People v. Deiner CA4/2

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Filed 1/10/25 P. v. Deiner CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E082014

v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV1400027)

JASON DEINER, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Daniel W.

Detienne, Judge. Conditionally reversed with directions.

So'Hum Law Center of Richard Jay Moller and Richard Jay Moller for Defendant

and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and

Michael J. Patty, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
A jury convicted Jason Deiner of five counts of robbery, two counts of burglary,

and one count of reckless evasion of a police officer. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 459; Veh.

Code, § 2800.2; unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Penal Code.) In 2019, we

decided Deiner’s appeal from the judgment. (People v. Deiner (Dec. 19, 2019, E071193)

[nonpub. opn.] (Deiner I).)1 We conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the

matter for the trial court to consider whether Deiner qualified for mental health diversion

under section 1001.36. We also directed the court to consider whether to strike Deiner’s

enhancements for prior serious felony convictions, assuming that the court declined to

order mental health diversion.

On remand, the court denied Deiner’s diversion motion. The court resentenced

him by striking four prior serious felony enhancements, reducing his prison sentence by

20 years. In this appeal from the amended judgment, Deiner argues that the court abused

its discretion by applying the incorrect legal standard to his diversion motion. He also

argues that the court abused its discretion by declining to consider a full resentencing on

remand. We agree that the court applied the incorrect legal standard when it ruled on the

diversion motion. We therefore conditionally reverse the judgment and remand for the

court to reconsider the diversion motion under the correct standard. But we otherwise

reject Deiner’s arguments.

1 We granted Deiner’s request to take judicial notice of our opinion in his first
appeal.

2
BACKGROUND

I. Deiner’s convictions and original sentence

The evidence at trial showed that Deiner robbed two banks, one in December 2013

and another in January 2014. (Deiner I, supra, E071193, pp. 2-3.) He wielded a gun

during both robberies, and he also claimed to have a bomb during one robbery. (Ibid.)

Deiner led officers on a car chase after the second robbery, but they eventually

apprehended him. (Id. at p. 3.) Inside his truck, investigators found clothing that

matched descriptions of the robber’s clothing, $1100, and a BB gun. (Ibid.)

The jury convicted Deiner of robbing two employees at the first bank and three

employees at the second bank. (Deiner I, supra, E071193, p. 9.) The jurors also

convicted him of second degree burglary of both banks and recklessly evading officers

for the car chase. (Ibid.) The operative information alleged that Deiner had five prior

robbery convictions (three in one case and two in another case), which qualified as prior

strikes for purposes of the three strikes law and prior serious felonies under section 667,

subdivision (a)(1). (Id. at p. 8.) The court found those allegations to be true, and it

denied Deiner’s motion to strike or dismiss the prior strikes under section 1385 and

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). (Deiner I, supra,

E071193, p. 8.)

The court sentenced Deiner to a total of 70 years to life in prison, plus a

determinate term of six years. (Deiner I, supra, E071193, p. 2.) The indeterminate

sentence consisted of two 25-years-to-life terms for two of the robbery counts and four

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five-year terms for prior serious felony enhancements. (Id. at p. 9.) The six-year term

was for recklessly evading officers. (Ibid.) The court imposed prison terms on the

remaining counts, but it stayed them under section 654 or ordered them to run

concurrently. (Ibid.)

II. Mental health diversion proceedings on remand

In Deiner I, Deiner argued that the recently enacted mental health diversion statute

applied retroactively in his case because the judgment was nonfinal. We agreed,

conditionally reversed the judgment, and directed the trial court to consider whether

Deiner qualified for mental health diversion under section 1001.36. Our Supreme Court

granted review and deferred further action pending review and disposition of the issue in

People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618 (Frahs). (People v. Deiner (Feb. 26, 2020),

S260282.) Frahs held that section 1001.36 applied retroactively to all cases not yet final

on appeal (Frahs, at pp. 624, 630-631), and the Supreme Court dismissed review in

Deiner I. (People v. Deiner (July 29, 2020), S260282.)

A. Relevant evidence

After the case was remanded to the trial court, Deiner submitted a written report

from a licensed psychologist, Dr. Chuck Leeb. Dr. Leeb evaluated Deiner in May 2021

and found him to be an appropriate candidate for mental health diversion. The doctor

diagnosed Deiner with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), amphetamine-type

substance use disorder, and opioid use disorder.

4
According to Dr. Leeb’s report, Deiner began using methamphetamine at age 12

and heroin at age 30. (Deiner was 42 years old when evaluated.) In Dr. Leeb’s

experience, there was “a high correlation” between methamphetamine use at an early age

and sexual assault. The doctor asked Deiner “if this applied to him.” Deiner slumped his

shoulders, looked away, and turned to the side. He then reported that when he was eight

or nine years old, his older brother’s friend “was around a lot.” The friend was

approximately 15 years older than Deiner. The friend threatened to hurt Deiner and his

family if Deiner said anything. Dr. Leeb concluded that Deiner had been sexually

assaulted. He opined that the sexual assault caused PTSD and that Deiner dealt with the

trauma by using methamphetamine and heroin.

The doctor further opined that there was “a very high probability that Mr. Deiner’s

mental health symptoms were the only reason” that Deiner committed the offenses.

Someone with PTSD may suffer from auditory pseudo-hallucinations and paranoid

ideation. Deiner reported that he had been delusional and had auditory hallucinations

when he was using drugs, and he had paranoid auditory hallucinations even when he was

sober. The hallucinations had stopped since he started taking antipsychotic and

antianxiety medications. Deiner said that he committed the offenses because he needed

money to hire an attorney in his child custody dispute. Dr. Leeb opined that PTSD

impacted Deiner’s reasonableness, insight, foresight, judgment, and ability to control

himself. He also opined that the symptoms motivating Deiner’s criminal behavior would

respond to mental health treatment.

5
The court held several hearings on Deiner’s diversion motion. Dr. Leeb testified

at the first hearing in April 2022. Consistent with his report, the doctor testified that he

diagnosed Deiner with PTSD resulting from childhood sexual assault. When Deiner said

that he had started using methamphetamine at 12 years old, Dr. Leeb asked him if he had

been sexually assaulted as a child. Deiner “broke down and admitted reluctantly that he

had been.” He appeared to be in emotional pain; he dropped his head, slumped his

shoulders, put his hands on his head, and teared up. Deiner said that he had been

assaulted over a period of time and that the perpetrator threatened his safety and the

safety of his family. At that age, Deiner believed that he and his family were in danger,

so he did not disclose the assault. Dr. Leeb asked Deiner for more details but did not

push when Deiner said that he did not “‘want to go there now.’”

According to Dr. Leeb, victims of childhood sexual assault can experience

scarring and lesions particularly in the right hemisphere of the brain, which is the area of

the brain that affects executive functions, the ability to regulate emotions, and self-image

and self-esteem. It was not unusual for victims of childhood sexual assault to engage in

criminal behavior because of the effect on the executive functioning of the brain. For

example, Deiner said that he committed the robberies to get money for his children.

Committing robberies for that purpose “doesn’t make any sense, but it does make sense if

you can’t engage the executive functions.” Dr. Leeb saw no evidence that Deiner had a

toxicology screen when he was arrested, but if he had methamphetamine in his system,

6
that would have also driven his behavior. Methamphetamine was “not known for

producing logical, reasonable thought.”

Dr. Leeb opined that Deiner would not have committed the offenses if he had not

been suffering from PTSD caused by childhood sexual assault. Deiner took full

responsibility for his behavior, felt remorse for his actions, and was empathetic toward

his victims. His records also showed that he had been a model prisoner; he had not

violated any rules, and he was medication compliant. The doctor did not see any

indications that Deiner was malingering.

Deiner also submitted his medical records from prison, and the court indicated that

it reviewed them. According to the medical records, Deiner had a mental health

consultation in July 2020. In the section describing the reason for the consultation, the

notes state: “Inmate has issues of drug usage and old childhood traumas that he reports

he can barely recall.” The records indicate that he had a mental health assessment later

that month. The clinical summary states that Deiner was “endorsing both anxiety and

some depression. He reports having been depressed most of his life. . . . The patient

reported having been sexually molested by a neighbor boy when he []was in grade

school. . . . The patient has a drug history that began about age 12 shortly after a Sunday

School teacher was being too overfamiliar with him and he stopped going to that church.”

The records of the same assessment also state: “Overall, this patient had difficulties in

school in reaction to his sexual molest and managed to graduate continuation School. He

reacted again to the later overfamiliarity by using drugs to numb up. The patient most

7
likely lost his trust in people following the overfamiliarity and drug abuse led to

criminality and finally to prison.”

B. The court’s ruling

The court heard argument on the diversion motion at a second hearing in May

2022. Deiner argued that he had shown his eligibility for mental health diversion,

because Dr. Leeb had diagnosed him with qualifying mental disorders and those

disorders played a significant role in the commission of the offenses. The court did not

rule on that date and continued the matter.

At the continued hearing in March 2023, the court announced its tentative ruling to

deny the diversion motion. The court observed that Deiner had a long history of

substance abuse and characterized that evidence as “completely credible.” But the court

stated: “There were some other things that were not as clearly proven. There was a

sexual abuse as a child claim that was made that has credibility issues. I note [defense

counsel] didn’t even mention that in her original sentencing brief, so this is something

that came out later in talking to Dr. Leeb; and the evidence of that in the record is

unclear.” The court also observed that Deiner “probably wouldn’t commit another crime.

His dangerousness to the community may or may not be there, and he may or may not

have some mental illness; but the Court finds no nexus, no evidence, not even near a

preponderance of the evidence, just no evidence that this—these two bank robberies were

related to a mental illness.” The court noted that in committing the offenses, Deiner used

clothing to disguise himself, used a gun (that the victims did not know was fake), led

8
police on a car chase, and told police that he committed the robberies because he needed

money for child support. The court also noted that there was no evidence that Deiner was

under the influence when he committed the offenses. The court reasoned: “So while I

think he may have had a drug addiction at the time, probably did, there’s zero evidence in

the record that any of that, that he had a mental illness other than drug abuse that

contributed to the crime; and that even if he was a drug addict, there’s no evidence

linking the addiction to the crime. [¶] And, therefore, because there’s no evidence of a

nexus, my tentative would be to deny consideration for M.D.D.”

In response to the tentative ruling, Deiner argued that Dr. Leeb testified that

Deiner had PTSD, which could lead to drug abuse as a way to deal with untreated mental

health issues. Deiner asserted that there was a nexus between his untreated PTSD and the

offenses. The court replied: “And it’s that P.T.S.D. that I just find no supporting

evidence of in the—in the record for that.” The court adopted its tentative ruling and

denied Deiner’s motion for diversion.

III. Deiner’s resentencing

After Deiner’s original sentencing, the Legislature amended section 1385,

subdivision (b), to give courts discretion to strike or dismiss prior serious felony

enhancements. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.) In Deiner I, we directed the

9
court to consider whether to strike or dismiss those enhancements if it did not grant

Deiner’s diversion motion.2 (Deiner I, supra, E071193, pp. 14-15.)

The court resentenced Deiner in August 2023. Deiner’s resentencing brief argued

that he was entitled to “a full resentencing” on the prior serious felony enhancements and

also his prior strikes. Deiner urged the court to strike both the prior strikes and the prior

serious felony enhancements. He also urged the People to recommend that the court

recall his sentence and resentence him under section 1172.1. (Former § 1172.1, subd.

(a)(1), enacted by Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 9 [court may recall the sentence and resentence a

defendant “at any time upon the recommendation” of the district attorney].)

The People argued that the court had no jurisdiction to reconsider its denial of

Deiner’s Romero motion to strike the prior strikes; Deiner did not raise that issue in

Deiner I, and the remittitur did not mention the issue. The People also declined to

recommend that the court recall Deiner’s sentence under section 1172.1.

The court struck all four of the prior serious felony enhancements, giving Deiner a

total sentence of 50 years to life in prison plus a determinate sentence of six years. But

the court determined that the remittitur did not give it authority to conduct a full

resentencing, and it had no authority to conduct a full resentencing under section 1172.1.

The court noted that even if it had jurisdiction to strike the prior strikes, it would again

decline to do so.

2 Specifically, our disposition stated: “If the court reinstates [Deiner’s] convictions,
the court shall resentence Deiner and consider whether to strike or dismiss the prior
serious felony enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and section 1385,
subdivision (b).” (Deiner I, supra, E071193, p. 15.)

10
DISCUSSION

I. Mental health diversion

Deiner argues that the trial court abused its discretion by applying the incorrect

legal standard to his motion for diversion. He asserts that the Legislature had recently

amended section 1001.36, but the court applied the former version of the statute. We

agree and remand for the court to reconsider the motion under the correct legal standard.

A. Overview of the diversion statute

Since 2018, section 1001.36 has given trial courts discretion to grant pretrial

diversion to defendants suffering from qualifying mental disorders. (People v. Brown

(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 119 (Brown).) In April and May 2022 (when the first two

hearings in this matter occurred), the former version of the statute listed six criteria for

determining whether to grant diversion. (Former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(A)-(F), as

amended by Stats. 2019, ch. 497, § 203.) The first two criteria required the court to be

“satisfied” (1) that “the defendant suffers from a mental disorder as identified in the most

recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders” (DSM) and

(2) that “the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the

charged offense.” (Former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(A)-(B).) The defendant had to show

that those criteria were satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence. (See Evid. Code,

§ 115 [“Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a

preponderance of the evidence”].)

11
Effective January 1, 2023, the Legislature amended section 1001.36. (Stats. 2022,

ch. 735, § 1.) The Legislature recharacterized the first two criteria as “‘eligibility’”

criteria. (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891 (Sarmiento).)

“More substantively, a defendant’s eligibility no longer turned on findings to the court’s

‘satisfaction.’ Rather, defendants are generally eligible if they ‘ha[ve] been diagnosed’

with a recognized mental disorder” (ibid.), including PTSD and other disorders identified

in the most recent edition of the DSM. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) The defendant must

provide evidence of the mental disorder, which “shall include a diagnosis or treatment for

a diagnosed mental disorder within the last five years by a qualified mental health

expert.” (Ibid.) A psychologist is a “qualified mental health expert” for purposes of the

statute. (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(D)(2).) That expert “may rely on an examination of the

defendant, the defendant’s medical records, arrest reports, or any other relevant

evidence.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).)

With respect to the second eligibility criterion, “the amended statute creates a

presumption that the defendant’s diagnosed mental disorder was a significant factor in the

commission of the charged crime.” (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 891.) That

is, the court “shall find” that the diagnosed mental disorder was a significant factor

“unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal

factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.”

(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)

12
The amended statute recharacterizes the remaining four criteria as suitability

factors that the court must consider for any defendant who satisfies the eligibility

requirements. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c); Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 891.) A

defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion if (1) a qualified mental health expert opines

that the symptoms of the defendant’s mental disorder will respond to treatment, (2) the

defendant consents to diversion and waives the right to a speedy trial, (3) the defendant

agrees to comply with treatment, and (4) the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk

of danger to public safety if treated in the community. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4).)

Even if the defendant makes a prima facie showing that they satisfy all of the

eligibility and suitability requirements, the court still has discretion to deny diversion.

(§ 1001.36, subd. (a); Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892.) We review the

court’s ultimate decision whether to grant diversion for abuse of discretion. (Brown,

supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 121.) “A trial court abuses its discretion when it bases its

ruling on the wrong legal standard.” (Lunsted v. Superior Court (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th

138, 147 (Lunsted).)

B. Application of the incorrect legal standard

The People concede that the court erred by applying the former version of section

1001.36, but they contend that Deiner forfeited the argument. They note that Deiner did

not draw the court’s attention to the change in the law at the March 2023 hearing, after

the court announced its tentative ruling. We exercise our discretion to reach the merits of

Deiner’s argument to forestall any eventual claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

13
(People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [“An appellate court is generally

not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a

party”]; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 146 [reviewing forfeited claims on the

merits in view of potential claim for ineffective assistance of counsel].)

The court erred by applying the outdated version of the statute. At the time of the

court’s ruling, the eligibility criteria required that Deiner “ha[d] been diagnosed with a

mental disorder” by a qualified mental health expert within the last five years.

(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) Dr. Leeb’s recent PTSD diagnosis satisfied that requirement.

The doctor was a qualified mental health expert within the meaning of the statute (a

psychologist), and he diagnosed Deiner in 2021. But the court appeared to apply the

former law, which instead necessitated that the court be “satisfied that the defendant

suffers from a mental disorder.” (Former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(A).) Using that

standard, the court found “no supporting evidence” that Deiner had PTSD and “zero

evidence . . . that he had a mental illness other than drug abuse that contributed to the

crime.”

Moreover, the court found no evidence, “not even near a preponderance of the

evidence,” linking a mental disorder to the offenses. The court thus appeared to be

applying the former law, which required the defendant to show by a preponderance of the

evidence that the mental disorder was a significant factor in the offense. But Deiner was

entitled to a presumption that his diagnosed mental disorder was a significant factor in the

commission of the offenses, and that presumption may be rebutted only by clear and

14
convincing evidence to the contrary. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) The court’s application

of the incorrect legal standard in both of the foregoing respects amounted to an abuse of

discretion. (Lunsted, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 147.)

The proper remedy is to remand unless the record clearly indicates that the trial

court would have reached the same conclusion using the correct standard. (People v.

Doron (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1, 10; Brown, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 128.) The

record lacks that clarity. The court did not appear to credit the PTSD diagnosis, and its

finding that there was no evidence that a mental disorder was a significant factor in the

offense appears to have been limited to the drug-related disorders. Under these

circumstances, it is unclear whether the court would find by clear and convincing

evidence that Deiner’s diagnosed PTSD was not a significant factor. Dr. Leeb’s report

and testimony provided evidence of the various effects of PTSD (some of which we

summarized in part II.B. of the Background section). But it is unclear whether the court

considered any of that, given its rejection of the PTSD diagnosis. Whether PTSD was

“was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor” (§ 1001.36, subd.

(b)(2)) in Deiner’s offenses “is ‘quintessential factfinding’ [citation] and thus a question

best left to the trial court to answer in the first instance.” (People v. Doron, at p. 10.) We

express no opinion on how the court should decide the issue on remand.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that the court erred by applying the incorrect

legal standard to Deiner’s diversion motion. We conditionally reverse the judgment,

15
reverse the order denying the diversion motion, and remand for the court to reconsider

the motion.

II. Resentencing

Deiner argues that the court abused its discretion by declining to consider a full

resentencing on remand. He asserts that we ordered him to be “fully resentenced” in

Deiner I. He additionally contends that we should remand for the court to resentence him

under section 1172.1. The arguments lack merit.

After the remittitur issues, “the trial court is revested with jurisdiction of the case”

to carry out the directions of the reviewing court. (People v. Dutra (2006) 145

Cal.App.4th 1359, 1366.) “‘The terms of the remittitur define the trial court’s

jurisdiction to act.’” (Id. at p. 1367.) The remittitur directions are in the dispositional

language of the opinion, which “must be read in conjunction with the opinion as a

whole.” (Ayyad v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 851, 859.) “‘The issues

a trial court may address in remand proceedings are therefore limited to those specified in

the reviewing court’s directions, and if the reviewing court does not direct the trial court

to take a particular action or make a particular determination, the trial court is not

authorized to do so.’” (People v. Cervantes (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 326, 332.)

The trial court did not misinterpret our directions on remand by refusing Deiner’s

request for a full resentencing. Specifically, Deiner asked the court to reconsider striking

his prior strikes. Our disposition did not vacate his sentence or otherwise order the court

to reconsider the entirety of his sentence. If there was any ambiguity about that in the

16
disposition, then the whole of the opinion dispelled it. Deiner argued only that we should

remand for the court to exercise its newly granted discretion to strike the prior serious

felony enhancements. He did not argue that the court erred by denying his Romero

motion to strike the prior strikes, and we did not address that or any other issue that

would entitle him to a full resentencing. The court correctly interpreted our directions on

remand. (People v. Cervantes, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 332 [on remand for the trial

court to consider whether to strike a firearm enhancement, the court had no authority to

conduct a full resentencing].)

The court also did not err by refusing to recall the sentence and resentence Deiner

under section 1172.1. At the time of the proceedings on remand, the statute permitted the

court to recall the sentence on its own motion, but only “within 120 days of the date of

commitment” to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (Former § 1172.1,

subd. (a)(1), as amended by Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 9.) Deiner was committed to the

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in 2018. Section 11721.1 did not permit

the court to recall the sentence on its own motion in March 2023, long after the 120-day

period had expired.

Effective January 1, 2024, the Legislature amended section 1172.1 to permit the

court to recall a sentence on its own motion “at any time if the applicable sentencing laws

at the time of the original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority

or case law.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1), as amended by Stats. 2023, ch. 446. § 2.) The

“[r]ecall and resentencing under this section may be initiated by the original sentencing

17
judge, a judge designated by the presiding judge, or any judge with jurisdiction in the

case.” (Ibid.) Deiner urges us to “remand for the trial court to consider whether to

resentence” him under the recently amended statute. But the court needs no directions

from us to recall the sentence and resentence Deiner under section 1172.1. As already

explained, the statute gives the court authority to do that on its own motion if the

applicable sentencing laws have changed. Our remittitur would not be the source of the

court’s jurisdiction in that respect.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is conditionally reversed, and the order denying Deiner’s motion for

diversion under section 1001.36 is reversed. On remand, the trial court shall reconsider

the motion under section 1001.36. If the court determines that Deiner qualifies for

mental health diversion, then the court may grant diversion. If the court does not grant

diversion, or if Deiner is granted diversion but does not successfully complete it, then the

court shall reinstate the judgment.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ
J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

FIELDS
J.

18

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