CourtListener 10311265•People v. Craig CA4/1
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Filed 1/9/25 P. v. Craig CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082475
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD225297)
DONTAYE COLEMAN CRAIG,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
David M. Gill, Judge. Affirmed.
Mary Woodward Wells, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, James M. Toohey and Randall D. Einhorn, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Dontaye Coleman Craig submitted a petition under Penal
Code section 1172.61 challenging his conviction for attempted murder. The
People filed the trial transcripts trial during the prima facie stage of the
proceedings, and both parties relied on the transcripts during the evidentiary
hearing stage. The People did not formally move the transcripts into
evidence during the hearing, and the court denied Craig’s petition without
stating that it had reviewed them.
Craig appeals, claiming that the absence of any indication that the
court reviewed the transcripts means it failed to perform the fact-finding
function mandated by section 1172.6. But appellate courts presume that trial
courts follow the applicable law, and a party’s reliance on the silence in the
record is not a sufficient basis to rebut that presumption. Accordingly, we
affirm the court’s order denying Craig’s petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Craig and two codefendants instigated an altercation with rival gang
members in 2009 during which multiple shots were fired. (People v. Craig
(June 5, 2015, D063070) [nonpub. opn.].)2 One rival gang member was shot
several times and seriously injured. Bullets also struck two bystanders,
killing one. The People’s principal theory at trial was that Craig was the
shooter, but there was evidence that another defendant may have fired the
weapon.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Legislation
in 2022 renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 without substantive
changes. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For clarity, we will use the current
number in this opinion.
2 Rather than state the entire factual background of the case, we will
assume familiarity with this prior opinion.
2
Each defendant was convicted by a jury of murder (§ 187, subd. (a);
count 1), attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 2) and assault with
a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 3). The jury also found true certain
firearms and gang-related allegations. The court sentenced Craig to 11 years
eight months, plus 75 years to life. Following a successful appeal of his first
degree murder conviction, the People accepted a plea to a count of second
degree murder rather than retrying him on the first degree offense. Craig
was resentenced to 11 years eight months, plus 65 years to life. This appeal
concerns Craig’s section 1172.6 petition for resentencing that challenges his
attempted murder conviction.
A. Statutory Amendments in 2019
At the time Craig was sentenced, a person who committed a homicide
during the perpetration of certain enumerated inherently dangerous felonies
was guilty of first degree murder, also referred to as “felony murder,” even if
the killing was unintentional or accidental. (People v. Cavitt (2004) 33
Cal.4th 187, 197; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 94.) Additionally,
a person who knowingly aided and abetted a nonhomicide crime was guilty of
any murder that was the natural and probable consequence of the intended
crime, irrespective of the aider and abettor’s mens rea. (People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 845; People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 164–167;
People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 920.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437), which was effective January 1,
2019, changed the law as to felony murder and murder under an imputed
malice theory. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) The bill limited the applicability
of the felony murder doctrine to those who were the actual killer, intended to
kill, or were a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life. (Id., § 3; see § 189, subd. (e).) It also
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eliminated the imputed malice theory of murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2;
see § 188, subd. (a)(3).) Accordingly, the natural and probable consequences
doctrine of aiding and abetting liability is no longer a valid theory of second
degree murder. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990.) Senate Bill
1437 did not, however, invalidate accomplice liability for murder under direct
aiding and abetting principles. (Reyes, at p. 990.)
In addition, Senate Bill 1437 created a process for persons convicted of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine to petition for resentencing. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4. ) Senate Bill
No. 775 (Senate Bill 775), which became effective on January 1, 2022,
expanded access to this petition process to include, as relevant here, persons
convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2; see also § 1172.6, subd. (a).)
The petition process under section 1172.6 consists of two steps. At the
first, petitioners attempt to establish a prima facie case that they could not
be convicted of murder or attempted murder under current law. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (a)–(c).) The People must respond in writing, and the court holds a
hearing and determines whether a prima facie case was established. (Id.,
subd. (c).) At this stage, the court does not make any findings of fact or
credibility determinations. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972.)
If the petitioner succeeds in establishing a prima facie case for relief,
the court moves to the second step: it issues an order to show cause and
holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the challenged
conviction. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d).) At this step, the People bear the burden
of proof to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty
of murder or attempted murder under current law. (Id., subd. (d)(3).) In
contrast to the earlier stage, the court “acts as an independent fact finder
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and determines whether the People have met their burden” during the
evidentiary hearing. (People v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 737.) If
the People meet their burden, the challenged conviction is upheld and the
petitioner is not resentenced. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a), (d)(3)). If the People do
not, the challenged conviction is vacated, and the petitioner is resentenced on
any remaining counts. (Ibid.)
B. Craig’s Petitions for Resentencing
In 2019, Craig filed a section 1172.6 petition challenging his second
degree murder conviction pursuant to the parties’ agreement, Craig withdrew
his resentencing petition and his murder conviction was set aside. In
December 2021, Craig pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter on count 1
(§ 192) and stipulated to an upper term sentence of 11 years, thereby
reducing his total sentence to 22 years and eight months, plus 25 years to
life. At that point, Craig stood convicted of voluntary manslaughter,
attempted murder, and assault with a firearm.
After Senate Bill 775 became effective, Craig filed a section 1172.6
petition to challenge his attempted murder conviction. The People initially
argued that Craig could not establish a prima facie case based on the
information contained in the record, including the trial transcripts they
attached as an exhibit.3 Later, however, the People stipulated to a prima
facie case for relief. The court issued a show cause order and scheduled an
evidentiary hearing. The People told the trial court they would resubmit trial
transcripts at the evidentiary hearing.
The People’s written response to the show cause order argued that the
trial record established Craig should be convicted of murder because he was
3 The transcripts were not included in the initial record for appeal.
We granted Craig’s motion to augment the record.
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either the actual shooter or a direct aider and abettor. The People did not
attach the trial transcripts, but nonetheless referenced trial testimony to
make their argument. Craig’s reply to the People’s response also cited to the
jury instructions as reflected in the trial transcripts when arguing that the
People could not carry their burden of proof.
The evidentiary hearing was held in 2023. Both parties relied on the
paper record to support their respective positions. Although the People did
not submit the trial transcripts again before the evidentiary hearing, both
parties’ oral remarks referenced trial testimony. The court denied Craig’s
petition, finding no reasonable doubt that he was “the direct perpetrator
and[/]or direct aider and abettor.” In making this ruling, the trial judge did
not specifically state that he had reviewed the trial transcripts.
DISCUSSION
This appeal concerns the deference we accord a trial court’s ruling
where the record is silent as to how its decision was made. Craig requests
that we order a second evidentiary hearing on his resentencing petition
because the record does not show that the court performed its mandatory fact
finding function in denying his petition. Although Craig recognizes that we
must presume that the trial court knew and followed the law, in his view that
presumption has been rebutted based on the fact that (1) the People did not
move to admit the trial transcripts into evidence during the evidentiary
hearing, and (2) the court did not state that it had reviewed the transcripts
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that were provided during the prima facie stage. The People respond that the
presumption has not been rebutted and that any error was harmless.4
“ ‘[A] trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the
applicable law.’ ” (People v. Martinez (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.)
Accordingly, “ ‘we presume that a judgment or order of the trial court is
correct, “ ‘[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on
matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively
shown.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Hurtado (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 871, 878.) Trial courts
are also presumed to have “ ‘ “ distinguish[ed] admissible from inadmissible
evidence, relevant from irrelevant facts, and . . . recognize[d] those facts
which properly may be considered in the judicial decisionmaking process.” ’ ”
(People v. Presley (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1142–1143.) In short, absent
an affirmative showing otherwise, we must conclude even on a silent record
that the trial court properly performed its fact finding functions.
That is the conclusion we reach in this case. The transcripts were
provided to the court at the prima facie stage of the proceedings on Craig’s
resentencing petition, and the parties relied on them in their papers and oral
arguments during the evidentiary hearing. Thus, they apparently believed
the transcripts were received in evidence and treated them as such. So did
the court, given that it did not express confusion or surprise concerning the
parties’ use of them. (See Miller v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th
728, 742 [“ ‘Where documents are not formally introduced, but it is apparent
4 The People also argue that Craig forfeited his claim by failing to raise it
below. We exercise our discretion to consider its merits because Craig does
not dispute the People’s representation that the transcripts were provided to
the court at the prima facie stage of these proceedings. (People v. Williams
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [discussing discretion to review forfeited
issues].)
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that the court and the offering party understood that they were in evidence,
they must be so considered.’ ”].) Accordingly, we presume that the court
considered their relevant portions before denying Craig’s petition.
For his part, Craig argues that “the silent record in this case does not
instill confidence that the court’s required independent review ever occurred.”
But he has it backwards, as we presume from a silent record that the court
did conduct the required review. (Hurtado, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 878.)
Speculation otherwise does not constitute the affirmative showing necessary
to rebut that presumption. (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042
[“Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew the
law and followed it” (italics added).].) We therefore must affirm the court’s
order denying Craig’s petition.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
DO, J.
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