CourtListener 10316909•People v. Tovar CA4/3
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Filed 1/17/25 P. v. Tovar CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G062507
v. (Super. Ct. No. 20CF1392)
JAVIER TOVAR, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Scott A. Steiner, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions.
Elisa A. Brandes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant
Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Michael J. Patty, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
1
Javier Tovar was convicted of mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203) and
assault with intent to commit great bodily injury (§ 245(a)(4)), based upon an
incident in which he and a codefendant attacked a fellow inmate on behalf of
the Mexican Mafia. Tovar appeals, arguing the evidence is insufficient to
support his mayhem conviction, and that the judgment does not accurately
reflect the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment. The Attorney General
concedes that the judgment must be modified to reflect the court’s oral
pronouncement, and points out additional inaccuracies that must be
corrected. We agree the judgment must be modified and remand the case to
the trial court for that purpose.
However, we reject Tovar’s argument that the evidence was
insufficient to demonstrate either that the victim’s eye injury was caused by
the assault or that it was permanent. Although the victim refused to testify
when he appeared at trial, the jury reasonably could infer from the fact he
received follow-up testing of his vision in the months following the attack
that he was not already blind in his damaged eye when the attack occurred.
His treating physician also testified that, because of the damage inflicted on
the victim’s eye and the persistence of his blindness in that eye over a period
of months, his sight would not be restored. We therefore affirm the mayhem
conviction.
1
Subsequent statutory references are to this code unless
otherwise noted.
2
We remand the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of
clarifying the judgment and ensuring the abstract of judgment correctly
reflects it.
FACTS
Both Tovar and the victim were inmates at the Theo Lacy jail on
October 13, 2019. On that date, the victim was moved into the general
population from protective custody. Shortly after he entered his new cell, he
was beaten by a group of other inmates, including Tovar. The incident was
captured on surveillance video, which was played for the jury.
The victim was transported to the emergency room at UC Irvine
Medical Center (ER) following the incident. The ophthalmologist who
examined and treated the victim testified the victim was conscious, but
incoherent, in the ER, apparently due to being under the influence of heroin.
The victim had fractures of the bones surrounding his right eye.
He also had bleeding behind the eye which caused the eye to “come forward.”
The doctor conducted a vision test that demonstrated the victim was not able
to see any light—i.e., that he was blind in that eye.
The doctor opined that “the pressure from the hemorrhage, from
the bleeding,” was sufficient to cause the victim to lose vision in that eye. She
explained that “whenever there’s damage to the bones or the muscles or the
fat behind the eye, it can cause bleeding. So he had bleeding within that
closed space, and so it put a lot of pressure in the orbit and put pressure on
the optic nerve. [¶] The optic nerve is basically the cable that connects the
eyeball to the brain. When there’s a lot of pressure on the optic nerve, it can
cause permanent, irreversible blindness.”2
2
On cross-examination, the doctor acknowledged she had no
3
The doctor testified the pressure on the victim’s eye was so high
that “he could not move his eye at all.” To relieve that pressure, the doctors
made incisions on the lateral eyelid. However, when they checked back later
that evening, there was no improvement in the victim’s vision. The doctors
considered doing surgery to remove the blood pooled behind the eye, but they
decided not to because the victim was unable to demonstrate he could
understand the risks, benefits, and alternatives to surgery—and thus he
could not give informed consent.
The victim remained in the hospital until November 7.
When the victim was later seen at UC Irvine’s eye clinic in
2020—i.e., at least three months after his October 13, 2019, injury—he was
still unable to perceive light from that eye, which meant he remained blind in
that eye.
The doctor acknowledged she had not seen the victim in the three
years prior to trial in 2023; she testified however that “injuries of this
type . . . do not tend to recover.” When asked if the victim could recover his
vision after such an injury, the doctor replied, “I don’t think so, no.”
The jury was instructed that “[t]o prove that a defendant is guilty
of mayhem, the People must prove that the defendant unlawfully and
maliciously: [¶] Disabled or made useless a part of someone’s body and the
disability was more than slight or temporary; OR [¶] Put out someone’s eye or
injured someone’s eye in a way that so significantly reduced his ability to see
that the eye was useless for the purpose of ordinary sight.”
knowledge of whether the victim had any damage to his eyes before he was
attacked by Tovar and his cohorts in the jail.
4
The jury found Tovar guilty of mayhem (count 2) and assault
with force likely to produce great bodily injury (count 3); it also found true
that he inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in connection with count
three (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
The trial court stayed the imposition of sentence for the mayhem
conviction after finding that, pursuant to section 654, it was “merge[d]” with
the conviction for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. It
then sentenced Tovar to a total term of eleven years on the assault
conviction, consisting of the mid-term of three years, doubled pursuant to
section 667, subdivisions (d) and (e), plus five years for a strike prior Tovar
admitted to.
DISCUSSION
I.
SUFFICIENCY OF MAYHEM EVIDENCE
Tovar argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction
for mayhem for two reasons. First, he contends the evidence was insufficient
because it does not establish the condition of the victim’s eye before the jail
attack, and “[t]hus, the prosecution failed to prove that the blindness was
caused by the assault . . . and not some pre-existing condition.” We are not
persuaded.
An injury inflicted to the eye amounts to mayhem when it causes
significant impairment to vision. Hence, in People v. Dennis (1985)
169 Cal.App.3d 1135, 1138, mayhem was established by a blow to the eye
that dislocated the victim’s lens in one eye, requiring its removal, which left
her with visual acuity of 20/50 in the injured eye with corrective lenses.
(Accord, People v. Green (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 1, 3-4 [Mayhem was committed
5
when the defendant’s act caused distortion of the victim’s peripheral vision,
causing double vision, and requiring corrective lenses].)
Thus, even if the victim here had a pre-existing eye condition
that impaired his vision, that would not undermine the factual basis for a
conviction for mayhem since the assault on him further degraded his eyesight
to actual blindness.
Alternatively, Tovar seems to argue that the prosecution was
required to establish the victim was not already completely blind in that
right eye before the jail attack. We reject that assertion as well. In the
absence of direct evidence proving a fact, the jury can draw reasonable
inferences from the other evidence to establish any fact. (Evid. Code, § 600,
subd. (b) [“An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and
reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise
established in the action”].)
In this case, while the evidence includes no direct evidence on the
victim’s ability to see with his right eye prior to the attack—he refused to
testify at trial—it does establish the victim was re-tested months after the
attack to assess whether he remained blind in that eye. There would be no
logical reason to conduct such testing if the victim had been blind in that eye
before the attack. The jury could reasonably infer from the post-attack
testing that the victim was not blind in his injured eye before he was
attacked in jail.
Tovar also argues the evidence is insufficient to establish that the
victim’s blindness was “permanent” because the doctor who testified
established only that the victim remained blind in his injured eye for some
months after the jail attack, but then acknowledged she had not followed up
6
on his condition in the three years between his examination in 2020 and the
trial in 2023. We disagree.
Contrary to Tovar’s assertion, the doctor was not speculating or
equivocal when she was asked whether someone with the victim’s injury “can
3
recover” his sight in the injured eye. She answered, “I don’t think so, no.”
That was the medical opinion of a trained expert; it is sufficient to establish
that the victim’s blindness was a permanent condition.
Finally, we are not persuaded by Tovar’s assertion that the
doctor’s credibility was undermined by the evidence demonstrating that
efforts were made to save/restore the victim’s eyesight in the ER on the night
of the jail attack. According to Tovar, “the very use of these medical
interventions is inconsistent with an injury from which no one can ever
recover.”
Tovar’s argument confuses the issue of whether blindness might
be averted by alleviation of the pressure behind the eye in the immediate
wake of the injury, with the issue of whether a patient who remained blind
for months after the injury, and who was otherwise physically healed from
the attack, might yet recover his sight. It was the second issue that the doctor
addressed. Her testimony supports the conclusion that the victim’s blindness
was permanent.
3
Tovar does not explain why the opinion of an expert
ophthalmologist was speculative. We consequently need not address the
assertion.
7
II.
MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT
Tovar notes the abstract of judgment is incorrect because it
reflects a total of $1,200 in state restitution fines (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)),
consisting of $300 for this case plus $300 for charges in each of three other
cases to which Tovar pleaded guilty immediately following his sentencing in
this case. According to Tovar, the court assessed only a single $300
restitution fine, not one for each case. The record supports Tovar.
The court sentenced Tovar in the instant case, including the
imposition of the $300 restitution fine, before he pleaded guilty in the other
three cases. The court did not thereafter impose any restitution fines for
those other cases. The abstract is inaccurate on that point and must be
corrected.
Instead of addressing Tovar’s restitution reduction argument, the
Attorney General contends the $1,200 amount should actually be raised an
additional $300, to a total of $1,500, to account for Tovar’s separate mayhem
conviction in this case. We disagree. When the court found that the mayhem
conviction merged under section 654 with Tovar’s assault conviction in this
case, it properly declined to impose a separate sentence on that merged
conviction. No separate fines or fees were—or could be—imposed on the
mayhem charge.
Tovar also claims the abstract is incorrect because the court
assessed only a “Conviction fee, $40. Court operations fee,” before finding
Tovar had “[an] inability to pay on all the fines and fees.” The abstract
nonetheless reflects imposition of a “Court Operations Assessment” in the
amount of $320, plus a “Conviction Assessment” in the amount of $240. The
Attorney General argues the appropriate amount of the court operations fee
8
should be $200, representing “five convictions times $40” (see Pen. Code,
§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and the proper amount of the criminal conviction
assessment fee should be $150, representing “five convictions times $30” (see
Govt. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)).
We find that the court miscalculated its fee assessments. The
case must therefore be remanded to correct both the conviction fees and the
court operations fees assessed.
Finally, the parties differ on whether the court’s statement that
Tovar had “an inability to pay on all the fines and fees” was intended to
reflect its discretionary decision “to not impose the fines and fees,” or merely
to “stay” them. On remand, the court is directed to clarify its ruling and to
ensure the abstract accurately reflects its intent.
DISPOSITION
Tovar’s mayhem conviction is affirmed. The case is remanded for
the limited purpose of clarifying what fines and fees the court intended to
impose, and if imposed, whether they are stayed. Once those issues are
settled, the court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and
forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
GOETHALS, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P. J.
MOTOIKE, J.
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