CourtListener 10313533•People v. Smith CA2/4
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Filed 1/14/25 P. v. Smith CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B331510
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA098545)
v.
JAMES LEWIS SMITH,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Judith L. Meyer, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Jonathan Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant James Lewis Smith and his brother, David, got
into a fistfight with two strangers they randomly encountered on
the street. After getting knocked down during the fight, David
drew a gun and fatally shot one of the strangers. A jury found
David guilty of second degree murder, and appellant pled no
contest to voluntary manslaughter. Appellant subsequently filed
a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6,1
arguing that he could not be convicted under an aiding and
abetting theory because there was no evidence he shared David’s
intent to kill. The trial court denied the petition after an
evidentiary hearing, and appellant appealed.
Approximately one month later, the Supreme Court decided
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 992 (Reyes), in which it
clarified the key questions necessary to determine whether a
petitioner aided and abetted a direct perpetrator of murder: Did
the petitioner know the perpetrator intended to kill the victim?
Did the petitioner intend to aid the killing? Did the petitioner
know the shooting or other life-endangering act was dangerous to
human life? And did the petitioner act in conscious disregard for
human life? The trial court did not have the benefit of Reyes at
the time of appellant’s evidentiary hearing and does not appear
to have considered these questions. Because we cannot know
whether the trial court would have reached the same result
under the correct standard, we reverse and remand for the trial
court to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered to section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.) All further undesignated statutory references
are to the Penal Code.
2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts were adduced from evidence admitted
at appellant’s section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) hearing. That
evidence consisted of transcripts of appellant’s preliminary, plea,
and sentencing hearings; a transcript of a recorded conversation
appellant had with jail informants (the “Perkins operation”2); and
a transcript of the interrogation of his cousin, Asia Otts.
Around 1:50 p.m. on February 21, 2014, M. Allen was
walking down a Long Beach sidewalk with her friend
Christopher Lane. Appellant and his brother David were
walking the opposite direction and approached Lane and Allen.
Appellant bumped into Allen and asked her, “Baby, what you
doin’ with him?” He also asked Allen and Lane where they were
from, which Allen interpreted as gang banging Appellant told
them, “This ain’t no Hub City,” which Allen took as a
“disrespectful” reference to the Compton hat she was wearing.
Allen and Lane said they did not gang bang and tried to walk
away.
David said, “This is Babies. This is our city,” which Allen
understood as a reference to a local gang she knew as “Insane.”3
Appellant then insulted Allen and told her she was “out of
pocket.” Allen responded in kind. At some point, David and
2 In Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292 (Perkins), the
United States Supreme Court held a criminal suspect who makes
incriminating statements is not entitled to warnings under
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 “when the suspect is
unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer and
gives a voluntary statement.” (Perkins, at p. 294.)
3 A gang expert testified at the preliminary hearing that
“Baby Insane” was a prominent clique of the Insane Crips gang.
3
appellant asked Allen and Lane to go around the corner. Allen
and Lane refused.
At that point, either appellant struck Allen, or she struck
him; Allen said the former on direct examination and the latter
on cross and to police. When David tried to intervene, Lane
struck him, and the two men began fighting as well. After David
and Lane exchanged some blows, Lane knocked David to the
ground. Allen and appellant stopped fighting and “were just
standing there looking shocked.” Allen told Lane, “Let’s go,” and
they started to walk away. David then got up, drew a gun, and
fired three or four shots at Lane’s back. Lane was struck and fell
to the ground.
Allen knelt down next to Lane and began talking to him.
David approached, put his revolver about a foot from Allen’s face,
and threatened to kill her. Lane said appellant “stood together”
with David in Allen’s “area,” and “they didn’t separate until
[Lane] was laying on the ground and [David] put the gun in my
face.” Allen told David to go ahead, but he withdrew the gun.
Allen then stood up to call 911 and Lane’s mother, and David and
appellant walked away, going in different directions. Allen
estimated the entire encounter took “no more than two minutes.”
For purposes of the preliminary hearing, the parties stipulated
that Lane died of multiple gunshot wounds.
After the shooting, appellant and David stayed in various
hotels with their cousin, Asia Otts, who believed they had been
involved with a robbery. Sometime later, appellant was arrested
and placed in a jail cell with two government informants; his
conversation with them was recorded.
During the conversation, appellant told the informants he
was from “Babies” in Long Beach but he and his older brother
4
had been apprehended in Los Angeles for “hood shit.” Appellant
said “the shit happened” when Lane and Allen started it. When
asked if he and David had been “on a gang banging trip,”
appellant said “[l]ow-ball” and “we was cool,” but Lane, who was
from Compton, had been tripping. Appellant claimed that he had
thrown punches at Lane and denied fighting Allen. He further
acknowledged that David shot Lane in the back, and said he had
been “about 5 feet,” or “5 or 10 feet” away at the time. When one
of the informants asked appellant if he had burned the clothes he
had been wearing, appellant said “Uh-huh.” He also
acknowledged a role in disposing of the gun. When asked if he
had been “running” before his apprehension, appellant said his
cousin “had the hotel.” One of the informants advised appellant
to talk to David and “come up with . . . a story,” such as “‘I didn’t
know shit. I was just - - yes, I was there[, a]nd shit like that, you
know, if your brother is okay with it.” Appellant responded, “Uh-
huh.”
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. Conviction
A felony complaint filed March 11, 2014 charged appellant
and David with the murder of Lane (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) and
the assault of Allen with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2), count 2).
The complaint included gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) and
principal use firearm allegations (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1))
against both appellant and David, and personal use firearm
allegations against David only (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53,
subds. (b)-(d)). The preliminary hearing at which Allen gave the
above testimony was held on December 23, 2014. The trial court
held both appellant and David to answer.
5
On April 5, 2017, appellant and the People agreed to a plea
deal. Under the terms of the agreement, the People added a
charge of voluntary manslaughter to the information (§ 192,
subd. (a), count 3). Appellant pled no contest to all three charges
and applicable enhancements, with the proviso that sentencing
would be put over until the conclusion of David’s trial. If
appellant refrained from committing any crimes that affected the
case and testified truthfully if called at trial, the People would
dismiss all charges and allegations except the interlineated
voluntary manslaughter charge, on which appellant would
receive a midterm sentence of six years.
David proceeded to trial, at which a jury found him guilty
of second degree murder and assault and found the
enhancements true. On May 8, 2017, in accordance with the plea
agreement, the People dismissed the murder and assault charges
and enhancement allegations and the trial court sentenced
appellant to the midterm of six years for voluntary
manslaughter. The trial court also ordered appellant to pay
restitution, for which he was jointly and severally liable with
David.
II. Section 1172.6 Proceedings
On January 12, 2022, appellant filed a section 1172.6
petition for resentencing. The trial court appointed counsel for
him and ordered the People to respond to the petition.
On February 28, 2022, the People filed an opposition
arguing that appellant was ineligible for relief because “[n]either
natural and probable consequences nor felony murder were
applicable theories of liability to this case.” Citing the appellate
opinion affirming David’s convictions on direct appeal, People v.
Smith (Jan. 8, 2019, B283278) [nonpub. opn.], which stated that
6
appellant’s statements to the informants “exposed him to possible
aider and abettor liability,” the People argued that appellant
could still be found guilty as an aider and abettor.
On May 16, 2022, appellant filed a reply asserting that the
“theory throughout the prosecution of the case was on the
contrary a Natural and Probable Consequences Theory.” He
argued that there “was a lack of evidence to support that James
Smith had knowledge of the gun David Smith possessed prior to
the shooting, but even further there was a lack of evidence to
support that James Smith had the requisite intent to aid and
abet the shooting in that he did anything to ‘aid, facilitate,
promote, encourage, or instigate the commission of the crime,’
which would have been required to successfully prosecute under
an aiding and abetting theory.”
On August 4, 2022, the trial court found a prima facie case
for resentencing and issued an order to show cause. The People
subsequently filed an additional opposition, arguing that
evidence from the record of conviction proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant directly aided and abetted Lane’s
murder and was guilty of first or second degree murder. The
People specifically pointed to the following, with all punctuation
variations in original: “1) Petitioner James Smith initiated the
confrontation with the victims 2) Petitioner James Smith
Escalated [sic] the confrontation with the victims 3) petitioner
attempted to continue the altercation on a street with less
visibility 4) Petitioner got into a physical fight with [ ] Allen ; 4)
[sic] Petitioner fighting with Allen gave David Smith an
opportunity to fight with Victim Lane; 5) when the fight ended
petitioner James Smith remained with his brother and fellow
gang member. 6) petitioner stood next to David Smith as David
7
Smith shot Lane in the back. Petitioner did not flee. 7) Petitioner
stood by as David assaulted and threatened Allen Petitioner [sic]
did not flee. 8) Petitioner casually walked away with David. 9)
Petitioner got rid of the gun 10) Petitioner got rid of the clothing
he was wearing at the time 11) Petitioner hid in hotels after the
murder[.]”
The People further argued that appellant was “guilty of a
second degree, implied malice murder as a direct aider and
abettor.” Citing the same evidence, the People argued that
appellant “facilitated this shooting of Lane by claiming their gang
keeping [sic] Allen engaged during the physical fight. His
statements claiming babies [sic] and Insane compelled David to
kill. His presence at the crime scene reassured David conduct
[sic]. Through his conduct, Petitioner Smith demonstrated his
conscious disregard for Lane’s life. After the victim was shot
numerous times, Petitioner Smith casually and callously walked
away with his brother. Petitioner Smith’s actions demonstrated
malice aforethought, implied malice, as required by the newly
amended section 188.” Appellant did not submit any additional
filings.
On May 30, 2023, the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing. The court sustained appellant’s objections to the
admission of the jury instructions and sentencing hearing
transcript from David’s trial and the appellate opinion affirming
David’s convictions. It admitted into evidence appellant’s
preliminary hearing transcript, the plea hearing transcript, the
recordings and transcript of the Perkins operation, and the
recording and transcript of Otts’s police interview. Neither side
called any witnesses or presented other evidence.
8
In addition to relying on their written arguments, the
People asserted that the petition should be denied because
appellant’s initial no contest plea to the murder and joint and
several responsibility for restitution showed that “the theory of
the disposition was for aiding and abetting.” Appellant’s counsel
repeatedly contended there was no evidence that appellant
shared David’s intent to kill Lane, “which is required for an
aiding and abetting theory.” Appellant’s counsel characterized
the facts as “a classic natural and probable consequences
scenario,” and emphasized that appellant was not fighting at the
time the shots were fired.
In reply, the People characterized the facts as “a classic
gang confrontation” and asserted that appellant’s comments to
the informants about “low-ball gang banging” showed that
appellant knew that David “was prepared to end that
confrontation and was armed.” The People also asserted that
appellant tried to get Lane and Allen to go around the corner
because he “wanted less witnesses to what was about to happen,”
and was “there for support” as the fight ended and David
threatened Allen. They also pointed to appellant’s disposal of the
gun and his clothes as evidence that he aided and abetted.
Appellant’s counsel responded that the post-shooting conduct was
“tantamount to accessory-after-the-fact behavior” and did little to
demonstrate appellant’s intent at the relevant time. She further
reiterated her contention that the People were making “the exact
argument you make in a natural and probable consequences
argument.” The court took the matter under submission.
In a written ruling filed later the same day, the court
denied the petition. After listing the evidence and written
arguments it had considered, the court made the following ruling:
9
“The court finds beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of James
Lewis Smith. The court basis [sic] this ruling upon evidence
presented and admitted at the hearing. Specifically, the court re-
reviewed the Perkins Operation DVD and transcript. The court
found that as compelling evidence to Mr. James Lewis Smith [sic]
specific intent towards guilt in this case. In addition, specifically
in the PH [preliminary hearing] transcript, on page 69, line 27-
28, through page 70, lines 1-10, the court finds that testimony
relevant as to whether Mr. James Lewis Smith harbored a
specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt to satisfy guilt in this
case. Ultimately, based upon the entire record of this hearing,
this court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to Mr. James
Lewis Smith’s guilty [sic] in this case.”4 Appellant timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
While appellant’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court
decided Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th 981. In Reyes, defendant Reyes
was with a group of fellow gang members, one of whom he knew
had a gun. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 985.) Reyes and the
group rode their bicycles to an area on the edge of a rival gang’s
4 The cited portion of the preliminary hearing transcript
contains Allen’s re-cross-examination testimony about what
happened after David fired at Lane: “Q. And once the shots went
off, [appellant] walked down the street; correct? A. Not right at –
they stood together, they didn’t separate until [Lane] was laying
on the ground and this young guy right here put the gun in my
face. Q. But [appellant] was walking down the street at that
point? A. No, he was not. He was still in that area as this young
guy put a gun in my face. Q. He wasn’t standing next to you,
though? A. They both were in my area as I was laying on the
ground, a gun in my face.”
10
territory, where they chased after a car. The gang member with
the gun, Lopez, fired a single shot at the driver of the car. The
shot struck the driver in the head and killed him. (Ibid.) Later
in the day, Reyes held the murder weapon to another victim’s
head while he and several others assaulted the victim. (Ibid.)
Reyes was charged with murder. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 985.) At his trial, the People conceded Reyes was not the
shooter and argued that Reyes was guilty under the natural and
probable consequences theory or “directly aided and abetted the
murder by ‘backing up fellow gang members’ during the killing.”
(Ibid.) Notably, “[t]here was no evidence that Reyes had
expressly agreed to serve as backup while Lopez committed the
murder. The prosecutor argued that there was no need to show
an express agreement because the jury could ‘infer from the
surrounding facts’ that Reyes was acting as backup.” (Id. at p.
986.) Specifically, the prosecutor “pointed to Reyes’s ‘presence’ at
the time of the shooting and earlier in the park when Lopez
showed the gun to others; his ‘companionship’ with Lopez . . .; his
‘flight from the scene’ after the killing; and the fact that Reyes
subsequently possessed the murder weapon and used it during a
separate assault later that day.” (Ibid.) The jury found Reyes
guilty of second degree murder, street terrorism, and related
gang and firearm enhancements. (Ibid.)
Reyes later filed a petition for resentencing under section
1172.6, arguing that he was convicted under the now-invalid
natural and probable consequences theory. (Reyes, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 986.) The matter proceeded to an evidentiary
hearing, at which Reyes’s counsel argued there was no evidence
that Reyes committed any act that helped, encouraged, or
facilitated the fatal shooting. (Id. at pp. 986-987.) The trial court
11
denied the petition, finding that “‘the act in this case is the
defendant, along with several other gang members, one of which
[was] armed, traveled to rival gang territory,’ that the natural
and probable consequence of their doing so was dangerous to
human life, that Reyes was aware the act was dangerous to
human life, and that he deliberately acted with conscious
disregard for that danger.” (Id. at p. 987.) The Court of Appeal
affirmed. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court granted review and
reversed.
Applying the de novo standard of review because there was
“an issue as to whether the court misunderstood the elements of
the applicable offense,” the Supreme Court concluded the trial
court “misapprehended what is required as a matter of law to
prove aiding and abetting implied malice murder.” (Reyes, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 988.) The court explained that “[t]o suffice for
implied malice murder, the defendant’s act must not merely be
dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must
‘“involve[ ] a high degree of probability that it will result in
death.”’” (Id. at p. 989.) The court noted that Reyes accompanied
an armed gang member to an area near rival territory, and “[i]t
may have been likely that this act would result in some sort of
gang confrontation, and it is possible that someone would get
hurt or killed.” (Ibid.) However, the court held that “the act does
not by itself give rise to a high degree of probability that death
will result.” (Ibid.) The court further held that “‘to be liable for
an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by
words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act,
not the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be
personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge
that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the
12
perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act
is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for
human life.’” (Id. at p. 991, emphases in original.)
Thus, it held that, “assuming the life-endangering act was
the shooting, the trial court should have asked whether Reyes
knew that Lopez intended to shoot at the victim, intended to aid
him in the shooting, knew that the shooting was dangerous to
life, and acted in conscious disregard for life.” (Reyes, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 992.) Because it was unclear whether the trial court
would reach the same result under the correct standard, the
Supreme Court remanded the matter for “proper application of
the elements of implied malice murder on a direct aiding and
abetting theory.” (Ibid.)
Appellant contends that Reyes is factually and legally
analogous, and, under its holding, “it is apparent that the
evidence was not sufficient to sustain a finding that appellant
aided and abetted the shooting of the victim.” He acknowledges
that “there was always the possibility” that the spontaneous
encounter he and David had with Lane and Allen on the sidewalk
“could escalate into violence,” but argues that “nothing about the
circumstances leading up to the shooting created a substantial
likelihood or reasonable expectation that fatal violence would be
the outcome.” He requests that we reverse outright or remand
“for a new evidentiary hearing and a proper application of the
elements of implied malice murder on a direct aiding and
abetting theory.”
The Attorney General responds that substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that appellant directly aided
and abetted either an express or implied malice murder.
Respondent argues that appellant’s reliance on Reyes “is not well
13
taken” because “appellant’s actions did more than create the
possibility of a fatal outcome.” Respondent asserts that “the
evidence here showed that appellant admitted to an informant he
was ‘gang banging’ with David, instigated and escalated the gang
fight, did nothing to indicate surprise when David took out the
gun, joined in threatening the surviving victim, and concealed
evidence of the crime afterwards.” Respondent contends the case
is more analogous to People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943
(Vargas), an appellate court decision that pre-dates Reyes.
We first consider whether the trial court applied the correct
standard in determining whether appellant could be guilty under
a direct aiding and abetting theory. This is a legal question that
we review independently. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.)
We agree with appellant that Reyes delineates the
applicable legal requirements of direct aiding and abetting
implied malice murder. Even if Vargas is more factually
analogous, which we do not decide here, it pre-dates Reyes, which
is binding on this court. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) To the extent the trial court
may have found appellant guilty of directly aiding and abetting
an express malice murder, the standard is largely the same: a
defendant must have “not only an intent to kill but knowledge
and intent regarding the direct perpetrator’s homicidal or life-
endangering acts.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 469
(Curiel); see also id. at p. 463 [noting similarity of standards and
citing Reyes].) “Intent to kill itself does not establish a sufficient
mens rea regarding a murder or life-endangering conduct that
the aider and abettor has no intent to aid or encourage — and
that the aider and abettor does not even subjectively know will
occur.” (Id. at p. 470.)
14
Both Reyes and Curiel were decided after the trial court
made its ruling in this case. The court accordingly did not have
the benefit of either decision when considering whether the
People proved appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We
presume the court understood and applied the correct legal
standard (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114), but the
applicable standards in the section 1172.6 context have evolved
rapidly and were further refined after the court made its ruling.
Although the court displayed great care in its evaluation of
the evidence presented at the hearing, it does not appear to have
considered the pertinent questions set forth in the superseding
and controlling authorities of Reyes and Curiel: “whether
[appellant] knew that [David] intended to shoot at the victim,
intended to aid him in the shooting, knew that the shooting was
dangerous to life, and acted in conscious disregard for life.”
(Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 992.) Instead, it primarily
emphasized whether appellant “harbored a specific intent.” As
Curiel teaches, such intent is not dispositive in the context of
aiding and abetting liability. We accordingly conclude the court
erred.
Because the court did not have the opportunity to evaluate
the facts under the correct standards for aiding and abetting
liability, we remand the matter to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion and any additional
developments in section 1172.6 jurisprudence. On remand, the
parties may address appellant’s age and maturity level at the
time of the crime.
15
DISPOSITION
The order denying appellant’s section 1172.6 petition is
reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
CURREY, P.J.
MORI, J.
16
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