People v. Hackworth CA4/3

CourtListener 10318162Calctapp21 de jan. de 2025

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 1/21/25 P. v. Hackworth CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062513

v. (Super. Ct. No. 21CF2954)

JETHRO JAMES HACKWORTH, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Robert A. Knox, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Michelle T. LiVecchi-Raufi, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Donald
W. Ostertag and Robin Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Jethro James Hackworth appeals his
conviction for one count of assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245,
subd. (a)(1); all undesignated statutory references are to this code.) He argues
the trial court erred by revoking his right of self-representation under the
Sixth Amendment and Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 807
(Faretta). He also contends the trial court erred by denying his request to
reduce the offense to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b).
We conclude the trial court violated Hackworth’s Sixth Amendment right of
self-representation. As the error is reversible per se, we reverse the
judgment, and we need not address the second issue raised on appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
One morning, a resident of an apartment complex was walking
from the complex to the parking lot. Suddenly, he felt something pass his
right arm so fast he “could feel the wind” from it and heard a swooshing
noise. He looked down and saw an arrow sticking out of the ground. He asked
a landscaper standing nearby what had happened. The landscaper pointed to
the balcony above the resident’s apartment, and the resident saw Hackworth
standing there. The resident asked Hackworth, “‘What was that?’”
Hackworth grabbed a bow and arrow, drew the bow back, and said, “‘Quit
fucking with me.’” The resident ran back inside his home and called the
police.
The Orange County District Attorney charged Hackworth with
one count of assault with a deadly weapon. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) At his
arraignment in early January 2022 before Judge Cynthia M. Herrera,
Hackworth asked to represent himself and filed a Faretta waiver form.
The first page of the Faretta waiver form provided the following
advisements: “You have stated to the court that you do not wish to be

2
represented by an attorney even though one would be provided to you at no
expense if you cannot afford one and that you wish to represent yourself. In
making this decision to be your own attorney have you considered: [¶] 1. It is
almost always unwise to represent yourself and in so doing you may conduct
a defense which may aid the prosecutor in convicting you of the charge(s)?
[¶] . . . [¶] 2. You are not entitled to any special privileges or treatment from
the judge. The judge will require you to follow all the technical rules of law[,]
procedure[,] and evidence in the defense of your case and in the presentation
of your defense. The judge will not aid you in your efforts to defend yourself.
[¶] . . . [¶] 3. The prosecutor will be an experienced professional attorney who
will not treat you leniently or in any special way even though you do not have
the same skills or experience the prosecutor has. It will not likely be a fair
contest since the prosecutor will have an advantage by reason of their skill
and experience. [¶] . . . [¶] 4. If you are in custody you will receive no more
library privileges than those available to other persons representing
themselves. You will receive no extra time for preparation. You will have no
staff or investigators at your beck and call. [¶] . . . [¶] 5. If you elect to
represent yourself you will not be successful in any appeal based upon the
quality of your representation. In other words an allegation that you were
denied effective assistance of counsel[—]that is[,] you were incompetent as a
trial attorney[—]will not result in a new trial with competent counsel.
[¶] . . . [¶] 6. If you change your mind during the trial you may not be
permitted to obtain a postponement of the case while you obtain an attorney.
[¶] . . . [¶] 7. Your right to represent yourself may be ended, an attorney
appointed for you, and you may be excluded from the courtroom if you
misbehave during this case or seriously disrupt the trial.”

3
On the form, next to each advisement, Hackworth marked the
“[n]o” box, denoting he did not consider the advisements. He also circled the
“[y]es” box and initialed the circle, indicating he did consider the
advisements.
On the second page of the Faretta waiver form, Hackworth
indicated: he had not represented himself before in a jury trial, he was
charged with assault with a dangerous weapon and considered possible
defenses, he was unaware of the maximum penalty if he were convicted, he
had five years of a college education, he spoke English as his first language,
he had been treated for anxiety and depression, he had no difficulty reading
or understanding the form, he thought the waiver form was “simple,” and he
wished to represent himself because he was “telling the truth.” In response to
the final question, “Do you now wish the court to permit you to represent
yourself as your own attorney?” he marked the “[n]o” box.
According to the trial court’s minutes, the trial court reviewed the
Faretta waiver form with Hackworth, informed him of the maximum possible
sentence, and advised Hackworth of his rights, including the right of self-
representation. Hackworth acknowledged he understood his rights. The trial
court found Hackworth understood his rights as explained and the nature of
the charge. The trial court proceeded with the arraignment and Hackworth,
representing himself, pleaded not guilty and was released on bail.
In mid-January 2022, Hackworth represented himself at a
pretrial hearing before Judge Larry Yellin. A few days later, at a preliminary
hearing before Judge Jeannie Joseph, Hackworth represented himself and
stated he was not ready to proceed. The trial court continued the preliminary
hearing. At the scheduled preliminary hearing in March 2022, Hackworth
failed to appear, and Judge Herrera issued a bench warrant for his arrest.

4
In November 2022, the Orange County Sheriff’s Department
executed the warrant. Hackworth represented himself at a hearing before
Commissioner Michele Bell. The trial court recalled the warrant, spoke to
Hackworth regarding self-representation, and permitted him to continue
representing himself.
On December 9, 2022, Judge Larry Yellin held a preliminary
hearing. While Hackworth stated he was ready, the prosecution said it was
not. The trial court trailed the hearing to December 12, 2022. At the start of
the hearing that day, Judge Yellin revoked Hackworth’s Faretta waiver and
appointed him a public defender. Judge Yellin and Hackworth had the
following exchange:
“The court: [¶] . . . [¶] Mr. Hackworth, we had a discussion last
Friday when the [prosecution] needed to trail your case, and it gave me a lot
of concern about your ability to represent yourself. You were focused on a lot
of issues that I don’t think were related to the case, I’m not sure are legally
accurate, and as such, I went back and looked at your original Faretta
waiver. And that actually adds additional concerns for me to allow you to
proceed . . . representing yourself. [¶] So I’m going to appoint the public
defender at this time to represent you; okay?
“The defendant: No, that’s not okay.
“The court: Okay. Well --
“The defendant: No.
“The court: Okay. But it is --
“The defendant: I’m not going to let them represent me.
“The court: Okay.
“The defendant: I don’t want him on my case. Or she. [¶] . . . [¶]
“The court: I just did.

5
“The defendant: No.
“The court: See, that’s the problem. I’m the judge and we’re not
going to argue about this. And that’s one reason why you can’t represent
yourself because you’re talking -- wait. I’m talking. Court reporter needs to
take this down. [¶] It’s for your own protection as well; okay?
“The defendant: No, it’s not.
“The court: No, it’s not?
“The defendant: No. I don’t want to be part of this circus. I’m
tired of this American bullshit. You understand?
“The court: Go ahead.
“The defendant: Did you hear me?
“The court: Yeah. [¶] . . . [¶]
“The defendant: So there’s no reason for a representative for me.
I’m fine. I can represent myself.
“The court: No, you can’t.
“The defendant: Yes, I can.
“The court: Okay. We’ll take a recess.” (Italics added.)
When the hearing resumed, a public defender represented
Hackworth.
In February 2023, a jury found Hackworth guilty as charged.
Hackworth moved to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor under section 17,
subdivision (b). Judge Robert A. Knox denied the motion. Judge Knox
suspended the imposition of sentence, placed Hackworth on formal probation
for two years, and ordered him to serve 240 days in jail.
Hackworth timely appealed.

6
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Hackworth argues the trial court erred by revoking
his right of self-representation. The trial court revoked his right of self-
representation based on three findings: (1) his “ability to represent” himself;
(2) his Faretta waiver form; and (3) an exchange with him after it announced
it was appointing a public defender to represent him. Hackworth argues he
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived representation. He contends
no evidence shows the trial court found him mentally incompetent to
represent himself due to a “severe mental illness.” (People v. Johnson (2012)
53 Cal.4th 519, 530 (Johnson).) He also asserts he did not engage in
misconduct undermining the integrity of the trial. We agree.
I.
GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A criminal defendant has a right of self-representation under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Faretta, supra, 422
U.S. at p. 807.) The government may not “constitutionally hale a person into
its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists
that he wants to conduct his own defense.” (Ibid.) “The language and spirit of
the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel . . . shall be an aid to a
willing defendant—not an organ of the State interposed between an
unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally. To thrust
counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic
of the Amendment.” (Id. at p. 820.) “An unwanted counsel ‘represents’ the
defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the
accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not
the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is
not his defense.” (Id. at p. 821.) “‘[T]he core of the Faretta right’ is that

7
‘the pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the case he
chooses to present to the jury.’” (People v. Espinoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 61, 77.)
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REVOKING HACKWORTH’S
RIGHT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION
A. The Faretta Waiver Was Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary
“‘A knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is
required before a criminal defendant is allowed to represent himself.
[Citation.] The defendant should be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation so the record shows he is making an
informed choice with his eyes wide open. [Citation.] The purpose of this
requirement is to determine whether the defendant in fact understands the
significance and consequences of his decision and whether that decision is
voluntary. . . . [W]e examine the record as a whole to determine whether the
defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the
risks and complexities of his case.’” (People v. Orosco (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
348, 363 (Orosco).)
“On appeal the test is not whether specific warnings or
advisements were given.” (Orosco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 363.)
“[T]echnical legal knowledge is irrelevant to whether he or she is competent
to waive the right to counsel.” (People v. Best (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 747, 758
(Best).) “The ‘critical question is not whether a self-represented defendant
meets the standards of an attorney, or even whether a defendant is capable of
conducting an effective defense. Instead, [our high court has] accepted that
the cost of recognizing a criminal defendant’s right to self-representation may
result “‘in detriment to the defendant, if not outright unfairness.’” [Citation.]

8
But that is a cost we allow defendants the choice of paying, if they can do so
knowingly and voluntarily.’” (Id. at p. 757)
“The question whether the defendant’s assertion of the right to
self-representation and waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and
intelligent is reviewed de novo.” (Orosco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 358.)
Here, the record before the trial court shows Hackworth “was
made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” and
“understood the significance and consequences of his decision.” (Orosco,
supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 363.) Hackworth read and completed the Faretta
waiver form. He made some edits on the form, using a common practice:
initialing his corrections. Despite marking the “[n]o” boxes in response to the
advisements, we interpret his circling and initialing the “[y]es” boxes to
indicate his acknowledgment of the advisements. Accordingly, Hackworth
acknowledged: (1) it was “almost always unwise” for a criminal defendant to
represent himself; (2) he was “not entitled to any special privileges or
treatment”; (3) his opponent would be “an experienced professional attorney”;
(4) he would not receive more library privileges than other self-represented
defendants and would have no staff or investigators assisting him; (5) he
would be waiving ineffective assistance of counsel as an issue on appeal; (6) if
he changed his mind during trial, he would not be afforded a postponement to
find counsel; and (7) if he misbehaved or seriously disrupted trial, his right of
self-representation could be terminated. The trial court reviewed the form

9
with Hackworth, informed him of his legal and constitutional rights, and
found he understood his “rights as explained” and the nature of the charges.1
Additionally, Hackworth’s request for self-representation was
unequivocal, and he had “‘a strong desire to represent himself.’” (Orosco,
supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 364.) Certainly, he responded “[n]o” to the
question on the Faretta waiver form, “Do you now wish the court to permit
you to represent yourself as your own attorney?” But, according to the trial
court’s minutes, Hackworth requested self-representation at the hearing on
the Faretta waiver in January 2022. Thereafter, he represented himself in
several hearings. During the November 2022 hearing, the trial court spoke to
Hackworth regarding self-representation, and allowed him to continue
representing himself. At the hearing on December 12, 2022, after the trial
court announced it was appointing a public defender as Hackworth’s counsel,
Hackworth objected and sought to continue representing himself, stating,
“I’m not going to let them represent me,” “I don’t want him on my case,” and
“I can represent myself.”
The Attorney General argues Hackworth did not knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waive representation due to the purported
errors on his Faretta waiver form. But, even if he struggled filling out or
comprehending aspects of the form, “the form ‘is not . . . a test the defendant
must pass in order to achieve self-representation.’” (Orosco, supra, 82
Cal.App.5th at p. 364.) The “form must be seen as no more than a means by
which the judge and the defendant seeking self-representation may have a

1 Hackworth also indicated he did not know the maximum

penalty if he were convicted. Nonetheless, according to the trial court’s
minutes, the trial court advised him of the maximum possible sentence while
considering his form.

10
meaningful dialogue concerning the dangers and responsibilities of self-
representation.” (People v. Silfa (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1322.)
Thus, based on our independent examination of the record, we
conclude Hackworth’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
B. No Evidence Shows Hackworth Was Mentally Incompetent to Represent
Himself
Courts may deny self-representation when a defendant is
mentally competent to stand trial but incompetent to conduct trial
proceedings. (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 523 [adopting the holding in
Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164, 174 (Edwards)].) “[T]he standard
that trial courts considering exercising their discretion to deny self-
representation should apply is simply whether the defendant suffers from a
severe mental illness to the point where he or she cannot carry out the basic
tasks needed to present the defense without the help of counsel.” (Johnson, at
p. 530.) “‘“Severe mental illness” appears to be a condition precedent. . . .
Nothing in the [Edwards] opinion suggests that a court can deny a request
for self-representation in the absence of this.’”2 (Orosco, supra, 82
Cal.App.5th at p. 360.)
“A trial court need not routinely inquire into the mental
competence of a defendant seeking self-representation. It needs to do so only
if it is considering denying self-representation due to doubts about the
defendant’s mental competence. When a court doubts a defendant’s

2 We note the mental competence to represent oneself is distinct

from the competence to waive one’s right to counsel. (Edwards, supra, 554
U.S. at p. 172 [“‘the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to
waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the
competence to represent himself’”].)

11
competence to stand trial, it ‘shall appoint a psychiatrist or licensed
psychologist, and any other expert the court may deem appropriate, to
examine the defendant.’ [Citation.] Similarly, when it doubts the defendant’s
mental competence for self-representation, it may order a psychological or
psychiatric examination to inquire into that question. To minimize the risk of
improperly denying self-representation to a competent defendant, ‘trial courts
should be cautious about making an incompetence finding without benefit of
an expert evaluation, though the judge’s own observations of the defendant’s
in-court behavior will also provide key support for an incompetence finding
and should be expressly placed on the record.’ [Citation.]
“Trial courts must apply this standard cautiously. . . . Criminal
defendants still generally have a Sixth Amendment right to represent
themselves. Self-representation by defendants who wish it and validly waive
counsel remains the norm and may not be denied lightly. A court may not
deny self-representation merely because it believes the matter could be tried
more efficiently, or even more fairly, with attorneys on both sides. Rather, it
may deny self-representation only in those situations where Edwards permits
it.” (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 530–531.)
We review a trial court’s denial of self-representation for abuse of
discretion. (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 531–532.) “The trial court’s
determination regarding a defendant’s competence must be upheld if
supported by substantial evidence.” (Id. at p. 531.)
Here, no evidence shows Hackworth suffered from a severe
mental illness rendering him mentally incompetent to represent himself. In
revoking his right of self-representation, the trial court expressed concern
regarding his “ability to represent” himself. It cited his performance at the
preliminary hearing on December 9, 2022—particularly his focus on

12
irrelevant issues that appeared to be legally inaccurate—and his Faretta
waiver form.
These justifications are problematic. First, focusing on irrelevant
issues does not necessarily constitute a severe mental illness. That
justification, without additional explanation, appears to suggest the trial
court revoked Hackworth’s right of self-representation for efficiency purposes.
(See Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 531.)
Second, Hackworth’s Faretta waiver form does not demonstrate a
severe mental illness. Orosco is instructive. In Orosco, the defendant
completed a Faretta waiver form. (Orosco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 353.)
On the form, the defendant indicated he was requesting an interpreter, but
then crossed out his selection, initialed the edit, and marked he was not
requesting an interpreter. (Ibid.) The form contained a line, stating, “‘I have
been involved in ________ criminal proceedings in the past and I feel I am
capable of representing myself.’” (Ibid.) The defendant initialed on the line,
struck his initials, and initialed again. (Ibid.) At the preliminary hearing, the
trial court inquired whether the defendant was requesting an interpreter. (Id.
at p. 354.) The defendant wavered before disclosing, “‘I honestly didn’t know
how to fill it out.’” (Ibid.) The trial court also asked about the defendant’s
response to the criminal proceedings line on the form. (Ibid.) The defendant
responded, “‘I thought that meant that if I was pro per in the past.’” (Ibid.)
After given another opportunity to read the line, the defendant said, “‘I read
it. I don’t understand what it’s saying. [¶] . . . [¶] I haven’t represented myself
before. This is my first time representing myself. So I don’t understand what
I’m supposed to put, yeah or no, in the blank.”’ (Ibid.) The trial court denied
the Faretta motion because the defendant did not appear to comprehend the
Faretta waiver form. (Id. at pp. 354–355.)

13
The appellate court reversed. It concluded, “Any confusion [the
defendant] may have had about the waiver form was not by itself evidence of
mental illness.” (Orosco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 360.) On the interpreter
question, the defendant completed the form correctly by denoting he was not
requesting an interpreter. (Ibid.) Despite expressing confusion at the hearing,
the defendant clarified he did not need an interpreter, and the “momentary
misunderstanding at the hearing was not evidence of his inability to carry
out the basic tasks needed for self-representation.” (Ibid.) Regarding his
involvement in prior criminal proceedings, the defendant explained “he left
the line blank because he had never represented himself before,” and the
appellate court considered it “not unusual . . . to leave a line blank when the
answer is zero.” (Id. at p. 361.) The appellate court found, “To the extent [the
defendant] may have misunderstood what the question was asking, his
simple misunderstanding again did not constitute evidence of inability to
carry out the basic tasks of self-representation.” (Ibid.)
Here, some answers on Hackworth’s Faretta waiver form suggest
he may have been confused. We discussed those answers above. But, as in
Orosco, even if Hackworth was confused, “[a]ny confusion” Hackworth “may
have had about the waiver form was not by itself evidence of mental illness.”
(Orosco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 360.) Nothing in the record implies
Hackworth suffered from a severe mental illness. “‘Because there was no
evidence before the trial court showing that [he] had such an affliction,
Edwards was simply off the table.’ [Citation.] And under Johnson, a
California court may deny self-representation based on mental incompetence
‘only in those situations where Edwards permits it.’” (Ibid.)

14
C. Hackworth’s Conduct Did Not Impact the Core Integrity of the Trial
“A defendant’s Faretta right is subject to termination whenever
he engages in ‘“deliberate dilatory or obstructive behavior” [that] threatens to
subvert “the core concept of a trial.”’ [Citation.] ‘When determining whether
termination is necessary and appropriate, the trial court should consider
several factors in addition to the nature of the misconduct and its impact on
the trial proceedings,’ including: (1) ‘the availability and suitability of
alternative sanctions,’ (2) ‘whether the defendant has been warned
that particular misconduct will result in termination of in propria persona
status,’ and (3) ‘whether the defendant has “intentionally sought to disrupt
and delay his trial.”’ [Citation.] The intention to disrupt and delay trial is, in
many instances, sufficient to order termination. [Citation.]
“The trial court must make a thorough record establishing the
basis for termination. The record must include ‘the precise misconduct on
which the trial court based the decision to terminate. [Citation.] The court
should also explain how the misconduct threatened to impair the core
integrity of the trial. Did the court also rely on antecedent misconduct and, if
so, what and why? Did any of the misconduct occur while the defendant was
represented by counsel? If so, what is the relation to the defendant’s self-
representation? Additionally, was the defendant warned such misconduct
might forfeit his Faretta rights? Were other sanctions available? If so, why
were they inadequate? In most cases, no one consideration will be dispositive;
rather, the totality of the circumstances should inform the court’s exercise of
its discretion.’ [Citation.] The trial court has considerable discretion in
determining whether termination of Faretta rights is necessary to maintain
the integrity and fairness of proceedings. [Citation.] A court’s decision will

15
not be disturbed absent a strong showing of clear abuse.” (People v. Ng (2022)
13 Cal.5th 448, 494–495.)
The Attorney General asserts two instances of purported
misconduct justify the trial court’s termination of Hackworth’s self-
representation status. We address these in turn. First, the Attorney General
highlights Hackworth failed to appear at the scheduled preliminary hearing
in March 2022, and the criminal proceedings did not continue until he was
apprehended on a bench warrant in November 2022. But the trial court did
not rely on Hackworth’s failure to appear as a basis to revoke self-
representation. We are not required or permitted “to imply discretionary
findings that the trial court did not in fact make.” (Best, supra, 49
Cal.App.5th at p. 762.)
Second, the Attorney General points out Hackworth engaged in
disruptive behavior at the preliminary hearing on December 12, 2022. After
the trial court stated it was appointing a public defender to represent him, he
resisted and still wanted to represent himself. The trial court responded,
“See, that’s the problem. I’m the judge and we’re not going to argue about
this. And that’s one reason why you can’t represent yourself because you’re
talking—wait. I’m talking. Court reporter needs to take this down. [¶] It’s for
your own protection as well; okay?” It appears the trial court cited
Hackworth’s reaction to the appointment as a basis to revoke his right of self-
representation. But “a criminal defendant’s frustration about being denied
the right to represent himself—and forced to have an attorney speak for him
against his will—may cause him to become disruptive when he would not
otherwise have been.” (Orosco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 363.) Thus,
Hackworth’s frustration in this instance cannot be a proper basis to revoke
self-representation.

16
“Erroneous denial of a Faretta motion is reversible per se.
[Citation.] ‘Applying this rule, we must reverse the judgment and remand the
matter for a new trial. [Citation.] Because we do so, we need not consider
[Hackworth]’s remaining contentions on appeal.’ [Citation.] ‘We emphasize
that our decision is based on the record as of the time the trial court denied
defendant’s Faretta motion. Nothing we say here prevents the trial court on
remand from evaluating [Hackworth]’s competence to represent [himself],
and the potential for disruption, based on conditions as they exist at the time
of any new motion for self-representation.’” (Orosco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at
p. 364.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded for a new
trial. On remand, if Hackworth again seeks to represent himself, the request
shall be considered based on the record before the court at the time of the
ruling on any such motion.

MOTOIKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

17

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.