CourtListener 10308512•People v. Bowser CA5
Texto completo
Filed 1/7/25 P. v. Bowser CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087271
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. SC076439A)
v.
EDWARD BOWSER, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Stephanie
Renee Childers, Judge.
Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberly A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Chung Mi
Choi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Franson, J. and Meehan, J.
In 1999, the trial court sentenced Edward Bowser to 25 years to life under the
former Three Strikes law, plus an additional year for a prior prison term enhancement. In
2023, Bowser appeared for resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 483) (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3), codified as Penal Code section
1172.75 (formerly § 1171.1).1 At the hearing, the trial court struck Bowser’s prior
prison term enhancement, but otherwise left his sentence intact. Bowser appeals, arguing
the trial court erred in resentencing him pursuant to section 1172.75 without applying the
revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Reform Act or Act)
(Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)). The People concede that
Bowser was entitled to such a resentencing. We are not bound by the People’s
concession and affirm.2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 1999, the Kern County District Attorney filed an information charging
Bowser with one count of possession of methamphetamine (.12 grams) (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) and one misdemeanor count of possession of drug
paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364). The information alleged Bowser had
suffered two strike priors, consisting of a section 288, subdivision (a) lewd and lascivious
conduct conviction on May 11, 1982, involving his six- and one-half-year-old sister, and
another section 288, subdivision (a) lewd and lascivious conduct conviction on January 5,
1990, involving his seven-year-old niece (§§ 1170.12 (a)-(e) and 667 (c)-(j)). It further
alleged Bowser had two prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)
On April 15, 1999, the jury found Bowser guilty of both counts. In a bifurcated
proceeding, the trial court found all prior allegations, except one prison prior, to be true.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
2 As a general rule, we are not bound by concessions made by the People in a
criminal case. (People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1021.)
2.
On May 13, 1999, the court denied Bowser’s request to reduce his conviction to a
misdemeanor or strike one or both of his strike priors and his prison prior. The court
imposed 25 years to life on the felony count, and a consecutive year for the prison prior,
for a total of 26 years to life.
In 2012, after Bowser’s sentencing, the electorate passed the Reform Act, which
provides that some third strike defendants whose current offense is not a serious or
violent felony “are excepted from the provision imposing an indeterminate life sentence
[citation] and are instead sentenced in the same way as second strike defendants
[citation]: that is, they receive a term equal to ‘twice the term otherwise provided as
punishment for the current felony conviction’ [citation].” (People v. Conley (2016) 63
Cal.4th 646, 653 (Conley).) Section 1170.126 established the procedure for an eligible
defendant to seek resentencing under the Reform Act.
Effective in 2020, the Legislature limited the circumstances in which a prior
prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) may apply and, effective in 2022, enacted
section 1172.75 allowing for resentencing in certain cases. Under section 1172.75, for
eligible cases with a legally invalid prior prison term enhancement, the trial court in
resentencing a defendant “shall ... apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences.”
(Id., subd. (d)(2).)
On October 30, 2023, the court, sua sponte, set a section 1172.75 hearing for
November 27, 2023, and referred the case for a supplemental probation officer’s report.
On November 16, 2023, Bowser filed a sentencing statement asking that the trial court
strike the invalid section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior. The statement further listed various
factors in mitigation and asked that he be resentenced to a total term of six years on his
third strike (possession of methamphetamine), because “[t]oday the 3 strikes law does not
allow a 25 year to life sentence when the new felony charges are not listed as a violent or
serious felony.”
3.
At the November 27, 2023, hearing, counsel for Bowser argued that Bowser had
two serious prior convictions, but that his third strike was for “a very small amount” of
methamphetamine, and asked that the trial court “strike his burglary[3] and one of the
288s” and sentence him to “no more than 16 [months], 2 [years] or 3 [years] doubled.”
Counsel argued that Bowser, now age 60, had already served almost 25 years since his
imprisonment in 1999. Counsel argued further that Bowser suffers from epilepsy, severe
depression, asthma, and pulmonary cardiac disease. Counsel represented that Bowser
completed several programs, including anger management, victim awareness, and
narcotic and alcoholic programs, and that he had held regular prison jobs despite his poor
health, and has stayed out of trouble.
Bowser testified that he received a “Laudatory Chrono” from the prison thanking
him for his work in the dining hall during the Covid-19 pandemic. Bowser explained that
he had matured and had tried to work on himself, and would avoid children if released.
The prosecution introduced Exhibit 14and argued that Bowser was a “recidivist
child molester” who victimized two children, ages six and seven, and should not be
granted further relief “given the relative lack of any mitigating circumstances that have
been presented since his incarceration.”
The court found there were no circumstances in mitigation and many in
aggravation, including Bowser’s long criminal history, having spent most of the time
between 1983 and the present in prison, as he frequently reoffended. The trial court
struck the prison prior, but denied Bowser’s request to strike any of his prior convictions
3 It appears that counsel is referred to the information, which initially alleged a prior
prison term for burglary (§ 459), but that was crossed off and replaced with an allegation
of a prior prison term for lewd and lascivious conduct (§ 288, subd. (a)). The probation
report shows a prior conviction for burglary (§ 459) in July of 1984.
4 Bowser’s “rap sheet.” The exhibit does not appear in the record.
4.
and be resentenced on his third strike. The trial court reduced Bowser’s sentence to 25
years to life.
DISCUSSION
The issue in this case focuses on the interplay of two ameliorative changes made
to our state’s sentencing laws — the Reform Act and section 1172.75 — each of which
has its own resentencing mechanism. Bowser was most recently considered for
resentencing under section 1172.75’s recall and resentencing procedure. Bowser argues
that, because section 1172.75 requires the trial court to conduct a full resentencing
hearing (subd. (d)(2)), it was required to apply the ameliorative sentencing changes
adopted by voters in the Reform Act.
We first provide a brief overview of (1) the Reform Act, including resentencing
under section 1170.126, and (2) the more recent legislative change regarding
resentencing under section 1172.75 due to invalid prior prison term enhancements. We
then turn to the issue of whether the trial court erred when it resentenced Bowser to an
indeterminate term, but find no error.
Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012
Under the Three Strikes law as originally enacted in 1994, “a felony defendant
who had been convicted of a single prior serious or violent felony (a second strike
defendant) was to be sentenced to a term equal to ‘twice the term otherwise provided as
punishment for the current felony conviction.’ [Citation.] By contrast, a defendant who
had been convicted of two or more prior serious or violent felonies (a third strike
defendant) was to be sentenced to ‘an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a
minimum term of’ at least 25 years.” (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 652.)
In 2012, voters enacted Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012.
(Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 651.) “The Reform Act changed the sentence prescribed
for a third strike defendant whose current offense is not a serious or violent felony.
5.
[Citation.] Under the Reform Act’s revised penalty provisions, many third strike
defendants are excepted from the provision imposing an indeterminate life sentence
[citation] and are instead sentenced in the same way as second strike defendants
[citation]: that is, they receive a term equal to ‘twice the term otherwise provided as
punishment for the current felony conviction’ [citation].” (Id. at pp. 652-653; see, e.g.,
§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), (2)(A) & (C).) The Reform Act contains exceptions to these
revised penalty provisions, and those exceptions “relate to a defendant’s current offense
and prior offenses.” (People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 681 (Johnson); see
§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(i)–(iv).)5
The Reform Act “also enacted a procedure governing inmates sentenced under the
former Three Strikes law whose third strike was neither serious nor violent, permitting
them to petition for resentencing in accordance with Proposition 36’s new sentencing
provisions.” (People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 350.) Specifically, section
1170.126 provides that “persons presently serving an indeterminate term of
imprisonment” under the prior version of the Three Strikes law “may file a petition for a
recall of sentence, within two years after the effective date of the act ... or at a later date
5 Specifically, a “defendant does not qualify for this ameliorative change ... if [the
defendant’s] current offense is a controlled substance charge involving large quantities
[citation], one of various enumerated sex offenses [citation], or one in which he [or she]
used a firearm, was armed with a firearm or deadly weapon, or intended to cause great
bodily injury [citation]. The ameliorative provisions of the Reform Act also do not apply
in cases in which the defendant was previously convicted of certain enumerated offenses,
including those involving sexual violence, child sexual abuse, homicide or attempted
homicide, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a peace officer or
firefighter, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, or any serious or violent felony
punishable by life imprisonment or death. [Citation.] The Act provides that these
disqualifying factors must be pleaded and proved by the prosecution.” (Conley, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 653.) The prior convictions mentioned are sometimes referred to as “super
strikes” (Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 681; § 1170.12, subds. (c)(3)(C)(iv)(I)-(VII)),
and it is of note that the specified prior offenses include convictions of section 288, of
which Bowser has two (§ 1170.12, subds. (c)(3)(C)(iv)(III)).
6.
upon a showing of good cause, before the trial court that entered the judgment of
conviction ... to request resentencing ....” (§ 1170.126, subds. (a) & (b); see Conley,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 653.) “Like a defendant who is being sentenced under the new
provisions, an inmate is disqualified from resentencing if any of the exceptions ... are
present.” (Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 682.)
“In contrast to the rules that apply to sentencing [under section 1170.12], ... the
rules governing resentencing [under section 1170.126] provide that an inmate will be
denied recall of his or her sentence if ‘the court, in its discretion, determines that
resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.’
(§ 1170.126, subd. (f).)” (Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 682.) “In exercising this
discretion, the court may consider the defendant’s criminal conviction history, the
defendant’s disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation while incarcerated, and ‘[a]ny
other evidence the court ... determines to be relevant.’ ([§ 1170.126], subd. (g).)”
(Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 653.)
Resentencing Under Section 1172.75
Before January 2020, subdivision (b) of section 667.5 permitted enhancements for
any prior prison term for a felony. (Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 65.) Effective January 1,
2020, however, the Legislature amended subdivision (b) to limit prior prison term
enhancements to sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) The Legislature
later declared that prior prison term enhancements imposed before January 1, 2020, were
“legally invalid” if the enhancement was imposed for a prior conviction other than a
sexually violent offense. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a), formerly § 1171.1, subd. (a); see People v.
Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1282.)
Section 1172.75 sets forth the procedure for resentencing if the defendant’s
sentence includes a legally invalid prior prison term enhancement. Specifically, the trial
court “shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant” “[i]f the court determines
7.
that the current judgment includes” a legally invalid prior prison term enhancement as
described in section 1172.75, subdivision (a). (Id., subd. (c).)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d) sets forth several rules regarding the
resentencing. First, “[r]esentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser
sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed
enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a
lesser sentence would endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to this section shall
not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).)
Second, “[t]he court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply
any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to
eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (Id., subd.
(d)(2), italics added.) Third, “[t]he court may consider postconviction factors, including,
but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant
while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished
physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and
evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so
that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
Fourth, “[u]nless the court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not impose a
sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation that
justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those
facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (Id., subd. (d)(4).)
Interplay Between Section 1170.126 and 1172.75
Bowser argues that, because section 1172.75 requires the trial court to apply “any
other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion” at
resentencing (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2)), the trial court was required to apply the Reform
8.
Act’s revised sentencing rules (§ 1170.12) without regard to the Reform Act’s distinct
resentencing mechanism (§ 1170.126).
Every single Court of Appeal to consider this question has held that the
resentencing provisions of section 1170.126 provide the exclusive mechanism for
reducing a third strike sentence for a nonserious and nonviolent felony, and that
“applying the revised penalty provisions of the ... Reform Act to reduce a defendant’s
indeterminate life term to a determinate term when the defendant is being resentenced
under section 1172.75 due to an invalid prior prison term enhancement unconstitutionally
amends the resentencing procedure and requirements set forth in section 1170.126 of the
voter-approved ... Reform Act.” (People v. Superior Court (Williams) (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 1242, 1250 (Williams), review granted Aug. 28, 2024, S286128; accord,
People v. Santos (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 666 (Santos), review granted May 29, 2024,
S284341; People v. Kimble (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 746 (Kimble), review granted Apr. 24,
2024, S284259; People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 978
(Guevara), review granted Mar. 12, 2024, S283305.)
Bowser urges us to adopt the view of the lone justice that has dissented from this
view (Guevara, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 988-995 (dis. opn. of Baltodano, J.)),
requiring resentencing him as a two-striker, or remanding for resentencing to determine
whether there was clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety. The People respond that they agree with Bowser in part, arguing
that the provisions of section 1172.75, when read in conjunction with the modifications to
section 1170.126 under the Reform Act, entitled Bowser to a full resentencing hearing
under both provisions, although they acknowledge that the courts in Kimble, Guevara,
and Santos have rejected this position.
We reject the argument, as we explain further.
Analysis
9.
We agree with the opinions to date that have analyzed the issue of whether it is
appropriate to consider the applicability of the Reform Act in a section 1172.75 hearing,
all of which have rejected the position advocated by Bowser and the People.
We have several problems with this position, all of which prior courts have noted.
First, such a construction of section 1172.75 would unconstitutionally amend section
1170.126. The Reform Act “allows the Legislature to amend it by statute only if the
statute passes each house of the Legislature by a vote of two-thirds of the membership.
(Prop. 36, § 11, subd. (b).) Senate Bill No. 483 … , codified as section 1172.75 did not
pass the Senate with a two-thirds vote. [Citation.]” (Guevara, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
p. 985.)
In addition, the parties’ interpretation of section 1172.75 would unconstitutionally
amend section 1170.126 by eliminating the requirement that a resentencing petition for a
pre-Reform Act Three Strikes sentence be filed within two years of the effective date of
the Reform Act (in other words, no later than November 2014), and only later upon a
showing of good cause. (Williams, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 1267.)
We also find that applying the Reform Act as the parties urge would frustrate
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2)’s intent to promote uniformity of sentencing by
carving out a favorable exception for a specific subset of defendants — those sentenced
under the former Three Strikes law who may be eligible for resentencing as second strike
offenders and who received a prior prison term enhancement within the gambit of Senate
Bill 483. “This exception would grant those defendants mandatory relief under the
Reform Act, requiring the court to resentence them as second strike offenders, while
leaving otherwise similarly-situated inmates with only the Reform Act’s (time-limited)
petition process as a path to resentencing, with its assessment of disqualifying factors and
discretionary weighing of safety and recidivism considerations. Such a result would be at
odds with Senate Bill 483’s plainly stated objective of promoting uniformity, and
eliminating disparities, in sentencing.” (Kimble, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 755.)
10.
Despite the above, the parties urge us to adopt the view expressed by Justice
Hernaldo Baltodano in his dissent in Guevara, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pages 988-995.
That view rests on the assertion that a resentencing under section 1172.75 is a full
resentencing, and therefore a defendant like Bowser is entitled to be resentenced as
though he was just convicted of a nonviolent and nonserious offense. We reject that
premise for the same reason the majority in Guevara did, namely that the portion of
Bowser’s sentence mandated by the Three Strikes law was not vacated and thus not
subject to resentencing in a section 1172.75 proceeding. (Guevara, supra, at p. 986.)
Simply put, “because section 1172.75 was not enacted by a two-thirds vote of both
houses of the Legislature, it is not the mechanism for relief for those serving an
indeterminate term pursuant to the Reform Act.” (Id. at p. 987.) With regard to his third
strike sentence, Bowser “is entitled to resentencing only upon a successful petition under
section 1170.126.” (Santos, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 676.)
The People’s Additional Argument
As noted above, the People agreed with Bowser that it is appropriate for the trial
court to consider the amendments to the Reform Act in a section 1172.75 resentencing
hearing, an argument we have rejected above. Because we do so, we need not address
the People’s further argument that here the trial court did consider the Reform Act and
correctly sentenced Bowser to an indeterminate term.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
11.
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.