CourtListener 10315207•People v. Campos CA2/3
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Filed 1/16/25 P. v. Campos CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B330784
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA159029)
v.
DANNY CAMPOS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hector E. Gutierrez, Judge. Affirmed.
Sarah S. Sanger and Robert M. Sanger, under
appointments by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Gabriel Bradley,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
A jury found Danny Campos guilty of possession of a
firearm with a prior violent felony conviction. On appeal,
Campos argues the evidence of the firearm should have been
suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
bring a suppression motion. Campos also contends that the trial
court erroneously instructed the jury on flight. We affirm the
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 1, 2022, at approximately 7:22 p.m., Los
Angeles County Sheriff Deputies Eliezer Vera and Joseph Welch
were in a marked car, patrolling a residential area in the City of
Lynwood. On one street, they observed a vehicle impeding
traffic. A man wearing black clothing, a black L.A. Dodgers hat,
and a crossbody bag was standing near the driver’s side door
of the car.
Vera shined his flashlight on the vehicle and the person
standing next to it. The man turned towards the officers, such
that Vera could observe his “whole front area.” Welch also saw
the man and noticed that he wore a black crossbody bag. The
individual appeared frightened and startled. He ran away within
seconds of Vera shining the light on him. At trial, Vera and
Welch both identified this individual as Campos.
Vera followed Campos on foot. He witnessed Campos run
through the side yard of a residence, climb over a gate, and
continue running. Vera then lost sight of him.
2
Vera called for backup. Within one to three minutes, a
helicopter and additional patrol vehicles arrived. Law
enforcement “took a position of containment,” and blocked off two
streets in the area to create a “box” around Campos’s last known
location, which took about two minutes. The helicopter circled
over the area. This ensured that law enforcement had a
“constant visual so that nobody could come in or out.”
Vera and other deputies searched for Campos. In the yard
of the house directly to the north of the residence where Vera had
last seen Campos, they found a black crossbody bag. Vera
recognized it as the one Campos had been wearing. The bag was
open, and the deputies saw a semiautomatic handgun inside.
The gun was loaded. No one at the property claimed the bag, and
Campos did not live at the residence. The deputies found the bag
approximately 20 minutes after Vera had last seen Campos.
Vera radioed for a K-9 unit. The K-9 unit alerted the
deputies to a person under a vehicle at a house that shared an
adjoining wall with the yard where the deputies had found the
bag. There was a black L.A. Dodgers hat on the ground near
where the man had hidden. Vera identified that person, Campos,
as the man he had seen earlier by the car.
In March 2023, an amended information charged Campos
with one count of possession of a firearm with a prior violent
conviction (Pen. Code, § 29900, subd. (a)(1); count 1).1 It also
alleged Campos had suffered prior convictions within the
meaning of the Three Strikes Law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j), 1170.12)
for first degree burglary (§ 459) and assault with a deadly
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
3
weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). The information additionally alleged
three circumstances in aggravation.
At a March 2023 jury trial, the parties stipulated that
Campos had been previously convicted of a felony. Campos did
not present any evidence at trial. His counsel argued to the jury
that the People could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Campos was the man Vera and Welch had seen by the car, or
that the bag the deputies found was the same bag the person on
the street had been wearing. The prosecution asserted it was
Campos who fled after seeing the police and his flight indicated
he knew he had a gun in his bag, which was relevant to one of the
elements of the charge under section 29900, subdivision (a)(1).2
Without objection from the defense,3 the trial court
instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 372 regarding flight: “If
the defendant fled immediately after the crime was committed,
that conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt. If you
conclude that the defendant fled, it is up to you to decide the
meaning and importance of that conduct. However, evidence that
the defendant fled cannot prove guilt by itself.”
The jury found Campos guilty as charged. Campos waived
a jury trial on his prior convictions and the alleged circumstances
in aggravation. Campos admitted the strike priors, and the trial
court dismissed one in the interests of justice. Campos also
2 The prosecution informed the jury there were three
elements it had to find for a conviction: (1) Campos possessed a
firearm, (2) Campos knew he possessed a firearm, and
(3) Campos had been previously convicted of a felony.
3 In his briefing on appeal, Campos states the flight
instruction was given over trial counsel’s objection. We find no
support for this contention in the record.
4
admitted as true the aggravating circumstance that he
committed the charged crime while on probation, mandatory
supervision, post-release community supervision, or parole,
within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(4).
The court sentenced Campos to a state prison term of six years.
Campos timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Campos argues that evidence of the firearm should have
been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights. He concedes that his trial counsel did
not file a motion to suppress, but asserts the argument is
cognizable on appeal as one for ineffective assistance of counsel.4
Campos also argues that the trial court erred in instructing the
jury on flight. We find no error and affirm.
I. Campos Has Not Established Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel
A. Applicable legal principles
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, guarantee
the right to the assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions.
The “proper standard for attorney performance is that of
reasonably effective assistance.” (Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland); People v. Pope (1979) 23
Cal.3d 412, 424 [attorney must provide “reasonably competent
4 To the extent Campos is attempting to raise a standalone
Fourth Amendment argument, he may not raise it for the first
time on appeal. (People v. Jenkins (1975) 13 Cal.3d 749, 753
(Jenkins) [failure to raise Fourth Amendment issue by
suppression motion before conviction forecloses argument on
appeal].)
5
assistance”].) An ineffective assistance claim “has two
components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable.” (Strickland, at p. 687.)
“ ‘ “In order to prevail on [an ineffective assistance of
counsel] claim on direct appeal, the record must affirmatively
disclose the lack of a rational tactical purpose for the challenged
act or omission.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Majors (1998)
18 Cal.4th 385, 403.) Thus, “if the record ‘ “sheds no light on why
counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,” ’ we
must reject the claim ‘ “unless counsel was asked for an
explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply
could be no satisfactory explanation.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 488 (Caro).) There is a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. (People v. Stanley (2006) 39
Cal.4th 913, 954.) We therefore defer to trial counsel’s
reasonable tactical decisions and do not judge those decisions in
hindsight’s harsh light. (Ibid.)
“Where a defendant claims ineffective assistance based on
counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim,
Strickland’s performance prong requires [him or] her to show
that it was objectively unreasonable—‘that is, contrary to
prevailing professional norms’—to forgo the [suppression]
motion.” (Caro, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 488.) “Examining the
6
Fourth Amendment claim’s merit has a role to play here. For
example, ‘[c]ounsel is not ineffective for failing to make frivolous
or futile motions.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “The prejudice prong of
Strickland then requires the defendant to ‘prove that [the]
Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a
reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different
absent the excludable evidence.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
B. Application
The record does not affirmatively indicate why Campos’s
trial counsel did not file a suppression motion. “[W]e presume
counsel’s decision not to raise the claim was a reasonable, tactical
one unless the record affirmatively demonstrates otherwise.”
(People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 443.) Nothing in the
record permits an inference that counsel’s decision was anything
other than a tactical one. There is no evidence that counsel “was
unaware of the exclusionary rule, the procedure for invoking it, or
the grounds for its invocation.” (Jenkins, supra, 13 Cal.3d at
p. 754.) Campos has not met his burden of establishing the
decision was not tactical. (Id. at p. 753 [when counsel does not
bring a motion to suppress, defendant bears the burden of
establishing counsel’s ineffectiveness in a non-speculative
manner].) Indeed, the relevant Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence indicates it was not objectively unreasonable for
Campos’s counsel to forgo the suppression motion and, for similar
reasons, Campos cannot establish that any such motion would
have been meritorious.
Campos asserts that evidence of the firearm should have
been excluded because it was the fruit of an unlawful seizure that
occurred when law enforcement pursued him. The United States
Supreme Court addressed a nearly identical issue in California v.
7
Hodari D. (1991) 499 U.S. 621 (Hodari). In Hodari, police officers
were on patrol, wearing jackets identifying them as police, when
they came upon several young people, including the defendant,
Hodari. Upon seeing the officers in their unmarked car, the
youths immediately took flight. (Id. at pp. 622–623.) The officers
pursued them. When one officer had nearly reached him, Hodari
tossed away a small rock of crack cocaine. The officer tackled
Hodari a moment later. (Id. at p. 623.) Although the juvenile
court denied a motion to suppress, the Court of Appeal reversed,
concluding Hodari was seized when he saw the officer running
toward him, the seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, and the evidence of cocaine was the fruit of the
illegal seizure and therefore had to be suppressed. The
California Supreme Court denied the People’s petition for review,
but the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. (Ibid.)
The high court considered only the issue of whether “at the
time he dropped the drugs, Hodari had been ‘seized’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” (Hodari, supra, 499 U.S. at
p. 623, fn. omitted.) Hodari argued that if he had been seized,
“the drugs were the fruit of that seizure and the evidence
concerning them was properly excluded. If not, the drugs were
abandoned by Hodari and lawfully recovered by the police, and
the evidence should have been admitted.” (Id. at p. 624.) The
court held there is no seizure if the subject does not yield. (Id. at
p. 626.) Thus, “assuming [the officer’s] pursuit in the present
case constituted a ‘show of authority’ enjoining Hodari to halt,
since Hodari did not comply with that injunction he was not
seized until he was tackled. The cocaine abandoned while he was
running was in this case not the fruit of a seizure, and his motion
to exclude evidence of it was properly denied.” (Id. at p. 629.)
8
On appeal, Campos asserts Hodari is distinguishable
because he was “seized” once the officers created a containment
zone and surrounded the area with cars and a helicopter. Yet,
this argument ignores that the record does not indicate when,
during the pursuit, Campos abandoned the bag containing the
firearm. Campos argues that the bag was found after the
containment, but this does not establish that it was not
abandoned beforehand, during the chase. This timing is critical.
(Hodari, supra, 499 U.S. at pp. 623–624, 629; People v. Raybourn
(1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 308, 313 [recognizing that contraband
found as a “product of the illegal detention” is subject to
suppression, whereas contraband discarded in anticipation of
detention during a police chase is not (italics added)].) As the
People point out, the record on this point was not developed
because Campos failed to move to suppress the evidence prior to
trial.5 On this record, Campos cannot establish that it was
objectively unreasonable for his trial counsel to fail to file a
suppression motion. The United States Supreme Court has not
overturned Hodari (see, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis
(1998) 523 U.S. 833, 844 [“a police pursuit in attempting to seize
a person does not amount to a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment”]), and courts of this state have followed the
ruling, as they must. (See, e.g., People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th
5 To the extent there was any relevant information in the
record, it did not necessarily support the claim Campos now
makes on appeal. Deputy Vera testified that he saw Campos run
through the yard of one residence, climb over a gate, and
continue running. At that point he lost sight of Campos and
called for backup, which led to the “containment.” The bag was
found in the yard of a residence that was only one house north of
the house where Vera had last seen Campos.
9
137, 180–181; People v. Arangure (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1302,
1307; People v. Johnson (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1, 11.)
Even assuming there was a colorable legal argument that
the containment zone constituted a seizure, if counsel had
information indicating Campos abandoned the bag before the
containment was set up, Hodari would indisputably control,
rendering any suppression motion futile. “An appellate court
should not declare that a police officer acted unlawfully, suppress
relevant evidence, set aside a jury verdict, and brand a defense
attorney incompetent unless it can be truly confident all the
relevant facts have been developed and the police and
prosecution had a full opportunity to defend the admissibility of
the evidence.” (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264,
267.) We have no such confidence here.
For the same reasons, Campos cannot establish that a
suppression motion would have been meritorious. The record
does not indicate that the facts, if developed, would have taken
the case outside of the reasoning of Hodari. (Caro, supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 489 [ambiguity in record prevented court from
determining plain view exception was inapplicable, thus
defendant did not carry her burden to establish Fourth
Amendment claim had merit]; cf. People v. Patrick (1982) 135
Cal.App.3d 290, 294 [rejecting argument that abandoned
evidence thrown over a fence during police chase due to
threatened illegal detention should be suppressed].)
In sum, Campos has not carried his burden of establishing
ineffective assistance of counsel. He has not shown that counsel’s
decision not to file a suppression motion was anything other than
tactical or was objectively unreasonable. Further, on the record
before us, he has not demonstrated that if counsel had filed a
10
motion to suppress, there was a reasonable probability it would
have been granted and he would have obtained a more favorable
result. He has therefore failed to establish either prong of the
ineffective assistance of counsel test.
II. Campos Has Not Established Reversible Error Based
on the Flight Instruction
Campos argues that the flight instruction was improper
because identity was disputed. He contends the flight instruction
“directed the jurors’ attention to something that was not relevant
to determining Appellant’s guilt,” since the identity of the person
with the bag was the only issue for the jury. He also maintains
there is no connection between running from a flashlight and
consciousness of guilt. Campos appears to argue that the
instruction was not supported by the evidence.
Campos did not object to the flight instruction in the trial
court. Therefore, we agree with the People that Campos has
forfeited this argument. (People v. Anderson (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 919, 927 [“Failure to object to instructional error
forfeits the issue on appeal unless the error affects defendant’s
substantial rights.”].) The question remains however whether
any alleged error was prejudicial under People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818. (Anderson, at p. 927.) We therefore address the
merits of Campos’s argument and find no error.
Under section 1127c, when the prosecution relies on
evidence of the defendant’s flight as tending to show guilt, the
trial court must provide a flight instruction. The instruction is to
inform the jury that “[t]he flight of a person immediately after
the commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a crime that
has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish his
guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, the jury may consider in
11
deciding his guilt or innocence. The weight to which such
circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.”
(§ 1127c.)
Courts have rejected the argument Campos makes here,
namely that the trial court should not instruct the jury on flight
when identity is at issue in the case. In People v. Mason (1991)
52 Cal.3d 909, 943 (Mason), the court explained that courts have
widely rejected the proposition that a flight instruction is error
whenever identity is a contested issue. Instead, “[i]f there is
evidence identifying the person who fled as the defendant, and if
such evidence ‘is relied upon as tending to show guilt,’ then it is
proper to instruct on flight. (§ 1127c.) ‘The jury must know that
it is entitled to infer consciousness of guilt from flight and that
flight, alone, is not sufficient to establish guilt. ([ ] § 1127c.) The
jury’s need to know these things does not change just because
identity is also an issue. Instead, such a case [only] requires the
jury to proceed logically by deciding first whether the [person
who fled] was the defendant and then, if the answer is
affirmative, how much weight to accord to flight in resolving the
other issues bearing on guilt. The jury needs the instruction for
the second step.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 943, citing People v.
London (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 896, 903.)
Here, there was evidence of Campos’s flight “apart from his
identification as the perpetrator, from which the jury could
reasonably infer a consciousness of guilt.” (People v. Rhodes
(1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1471, 1476, italics omitted.) Under such
circumstances, the instruction is appropriate. (People v. Scott
(1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1094.) We further disagree with
Campos’s assertion that the evidence was insufficient to create
an inference of consciousness of guilt because he was not fleeing
12
the scene of a crime and was merely running from a flashlight.
The evidence at trial established Campos was unlawfully in
possession of a firearm, a fact of which he would have been
aware, and, upon seeing law enforcement officers shine a light on
him from a marked police car, he fled. It was proper for the trial
court to instruct on flight. (Mason, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 943.)
Moreover, even if the trial court erred in giving the
instruction, Campos has not established it was reasonably
probable that the jury would have reached a more favorable
result had the instruction been omitted. There is no evidence
that the flight instruction misdirected or confused the jury.
Indeed, the jury was also instructed: “Some of these instructions
may not apply, depending on your findings about the facts of the
case. Do not assume just because I give a particular instruction
that I am suggesting anything about the facts. After you have
decided what the facts are, follow the instructions that do apply
to the facts as you find them.” The flight instruction also left it
up to the jury to decide “the meaning and importance” of
Campos’s flight. While the instruction informed the jury that it
could consider the evidence of flight as an indication that Campos
“was aware of his guilt,” it also provided that the “evidence that
the defendant fled cannot prove guilt by itself.” Absent a
contrary indication in the record, we presume that the jury
followed the court’s instructions. (Carroll v. Commission on
Teacher Credentialing (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 365, 382–383.)
“ ‘[T]he instruction merely permitted the jury to consider
evidence of flight in deciding defendant’s guilt or innocence; it did
not suggest that the jury should consider such evidence as
dispositive.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472,
522.)
13
Campos has not demonstrated that without the flight
instruction, it was reasonably probable that the jury would have
reached a more favorable verdict.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
HANASONO, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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