People v. Wright CA6

CourtListener 10308526Calctapp7 de jan. de 2025

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Filed 1/7/25 P. v. Wright CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H051116
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. Nos. F1765268, F1765391)

v.

JONATHAN WAYNE WRIGHT,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant Jonathan Wayne Wright pleaded no contest in two separate cases to
possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), being a felon
in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and possession of more
than 100 pounds of illegal fireworks (Health & Saf. Code, § 12700, subd. (b)(3)).1 On
appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
uncovered as a result of his detention and pat search upon being found asleep in his truck.
Finding no error in the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, we will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Operative Pleadings

In October 2017, in case number F1765391, the Santa Clara County District
Attorney charged Wright with possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health &

1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Saf. Code, § 11378; count 1) and possession of a saps and similar weapons (§ 22210;
count 2). The information also alleged that Wright had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12).
On the same day, in case number F1765268, the Santa Clara County District
Attorney charged Wright with being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1); count 1), possession of ammunition by a prohibited person (§ 30305,
subd. (a)(1); count 2), and possession of more than 100 pounds of illegal fireworks
(Health & Saf. Code, § 12700, subd. (b)(3); count 3). The information also alleged that
Wright had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12) and was on bail at
the time of the offense (§ 12022.1).
B. The Motion to Suppress

Wright moved to suppress the contraband and other evidence underlying both
cases. Wright argued that an initial June 2017 detention and pat search were not
supported by reasonable suspicion, and that the search incident to his ensuing arrest and
the subsequent search of his home were both tainted by the unconstitutionality of that
initial detention and pat search.2 At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the
prosecution called Gilroy Police Department Sergeant Michael McMahon as its sole
witness, and the court also admitted at Wright’s request the video recording of the
incident from McMahon’s body camera.
McMahon testified that at around 8:49 a.m. the day of the offense, officers
received a report of a man sleeping inside a truck parked in front of a donut shop. The
truck was parked at what McMahon called a “slight angle” across two parking spots.

2
The prosecutor in opposing the motion to suppress conceded that if the trial court
found the pat search to be unlawful, the search warrant of Wright’s home would be
invalid. The stated basis for the search warrant for Wright’s home was the June 2017
search of Wright and the discovery of 77.35 grams of methamphetamine and $735 cash
on his person, mostly in $20 bills.

2
Wright was slumped over in the driver’s seat, his head lowered in front of him, and he
appeared to be breathing heavily. McMahon observed Wright for a few minutes while
awaiting other officers, whom he had requested in case Wright was intoxicated and
became violent on waking.
After the second unit arrived, McMahon knocked on the passenger door and
identified himself as a police officer; it took several knocks to rouse Wright. Wright
awoke shortly after McMahon knocked on the car door and on video appeared
cooperative and apologetic. McMahon testified that he could see drool on Wright’s chin
(but acknowledged this was not visible in his body camera recording). At that point,
McMahon suspected that Wright was either intoxicated or was experiencing a medical
episode of some kind. Wright denied having been drinking. While Wright was still
seated in the truck, McMahon asked for identification and allowed Wright to retrieve his
wallet from his pocket for this purpose.
McMahon asked Wright to exit the truck, intending to gauge his mobility and
responsiveness. Based on the surveillance video footage, as Wright emerged, there were
three officers standing nearby. One officer can be heard saying that Wright had “been
there since 5:00 or 6:40” in the morning.
Wright came slowly out of his truck, confirming that he could walk but that his leg
was “a little messed up,” and he appeared unsteady in McMahon’s view. Wright was
wearing baggy cargo shorts, and McMahon noticed a bulge in Wright’s right front pocket
that McMahon considered “the size of a weapon, a gun.” McMahon was concerned that
Wright might be armed based on his “delay in exiting and the fact that his arm had kind
of gone down that side of his body.”
When asked if he had any “guns or knives” on his person, Wright reached down to
feel his front pockets before answering. One officer laughed, saying “I hope not,” while
McMahon told Wright not to “grab anything.” Wright explained that he was “just seeing
what” he had on him and then answered no. (At the hearing, McMahon could not recall
3
Wright’s answer to the question about weapons, but he recalled that Wright did not admit
being armed.)
McMahon then placed Wright’s hands behind his back, patted Wright’s right front
pants pocket. McMahon felt a hard object inside Wright’s pocket, which felt like a pipe
used to smoke illegal drugs. Asked if what McMahon felt there was a pipe, Wright said,
“Probably yes,” at which McMahon asked permission to “take a look.” Wright said that
he preferred McMahon not do so but McMahon, tugging at the opening of Wright’s
pocket, replied that he could see the pipe there. McMahon could see a pipe with residue
inside. McMahon then handcuffed Wright and removed a glass pipe and a plastic bag
from Wright’s right front pocket.
Searching Wright incident to arrest, McMahon found methamphetamine in the bag
recovered from Wright’s person, as well as cash and another pipe. A search of Wright’s
truck revealed a collapsible baton in the driver’s side door.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that McMahon had
reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial detention based on the totality of the
circumstances and that McMahon was further justified to undertake the pat search for
officer safety concerns.3
C. The Plea and Sentencing

In 2018, Wright pleaded no contest to possession for sale of a controlled substance
(count 1) in case number F1765391 and both counts in case number F1765268.4 He also
admitted the allegations that he had a prior strike conviction in both cases.
3
In October 2018, Wright filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s
denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the trial court in its earlier decision had
relied upon People v. Sacrite (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 77, which the California Supreme
Court ordered depublished on September 12, 2018 (S249900). The trial court found that
it lacked jurisdiction to consider the issue and denied the motion for reconsideration.
4
Wright also pleaded no contest to counts in case number C1892412, which is not
at issue in this appeal.

4
In April 2023, the trial court sentenced Wright to 16 months (one-third the
midterm, doubled) for possession for sale of a controlled substance in case number
F1765391 and 16 months (one-third the midterm, doubled) for being a felon in
possession of a firearm and 16 months (one-third the midterm, doubled) for possession of
more than 100 pounds of illegal fireworks in case number F1765268, all terms to run
consecutively to Wright’s sentence in an unrelated case.5 The trial court struck the
additional punishment for the on-bail enhancement alleged in case number F1765391.
As to both cases, the sentence was deemed served due to Wright’s custody credits.
II. DISCUSSION

Wright argues that he was unconstitutionally detained when McMahon ordered
him outside of his car as there was no indication he was involved in illegal activity and
that McMahon lacked sufficient justification for the subsequent pat search. Given the
totality of the circumstances, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of his motion to
suppress.
A. The Applicable Legal Standards

“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the
government from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures of private property.”
(People v. Smith (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 375, 382.) A warrantless search or seizure is
presumptively unreasonable, and the prosecution bears the burden of establishing that the
intrusion is nonetheless justified. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 127.)
“[A] detention is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution; a seizure occurs when an officer restrains a person’s liberty
by force or show of authority.” (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1081.) “In

5
At the same hearing, Wright was sentenced in case number F1902149, which is
not a part of this appeal and which supplied the base term for Wright’s aggregate
sentence.

5
situations involving a show of authority, a person is seized ‘if “in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave” ’ or ‘ “otherwise terminate the encounter,” ’ [citation], and if the
person actually submits to the show of authority [citation].” (People v. Brown (2015)
61 Cal.4th 968, 974 (Brown).)
A temporary detention or seizure of a person must be supported by reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. (Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 980–981; see Florida v.
Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 498.) “ ‘The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative
stops . . . when a law enforcement officer has “a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” ’ ” (Brown, at p. 981.)
An exception to the requirement of a warrant and probable cause for a search is a
protective frisk for weapons when an officer “has reason to believe that he is dealing with
an armed and dangerous individual.” (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27 (Terry).) The
standard does not require an officer to have absolute certainty that an individual is armed:
“[I]n determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight
must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience.” (Ibid.) In other words, the officer “must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant” the intrusion of a pat search. (Id. at p. 21.)
A Terry search thus requires reasonable suspicion that an individual is armed.
“ ‘Because it is a “less demanding” standard [than probable cause], “reasonable suspicion
can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that
required to establish probable cause.” [Citation.] The standard “depends on the factual
and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act.” [Citation.] Courts “cannot reasonably demand scientific
certainty . . . where none exists.” [Citation.] Rather, they must permit officers to make
6
“commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” ’ ” (People v. Flores
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1041 (Flores); see also Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 27.) The
standard requires “an objective evaluation of the totality of the circumstances . . .
confronting both the officer and the citizen.” (Flores, at p. 1049; Brigham City v. Stuart
(2006) 547 U.S. 398, 404 [reasonableness under Fourth Amendment judged under
objective standard and an “officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant”].) Reasonable
suspicion requires more than a hunch but less than a preponderance of the evidence and
less than what is required for probable cause. (Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 981.)
“ ‘ “In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer
to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial
evidence. [Citation.] We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on
the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.” ’ ” (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1043; see also People v. Ovieda (2019)
7 Cal.5th 1034, 1041 [applying federal constitutional standards to search and seizure
issues under the California Constitution].)
B. The Detention

The parties agree the contact between McMahon and Wright was consensual when
McMahon initially approached Wright’s truck to conduct a welfare check. (Brown,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 974; see also People v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235, 241
[“[o]fficers can approach people on the street and engage them in consensual
conversation”].) But Wright argues that he was unreasonably detained once McMahon
directed him to step outside of his truck. (See Brown, at p. 974 [detention occurs if
person submits to show of authority and reasonable person would not have believed he or
she was free to leave]; see also United States v. Jefferson (8th Cir. 1990) 906 F.2d 346,
349–350 [consensual encounter transformed into detention in part after officer requested
identification cards and asked passenger to step out of the car].)

7
We agree that McMahon effectively detained Wright by directing him to step out
of his truck but conclude the detention in this case was justified so that the officers could
assess his condition and determine whether he was under the influence of alcohol or
drugs. The officers had received a report that Wright had been parked near the donut
shop for an extended period—long enough to prompt the report to police for a welfare
check. Wright remained asleep while McMahon awaited backup, and his truck was
irregularly parked in a manner that might reasonably suggest impairment. When Wright
awoke, he disclosed that he lived nearby, ruling out the possibility he was merely
unhoused or facing a long route to a more natural resting spot. (See People v. Superior
Court of L.A. County (Poole) (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 363, 365 [holding that “[i]t is
certainly not improper or onerous to ask an individual to step out of an automobile in
order to fully determine why or under what circumstances a person may have been asleep
in an automobile parked on a public street”].)
To be sure, without reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, directing a person to
step outside a car is generally unjustified. (Barber v. Superior Court (1973)
30 Cal.App.3d 326, 329 (Barber).) In Barber, the Court of Appeal found that an officer
who happened on a family asleep in a car at 2:45 a.m. “neither suspected nor had any
reason to suspect any illegal behavior” and that his purpose to ascertain the family’s
welfare had been satisfied upon the defendant’s response that “everything was all right”
when asked. (Id. at pp. 328–329.) Thus, the officer’s later acts in detaining the driver
were prompted only by “ ‘general curiosity.’ ” (Id. at p. 330.)
But Barber is distinguishable. In Barber, the officer “had [no] suspicion or
hunch . . . [citation] that Barber and his family were doing anything other than resting by
the roadside, as do many drivers, sleepy from travel, before continuing safely and alertly
in traffic on the road.” (Barber, supra, 30 Cal.App.3d at p. 329.) The hour, the roadside
location, all the family being asleep—these factors all pointed to an obvious noncriminal
explanation for their presence and condition. Whereas here, there was evidence
8
justifying the officers’ concern for Wright’s welfare and suspicion that he may be
intoxicated or in need of help.
Wright also relies on People v. Manning (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 586 (Manning). In
Manning, the Second District considered an appeal from a grant of a motion to suppress
when evidence was obtained after a search when officers on patrol saw the defendant
slumped over in a car in a parking lot. (Id. at p. 591.) One officer spoke to the defendant
through an open window and asked if the defendant was okay; at the suppression hearing
the officer testified that the defendant “ ‘mumbled something’ ” that the officer could not
understand, and the officer thereafter asked the defendant to exit the vehicle. (Ibid.) In
granting the motion to suppress, however, the trial court surmised that the defendant had
replied that he was either okay or all right. (Id. at p. 604.) Manning observed that when
an attempt to ascertain an individual’s condition “is made and is frustrated, it is
reasonable for the officer to request the person to alight in order to ascertain his condition
or to engage him, if possible, in intelligible conversation.” (Id. at p. 605.)6 And that
“until such purpose [of the inquiry or detention] is accomplished, the inquiry need not
terminate.” (Manning, at p. 605.) Wright therefore argues that under this rationale in
Manning, the purpose of the inquiry or detention had ceased by the time he cogently
answered McMahon’s questions while still seated inside his truck.
But Manning does not aid Wright. Manning itself noted that in the case before it,
there was “not a scintilla of evidence that [Manning] was ‘All right’ or that the officer
concluded that he was or should have done so.” (Manning, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at
p. 605.) And as stated ante, there were objective reasons to suggest an additional inquiry

6
In Manning, given the evidence presented at the hearing—that the trial court had
made repeated references to the nonexistent and “mythical reply by defendant that he was
‘Okay’ or ‘All right’ ” despite the lack of supporting evidence, the Second District
ultimately held that “the suppression order was based upon either a ground wholly
unsupported by evidence or upon an erroneous application of constitutional standards.”
(Manning, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at pp. 604–605.)

9
into Wright’s welfare was warranted given the length of time he had been asleep in the
truck and the way it was parked.
Asking Wright to step out of the car was therefore a de minimis additional
intrusion or extension of the otherwise justified detention. (See Pennsylvania v. Mimms
(1977) 434 U.S. 106, 111 [when initial stop of car was “justified” additional intrusion to
ask driver to step out of car is “de minimis”].)
C. The Pat Search

We also find that there are specific, articulable facts suggesting that Wright was
armed rendering the subsequent pat search lawful. At the time McMahon engaged in the
pat search, McMahon testified that Wright’s right hand was down near the right side of
the leg, and he thought Wright had appeared slow to exit from the truck. Further, Wright
was wearing baggy cargo shorts, and McMahon saw a bulge on the right-side pocket.
McMahon thus asserted that he was concerned that Wright had weapons based on the
bulge in his pocket and his “delay in exiting and the fact that his arm had kind of gone
down that side of his body.” More importantly, Wright’s seeming uncertainty when
asked if he had “guns, knives” on his person—his inability to confirm that he was
unarmed until after feeling his pockets—could suggest to a reasonable officer that Wright
was armed or that he carried guns or knives often enough that he could not answer the
officer’s question without checking his own pockets. (See, e.g., United States v.
Valenzuela (10th Cir. 2007) 494 F.3d 886, 890 [equivocal response to question about
weapons “engenders the notion that weapons may be in the vehicle” and therefore did not
unreasonably prolong detention].)7
7
The Attorney General argues that even before the pat search, McMahon could
see a glass pipe with residue in Wright’s pocket and that for officer safety reasons,
McMahon subsequently touched the outside of Wright’s pocket and felt something hard
that could have been a weapon. We read the record differently: McMahon testified that
he first conducted a pat search for weapons during which he felt a hard object and then
looked in Wright’s pocket and could see a pipe with residue. The body camera footage
does not show the pipe in plain view; instead, McMahon pulls open Wright’s pocket after
10
Wright argues that “[t]he sum total of the evidence supporting [his] search was a
bulge in his pocket that was caused by something unknown to McMahon.” We disagree
on this record. Considered in isolation, the mere fact that Wright wore baggy clothes or
that it appeared that he had items in his pocket by itself does not support a reasonable
suspicion to conduct a patdown search. (See United States v. Job (9th Cir. 2017)
871 F.3d 852, 861 [“the facts that [defendant’s] pants appeared to be ‘full of items’ and
he appeared nervous do not support the conclusion that he was engaged in criminal
activity”]; People v. Pantoja (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 483, 490 [trial court could have
reasonably discounted testimony that defendant’s clothing that “ ‘naturally has bulges in
it’ ” as giving rise to reasonable suspicion].) But we must consider the totality of
circumstances, in which a visible bulge in clothing is among the circumstances that may
inform whether there is a reasonable suspicion that a defendant is armed. (United States
v. Colbert (7th Cir. 2022) 54 F.4th 521, 529 [bulge in suspect’s clothing can be a
circumstance contributing to reasonable suspicion that a defendant is armed and
dangerous]; Thomas v. Dillard (9th Cir. 2016) 818 F.3d 864, 877 [in assessing totality of
circumstances, relevant considerations can include a visible bulge in a person’s clothing
that may suggest the presence of a weapon].)

asking if what McMahon felt in the pocket was a pipe. Although McMahon previously
testified at the preliminary hearing that he had seen a pipe in Wright’s pocket before
commencing the search, the motion to suppress was litigated later, at a special hearing
where the parties did not rely on the preliminary hearing testimony or seek to admit the
preliminary hearing transcript into evidence. The trial court thus did not consider
McMahon’s preliminary hearing testimony. (§ 1538.5, subd. (i) [if offense was initiated
by indictment or complaint and no motion was made at preliminary hearing, “the
defendant shall have the right to fully litigate the validity of a search or seizure on the
basis of the evidence presented at a special hearing”]; People v. Neighbours (1990)
223 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1120 [§ 1538.5 does not provide for admission of preliminary
hearing transcript at a special hearing unless transcript is formally received in evidence].)
Nor will we.

11
Wright counters that before McMahon conducted the pat search, McMahon had
permitted Wright to reach into a pocket to retrieve his driver’s license. But asking
Wright for his identification while the encounter was still consensual does not limit the
range of possible risks as the contact ripened into a detention. Although officers may not
have had a reasonable suspicion that Wright was armed when he was still inside the
truck, the circumstances had changed by the time he stepped outside of his vehicle.
Officers could then more clearly see that Wright had the capacity to be carrying a
concealed weapon (Wright’s bulging cargo pocket) and consider Wright’s equivocal
response to McMahon’s query about weapons.
“ ‘The judiciary should not lightly second-guess a police officer’s decision to
perform a patdown search for officer safety. The lives and safety of police officers weigh
heavily in the balance of competing Fourth Amendment considerations.’ ” (People v.
Collier (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1378.) Based on the totality of the circumstances,
we conclude that there are sufficient specific and articulable facts supporting a finding
that Wright was armed at the time of the pat search. (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 21.) In
our independent judgment, we conclude the June 2017 pat search was constitutional
under the Fourth Amendment. (See Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1043.) The trial court
accordingly did not err by denying Wright’s motion to suppress.
D. The Search of the Car and Search of Wright’s Home

Wright's sole basis for challenging the search incident to his arrest and the search
of his home is that both derived from the pat search, and that the baton found in his car
and the firearms, ammunition, and fireworks found in his home should likewise be
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Because we conclude that the trial court
properly denied Wright’s motion to suppress evidence obtained in the June 2017 pat
search, Wright’s challenge to the search incident to his arrest and the execution of the
search warrant at his home must likewise be rejected.

12
III. DISPOSITION

The judgments in case numbers F1765391 and F1765268 are affirmed.

13
_____________________________________
LIE, J.

WE CONCUR:

_____________________________________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, Acting P. J.

_____________________________________
GROVER, J.

People v. Wright
H051116

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