In re A.G. CA2/4

CourtListener 10313588Calctapp14 de jan. de 2025

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Filed 1/14/25 In re A.G. CA2/4
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re A.G., B331398

a Person Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP02589)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Philip L. Soto, Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded with directions.
Patricia K. Saucier, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Amir Pichvai for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
J.G. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating
parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26)1 over her child, A.G. Her sole
contention on appeal is that the Los Angeles County Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with the “initial duty to inquire”
under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and
related California statutes (§ 224 et seq.). We previously affirmed the order.
Subsequently, our Supreme Court granted mother’s petition for review and
ultimately transferred the case back to us with directions to vacate our prior
decision and reconsider the cause in light of In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1112 (Dezi C.). After reconsideration, we conditionally reverse the juvenile
court’s order and remand for further compliance with ICWA.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Our summary of the facts is limited to those needed for resolution of
the ICWA issue raised on appeal and to provide relevant context.
On July 6, 2022, DCFS filed a dependency petition on behalf of A.G.
(born in July 2022), which was sustained on August 10, 2022. Attached to
the petition was the ICWA-010 form, stating that on July 3, 2022, mother
and maternal aunt Ingrid G. (Ingrid) gave the social worker no reason to
believe A.G. was an Indian child. Ingrid later told the social worker that she
lived in Nevada with maternal grandmother and maternal uncle Morris G.
(Morris). Mother reported she had a “good” relationship with maternal
grandparents and that she spoke to them on a weekly basis.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise stated.

2
On July 6, 2022, mother filed an ICWA-020 form, stating she had no
Indian ancestry as far as she knew.
At the detention hearing on July 7, 2022, the juvenile court
acknowledged receipt of mother’s ICWA-020 form. The court found there was
no reason to know A.G. was an Indian child but ordered mother to keep
DCFS, her attorney, and the court aware of any new information relating to
ICWA status.
On July 21, 2022, and January 13, 2023, mother continued to deny
having Indian ancestry. On July 22, 2022, and again on January 10, 2023,
Ingrid also denied having Indian ancestry.
At the six-month review hearing on April 24, 2023, the court ordered
DCFS to conduct an inquiry with A.G.’s relatives about any Indian ancestry.
The court also ordered DCFS to give notice to the tribes, Department of the
Interior, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, if necessary.
On July 25, 2023, maternal aunt Mirna S. denied having Indian
ancestry. That same day, Morris stated he thought the family might have
Indian ancestry but that Ingrid would know. When the social worker spoke
with Ingrid, she again denied Indian ancestry and reported she did some
research that led to the same conclusion. On August 1, 2023, maternal
cousin Osmar also denied Indian ancestry.
On August 21, 2023, the court found an adequate ICWA inquiry had
been conducted and that ICWA did not apply. The court confirmed with
mother at the hearing that she had no reason to believe she had Indian
ancestry. The court terminated parental rights.

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DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
ICWA2 reflects “a congressional determination to protect Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families by establishing minimum federal standards that a state court . . .
must follow before removing an Indian child from his or her family.” (In re
Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 881 (Austin J.), disapproved of on a
different ground in Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152, fn. 18.) Both ICWA
and the Welfare and Institutions Code define an “Indian child” as “any
unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an
Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1,
subds. (a) and (b) [incorporating federal definitions].)
The juvenile court and DCFS have “an affirmative and continuing duty
to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under Section 300 . . . may be
or has been filed, is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re
Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9, 11–12.) This continuing duty can be divided
into three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and
the duty to provide formal ICWA notice. The phase at issue here is the initial
duty to inquire.
The duty to inquire whether a child is an Indian child begins with “the
initial contact,” i.e., when the referring party reports child abuse or neglect
that triggers DCFS’s investigation. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) DCFS’s initial duty
to inquire includes asking the child, parents, legal guardian, extended family
members, and others who have an interest in the child whether the child is,

2 Our state Legislature incorporated ICWA’s requirements into
California statutory law in 2006. (In re Abbigail A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83, 91.)
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or may be, an Indian child. (Id., subd. (b).) Similarly, the juvenile court must
inquire at each parent’s first appearance whether he or she “knows or has
reason to know that the child is an Indian child.” (Id., subd. (c).) The
juvenile court must also require each parent to complete the parental
notification of Indian status form (ICWA-020). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.481(a)(2)(C).) The parties are instructed to inform the court “if they
subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child is an
Indian child.” (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a); § 224.2, subd. (c).)
A duty of further inquiry is imposed when DCFS or the juvenile court
has “reason to believe that an Indian child is involved” in the proceedings.
(§ 224.2, subd. (e); see Austin J., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at pp. 883–884; In re
D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048–1049 (D.S.).) When DCFS or the
juvenile court has “reason to know” an Indian child is involved, formal ICWA
notice is sent to the relevant tribes. (D.S., supra, at p. 1052.)
We review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings for substantial evidence.
(In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401; In re S.R. (2021) 64
Cal.App.5th 303, 312.) Not every error by DCFS in discharging its duties
under section 224.2 will undermine the court’s ICWA finding, but the court’s
ability to exercise discretion in this regard is dependent on adequate record
development by the agency. “‘“On a well-developed record, the court has
relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was
proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case. However,
the less developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily
becomes.”’ [Citations.]” (Dezi C., supra, at p. 1141.)

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II. Initial Inquiry
Mother contends DCFS failed to fulfill its duty of initial inquiry by not
inquiring of maternal grandparents.
As noted, section 224.2, subdivision (b) imposes on DCFS a duty of
initial inquiry, which includes asking “extended family members” whether
the child may be an Indian child. “Extended family members” are defined as
the “child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or
sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (See 25
U.S.C. § 1903(2) and § 224.1, subd. (c).) Mother reported to DCFS that she
had a “good relationship” with maternal grandparents (who were separated),
and that she spoke with them weekly. In addition, maternal grandmother
lived with Ingrid, who had numerous contacts with DCFS. However, DCFS
did not make any attempt to obtain either maternal grandparent’s contact
information from mother or Ingrid. Furthermore, it appears DCFS had the
address and telephone number for maternal grandmother’s home, as she
lived with Ingrid, and could have contacted her directly. On this record,
DCFS did not conduct a proper inquiry. Thus, we are compelled to
conditionally reverse the order of the juvenile court and remand the case for
further proceedings. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) We expect DCFS
will be diligent in making sure there has been full compliance with ICWA.
(See H.A. v. Superior Court (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 956, 965–966.)
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DISPOSITION
Our prior decision is vacated. The juvenile court’s order terminating
parental rights (§ 366.26) is conditionally reversed and the matter is
remanded for the limited purpose of complying with ICWA and related
California law. The juvenile court is directed to order DCFS to make
reasonable efforts to inquire of A.G.’s maternal grandparents and to submit
to the juvenile court a report of its interviews or efforts to conduct the
interviews. If, based on the initial inquiry, there is reason to believe an
Indian child may be involved but not yet sufficient information to determine
if notice must be provided to a tribe or tribes, DCFS is to conduct further
inquiry pursuant to section 224.2, subdivision (e). At a noticed hearing, with
counsel for mother reappointed, the juvenile court shall determine whether
adequate inquiry and any necessary notice has been made and make findings
as required by ICWA. If the court finds ICWA is not applicable, it shall
reinstate the order terminating parental rights. If notice is required and any
tribe indicates the child is an Indian child, the juvenile court is ordered to
conduct a new section 366.26 hearing and proceed in accordance with ICWA.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

CURREY, P. J.

MORI, J.

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