CourtListener 10311361•Simmons v. Gilmore Partners CA2/2
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Filed 1/9/25 Simmons v. Gilmore Partners CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ANTOINETTE SIMMONS, B328466
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant (Los Angeles County
and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 19STCV46894)
v.
GILMORE PARTNERS, LP,
Defendant, Cross-complainant
and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Noel Weiss and Noel Weiss for Plaintiff,
Cross-defendant and Appellant.
Burgee & Abramoff and John G. Burgee for Defendant,
Cross-complainant and Respondent.
__________________________
Antoinette Simmons appeals a judgment awarding her
landlord Gilmore Partners, LP (Gilmore) damages of $13,663.53
on its cross-complaint to collect unpaid rent. Simmons contends
the trial court applied the incorrect measure of damages and
erred by not crediting her claimed offsets for uninhabitability of
her apartment and for Gilmore’s failure to mitigate damages.
Finding no merit in her arguments, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Rent Dispute
In February of 2006, Simmons signed a one-year lease to
occupy Apartment 221 at a building owned by Gilmore in North
Hollywood, California. When Simmons’s lease expired, she
continued to occupy her apartment as a month-to-month tenant.
At the beginning of 2019, Gilmore’s management company
surveyed rents charged at comparable buildings in the area, and
suggested a 10 percent rent increase. Simmons’s monthly rent at
that time was $1400, plus a $3.61 “code enforcement fee” imposed
by the City of Los Angeles.
On January 30, 2019, Gilmore announced it would increase
the rent on month-to-month tenants in Simmons’s building.
Effective April 1, Simmons’s monthly rent was to increase by
$135, for a total of $1538.61 (including the $3.61 code
enforcement fee). In January, February and March of 2019
Simmons paid her base rent of $1400 but not the $3.61 code
enforcement surcharge. In April, the first month affected by the
increase, she paid $1407.22, and in May she paid $1400.
Gilmore’s policy was not to take enforcement action against
tenants who underpaid their rent by a small amount. Instead,
it will “give the tenant a month or two to pay and handle[] the
shortfall by talking to the tenant.”
2
In May of 2019 Gilmore announced a further rent increase,
to take effect later that summer. This time, Simmons and a
group of her fellow tenants responded with a rent strike.
Simmons paid no rent in June. In July she paid $1400.00 rent
which was the last payment Gilmore accepted.
On August 9, 2019, Gilmore announced it was rescinding
the second rent increase. The notice informed Simmons that her
monthly rent “will return to the previous rate of $1538.61” and
gave her until August 12 to pay her outstanding rent. When
Simmons did not pay, Gilmore’s manager posted a three-day
notice to pay or quit on August 12. It withdrew that notice and
posted a second notice on September 19, 2019. That notice, too,
was withdrawn. On October 14, Gilmore posted a third notice to
pay or quit, along with a letter showing the dates and amounts of
Simmons’s missed rent payments. In response, Simmons
tendered a check for a lesser sum, which Gilmore refused.
Thereafter, on October 28, 2019, Gilmore sent a fourth notice to
pay or quit as well as a letter offering to delay the effective date
of the 2019 rent increase until August 1, provided Simmons pay
the outstanding rent for June, August, September and October.
Simmons did not comply. Simmons tendered $1400 rent
payments in November and December of 2019, and in January of
2020, all of which Gilmore rejected. Simmons made no further
tenders of rent after January 2020.
B. Habitability Issues
Concurrently with the dispute over rent, Simmons was
raising concerns about maintenance at her apartment, as well as
concerns about a roach infestation. On July 23, 2019, she
forwarded a list of seven “repairs and services” for her
apartment, including “pest control services,” repairing broken
3
drawers in her kitchen cabinets, and replacing worn carpeting in
the apartment. In response to her requests, Gilmore’s on-site
maintenance man performed some repairs. Simmons received a
new air conditioner. A general contractor replaced the hot and
cold water faucets in her shower with a new control unit. A city
inspector visited Simmons’s apartment in July of 2019. The
inspector noted some items needing correction, which Gilmore
completed before re-inspection the next month. In October a city
inspector ordered Gilmore to replace the drawers in Simmons’s
kitchen. Gilmore hired a general contractor, who completed the
repairs. Gilmore’s unit passed its re-inspection.
Gilmore also attempted to address Simmons’s concerns
about pests. Gilmore had a pest control company perform regular
treatments at Simmons’s building. Although tenants were
notified from one to several days in advance when treatments
would occur, Simmons would not always make her unit available
for treatment. For example, on one occasion Simmons refused
access to her apartment, and on another access to her bedroom.
On still other occasions treatment was incomplete because of
“heavy clutter” in the apartment, or because Simmons had not
cleared her possessions from the kitchen counter and stove.
C. Simmons’s Complaint and Gilmore’s Cross-
Complaint
On December 20, 2019, Gilmore filed an unlawful detainer
action against Simmons asking for an award of past due rent,
attorney fees, and forfeiture of Simmons’s tenancy. That action
never came to trial and was ultimately dismissed in 2020.1
1 According to Gilmore, the unlawful detainer action never
came to trial “due to the Covid pandemic” and “was dismissed
without prejudice on September 10, 2020.”
4
On December 31, 2019, Simmons filed a verified complaint
against Gilmore, its general partner Millennium Holdings, Inc.
and Lucille Hotnog, the CEO of Millennium Holdings, Inc.,
alleging seven causes of action labeled unlawful business
practice, unfair business practice, fraudulent business practice,
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of
the warranty of habitability, private nuisance and negligence.
The first five causes of action were against Gilmore only, while
the claims for private nuisance and negligence were against all
defendants. The gravamen of her causes of action was that
Gilmore failed to maintain her apartment in habitable condition,
failed to make repairs when needed, and failed to abate a
cockroach infestation affecting Simmons’s apartment, all in order
to drive Simmons from her apartment in order to rent it to a new
tenant at higher rent than Simmons was paying. Simmons
sought general damages, punitive damages against all
defendants, attorney’s fees, and restitution from Gilmore “of all
sums obtained by said defendant as a result of its wrongful
conduct and that of its agents, employees, and officers.”
On May 17, 2021, Gilmore filed a cross-complaint against
Simmons, alleging causes of action for breach of contract and a
common count of using Gilmore’s property without paying rent.
Gilmore demanded damages of $20,000. Two significant events
occurred before trial. First, Simmons vacated her apartment on
or about September 5, 2020, although there is some ambiguity
about when Gilmore was notified Simmons had moved out.2
2 Although Gilmore contended that Simmons’s counsel only
provided notice to Gilmore on October 7, 2020, the court’s
Statement of Decision observed that “by happenstance, the
5
Second, Gilmore applied for, and received, a Covid relief payment
from the State of California in the amount of $12,057.16,
representing unpaid rent on Simmons’s apartment for the period
April through November, 2020.
D. Trial and Judgment
A bench trial on Simmons’s complaint and Gilmore’s cross-
complaint began in June of 2022.3 Simmons testified in support
of her claims and introduced photographs and other exhibits
supporting her contention that the apartment was uninhabitable
during much of 2019 and 2020. Gilmore presented testimony by
a representative of its management company, an on-site
maintenance man, the general contractor who performed repairs
in Simmons’s apartment in 2019, and the owner of the pest
control company that treated Simmons’s apartment building in
2019.
Following the close of evidence, the parties submitted post-
trial briefs. Simmons argued that Gilmore had terminated her
tenancy when it first served a three-day notice to pay rent or
quit, and thereby waived its right to collect more than the fair
rental value of the apartment, which she contended was
diminished by the defects making it uninhabitable. She also
argued that Gilmore had accepted her checks for less than the
amount of rent it claimed was owed. Finally, she argued that her
evidence proved she was entitled to damages as well as offsets
manager . . . saw Plaintiff moving [on September 5, 2020] and
Ms. Simmons told her she was leaving.”
3 The trial was not reported. In lieu of a reporter’s
transcript, counsel prepared and signed a daily “settled
statement” summarizing that day’s testimony.
6
against the damages claimed by Gilmore. For its part, Gilmore
insisted Simmons’s month-to-month tenancy was never
terminated and that her apartment was habitable at all times.
Taking into account the Covid relief payment it received from the
State of California, Gilmore calculated the amount of unpaid rent
as $13,663.53.
On December 15, 2022, the court issued its statement of
decision, finding in the defendants’ favor on all of Simmons’s
causes of action, and in Gilmore’s favor on its cross-complaint.
The trial court rejected Simmons’s contention that Gilmore’s
three-day notices terminated Simmons’s tenancy, concluding
instead that the month-to-month tenancy remained in effect until
Simmons vacated her apartment, and that the appropriate
measure of damages was the monthly rent charged by Gilmore
rather than Simmons’s estimated “fair rental value.” The court
also rejected Simmons’s claim that her apartment was not
habitable, finding that Gilmore “presented business records and
credible testimony that showed Ms. Simmons[’s] complaints were
grossly exaggerated” and that Simmons “has not shown that she
was denied full use of her apartment such that she is entitled to
restitution for any amount of time.” Applying the contract
measure of damages for the months when Simmons did not pay
rent, and deducting the amount Gilmore received in Covid relief,
the court awarded Gilmore damages in the amount of $13,663.53.
The court entered judgment on January 24, 2023, and Simmons
filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Simmons makes three contentions on appeal. First, she
argues that we must reverse the trial court because its statement
of decision does not address all the issues raised at trial. Second,
7
she contends the trial court improperly based its damage award
on the “contract” rent for Simmons’s apartment rather than on its
fair market value. Finally, she argues the trial court erred by not
reducing Gilmore’s damage award by her so-called “remediation”
and “mitigation” offsets.
A. Standard of Review
“In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of
decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law de
novo. [Citation.] We apply a substantial evidence standard of
review to the trial court’s findings of fact. [Citation.] Under this
deferential standard of review, findings of fact are liberally
construed to support the judgment and we consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all
reasonable inferences in support of the findings. [Citation.]”
(Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981 (Thompson).)
Provided the “ ‘statement of decision sets forth the factual and
legal basis for the decision, any conflict in the evidence or
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts will be resolved
in support of the determination of the trial court decision.’
[Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Ruelas (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th
339, 342, disapproved on another ground by Conservatorship of
O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.)
B. The Statement of Decision was Adequate
Simmons argues the judgment must be reversed because
the trial court’s statement of decision did not adequately address
contested issues. We disagree: the trial court’s statement of
decision addressed all the issues Simmons raised in her request
for that statement. “[C]ourts must issue a statement of decision
‘ “explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision” ’ only if a
party makes a timely request, and must address in that
8
statement only the ‘ “controverted issues” ’ a party ‘specif[ies]’ in
the request. [Citation.]” (F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099,
1115.) Simmons requested a statement of decision in her first
post-trial brief filed on July 18, 2022, listing three “core issues of
fact” and four “core issues of law” that she wanted the court to
address.4 Our review is limited to whether the statement of
decision addressed the issues Simmons raised: “omissions or
ambiguities in the statement of decision . . . are germane only as
to issues framed as materially controverted under [Code of Civil
Procedure] section 632.” (Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p.
982.)
“A court’s statement of decision . . . need only dispose of all
basic issues and fairly disclose the court’s determination as to
ultimate facts and material issues in the case. [Citation.]”
(Duarte Nursery, Inc. v. California Grape Rootstock Improvement
Com. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1012.) Here, the statement of
decision addressed the material issues raised by Simmons’s
complaint and Gilmore’s cross-complaint, including the issues of
law and fact raised by Simmons. Simmons’s objections to the
statement merely take issue with the court’s weighing of evidence
4 The “core issues of fact” Simmons identified were (1) the
date Gilmore terminated Simmons’s month-to-month tenancy;
(2) the reasonable rental value of Simmons’s apartment as of
August, 2019; and (3) Simmons’s damages. The “core issues of
law” she identified were (1) the legal relationship between
Simmons and Gilmore; (2) whether the January 2019 rent
increase remained in effect after Gilmore rescinded the second
rent increase; (3) whether Gilmore is limited to claiming the fair
market value of Simmons’s apartment in damages; and
(4) whether Simmons’s month-to-month tenancy remained in
effect until she vacated the apartment.
9
and its application of fact to law. “Objections” of this character
do not go to the sufficiency of the statement of decision, and do
not affect our review of the trial court’s findings of fact. (Id. at
p. 1012 [objections that “simply disagreed with the trial court’s
findings . . . were not a proper basis of objection under Code of
Civil Procedure section 634”]; Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA
Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 558 [same].)
C. The Trial Court Applied the Correct Measure of
Damages
A tenant who remains in possession after the landlord
terminates a lease or tenancy is no longer liable for rent, but
rather for the reasonable value of the premises. (Lehr v. Crosby
(1981) 123 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9.) According to Simmons,
Gilmore terminated her month-to-month tenancy effective
August 12, 2019, when it posted the first of four three-day notices
to pay rent or quit. She relies on this language in the August 12
notice:5 “if you fail to perform or otherwise comply, Owner/Agent
does hereby elect to declare the forfeiture of your Rental
Agreement under which you hold possession of the above-
described premises.”
The trial court determined that Gilmore’s three-day notices
did not terminate Simmons’s tenancy. It pointed to facts showing
neither party treated the tenancy as ended. Simmons continued
to occupy the apartment until at least September of 2020, and
she testified “she was planning to move depending on the
outcome of the court action” and she believed “the rent issue”
would be resolved by the court or by a settlement. Gilmore
specifically referred to Simmons’s “tenancy” in a second notice of
5 The notice dated September 9, 2019, does not contain this
language.
10
rent decrease dated December 26, 2019,6 long after the fourth
pay-or-quit notice was posted. Moreover, all four notices made
clear that termination of Simmons’s tenancy was reserved for a
subsequent action: each states, in substance, that in the event
Simmons does not pay or quit, “legal proceedings will be
instituted against you to declare the forfeiture of the lease or
rental agreement under which you occupy” the apartment.
We agree with the trial court that neither side treated the notices
themselves as terminating Simmons’s tenancy.7
Simmons next argues that Gilmore terminated her tenancy
when it included in its unlawful detainer complaint filed on
December 20, 2019, a request that the court declare her lease
forfeited. Again, we disagree. As Simmons acknowledges,
6 The December 26, 2019 notice decreased Simmons’s rent
from $1538.61 to $1519.81 and, according to Gilmore, was sent in
compliance with a recent change in law.
7 Even if Simmons is correct that Gilmore was limited to
recovering the fair market value of Simmons’s apartment
beginning in August of 2019, nothing in the record sets $1400 per
month as the market price. Gilmore raised rents in 2019 based
on a survey showing other landlords charged more rent for
comparable units. New tenants in Simmons’s building – those
signing one-year leases – were paying more than $1538 per
month for apartments similar to Simmons’s. Simmons testified
she was unable to find a comparable apartment that did not cost
at least $500 more per month than what Gilmore was charging.
Simmons’s apartment rented for $1750 per month after she
moved out. Whether measured by the actual rent charged or by
the “market rate,” the trial court’s award of damages was not
excessive.
11
Gilmore’s unlawful detainer action was never prosecuted, much
less adjudicated in Gilmore’s favor. In fact, Gilmore contended
below that the unlawful detainer action was dismissed on
September 10, 2020, more than seven months before Gilmore
filed its cross-complaint in this action. Simmons cites no
authority, and we are not aware of any, that the mere act of filing
an unlawful detainer action seeking forfeiture of the lease bars a
landlord from a later action to collect rent at the contract rate.
Simmons’s third contention is that Gilmore waived its right
to collect contract rent by accepting Simmons’s checks for less
than $1538.61 following the April 1 effective date of the rent
increase. The trial court rejected this argument, pointing to
language in Simmons’s original lease providing that “acceptance
of rent with knowledge of any default by Renter shall not be
deemed a waiver of such default, nor limit Owner’s rights with
respect to that or any subsequent default.”8 Although her lease
had long since expired, Simmons remained bound by its
“essential terms” during her subsequent month-to-month
tenancy. (Smyth v. Berman (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 183, 192;
Civ. Code, § 1945 [where a lessee remains in possession after the
lease term ends, the parties are presumed to have entered into a
tenancy at sufferance “on the same terms and for the same time,
not exceeding one month when the rent is payable monthly, nor
in any case one year”].) The “ ‘ “essential” ’ terms” that carry over
from the expired lease include the “ ‘ “amount and time of
payment of rent.” ’ ” (Smyth v. Berman, at p. 192.) The
testimony of Gilmore’s manager confirms that Gilmore did not
8 The lease was admitted in evidence at trial but is not
included in the record on appeal.
12
waive its remedies for Simmons’s underpayment of rent: its
policy was to allow tenants a grace period before pursuing
remedies, and it rejected Simmons’s tendered underpayments in
October, November and December of 2019 and January of 2020.9
D. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Rejecting
Simmons’s Remediation and Mitigation Offsets
Simmons’s final argument is that the trial court erred by
not reducing Gilmore’s claimed damages by the sums Simmons
describes as “remediation” and “mitigation” offsets. The
remediation offset is based on the fair market value of Simmons’s
apartment, multiplied by the number of days – 75 – she contends
the apartment was uninhabitable for reasons she attributes to
Gilmore. The mitigation offset is the amount of rent Simmons
tendered to Gilmore, but that Gilmore refused to accept.
Simmons contends that Gilmore is barred from recovering
damages it could have mitigated by accepting Simmons’s tender.
We first address Simmons’s remediation offset. She argues
that the court should have deducted from Gilmore’s damage
award a sum equal to the daily fair market rent for her
apartment multiplied by 75 days. It is Simmons’s burden to
prove her apartment was uninhabitable, (Boyd v. Carter (2014)
9 We reject out of hand Simmons’s contention that Gilmore’s
rescission of the second rent increase returned Simmons’s
monthly rent to $1403.61, rather than to the new rate of
$1538.61 that took effect on April 1, 2019. Simmons received
timely notice of the April 1 rent increase. Gilmore’s notice
rescinding the second rent increase clearly stated that Simmons’s
monthly rent “return[ed] to the previous rate of $1,538.61,” and
Simmons testified that she “understood that the landlord
believed she was obligated to pay” that amount.
13
227 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 7), and the trial court found she had
failed to meet her burden of proof.
On appeal from a finding that a party has failed to meet its
burden of proof, “ ‘the question for a reviewing court becomes
whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant
as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question
becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1)
“uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character
and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that
it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ [Citation.]” (Juen v.
Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 972, 978-979.)
“[U]nless the trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of
the losing [party], we presume the trial court found [that party’s]
evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the
burden of proof. [Citations.]” (Bookout v. State of California ex
rel Dept. of Transportation (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1486.)
Here, the evidence is contradictory and does not compel a
finding in Simmons’s favor. “[The] implied warranty of
habitability does not require that a landlord ensure that leased
premises are in perfect, aesthetically pleasing condition, but it
does mean that ‘bare living requirements’ must be maintained.
In most cases substantial compliance with those applicable
building and housing code standards which materially affect
health and safety will suffice to meet the landlord’s obligation.”
(Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 637, fn. omitted.)
Gilmore’s property manager testified that a city inspector visited
Simmons’s apartment and found it was habitable. Gilmore
presented testimony and work records from its contractor, its on-
site maintenance man, and its pest control contractor, all tending
to show Gilmore had been responsive to Simmons’s requests for
14
maintenance. The credibility of Simmons and of Gilmore’s
witnesses, and the weight to be afforded their testimony, was the
sole province of the trial court. We do not second-guess its
weighing of contested evidence. (Schmidt v. Superior Court
(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582.)
We need only briefly address Simmons’s argument that by
refusing Simmons’s tender of rent in amounts less than she owed,
Gilmore failed to mitigate its damages. Simmons cites no case to
support the argument and we can find none. “Typically, the rule
of mitigation of damages comes into play when the event
producing injury or damages has already occurred and it then
has become the obligation of the injured party to avoid continuing
or enhanced damages through reasonable efforts.” (Valle de Oro
Bank v. Gamboa (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1686, 1691.) The doctrine
is used sparingly in the contract or commercial context. (Ibid.)
Here, Gilmore is suing on an express obligation to pay rent
in a fixed sum. A creditor who refuses to accept less than the
debtor’s bargained-for performance does not thereby waive any
portion of its damages in a subsequent action to enforce the
contract. To the contrary, as stated nearly one hundred years
ago and still applicable today: “No case has been called to our
attention wherein this rule as to the duty to minimize damages
has been applied to a situation in which the defendant’s breach of
duty consisted solely of the failure or refusal to pay a liquidated
sum of money when due, and it may perhaps be doubted that the
rule is applicable to such a case. It would seem the situation of
the respondent is in this respect analogous to that of a lessor
whose lessee has repudiated the lease and given notice that he
will not perform it. It is held in such case that the lessor may
elect to stand upon his contract and may recover the full rent for
15
the term, when it has become due, in accordance with the terms
of the contract, or he may elect to treat the contract as abandoned
and relet the premises to another tenant, in which event he can
recover as damages only the difference between the rent he was
to receive and the rent actually received from the subsequent
tenant.” (Vitagraph, Inc. v. Liberty Theaters Co. (1925) 197 Cal.
694, 698-699.)10
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Gilmore is awarded its costs.
RICHARDSON, J.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
10 In fact, it may well have been error if the trial judge had
applied the doctrine of mitigation of damages in this lease
context. (Valle de Oro Bank v. Gamboa, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1694 [error to allow jury to consider doctrine of mitigation of
damages where Bank was entitled to recover unpaid balance of
the promissory note executed by defendant].)
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