In re Jac. H. CA2/7

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Filed 1/16/25 In re Jac. H. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re JAC. H. et al., Persons B335648
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP02365A-C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DANIELA B. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.
Sarah Vaona, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Daniela B.
Mitchell Keiter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Jonathan G.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Avedis Koutoujian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________

INTRODUCTION

Father Jonathan G. and mother Daniela B. appeal from an
order terminating their parental rights under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26.1 They contend they established
the beneficial parental relationship exception to prevent
termination of their parental rights, and that the juvenile court
abused its discretion when it failed to apply the exception.
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We conclude the juvenile court did
not abuse its discretion and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

Jonathan and Daniela have three children, J.G. (born 2019)
and twins Jac.H. and Jan.H. (born 2014) (collectively, the

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code, unless otherwise specified.
2 The facts leading up to and including the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing are summarized from our previous opinion,
In re J.H. (May 10, 2024, B325348 [nonpub. opn.].)

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children).3 Daniela also has an older child, A.H., with another
man. A.H. is not a subject of these dependency proceedings.
Jonathan and Daniela arranged for the children to live with their
maternal grandmother, Judith R., in November 2021. The
parents lived at the paternal grandmother’s home, which was a
few blocks away, but regularly visited the children. Judith was
designated as the prospective adoptive parent when the juvenile
court terminated Daniela’s and Jonathan’s parental rights.

A. Prior Referrals and Dependency Proceedings
Before J.G.’s birth, Jac.H. and Jan.H., along with A.H.,
were declared dependents of the juvenile court in two prior
dependency proceedings. In 2016, the court found allegations of
neglect were substantiated after Daniela reportedly attempted
suicide by laying in the middle of the street and refusing mental
health services. In 2017, the juvenile court sustained allegations
that Daniela was incapable of providing regular care for Jac.H.,
Jan.H., and A.H. due to her history of illicit drug abuse and her
current abuse of amphetamine and methamphetamine, and that
Daniela and A.H.’s father had a history of mutually violent
altercations. The court granted custody of A.H. to his father and
returned Jac.H. and Jan.H. to Daniela’s custody. The court
terminated its jurisdiction over the children in 2018.
The Department received four referrals involving the
family in 2021. Each referral was deemed inconclusive or
unfounded. In November 2021, Jonathan and Daniela arranged

3 The twins share a last name with A.H.’s father. They
discovered Jonathan was their biological father when they were
three years old and Jonathan is the presumed father in this case.

3
for the children to live with Judith, citing the burden of the
multiple referrals against them.

B. Current Dependency Proceeding
On June 17, 2022, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (Department) filed a dependency
petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j),
alleging seven-year-old Jac.H. and Jan.H. and two-year-old J.G.
were at substantial risk of harm due to Daniela’s substance
abuse and Jonathan’s failure to protect. The juvenile court
ordered the children detained with Judith, with whom they were
already living.

1. Jurisdiction Findings and Disposition Orders
Count b-1 of the section 300 petition alleged Daniela had a
history of illicit drug abuse and was a current substance abuser,
which rendered her incapable of providing regular care and
appropriate supervision for the children. The petition alleged
Daniela was under the influence of drugs while the children were
in her care, smoked a substance with a straw and foil over a
flame in the presence of Jan.H., and that she overdosed on
opiates requiring emergency medical treatment in 2020. The
petition further alleged J.G. was of “young age requiring constant
care and supervision” and that Jac.H., Jan.H., and A.H. were
prior dependents of the court due to Daniela’s drug abuse.
Count b-2 alleged, in relevant part, that Daniela “created a
detrimental and endangering home environment for the children
in that the mother smoked an unknown white substance in the
children’s home,” causing Jan.H. to feel ill. Count j-1 duplicated
the same allegations and language as count b-1.

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The juvenile court sustained the petition at the
September 7, 2022 combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
Neither parent appeared but they were each represented by
counsel at the hearing. In denying a request by Jonathan’s
counsel for a continuance, the court observed, “Parents are
essentially refusing to participate in the case. They never
responded to the [Department’s investigator] for interviews.
They are not [drug] testing. They didn’t bother to show up today
for their children’s case. A continuance would not ensure father’s
appearance.”
The children’s counsel argued extensively, urging the court
to sustain the petition as pleaded. The court found that the
evidence, while circumstantial, was “stitched together carefully
and in a compelling way” by the children’s counsel and
demonstrated a preponderance of the evidence for each of the
allegations. The court acknowledged it is very hard to confirm
drug use when parents refuse to test, but it noted the parents
were “so willing to avoid all testing that they want to give up
custody of their children and they don’t even want to appear in
this case.” The juvenile court declared the children dependents of
the court and removed them from both parents’ custody with
reunification services and monitored but separate visitation for
each parent.
The juvenile court ordered Daniela to complete weekly drug
and alcohol testing, a parenting program, and individual
counseling. Jonathan was ordered to complete five random drug
and alcohol tests, a parenting program, and individual
counseling.
Daniela appealed. We affirmed the jurisdiction findings
and disposition order, concluding substantial evidence supported

5
the juvenile court’s orders. (See In re J.H. (May 10, 2024,
B325348) [nonpub. opn.].)

2. Six-month and 12-month Review Hearings
On March 8, 2023, the juvenile court held the six-month
hearing and found the parents were not in compliance with their
case plan. The Department had reported Jonathan and Daniela
failed to submit to drug or alcohol testing and failed to
participate in the court-ordered parenting program or individual
counseling. Neither parent consistently communicated with the
Department.
Daniela, however, regularly visited with the children twice
a week for three hours per visit. Judith reported Daniela came
over to fold the children’s clothes, organize their closets, and cook
for and feed them during her visits. Jonathan also visited the
children at least once a week for up to two hours. His visitation
varied due to his work schedule. He played with the children
during his visits but Jan.H. observed he was sometimes on his
phone. Judith reported the visits with Jonathan and Daniela
went well. In a May 22, 2023 child and family team meeting in
which Jonathan participated, the team identified the children’s
need to “continue a relationship with their father and develop a
bond with him.”
In the 12-month status review report, the Department
reported the children were responding well to Judith’s care. The
parents had limited contact with the Department and failed to
comply with any part of their case plan. Daniela typically visited
the children twice a week on Tuesdays and Fridays from
6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., and Jonathan continued his weekly visits.
Judith reported Daniela’s visits were consistent and that Daniela

6
helped by folding clothes and feeding the children. Jan.H.
reported Daniela helped them clean their room during her visits.
Jac.H. reported Daniela brought him snacks but that she played
with the girls, and not him, during the visits. Judith observed
Jonathan’s visits were often less than two hours. She reported he
played video games with the older children.
When asked what he perceived to be the family’s needs,
Jonathan said, “‘I want to have custody of my kids back and be a
better father. Improve in all aspects of being a father and bond
with them individually.’” Daniela likewise stated, “‘I want to get
my kids back and have our own place with them.’” But the
Department recommended reunification services be terminated
due to the parents’ lack of progress in court-ordered services and
that a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing be
set.
At the September 6, 2023 12-month hearing, the juvenile
court found “[p]rogress by parents ha[s] been unsubstantial.”
The court terminated reunification services and ordered the
matter set for a permanency planning hearing.

3. Permanency Planning Pursuant to Section 366.26
In its January 10, 2024 section 366.26 report to the court,
the Department recommended adoption as the preferred
permanent plan. The Department emphasized that it would be
detrimental to deprive the children of the stability Judith could
provide.
The Department recounted the children’s relationship with
the parents. It reported Daniela helped bathe the children and
clean their room during her visits. For his visits, Jonathan
checked their homework, then watched movies with them or

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played soccer with them. Judith observed the children were
happy to see their parents but understood the parents would
leave once the visit was over, and their departure generally did
not result in any change in their attitude or behavior. But in
September and October 2023, J.G. cried twice when Daniela left
and once when Jonathan left. She cried for less than five
minutes each time. Jan.H. expressed a desire to live with both
Judith and Daniela and felt conflicted.
The Department stated the parents were not able to meet
the children’s needs due to Daniela’s substance abuse and that
both parents were unwilling to mitigate the issues that brought
the family to the Department’s attention. The Department
concluded, “severing the relationship . . . may cause emotional
instability, however, the caregiver [Judith] expressed that she
will continue to allow visitations with the children as long as the
mother and father are appropriate.”
The Department reported that Judith expressed a desire to
provide permanency for the children through adoption, and the
children were “‘okay with adoption’” by her. Nine-year old Jac.H.
and Jan.H. confirmed their desire to be adopted and said they
called Judith “‘mom.’” They reported being happy at Judith’s
home because “we have always lived here, this is home, even as a
baby.” The children had strong attachments to Judith and relied
on her for their daily needs.
Throughout the dependency proceedings, Jonathan and
Daniela continued their weekly visits. Daniela brought the
children new bedding and plush toys during her visits. Jonathan
took the children outside to play with the dogs in the garden.
They also played games and watched movies.

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On March 6, 2024, the juvenile court held the
section 366.26 permanency plan hearing. The Department and
children’s counsel urged the court to terminate parental rights,
arguing the parental-benefit exception outlined in In re Caden C.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.) was not met. The children’s
counsel argued the children had lived with their maternal
grandmother since July 2022 and that they lived with her on
prior occasions before the instant detention.4 The children’s
counsel also argued the older children stated they were “ready to
be adopted” by Judith.
Jonathan and Daniela, through separate counsel, objected
to termination of their parental rights, arguing they maintained
an ongoing and positive relationship with the children and
severing the relationship would cause emotional instability. The
parents further argued the Department impermissibly predicated
its recommendation for termination of parental rights on their
lack of progress in the case plan.
After hearing argument and reviewing the record before it,
the juvenile court terminated Daniela’s and Jonathan’s parental
rights. The court concluded that the parents failed to
demonstrate that two of the three Caden C. elements were met.
The court acknowledged the parents consistently visited and
helped with the children, and that the children enjoyed the visits
with their parents. But it found the “parents failed to develop
the key bonds with their children early in their lives—in the
children’s lives,” and they “failed to make the key bonds that

4 The Department states the children began living with
Judith in July 2022, when they were detained during the current
proceedings. The parents acknowledge, however, that they
arranged for the children to live with Judith in November 2021.

9
develop naturally when parents and children live together.” The
juvenile court found that the relationship between the parents
and children was “a friendly relationship rather than a deep
emotional bond that we see in healthy relationships between
parent and children.” The court concluded the termination of the
relationship with the parents would not significantly disrupt the
children’s lives or their emotional wellbeing, and the benefits to
adoption outweighed any detriment to the children. The juvenile
court stated it was “not putting any weight on parents’ inability
to complete the case [plan].” After the court determined the
beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply, it
designated Judith as the prospective adoptive parent, noting she
had expressed an intent to allow the children to continue visits
with their parents.
Jonathan and Daniela each separately appealed from the
court’s order.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The purpose of a section 366.26 selection and
implementation hearing is “to provide stable, permanent homes”
for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) “If the court has
decided to end parent-child reunification services, the legislative
preference is for adoption.” (In re Elizabeth M. (2018)
19 Cal.App.5th 768, 780; accord, In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th
45, 53 [“if the child is adoptable . . . adoption is the norm”]; see
In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307 [state has a
“compelling” interest in “providing stable, permanent homes for

10
children who have been removed from parental custody” and
reunification efforts have been unsuccessful].)
“When the court finds . . . the child is likely to be adopted,
the statute mandates judicial termination of parental rights
unless the parent opposing termination can demonstrate one of
six enumerated exceptions applies.” (In re Elizabeth M., supra,
19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 780-781; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B); see In re
Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53; In re Matthew C. (1993)
6 Cal.4th 386, 392.)
The beneficial parental relationship exception allows the
court to order a permanent plan other than adoption if a parent
demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, “(1) regular
visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of
which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) It applies
only in “‘exceptional circumstances.’” (Caden C., at p. 631;
accord, In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.)
We apply a “hybrid standard of review” to the beneficial
parental relationship exception. (In re Katherine J. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 303, 317; see In re I.E. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 683,
691.) The first two elements are reviewed for substantial
evidence. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) “[W]e
presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing
party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all
conflicts in support of the order.” (In re Autumn H. (1994)
27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) As a reviewing court, we do “‘not
reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or
resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ [Citation.] The determinations

11
should ‘be upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even
though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the
trial court might have reached a different result had it believed
other evidence.’” (Caden C., at p. 640.)
As for the third element, we review factual determinations
for substantial evidence and review the “the ultimate decision—
whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child due to the child’s relationship with his parent . . . for
abuse of discretion.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640; see
In re I.E., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 691.) “A court abuses its
discretion when it ‘“‘has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by
making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination’”’” or when it “rest[s] a disposition on an error of
law.” (In re M.G. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 836, 848-849; see
Caden C., at p. 641; In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145,
159.)

B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Concluding Jonathan and Daniela Failed To Establish the
Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception Termination of
Parental Rights
Jonathan argues a legal guardianship with Judith would
better serve the children’s interests than adoption and
termination of his parental rights. Daniela adopts Jonathan’s
arguments on appeal, and does not advance any separate
arguments. We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion because Jonathan and Daniela failed to establish the
beneficial parental relationship exception applied in this case.
(See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 636.)

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1. The First Element: Regular Visitation and Contact
“The first element—regular visitation and contact—is
straightforward. The question is just whether ‘parents visit
consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court
orders.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The parties
agree, as do we, that Jonathan and Daniela met the first element.
The juvenile court found at the section 366.26 hearing they
maintained regular visitation and contact with the children
during the dependency proceedings. Substantial evidence
supports the court’s finding the first Caden C. factor was
satisfied.

2. The Second Element: Beneficial Relationship
The second prong of the beneficial parental relationship
exception has two components: the child has a positive emotional
attachment to the parent, and the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 636.) Factors the court may consider include “‘[t]he age of the
child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody,
the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent
and child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Id. at p. 632; see
In re Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 317.) “[C]ourts
often consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or
talk about their parents.” (Caden C., at p. 632.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that Jonathan and Daniela failed to show the second Caden C.
element was met. The court determined there was no evidence of
“a deep emotional bond that we see in healthy relationships
between parent and children.”

13
Here, J.G. was four years old at the time of the permanency
planning hearing and had lived with Judith since 2021, when she
was two years old. J.G. had spent at least half of her life with
Judith. J.G. did not provide any statements during these
proceedings due to her age and a speech delay. Jac.H. and
Jan.H. were both 10 years old at the time of the hearing and had
lived with Judith since they were seven years old. They had also
previously been removed from the parents’ custody in 2016 and
2017, when they were two and three years old. The evidence
before the juvenile court was that the children lived a significant
portion of their lives outside of their parents’ custody. Jac.H.
stated, “we always lived here [in Judith’s home], this is home,
even as a baby.” The twins called Judith “mom,” and Jan.H. felt
“they are home when they are with Judith.”
The twins’ interactions with their parents and the way they
spoke about them supported the juvenile court’s finding that they
lacked a parental bond with Jonathan and Daniela meeting the
requirements of the second Caden C. element. The twins
consistently stated they enjoyed Daniela’s and Jonathan’s visits
because they bought them things and played with them, rather
than because the parents provided for their daily needs or played
a parental role. All three children accepted that their parents
only visited and were not generally disturbed by their parents’
departure after visits. Although J.G. cried during three instances
when the parents left, the crying lasted no longer than five
minutes.
At the time of the hearing, Jan.H. reported her relationship
with Jonathan was “neutral.” Before that, she indicated she was
scared of him because she did not know him well. She became
“comfortable” around him because he allowed her to watch

14
television. Jonathan also acknowledged he needed to bond with
the children.
Jonathan and Daniela argue the children’s attachment to
them is more than as mere “‘friendly visitors,’” citing J.G.’s crying
at the end of three visits and Jac.H.’s statement that he would
tell “‘mom, dad, and grandma’” if someone touched him
inappropriately. They also contend that Daniela helped bathe,
clothe, and feed the children, and Jonathan checked their
homework. Indeed, it is undisputed there is some evidence of a
positive relationship between the children and their parents.
Jan.H. expressed she wanted to live with both Judith and
Daniela. The Department observed, “severing the
relationship . . . may cause emotional instability.” But “a
reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’
[Citation.] The determinations should ‘be upheld if . . . supported
by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the
contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a
different result had it believed other evidence.’” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) While it is commendable that
Jonathan and Daniela regularly visited the children and assisted
in their upbringing, substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s finding that they had “merely a good relationship” and not
a beneficial relationship sufficient to meet the requirements of
Caden C.
Jonathan and Daniela further argue the trial court
improperly relied on the fact that they do not live with the
children. They argue every parent facing a section 366.26
hearing does not live with their child and thus that fact may not
bar application of the parental-benefit exception. Jonathan and

15
Daniela analogize their argument to one made in Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 637. Caden C. stated that “[a] parent’s
continued struggles with the issues leading to dependency are not
a categorical bar to applying the exception” because every parent
facing termination of their rights has failed to make sufficient
progress towards reunification. (Ibid.) Thus, “making a parent’s
continued struggles with the issues leading to dependency,
standing alone, a bar to the exception would effectively write the
exception out of the statute.” (Ibid.) But Caden C. also explained
that a parent’s struggles toward reunification may not be entirely
disregarded. Such struggles may be relevant to determining
whether there is a negative effect on the parent-child
relationship. (See ibid.)
Here, the juvenile court did not find the second Caden C.
element was lacking because the children did not live with their
parents. Rather, the court concluded the disruptions preventing
the family from living together also prevented the parents from
developing a key bond with the children early in their lives. As
in Caden C., the juvenile court considered the fact that the
parents did not live with the children for much of their lives and
that this circumstance had a negative effect on the parents’
relationship with the children.
We recognize Jonathan and Daniela have endeavored to
have a beneficial relationship with the children throughout the
underlying proceedings. Even if we assume they have fulfilled
the beneficial relationship element of the Caden C. analysis,
however, the parental-benefit exception would not apply because
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings on
detriment, as discussed below.

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3. The Third Element: Detriment from Termination
The final element of the beneficial parental relationship
exception is whether the stability and permanence that adoption
would bring were outweighed by the harm to the children that
would be caused by terminating their relationship with the
parents. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633-634.) As
stated, the legislative preference in a permanency hearing for a
dependent child is adoption, which mandates the termination of
parental rights. (See id. at p. 631 [“‘the norm . . . remains
adoption’”]; accord, In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.)
When the benefits of a stable, adoptive, permanent home
outweigh the harm the child would experience from the loss of a
continued parent-child relationship, the juvenile court orders
adoption. (See Caden C., at p. 634.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that termination of the parental relationship would not
significantly disrupt the children’s lives or their emotional well-
being. The court found no evidence the children were upset when
they could not see their parents whenever they wished or that
they were depressed because their parents were not present. The
children did not generally exhibit distress or changed behaviors
from the parents’ departure after their visits. Although J.G.
cried after three visits, it was for less than five minutes. Judith
stated the children expected the parents to leave. Jan.H.
described her relationship with Jonathan as neutral.
By contrast, the record before the juvenile court
demonstrated the children were strongly bonded with Judith:
they had lived with her for two years or more by the time of the
permanency hearing, they relied on her for their daily needs, they
were willing to be adopted by her, and they considered her home

17
to be their home and their safe place. The juvenile court thus
found that “the children are so bonded with the maternal
grandmother” that no detriment would result even if Judith
decided not to continue visits with the parents after adoption.
Indeed, Jonathan acknowledged, “there would not be a ‘new
family’; the children would remain in the same home, with the
same caregiver, as they had before.” The juvenile court properly
considered the benefits that Judith could provide through
adoption against any detriment to the children from the
termination of their relationship with Daniela or Jonathan. (See,
e.g., In re N.S. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 816, 842, 850-851 [parental
benefit exception did not apply where child had lived with
grandmother for most of his life, was happy and thriving in her
care, and had repeatedly expressed his desire to be adopted by
her; although child enjoyed weekly visits with mother and
wanted them to continue, relationship was not that of parent and
child, and he did not want increased visitation or show distress
when separating from mother].)
Jonathan and Daniela argue legal guardianship, rather
than adoption, is the better choice in this case because it provides
stability and permanency for the children without the detriment
of severing the parent-child relationship. They contend the
Department acknowledged that “severing the relationship . . .
may cause emotional instability,” and Jan.H.’s statement that
she wanted to live with both Judith and Daniela is evidence of
detriment to the children from severing the relationship. They
assert the juvenile court improperly relied on Judith’s promise to
allow them to continue visiting the children, but that such
promises cannot alleviate the detriment. (See Caden C., supra,

18
11 Cal.5th at p. 633 [“courts must assume that terminating
parental rights terminates the relationship”].)
These arguments ignore the legislative preference for
adoption. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) They also
mischaracterize the juvenile court’s ruling. The court did not
base its decision to terminate parental rights on Judith’s promise
to continue visits. Rather, the juvenile court expressly found the
children would not be harmed even if Judith decided not to allow
further visitation with the parents because the children were “so
bonded” with Judith. Caden C. instructs juvenile courts to
determine “how the child would be affected by losing the parental
relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the child in an
adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life. . . . [T]he
effects might include emotional instability.” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) But “a new, stable home may alleviate the
emotional instability . . . providing a new source of stability that
could make the loss of a parent not, at least on balance,
detrimental.” (Ibid.)
In all events, we do not reweigh the evidence on appeal and
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding on the
third Caden C. prong. Under the circumstances presented, we
cannot say the court’s termination of parental rights was
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise an abuse of discretion. (See
Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.)

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DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order terminating Jonathan’s and
Daniela’s parental rights is affirmed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.

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