations that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been armed with
these additional facts,[6] or that counsel would have been successful in
5 As Gowolo’s own letter and his defense attorney’s later statements
made clear, Gowolo understood that he was pleading guilty. He just did not
understand the legal significance of pleading to two strikes.
6 Kim had claimed he was not aware when he entered a plea to petty
theft with a prior that it would subject him to deportation. (Kim, supra,
45 Cal.4th at p. 1096.) He also said he did not know at the time of the plea
that “’ if deported, he would almost certainly face religious persecution.’ ”
(Ibid.)
14
arranging a plea to a nondeportable offense had these facts been known,
fundamentally misapprehends the pertinent inquiry.” (Kim, supra, 45
Cal.4th at pp. 1102–1103.) The court made clear that “[n]ew facts that would
merely have affected the willingness of a litigant to enter a plea, or would
have encouraged or convinced him or her to make different strategic choices
or seek a different disposition, are not facts that would have prevented
rendition of the judgment.” (Id. at p. 1103.) These are exactly the sort of
facts Gowolo presents here. Having the benefit of an interpreter to help him
ensure he understood the concept and ramifications of strikes may have
affected his willingness to enter the plea or induced him to make different
strategic choices, but it would not have altered his legal competence to stand
trial or to have a judgment entered against him. His argument fails as a
matter of law.
Accordingly, we conclude Gowolo was not eligible for writ relief and,
thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition.
II.
Sentencing
Gowolo next asserts that the court abused its discretion at sentencing
by failing to consider a presumptive low-term sentence due to his childhood
trauma and mental illness. Alternatively, he argues that even if the court
considered the low term, it abused its discretion by not imposing the low
term. The People respond that Gowolo forfeited this argument by failing to
raise any issues below regarding the scope of the court’s discretion. We
agree.
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), upon which Gowolo seeks to rely,
became effective on January 1, 2022. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).) Gowolo was
sentenced a year and a half later on July 19, 2023. Thus, we presume the
15
court and counsel were well-aware of this change to the law. (See People v.
Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 [the general rule is “ ‘that a trial court is
presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.
[Citations.]’ ”]; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 (Scott) [“counsel is
charged with understanding, advocating, and clarifying permissible
sentencing choices at the hearing”].) Gowolo could have argued for a low-
term sentence under this provision based on his allegations of trauma and
mental illness or objected to the sentence imposed. He did not, and therefore,
he has forfeited any claim to relief pursuant to section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6)(A). (See People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 778
[finding forfeiture where the defendant “did not seek the lower term based on
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6); object to the imposition of the middle term; or
argue that defendant suffered any psychological trauma as a result of mental
illness”]; see also Scott, at p. 353 [the forfeiture rule applies “to claims
involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its
discretionary sentencing choices”].)
Gowolo contends counsel preserved his claim by discussing his alleged
trauma, suggesting that minimal jail time with a treatment program would
be most appropriate, and arguing for imposition of a sentence of only eight or
nine years. Although admittedly imprecise, he argues this request would
most realistically be achieved with a low-term sentence. However, the
purpose of the forfeiture doctrine is to encourage parties to call routine
defects in the court’s statement of reasons to the court’s attention so that
they may be easily corrected. (See Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353.) The
information Gowolo cites did nothing to bring the alleged errors to the court’s
attention in a timely manner. In other words, his statements did not alert
the court that if it accepted Gowolo’s allegations of trauma and mental
16
illness, it was required to consider the low-term and had erred by seemingly
not doing so.
Gowolo also reasons that we should exercise our discretion to address
his claims on the merits because his entitlement to relief turns on two
California Supreme Court cases that were decided after he was sentenced.
Specifically, he argues that People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal. 5th 416, 427
(Salazar) held that section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) established a
“presumption” in favor of a low-term sentence. He further submits that
People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, construed the related provisions in
section 1385, subdivision (c) and explained how courts should go about
finding the presumptively lenient sentencing outcome overcome. In his view,
because the court lacked this binding guidance, remand is required.
We disagree. Salazar did not alter the plain reading of section 1170,
which already require that “the court shall order imposition of the lower term
if . . . [¶] [t]he person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual
violence” (italics added) unless aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances such that “imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).) In Salazar, the
prior version of section 1170 was in effect at the time of Salazar’s sentencing
(Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 423), whereas here the new statutory
language had been the law for over a year before Gowolo’s sentencing. As
such, the presumption was apparent from the statutory language itself.
Gowolo’s reliance on Walker to overcome the forfeiture is equally
unpersuasive as his argument presupposes that he had established he was
entitled to a presumptively lenient sentence, which is not clear in this case.
He argues the Walker court interpreted the phrase “contrary to the interests
17
of justice” in a “defendant-friendly” way and that the same phrase in
section 1170 should be similarly interpreted. However, the Salazar court did
not set standards for determining whether the defendant suffered a
“qualifying trauma” under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) because the
Attorney General in that case conceded that Salazar suffered a qualifying
trauma. (Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 426, fn. 5.) That does not appear to
be the case here. And, although Gowolo’s attorney presumed Gowolo
experienced trauma in Sudan, he offered few facts in support of his assertion
and there is no evidence in the record that the court made a finding on this
issue. Thus, Gowolo cannot overcome his failure to raise the issue by saying
the court did not have the benefit of a case he has not demonstrated the court
would have been required to consider.
Accordingly, we conclude Gowolo forfeited his sentencing challenge.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
I CONCUR:
KELETY, J.
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
BUCHANAN, J.
18
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