CourtListener 10308511•People v. Davis CA2/3
Texto completo
Filed 1/7/25 P. v. Davis CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, No. B328904
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA126733)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
ANTHONY DAVIS, AND DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING
Defendant and Appellant.
[No change in judgment]
THE COURT:
Order modifying opinion; no change in judgment.
It is ordered that the opinion filed on December 18, 2024 be
modified as follows:
On page 16, the sentence, “He also attempted to clean up
the blood as demonstrated by a towel with blood on it” is deleted
from the final paragraph. The final sentence of the paragraph is
amended to read, “The jury could have reasonably considered this
effort to conceal the activity to infer deliberation. (People v. Perez
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1128.).”
This modification does not affect the judgment. In all other
respects, the People and Davis’s petitions for rehearing are
denied.
EDMON, P. J. ADAMS, J. HANASONO, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
2
Filed 12/18/24 P. v. Davis CA2/3 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B328904
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA126733)
v.
ANTHONY DAVIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed.
Lori Nakaoka, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Anthony Davis appeals his
conviction for first degree murder, arising out of a 1978 cold case.
He raises claims of: (1) insufficiency of evidence to support
deliberate and premeditated murder, (2) improper exclusion of
hearsay statements, (3) improper admission of defense counsel’s
comments during a pre-arrest interview, (4) prosecutorial
misconduct based on multiple comments made before the jury
during the trial, and (5) cumulative error. Davis also challenges
the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to
preserve evidence and denial of presentence conduct credits. We
agree that the prosecutor improperly commented on Davis’s
exercise of his Fourth Amendment right when he refused to
voluntarily submit a DNA sample and fingerprints. But the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We reject all other
claims and affirm the judgment of conviction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Facts
1. The Prosecution Evidence
a. The incident and original investigation
On January 7, 1978, at about 3:00 p.m., El Monte Police
Department Officer Craig Sperry went to the Spic and Span
Motel in El Monte, California. When Officer Sperry arrived at
Room 2, the door was ajar. Officer Sperry pushed the door open
and saw blood on the bed, on the north, west, and south walls,
and on the door on the east wall. He found the decedent Rudolfo
Chavez unclothed on the floor.
The motel night manager, An-Chu Shaw, provided a
registration card for Room 2 to Officer Sperry. The registration
card listed an address on Davis Avenue in Maryland. It was later
2
determined this address did not exist. It was also later
determined that Chavez had a safe deposit box in Maryland.
Shaw provided Officer Sperry with a description of the two
persons who checked into Room 2. The description was “entirely
different” from Davis’s description at trial. Shaw worked behind
a window. The two men checked in at night and the room was
not well-lit. In his 1978 report, Officer Sperry described Shaw as
an “Oriental female,” but clarified in his testimony that she was
Asian.
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department supervising
criminalist Gary Chasteen collected evidence from Room 2.
These included blood samples and a bedspread that was placed
over the window. Chasteen also collected latent fingerprints.
On January 8, 1978, at about 2:05 p.m., Officer W.A.
Mitchell of the Arizona Department of Public Safety saw a
stopped car on the southbound frontage road while driving on the
Interstate 17.1 He found the passenger door ajar. He did not find
car keys. The car contained documents with Chavez’s name, a
bloodstained envelope, and a hitchhiker sign with “Phoenix”
written on it. The car was towed to an impound lot.
On January 10, 1978, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department Crime Lab Criminalist Wayne Plumtree and two
officers from the El Monte Police Department went to Arizona to
collect evidence from the car. The car’s ignition had no damage.
No car keys were found. Chavez’s wallet was found on the front
floorboard.
1 The parties stipulated to the facts related to the discovery
of Chavez’s car.
3
Plumtree collected blood samples from the car and items
found inside of it. An envelope from General Telephone and a
return card from International Society of Postmasters were
inconclusive for ABO blood types but were positive for blood
enzymes. An envelope from American Savings and Loan was
inconclusive.
Chief Los Angeles County Coroner Lakshmanan
Sathyavagiswaran conducted an autopsy on Chavez in 1978.
Chavez was five feet, four inches tall, weighed 156 pounds,
appeared to be in his early forties with a moderate build. He
sustained 45 stab wounds. These wounds included 15 to the head
and neck, 10 to the torso, and 14 to the back of the torso.
Lakshmanan determined the cause of death to be hemorrhage
from multiple stab wounds. Most of the wounds appeared to be
inflicted by an instrument with one dull side and one sharp side
with some having two sharp sides. Lakshmanan could not
identify the kind of weapon used. He examined Chavez’s clothing
and saw no stab marks on them.
Lakshmanan saw no injuries indicating sexual assault.
But he could not rule out consensual sex.
b. Reopening of investigation in 2018
In 2018, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Forensic
Identification Specialist Angela Lopez conducted a print analysis
after the Automated Fingerprint Identification System made an
identification. Lopez obtained the crime scene photographs and
vehicle latent prints from the evidence storage and compared
them to the 10-print exemplar cards for Davis and Timothy
Heisley.
On February 28, 2018, Lopez conducted three comparisons.
First, she identified the latent print taken from the inside left
4
edge of the motel room door as Davis’s left thumb print. Second,
Lopez found no match when comparing the latent prints from
Chavez’s car and Davis’s exemplar. Third, she matched Heisley’s
exemplar to the print found on the steering column of Chavez’s
car, one inch in front of the turn signal.
For two prints on the inside passenger window, Lopez
excluded Heisley. Lopez did not attempt to compare these prints
to any other print exemplars.
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Homicide
Bureau, Cold Case Unsolved Unit Detective Dale Falicon
confirmed Lopez’s analysis. Prior to his current assignment, for
19 years, Falicon examined latent fingerprints for the Sheriff’s
Department. Falicon identified Davis’s left thumb print and
palm print on the interior motel room door, 20 inches from the
top of the door with the thumb pointed downward lower than the
palm. Falicon did not see any blood in the prints.
On February 28, 2018, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Detective Harry Lewin was assigned to the case after receiving
information about the fingerprint originally found at the Spic and
Span Motel. He learned Davis’s thumb print and palm print
were on the inside of the front door to Room 2.
Detective Lewin tried calling Davis, but no one answered.
He left a business card and note to call him in Davis’s mailbox.
Davis called four days later. Lewin advised him that they needed
to talk in person. Forty minutes later, a lawyer called and
Detective Lewin informed him that Davis’s prints had been found
in a crime scene. Davis called again and insisted that his prints
had been planted. But he agreed to meet Detective Lewin.
On November 19, 2018, Detective Lewin interviewed Davis
at a restaurant. Davis denied being around El Monte in 1978.
5
But he admitted that he lived in El Monte as a child. He then
moved to Temple City. Davis said in 1978 he lived in Sherman
Oaks. Davis denied ever going to the Spic and Span Motel. He
also denied knowing anyone named Rudy Chavez.
Detective Lewin asked Davis if he ever spent time with gay
persons. Davis responded, “No, absolutely not.” He also stated,
“I’m not uh, part of that clan,” and “I’m totally a heterosexual
male, even though I’m not married.”
After the interview, Detective Lewin asked Davis if he
would provide a DNA sample and fingerprints. Davis refused.
Detective Lewin later obtained a search warrant for both.
In 2019, Detective Lewin interviewed a man named
Timothy Heisley in Florida. His fingerprints were found on the
steering column of Chavez’s car. Heisley provided a DNA sample
to the police in Florida and it was sent to Detective Lewin.
2. DNA Evidence
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department senior criminalist
Jamie Lajoie tested multiple blood samples found in the motel
room for DNA. She analyzed nearly one hundred DNA samples
for this investigation.
Lajoie expressed her certainty of the findings in DNA
analysis in terms of likelihood ratios which describe the
statistical evidence for inclusion. According to Lajoie, anything
over one million indicated a very strong likelihood of inclusion.
Anything between 100 to 10,000 indicated a moderate likelihood
of inclusion. Anything between 2 to 99 indicated a limited
likelihood.
Chavez’s DNA was included in the blood samples. Lajoie
testified that the likelihood ratio that Chavez was included as the
source of blood was “two times ten to the ninth times” more likely
6
that it originated from him and an unknown individual than if it
had originated from him and two unknown individuals. This
indicated a very strong likelihood of inclusion.
Lajoie testified that the bedspread found in the room had
multiple bloodstains. She examined the bedspread for semen
using multiple tests, including an alternate light source test, a
presumptive test for acid phosphatase (an enzyme found in
semen), and a presumptive test for the P-30 protein (found in
semen). One area of the bedspread produced positive results for
all three tests.
From this area, Lajoie extracted sperm cells and epithelial
cells. She stated that DNA from sperm cells and blood tend to
withstand the test of time better than DNA deposited by touching
a surface. She identified sperm cells in the sample. She
determined that Davis was a contributor. The likelihood ratio for
the profile was approximately two times ten to the twenty-fifth
times more likely if it originated from Davis and an unknown
individual than if it had originated from two unknown
individuals. This was considered a very strong level of support.
The secondary contributor was a low-level or trace
contributor. Lajoie compared the whole mixture to reference
samples from Heisley and Chavez. She determined that both
were excluded as contributors from the mixture. She had no
other information about the second contributor.
According to Lajoie, with old samples, she faces trying to
distinguish between a trace contributor of true DNA and
“artifacts” due to the amplification process. In other words, these
artifacts are a “by-product of the copying process.” Lajoie
testified that degraded samples can create artifacts that can look
like a trace contributor. Here, she could not conclude the absence
7
of artifacts. Consequently, Lajoie erred on the side of caution and
concluded the presence of two contributors with the second
contributor as a trace contributor. According to Lajoie, the
sample “could be expressing elevated artifacts or it could be a
second person’s DNA. They are both true.”
The epithelial fraction from the bedspread sample also
contained a mixture. Lajoie concluded that Davis and Chavez
were included in the DNA profile. A third unknown contributor
was also included. This unknown contributor was listed as a
1 percent contributor. Lajoie deemed it a low-level trace
contributor.
The likelihood ratio for Davis was approximately “four
times ten to the fifteenth times” more likely if it had originated
from Davis and two unknown individuals than if it had
originated from three unknown individuals. Again, this was
considered the highest level of support. The likelihood ratio for
Chavez was approximately “three times ten to the tenth times”
more likely if it originated from him and two unknown
individuals than if it had originated from three unknown
individuals. This was considered another strong profile.
Lajoie did not identify the source of Chavez’s DNA that was
included in the epithelial fraction. It could have come from blood,
skin, or hair.
There were other samples on the bedspread that potentially
contained bodily fluid other than semen. Lajoie did not test these
samples for DNA. She was only looking for semen.
Lajoie also determined that Chavez’s DNA was on the
blood-stained American Credit and Savings envelope found in the
car. Heisley’s DNA was found on two cigarette butts.
8
a. Interview with Deputy District
Attorney Lewin
On February 8, 2021, Deputy District Attorney John Lewin
interviewed Davis in the presence of his attorney, James Blatt,
who also represented him at trial. Detectives Harry Lewin and
Dale Falicon were also present.2 Early in the interview, DDA
Lewin stated that if Davis did not state anything different from
the evidence in his possession, he would file a murder case
against him.
Davis lived in Arcadia and Temple City, California as a
child. He initially denied having a connection to El Monte. Davis
later returned to Temple City as an adult in December 1977 to
February or March of 1978. Davis confirmed that he was living
close to El Monte and the Spic and Span Motel at this time. He
denied ever going to the Spic and Span Motel. After that, he
moved to the San Fernando Valley.
DDA Lewin next cautioned Davis that he wanted to turn to
an area that was a “little bit uncomfortable,” but “incredibly
important.” Lewin asked about Davis’s sexual orientation. Davis
responded, “I am a total heterosexual male.” He denied ever
having “homosexual actions with another male,” and declared,
“I’m not a homo.”
After establishing Davis’s residential history and inquiring
about his sexual orientation, DDA Lewin informed him that
Rudolfo Chavez was murdered at the Spic and Span Motel in El
Monte on January 7, 1978. Davis acknowledged that the murder
2 Deputy District Attorney John Lewin and Detective Harry
Lewin are not related. To avoid confusion, we refer to Deputy
District Attorney Lewin as DDA Lewin and Detective Harry
Lewin as Detective Lewin.
9
occurred during the time he was living near the Spic and Span
Motel.
DDA Lewin next told Davis that his fingerprint was found
on the inside of the door to the motel room. Davis denied being in
the room when the incident occurred. But he suggested that he
could have opened the door to the room when he was younger.
He repeated later that he might have touched the door when he
was “a kid.” He also suggested the door was moved from another
building. Davis also stated, “This isn’t right, man.” He also
expressed disbelief that his print was discovered and denied
killing Chavez.
When shown the crime scene photos, Davis agreed with
DDA Lewin that the killing did not appear to be in self-defense
based on the number of stab wounds and the amount of blood at
the scene. Davis also agreed that the number of stab wounds was
excessive to kill. Davis stated, “I couldn’t even do that to
somebody.” He denied having a relationship with Chavez and
doubted ever meeting him. Davis stated, “I’m also a thousand
percent sure I did not commit that murder, man,” and “I would
never do that to anybody.”
DDA Lewin asked Davis if he could give a reasonable
explanation for his print inside the room. Davis responded, “I
definitely didn’t kill anyone, and I don’t know how my print
coulda got in there to be honest with you.” When asked to
assume it was his print, Davis could not give any reasonable
explanation for why it was found in the room.
Davis agreed with DDA Lewin that DNA evidence is “very
trustworthy.” DDA Lewin informed Davis that his DNA was
found in the room. DDA Lewin further told Davis that the DNA
was found in semen that was on the bedspread that was hanging
10
from the window. Davis responded, “Wow. This is really—
there’s a mistake here.”
DDA Lewin also stated that Chavez’s DNA was mixed with
Davis’s semen. DDA Lewin commented that the only reasonable
explanation was that Davis engaged in sexual activity with
Chavez. Multiple times earlier in the interview, Davis denied
ever engaging in sexual activity with another man. At this point
in the interview, DDA Lewin invited Davis to provide any
explanations for the evidence against him. Defense counsel
advised Davis to not answer. Specifically, defense counsel
advised Davis to “just listen to what he has to say,” “just be
quiet,” and “don’t say anything right now.” He also thanked DDA
Lewin for the opportunity to meet and informed him that he
would need to consult with Davis.
3. The Defense Evidence
Davis relied on the state of the evidence without presenting
a defense.
B. Procedure
A jury convicted Davis of first degree willful, deliberate,
and premeditated murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a);3 count 1).
The trial court sentenced Davis to life with the possibility
of parole after seven years. The court awarded 712 days of actual
custody credit but denied presentence conduct credit.
3 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
11
DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Deliberate and
Premeditated Murder
The prosecutor proceeded under the theory that Davis
murdered Chavez with deliberation and premeditation. Davis
contends that insufficient evidence supported the conviction for
deliberate and premeditated murder. We disagree.
Our standard of review is well settled. For a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence, the record must contain
“substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357; People v.
Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; Jackson v. Virginia (1979)
443 U.S. 307, 318–319.) We review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment. (Zamudio, at p. 357.) We must
“presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
[the trier of fact] could reasonably have deduced from the
evidence.” (Ibid.) We do not resolve credibility issues or conflicts
in the evidence. (People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 44.)
“The same standard applies when the conviction rests
primarily on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23
Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “If the circumstances reasonably justify the
findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not
warranted simply because the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (People v.
Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638–639.)
12
1. Actual Killer
Davis argues that the evidence supports his mere presence
in the motel room. But Davis was the actual killer. The
substantial evidence to support this determination centers
around the physical and scientific evidence. Davis’s fingerprints
were found in the motel room where Officer Sperry discovered
Chavez’s unclothed body. Davis’s DNA was detected in a semen
stain on the bedspread in the room, along with Chavez’s DNA.
Based on these facts, the jury could reasonably infer that Davis
engaged in some form of sexual activity in the company of
Chavez. Further, Chavez’s clothing did not contain any damage
from the stabbings, supporting the inference that he was stabbed
to death while unclothed.
Davis tried to counter this scientific evidence that placed
him in the room at the Spic and Span Motel. He lied to Detective
Lewin and again to DDA Lewin about never visiting the Spic and
Span Motel. The Spic and Span Motel was in El Monte. Davis
denied ever living in El Monte. He recounted the various places
he lived with DDA Lewin. Davis ultimately revealed that from
December of 1977 to February or March of 1978, he resided in
Temple City, which he confirmed is near El Monte. Davis lived
near the Spic and Span Motel during this brief three-month
window in which the killing occurred, despite having lived in a
variety of other areas in Los Angeles County and out of state
before and after the killing.
To explain the fingerprint evidence against him, Davis
suggested that he could have left his fingerprints in the motel
room when he was child, or that the door with his fingerprints
was moved from another location to the motel. These incredible
13
suggestions support Davis’s awareness of his guilt of the crime.
(People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1024–1025.)
The evidence from the motel room refuted Davis’s denial of
ever having a sexual encounter with another man. This denial
adds to the other lies Davis told Detective Lewin and DDA
Lewin, further supporting his consciousness of guilt.
The totality of evidence, including these highlighted items,
amounts to substantial evidence that Davis was the direct
perpetrator of the killing. Where, as here, “the circumstances
reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the reviewing court may
not reverse the judgment merely because it believes that the
circumstances might also support a contrary finding.” (People v.
Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1139.)
2. Deliberation and Premeditation
A willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing is first
degree murder. (§ 189.) It requires more than a showing of an
intent to kill. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1080
(Koontz); People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1069
(Mendoza).) Premeditated means “ ‘considered beforehand.’ ”
(People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767, overruled on
another ground in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 390,
fn. 2.) Deliberate means “ ‘formed or arrived at or determined
upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of
considerations for and against the proposed course of action.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) An intentional killing is deliberate and
premeditated if it resulted from “preexisting thought,” rather
than “rash impulse.” (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514,
543.) “The process of premeditation and deliberation does not
require any extended period of time.” (Mayfield, at p. 767.)
14
Traditionally, to assess the sufficiency of evidence for
deliberation and premeditation, the Supreme Court has
established three factors or categories of evidence: planning
activity, motive to kill, and the manner of killing. (People v.
Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27; People v. Wharton (1991) 53
Cal.3d 522, 546; Mendoza, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1069.)
Deliberate and premeditated murder typically entails any one of
the following: (1) extremely strong evidence of planning, (2) a
combination of evidence of motive and either evidence of planning
or evidence of a calculated manner of killing, or (3) evidence of all
three factors. (Anderson, at p. 27; Wharton, at pp. 546–547;
People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 863, overruled on another
ground in People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 181, fn. 2.)
But the Supreme Court has clarified that Anderson “did not
refashion the elements of first degree murder.” (People v.
Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 517.) The Anderson factors need
not be present in any special combination. (People v. Booker
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 173.) They remain useful to review the
evidence. But establishing them is not required for first degree
deliberate and premeditated murder. (Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th
at p. 1081; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1224.)
Here, the evidence sufficiently supported deliberation and
premeditation based on the manner of killing alone. Davis
stabbed Chavez 45 times. This sheer number of blows would take
time to unleash. Chavez also sustained defensive wounds.
Smears of blood on the walls suggest he was trying to escape or
move away from Davis. Any jury could reasonably conclude this
murder did not occur instantly. Consumption of a length of time
sufficient to allow a killer to consider his or her actions supports
15
a finding of deliberation and premeditation. (People v. Hovarter
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1020.)
Chavez sustained multiple injuries in vital areas including
the head, neck, face, abdomen, and back. The jury could have
construed the potentially lethal wounds as demonstrating a
preconceived design to kill. (People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th
453, 471.) Such a death resulting from such multiple wounds
supports premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Morales
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 91; People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195,
247.)
Even if a jury determined this killing started as an
unplanned event, it could reasonably conclude that Davis’s attack
on Chavez evolved from an impulsive act to an act rooted in
reflection and decision to kill. The time is not determinative.
The reflection is. A killer may quickly reach a cold, calculated
judgment rapidly after considering thoughts that quickly follow
one another. (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 812.)
Concealing the killing or even the condition of the room
after the killing supports a killing that was not rash or impulsive.
(People v. Disa (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 654, 667.) Davis placed a
bedspread over the window of the room. He also attempted to
clean up the blood as demonstrated by a towel with blood on it.
The jury could have reasonably considered these efforts to conceal
the activity and clean the scene to infer deliberation. (People v.
Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1128.)
We conclude the record supports substantial evidence of
deliberation and premeditation.
16
B. Exclusion of Hearsay Statements of An-Chu Shaw
1. Additional Background
El Monte Police Officer Craig Sperry wrote a report that
summarized his interaction with Shaw, who was the night
manager of the Spic and Span Motel on January 6, 1978.
According to the report, Shaw stated that at 11:00 p.m., two men
entered the motel office to rent a room. She described one as
Latino, about 45 years old, five feet, eight inches tall, with a
husky build, black hair, graying at the temples, and very neatly
dressed. She described the other man as Latino, in his twenties,
about five feet, eight inches tall, and black hair.
Shaw said that the first man inquired about a room rate.
When she asked how many people were going to occupy the room,
the man indicated he and the other man. She told him the rate,
and he paid. The second man filled out a motel room registration
card. He pulled out a piece of paper from his pocket and copied
information onto the registration card. Shaw provided the key to
Room 2. She saw the men go to the room. After a short time,
they left, walking southbound toward Valley Boulevard. She did
not see them return because she did not remain in the office.
At about 1:15 p.m. on January 7, Shaw went to Room 2 to
see if the occupants had left. Checkout time was at 11:00 a.m.
When she opened the door, she saw a dead body. Shaw returned
to the office and called her husband, who called the El Monte
Police Department.
Shaw died prior to Davis’s trial. Davis sought to introduce
Shaw’s statement to Officer Sperry at trial. The trial court
excluded Shaw’s statement as inadmissible hearsay. The court
permitted defense counsel to ask Officer Sperry if Davis fit the
physical description of either man described by Shaw. The court
17
also permitted the prosecutor to ask Officer Sperry if he gave
Shaw the opportunity to tell him about her ability to perceive the
men.
At trial, Officer Sperry testified that Shaw’s descriptions of
the two men who checked into Room 2 were “entirely different”
from Davis as he appeared at trial. Officer Sperry also testified
that Shaw did not tell him how far she was positioned from them,
whether she paid attention to them, or whether the lighting was
good or bad. Shaw was unable to articulate her ability to observe
the man with the victim. She was positioned behind a walk-up
window in the motel office. Officer Sperry testified that based on
his prior visits to the motel office, the lighting conditions at night
were not good. Officer Sperry testified that his impression of
Shaw was that she did not get a good look at the suspect. He did
not ask Shaw how long the men were in front of her, what they
were wearing, their hairstyles, or whether she had any difficulty
seeing them.
2. Analysis
Without elaboration, Davis contests the trial court’s
determination that Shaw’s statements constituted inadmissible
hearsay. Davis also argues that the exclusion of the statements
violated due process, despite their inadmissibility under state
evidence law. We reject both arguments.
Shaw’s statements were inadmissible hearsay. As
determined by the trial court, the statements included the
physical descriptors of the two men, their interaction with Shaw,
and their subsequent actions. Defense counsel sought to
introduce these statements for their truth to present a
description of the perpetrator that was different from Davis.
18
The trial court also correctly concluded the statements
were not spontaneous under Evidence Code section 1240. No
evidence supported Shaw making the statements under stress of
the perceived event. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789,
809–810.) No evidence allowed for the court to determine her
state of mind. (Id. at p. 811.) No other exception permitted
admissibility of Shaw’s statements.
To support his due process claim, Davis relies on Green v.
Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95 (Green), which involved hearsay
statements that an accomplice confessed to killing the victim
after ordering the defendant to run an errand. The United States
Supreme Court determined that the testimony was reliable based
on the statements being made spontaneously to a close friend,
other evidence corroborating them, and their being against the
declarant’s interest. The prosecutor had introduced this
testimony at the accomplice’s earlier separate trial. Under “these
unique circumstances,” application of the hearsay rule denied a
fair trial on the issue of punishment. (Id. at p. 97.)
The California Supreme Court explained that under Green,
exclusion of hearsay testimony at the penalty phase of a capital
trial violates due process, if “the excluded testimony is ‘highly
relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase,’ ” and “there
are substantial reasons to assume the reliability of the evidence.”
(People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 704 (Kaurish); People v.
Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 759–760 (Edwards).) But the
“United States Supreme Court has never suggested that this
right precludes the state from applying ordinary rules of evidence
to determine whether such evidence is admissible.” (People v.
Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 995 (Smithey).)
19
Preliminarily, Green appears limited to the admissibility of
mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial.
(Kaurish, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 704; Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th
at p. 996.) The statements at issue in Green were “highly
relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase.” (Green,
supra, 442 U.S. at p. 97.) “The Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that the sentencer in a capital case not be
precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence.”
(People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1015, disapproved of on
another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421,
fn. 22; Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4.)
We question the applicability of Green to the guilt phase of
a non-capital trial as reviewed here. Davis cannot satisfy the
first element of Green. Specifically, Shaw’s statement is not
relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase of a capital
trial.
Davis also fails to satisfy the second element under Green.
The circumstances under which Shaw observed the two men were
unknown. Specifically, no evidence existed about how well Shaw
could see the suspect, whether any circumstances affected her
ability to observe, how closely she was paying attention, whether
she directly interacted with the suspect, and whether she was
under stress during her observations. Officer Sperry testified
that it was nighttime, and the lighting was not good. According
to the prosecutor, Shaw’s description of the suspect resulted in a
composite sketch of the victim. We conclude that the statements
20
lacked reliability based on the limited information about Shaw
and the conditions of her observations.4
We also reject Davis’s further argument that the exclusion
of Shaw’s statements violated his right to present a defense. The
application of the rules of evidence does not generally violate the
right to present a defense. (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th
381, 427–428.) A violation of this right by an evidentiary ruling
must amount to a complete preclusion of a defense. (Ibid.)
Officer Sperry testified that Shaw’s description of the persons
who checked into the motel were “entirely different” from Davis’s
description at trial. Additionally, Davis highlighted the existence
of Timothy Heisley as the perpetrator based on the determination
that his DNA and fingerprints were found in Chavez’s car. This
evidence supported the defense theory that Davis was not the
perpetrator.
C. Exclusion of Hearsay Statements of Timothy Heisley
Davis claims the trial court erred in excluding an interview
of Timothy Heisley conducted by Detective Lewin and DDA
Lewin. The defense sought to introduce Heisley’s interview to
establish third party culpability. The Attorney General argues
that the exclusion did not constitute an abuse of discretion or a
constitutional violation. We agree.
4 In the context of the penalty phase of a capital trial, the
California Supreme Court has also limited the admissibility of
mitigating evidence under Green when its exculpatory value is
tangential or cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial.
(Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 996; Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th
658 at p. 760.) The trial court admitted the information from
Officer Sperry, rendering any additional information about the
actual physical descriptors contained in Shaw’s hearsay
statements cumulative.
21
1. Additional Background Information
a. The interview
In 2019, DDA Lewin and Detective Lewin interviewed
Timothy Heisley in Florida. Heisley stated that in 1978, he
served in the Marine Corps and was stationed in Tustin,
California. He was discharged on June 24, 1978.
Heisley’s brother lived in Prescott, Arizona, north of
Flagstaff. He recounted a period of time of two or three
weekends when he was hitchhiking to Phoenix, Arizona because
his car broke down on the way to California from Ohio. He left
his car in Phoenix for his brother to fix. Heisley also made a
couple of trips to Blythe, California because he established a
relationship with a woman there.
Heisley denied ever being in a 1972 Chevy Impala from Los
Angeles to Phoenix or Flagstaff. He considered whether he would
have traveled in such a car when he was hitchhiking. But he
believed he was hitchhiking during the fall of 1976.
Heisley did not know anyone named Anthony Davis. When
shown Davis’s photo, Heisley denied knowing him.
DDA Lewin informed Heisley about the January 7, 1978,
murder at the motel in Los Angeles County. DDA Lewin also told
him that a 1972 blue Chevy was found. DDA Lewin further said
Heisley’s fingerprint was found on the steering wheel, and his
DNA was on a Marlboro cigarette. Heisley admitted to smoking
Marlboro cigarettes. DDA Lewin also told Heisley that the car
was found in Blythe on the day after the murder.
Heisley expressed concern that he was a suspect based on
his fingerprint and DNA being found in the car. DDA Lewin
assured him that he was not. Heisley asked who the victim was.
DDA Lewin told him about Chavez and asked Heisley if he had
22
ever engaged in sexual activity with other men. Heisley admitted
to engaging a “couple of times.” DDA Lewin further stated that
Chavez picked up a younger individual. DDA Lewin added that
he did not believe the younger individual was Heisley.
Heisley remembered one occasion when he was hitchhiking,
and the driver had him drive the car for most of the way to Los
Angeles. Heisley had been involved in cold weather training as a
Marine and missed his helicopter. To return to base by the next
Monday, he hitched a ride in Nevada. Heisley did not remember
what type of car the man drove. He also could not remember the
man’s face. The man did not make any sexual advances toward
Heisley.
Heisley denied ever going to El Monte. He denied staying
in any motel in El Monte, especially on Valley Boulevard where
the Spic and Span Motel was located. He denied that the Spic
and Span Motel registration card contained his signature.
b. Other evidence related to Heisley
No evidence connected Heisley to the motel room where the
killing occurred. But Heisley’s DNA was found on two cigarette
butts in Chavez’s car. Heisley’s fingerprint was also found on the
steering column. Heisley’s DNA and fingerprints were not on the
envelope that contained Chavez’s blood. His DNA and
fingerprints were not found on any other item in the car that
would have been taken from the motel room.
c. Trial court rulings
The trial court excluded Heisley’s interview with Detective
Lewin and DDA Lewin. The court ruled that defense counsel
could impeach Detective Lewin with his decision to not further
investigate Heisley as a suspect. The court also permitted
testimony about the nature of the questions Detective Lewin
23
asked of Heisley. The court did not allow the defense to introduce
any of Heisley’s specific statements through Detective Lewin.
The court permitted defense counsel to argue that Heisley was a
viable suspect and law enforcement chose not to follow up with
investigation of him and instead focused on Davis.
d. Testimony and evidence introduced at trial
Heisley did not testify at trial. Neither the defense nor the
prosecutor served him with a subpoena to testify.
At trial, Detective Lewin testified that he met with Heisley
in Florida. At Detective Lewin’s request, Heisley had previously
consented to providing a DNA sample to law enforcement officers
in Florida, where he lived.
Detective Lewin learned that Heisley’s fingerprints were in
Chavez’s car. Fifteen cigarette butts were found in the car.
Heisley’s DNA was on two menthol cigarette butts in the car.
Detective Lewin’s investigation did not reveal when the cigarette
butts were placed in the car. He was not able to determine when
Heisley was in the car. Some menthol cigarettes were found in
the motel room. Detective Lewin learned that Chavez was not a
smoker.
According to Detective Lewin, Chavez’s car was reported
outside of Phoenix, Arizona at about 3:00 or 4:00 p.m. on the day
after the killing. Detective Lewin discovered that one of Chavez’s
credit cards was used in Blythe to get gas. Blythe is on the way
to Phoenix. The signature for “Rudy Chavez” was signed on a
receipt. Detective Lewin did not compare the writing with
Heisley’s writing. Detective Lewin made up his mind that Davis,
not Heisley, killed Chavez when he learned that his DNA and
fingerprints were found in the motel room.
24
Detective Lewin asked Heisley if he was involved in the
murder, why his DNA was found in the car, whether he was
involved in sexual activity with other men during the time of the
incident, whether he was stationed in the Los Angeles area for
military service during the time of the incident, and whether he
went to Arizona during the time after the incident. Detective
Lewin also asked him questions about the physical evidence in
the car. Heisley was cooperative during the interview with
Lewin. Heisley was never evasive when Lewin asked him
questions.
Detective Lewin learned that envelopes with Chavez’s
blood were found in the car. Detective Lewin found no evidence
that Heisley’s fingerprints were on any bloody items in the car.
He also learned that Heisley’s DNA was not included in any
items in the motel room. There was no evidence of Heisley ever
being in the motel room. Lewin ruled out Heisley as a
perpetrator solely because his DNA was not in the room. As a
result, Detective Lewin terminated his investigation of Heisley as
a suspect.
2. Analysis
The trial court correctly determined that Heisley’s
statements were inadmissible hearsay, like Shaw’s statements to
Officer Sperry. Defense counsel sought to introduce Heisley’s
interview for the truth of his statements regarding his connection
to Blythe where Chavez’s credit card was used, his connection to
Arizona where Chavez’s car was found, his time spent in the Los
Angeles area around the time of the murder, and his admission to
engaging in sexual activity with other men. Because no
exception to the hearsay rule applied, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding the statements.
25
Without much elaboration, Davis also argues that the
exclusion of Heisley’s statements was fundamentally unfair
under Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302–303.
But unlike the trial court in Chambers, the trial court here did
not prevent Davis from calling Heisley as a witness. Heisley was
available to testify. But neither party served him with a
subpoena to testify. The trial court did nothing to deny Davis
due process or render his trial fundamentally unfair. (Id. at p.
303.)
D. Defense Counsel’s Statements During the Interview
with DDA Lewin
The prosecution introduced Davis’s interview with DDA
Lewin. Detective Lewin, Detective Falicon, and Davis’s attorney
also attended the interview. The interview included DDA Lewin
asking Davis questions about where he lived in the past and his
sexual orientation. DDA Lewin also informed Davis about the
evidence collected during the investigation of the murder. After
DDA Lewin concluded, he offered Davis an opportunity to provide
explanations for the evidence against him. Defense counsel
interjected and spoke with DDA Lewin.
The trial court excluded several of defense counsel’s
statements made during the interview at his request. The trial
court expressed concern that these statements contained defense
counsel’s opinion about limiting the defense theory to the absence
of malice or the existence of a justification because of the DNA
and fingerprint evidence that pointed to Davis as the perpetrator.
26
Davis argues that the trial court improperly admitted other
statements made by defense counsel.5 Davis claims that the
5 When DDA Lewin invited Davis to provide explanations for
the evidence against him, defense counsel began responding with
the following statements which Davis now flags:
“I understand your position. Totally. There’s
DNA and there was a fingerprint. And the DNA
indicates some type of sexual activity. I get it.”
“[W]hat I’m saying is that, you know, based
upon this, I can certainly understand the deep
concern that the District Attorney’s Office has in this
matter. This is not a fishing expedition. I get it.”
“He does not have an explanation other than to
say that it wasn’t him, that it’s a mistake. You may
not consider that a viable explanation.”
“I’ve had a very significant amount of
experience with DNA [¶] . . . [¶] I know how potent it
is. [¶] . . . [¶] Much more than a fingerprint.”
“I understand where you are coming from and
maybe at this time, you know, in other words, now
that I see the significance of your case— [¶] . . . [¶] —
give me time to talk to my client. You know, in other
words— [¶] . . . [¶] –give me one or two days to talk
to him—because, uh—you know, uh, I know—I
understand. [¶] . . . [¶] All right. I understand.”
“I wanna see what, if anything, may have
transpired or not. Uh, he’s in a tough emotional state
right now as anybody would be— [¶] . . . [¶] —looking
at the most powerful two pieces— [¶] . . . [¶] —of
evidence that you could possibly imagine. [¶] . . . [¶]
27
All right. If that’s the reality of it, especially the
DNA, that’s mixed.”
“So I need to talk to him, uh, about certain
realities. [¶] . . . [¶] This case—and I understand
it—is gonna be filed. You know, it—one way or the
other it’s gonna be filed. I get it. [¶] . . . [¶] You told
me in advance. [¶] . . . [¶] So I understand that.”
“[Davis:] Isn’t there a way we can do another
DNA test?”
“No. Hold on just—. Hold on. We’ll talk about
that later but first we’re going to talk. We now
understand the gravity of the case. [¶] . . . [¶] And
we’re also going to be given an opportunity, if it’s
viable, to give an explanation. We may not have an
explanation but we appreciate this opportunity. We
see how serious.”
“All right. Now, you’re facing reality. You’re
facing their evidence. Okay? This is it. This is not
some joke. [¶] . . . [¶] It’s not some— [¶] . . . [¶]
conspiracy, okay?”
“[Davis]: It’s worse than I could have ever even
imagined.”
“That’s right. . . . I understand where you’re
coming from. [¶] . . . [¶] I appreciate this
opportunity. Um, reality has to set in.”
“I’m looking at 44 wounds. [¶] . . . [¶] And
that’s rage. [¶] . . . [¶] You know, I mean, let’s—you
know, that’s—that’s a whole different ball game.
This is one— [¶] . . . [¶] [N]ot one or two wounds.
[¶] . . . [¶] All right. So there’s—it’s a whole
28
statements led the jurors to believe that the trial proceeded only
because of his failure to provide suitable answers to the
prosecutor during the interview. Davis also asserts these
statements amounted to defense counsel expressing his belief
that he was guilty.
We reject both arguments.
different animal here. All right. And I understand
that. So I have to talk to him about this, uh—you
know, I’ve—I’ve—I grew up in that time period.
[¶] . . . [¶] I understand the mentality.”
“And—and now we—we—we—truly appreciate
the severity of the evidence and why, uh—why this
thing is proceeding this way. [¶] . . . [¶] It is. This is
not a conspiracy. This is not anger towards you.
They are going on scientific evidence…. [¶] … [¶] All
right. They don’t know—they don’t know how it
started. They don’t know what, you know, they—
they are just looking at the evidence.”
“You have been honest with me from the very
beginning. You didn’t tell me specifically—what it
was. Of course that’s a strategic decision.”
“It’s my opinion that you will accept that
explanation if it’s reasonable and honest. If it’s not
reasonable and honest, you’ll reject it. [¶] . . . [¶]
You know, it’s—it’s just that simple. You know?”
“All right. I understand your position, all
right? And I respect it. All right? I—you know, I
just need to speak to him; in other words, it’s one
thing to have a fingerprint. [¶] . . . [¶] It’s another to
have DNA.”
29
First, the District Attorney proceeded to trial because of the
incriminating evidence against Davis, not because of any failure
to respond to DDA Lewin’s presentation of that evidence. DDA
Lewin informed Davis that based on the evidence he had
collected, he intended to file a murder case. By suggesting
defense counsel’s statements influenced the jurors, Davis ignores
the first three-quarters of the interview comprised of DDA
Lewin’s presentation of the evidence and his reactions. During
this portion of the interview, Davis admitted to living near El
Monte and the Spic and Span Motel at the time of the murder.
His denials of any previous sexual encounter with other men and
any previous visit to the Spic and Span Motel were contradicted
by the DNA and fingerprint evidence highlighted by DDA Lewin.
Davis’s incredible suggestion that he might have touched the
motel room door when he was a child further exposed his
consciousness of guilt.
Second, the statements did not express defense counsel’s
belief that the DNA and fingerprint evidence was irrefutable or
that Davis was guilty, as he now claims. The statements were
made near the end of the interview when DDA Lewin invited
Davis to provide explanations for the evidence. Defense counsel
merely wanted to conclude the interview before Davis made any
incriminating statements. This goal is supported by defense
counsel telling Davis, “[R]ight now we’re here to listen.” At
multiple points, defense counsel also interrupted or cut off Davis
by telling him to “be quiet.”
Defense counsel’s references to the strength of the evidence
were not his endorsement of it. He was merely acknowledging
DDA Lewin’s assessment of the evidence. At multiple points,
defense counsel states, “I can certainly understand the deep
30
concern that the District Attorney’s Office has,” “I get it,” “I
understand where you are coming from,” and “I understand your
position.” We can reasonably infer that defense counsel believed
DDA Lewin would not change his mind, even if Davis provided
explanations. DDA Lewin already expressed his confidence in
the evidence. He stated, “there is zero question in my mind—
zero—none—you killed this guy.” Defense counsel had nothing
else to immediately offer and had every incentive to conclude the
interview.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
defense counsel’s statements when viewed within the context of
the entire interview and interpreted as mere observations of the
prosecutor’s assessment of evidence. Nor did their admission
violate due process for these reasons. We conclude the jurors
would not have necessarily drawn the impermissible inferences
suggested by Davis, that is, defense counsel believed he was
guilty, and his trial proceeded because he was unable to provide
reasonable explanations for the incriminating evidence. (People
v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 230.) The admission of
the statements did not render Davis’s trial “fundamentally
unfair.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439.)
E. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Davis complains that the prosecutor committed misconduct
on multiple occasions throughout the trial. A prosecutor’s
misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment when “it infects
the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial
of due process.” (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44
(Morales); People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 937; Darden v.
Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181.) Under California law,
prosecutorial misconduct involves the use of “deceptive or
31
reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade . . . the jury.”
(Morales, at p. 44; People v. Otero (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 865,
870; People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1070–1071.) We
address the prosecutor’s acts and conclude that none amounts to
misconduct under federal or state law.
1. Appealing to the Sympathy of the Jury
Davis first claims the prosecutor improperly appealed to
the sympathy of the jurors twice. First, during opening
statement, the prosecutor presented Chavez’s photographs of
when he was alive and after he was “brutally murdered.” Second,
the prosecutor elicited testimony that Chavez was murdered a
day before his birthday.
The prosecutor did not deceptively introduce the
photographs to commit misconduct under state law. She sought
and received the trial court’s approval for the presentation of the
graphic photograph of Chavez. She apologized to the jurors for
the graphic nature of the photograph. But she also explained the
purpose of presenting it was to show the motive for the killing.
She stated that robbery was not the motive because a gold watch
and a gold chain remained on Chavez as depicted in the
photograph.
The combination of photographs could not have evoked
undue sympathy for Chavez or prejudice against Davis to
constitute misconduct under federal law. The trial court
instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 200. We presume the
jurors followed this instruction to not let bias, sympathy, or
prejudice influence their decision. (People v. Daveggio and
Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 861–862.)
32
2. Misstatements
a. Motel registration address
Davis next argues that the prosecutor improperly stated
that Davis created a fictitious address by using his name as the
street name for the motel registration card. Davis maintains that
he was not the person who wrote on the registration card based
on Shaw, the Spic and Span Motel night manager, describing
that person’s height and race differently from his height and
race. According to Davis, the handwriting on the registration
card also did not match his handwriting. Davis explains that the
prosecutor’s knowledge of these facts prohibited her from
claiming he created the fictitious address on the registration
card. (People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 480.)
The prosecutor’s statement was not baseless for several
reasons. First, the street name used was Davis. Second, Shaw’s
description of Chavez’s companion at the check-in did not
completely exclude Davis as the person who wrote on the
registration card. Shaw never identified someone other than
Davis as the man who occupied the room with Chavez. The
prosecutor maintained that Shaw was merely mistaken in
describing the height and race of the man suspected to be Davis.
Finally, the analysis of the handwriting on the registration card
did not exclude Davis as the person who wrote on the card, as he
now argues. The analysis was merely unable to determine
whether it was Davis’s handwriting.
b. Absence of Heisley’s DNA in the motel room
Davis also argues that the prosecutor misstated that no
evidence supported Heisley ever being inside the motel room.
Specifically, in opening statement, the prosecutor said that the
detectives “went to get a DNA sample from Tim Heisley and had
33
it tested against all of the evidence in the room; and there is no
evidence, not a trace of Timothy Heisley ever being in that motel
room. He was excluded from every single sample in that motel
room.”
The prosecutor’s statements are not inaccurate. Heisley
was excluded as a contributor from every DNA sample obtained
in the room. Heisley’s reference DNA sample was compared
against only the other DNA samples obtained from the evidence
and his DNA was not included in any of those samples. Implied
in the prosecutor’s statement is the fact that Heisley’s DNA could
only be compared against evidence from which a DNA sample
was found. It could not be compared against the missing or lost
evidence or any other evidence from which DNA samples were
not obtained. Understandably, DNA samples were not obtained
from the missing evidence. By the time the DNA testing
occurred, the evidence was already missing.6
Some of the other evidence was not tested for DNA. Davis
points out the prosecutor did not account for the possibility of
Heisley’s DNA in four out of five bodily fluid stains on a bed
sheet. But the analyst Lajoie found no DNA on the epithelial
fraction and sperm fraction for one sample out of the five bodily
fluid stains on the bed sheet. She did not test for DNA on the
remaining bodily fluid stains because of the negative DNA result
on the one sample.
6 According to Lajoie, DNA technology for forensic science
did not exist in 1978.
34
c. Two persons engaging in a sexual act
Davis similarly argues that the prosecutor improperly
limited the occupants of the room to two persons and stated they
engaged in sexual activity. We disagree.
The prosecutor’s statements did not limit the number of
persons in the motel room, as Davis claims they did. Instead, the
prosecutor clarified that Davis and Chavez were the only two
persons who satisfied two conditions: they were connected to the
room by scientific evidence, and they were connected to sexual
activity in that room. She did not mention any other contributor
of DNA evidence, but she also did not affirmatively exclude the
possibility of one.
The jurors could reasonably infer the sexual activity from
the existence of Davis’s semen on the bedspread and Chavez’s
unclothed condition. The jurors could further infer Chavez was
unclothed prior to the stabbing based on the absence of stab
marks on his clothes. Drawing the inference of sexual activity
does not require Davis’s seminal fluid or spermatozoa on
Chavez’s anal or oral cavity or Chavez’s seminal fluid in the
room, as Davis claims. The absence of Davis’s DNA on Chavez’s
body does not necessarily refute the possibility of sexual activity
either. As Lajoie stated, DNA left by touch does not withstand
time as well as DNA in sperm cells or blood.
d. Clean up of the crime scene
Davis argues that the prosecutor improperly told the jury,
“You heard that there was a towel with blood on it as though
somebody had tried to clean up.” In Davis’s interview, DDA
Lewin mentioned a bloody wash towel that was found on top of
the dresser in the room. But no evidence supported the existence
of this bloody wash towel.
35
The reference to the bloody towel was not prejudicial. The
jurors are presumed to have followed the court’s instruction that
the attorneys’ comments are not evidence. (People v. Hinton
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 863 (Hinton).) Additionally, the prosecutor
referenced the bloody towel during her argument that Davis’s
actions supported a calculated decision. Included in this
argument was a discussion of the bedspread hung over the
window to conceal the crime. The jurors could reasonably infer
from this evidence alone that Davis had the state of mind
described by the prosecutor.
e. Alleged undisclosed evidence known only to
DDA Lewin
Davis claims the prosecutor insinuated DDA Lewin’s
decision to not pursue Heisley as a suspect was supported by
undisclosed evidence known only to him. But she did not
insinuate anything. The prosecutor merely confirmed that the
case was not filed against Heisley after Detective Lewin and DDA
Lewin interviewed him, interviewed Davis, and reviewed the
evidence.
f. DNA evidence
Davis appears to argue that the prosecutor misstated two
points about the DNA evidence. First, Davis asserts that she
incorrectly stated that his DNA was mixed with Chavez’s DNA in
a manner not supported by the evidence.7 Second, he alleges the
prosecutor improperly equated the likelihood ratio for the DNA
profile in the semen sample to Davis’s guilt. We reject both
arguments.
7 Davis does not specify where the prosecutor makes this
statement. He did not include a page citation in his brief.
36
Davis appears to interpret the prosecutor’s statement to
mean that his semen was mixed with Chavez’s blood in such a
manner that they were deposited near the same time. In his
brief, he states, “it was not possible to determine forensically . . .
if the DNA was deposited in an overlapping fashion at different
times.” But the prosecutor did not say anything about the timing
of deposit for either the semen or any other substance.
The prosecutor also did not inaccurately summarize the
likelihood ratios of any profile. Analyst Lajoie testified that the
bedspread had multiple bloodstains. One area of the bedspread
produced positive results for sperm on three separate tests. From
this area, Lajoie extracted sperm cells and epithelial cells. She
determined that Davis was a contributor.
Davis contends the prosecutor misrepresented the DNA
results in referencing the likelihood ratio. He does not elaborate
but cites as an example McDaniel v. Brown (2010) 558 U.S. 120,
128, and parenthetically notes that a prosecutor may not “equate
DNA frequency statistics . . . to the quantitative probability that
the defendant is or is not the source of the DNA, or is or is not
guilty.” Brown addressed the so-called “prosecutor’s fallacy,” that
is, “the assumption that the random match probability is the
same as the probability that the defendant was not the source of
the DNA sample.” (Ibid.)
But the prosecutor did not improperly discuss any of the
likelihood ratios of the DNA profiles. Lajoie testified that the
likelihood ratios represent the level of support for inclusion of a
person’s DNA profile against the tested sample. The degrees of
support of inclusion are limited support, moderate support,
strong support, and very strong support. The degree of support is
determined by the numerical value produced by the likelihood
37
ratio. It compares two opposing explanations and asks, “Is it
likely that this explanation is true versus another explanation is
true?”
First, Lajoie determined that the likelihood ratio for the
DNA profile for the sperm fraction of the sample from the
bedspread was approximately “two times ten to the twenty-fifth
times” more likely if it originated from Davis and an unknown
individual than if it had originated from two unknown
individuals. This was considered a very strong level of support.
Next, Lajoie testified that the likelihood ratio for the DNA
profile for the epithelial fraction of the sample was approximately
“four times ten to the fifteenth times” more likely if it had
originated from Davis and two unknown individuals than if it
had originated from three unknown individuals. This was also
considered the highest level of support.
In closing argument, the prosecutor’s statements included
the findings that the likelihood ratios for the sperm fraction and
epithelial fraction produced the highest level of support of
inclusion for Davis. 8 These statements were consistent with
Lajoie’s testimony.
8 But the prosecutor misstated the number representing the
likelihood ratio for the sperm fraction was “somewhere above four
trillion times” more likely to be Davis than anybody else. The
number represented by Lajoie was “two times ten to the twenty-
fifth times” more likely. This number is 26 digits, or “twenty-five
zeroes after [the two].” The four-trillion-figure used by the
prosecutor is 13 digits, or “twelve zeroes after the four.” This is a
much smaller number. The mistake is of no consequence. The
prosecutor’s number and Lajoie’s number both fall under the
category of highest level of support for inclusion.
38
3. Comments About Defense Counsel and Stereotypes
Davis complains about the prosecutor stating he was
“homosexual because he never married.” Davis also flags the
prosecutor’s comments that defense counsel was “just doing his
job,” and “talking out of both sides of his mouth.” The prosecutor
also stated that defense attorneys, including counsel for Davis,
“have to work with the hands they are dealt with.” These
comments did not constitute misconduct.
None of the statements about defense counsel were
inflammatory. Prosecutors are afforded latitude to describe
deficiencies in defense counsel’s tactics and recitation of the facts.
(People v. Benmore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846.)
Similarly, the prosecutor did not say anything objectionable
about Davis’s marital status. During his interview with
Detective Lewin, Davis introduced the stereotype that persons
with a same-gender sexual orientation are unmarried. The
prosecutor merely quoted Davis, who stated, “I’m a total
heterosexual male even though I am not married.”
4. Laundry
Davis complains that in closing argument, the prosecutor
“introduced a theory that DNA may be diluted by laundering and
then proceeded to attack that theory in closing argument
insinuating that Davis had introduced it.” But the prosecutor
never argued that DNA evidence would be diluted by laundry.
The subject of laundry was first raised only as it related to
the existence of sperm, not DNA, on bedding. In opening
statement, defense counsel tried to argue the impossibility of
determining when the sperm cells found to have Davis’s DNA
were deposited. Defense counsel, not the prosecutor, introduced
the idea of the sperm cell’s resilience to laundry.
39
In closing argument, the prosecutor began to discuss the
idea of sperm cells transferring from items in laundry. But she
reduced this argument to a reference to Lajoie’s findings that
dispelled the possibilities of transferring sperm or diluting
semen. 9 We see no improper argument.
5. Cross-racial Identification
Davis also contends that the prosecutor argued about cross-
racial identification without the support of expert testimony.
The prosecutor’s reference to cross-racial identification is
unclear. After commenting on the absence of information related
to the conditions of Shaw’s observations, the prosecutor stated,
“There was cross-racial—this identification.” Her statement was
incomplete and ambiguous. Shaw never identified anyone. The
jurors heard Shaw was Asian. They saw Davis is not. But they
never learned the race of the suspect as described by Shaw. More
importantly, the statement hardly expresses the effect of the
different races of the witness and the suspect on the accuracy of
the witness’s identification of the suspect, as is typically
explained by an eyewitness identification expert.
9 Earlier in the trial, the prosecutor elicited Lajoie’s
testimony about transferring semen from one item of bedding to
another from laundry. According to Lajoie, sperm cells can
transfer but the acid phosphatase, which is the enzyme in the
semen, would not transfer. In other words, the acid phosphatase
does not follow the sperm cells as they go to the other item.
Lajoie also testified to the research for when an item with
semen was laundered. According to Lajoie, the fluorescence from
the alternate light source test would be gone, the acid
phosphatase would be slightly reduced, and the sperm cell rating
would be reduced from a “three-plus rating” to a “one-plus or a
zero” rating.
40
As stated, the court repeatedly instructed that nothing the
attorneys say is evidence. (CALCRIM No. 222.) This instruction
dispelled any prejudice. (Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 863.)
The jury was free to reject the prosecutor’s reference to the term
cross-racial, especially given its ambiguity.
6. Exercise of Constitutional Rights
a. Failure to provide explanation
Davis complains the prosecutor improperly commented on
his exercise of constitutional rights. Without elaboration, Davis
refers to the prosecutor’s comment during opening statement
about his failure to provide DDA Lewin with a reasonable
explanation for the incriminating evidence against him.
The prosecutor did not violate the Fifth Amendment
prohibition on commenting on a defendant’s decision to not testify
under Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 613. (People v.
Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 632.) The prosecutor commented
on Davis’s failure to provide reasonable responses to
incriminating evidence in his interview with DDA Lewin, not on
any decision not to testify. The interview with DDA Lewin
constituted a voluntary, non-custodial pre-arrest interview. The
prosecutor’s comments did not constitute misconduct.
b. Failure to provide DNA and fingerprint
samples
Next, Davis contends the prosecutor committed misconduct
by eliciting testimony that he refused to voluntarily provide a
DNA sample and arguing that the refusal supported his
consciousness of guilt. He explains that the prosecutor
improperly commented on his exercise of his Fourth Amendment
right to be free from a warrantless search for DNA extraction and
fingerprint impressions.
41
We agree. The prosecutor improperly used Davis’s exercise
of his Fourth Amendment right to show he had something to
hide. (People v. Wood (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 803, 809 (Wood).)
The prosecutor suggested Davis should be punished for requiring
Detective Lewin to obtain a search warrant for the samples.
We review a federal constitutional error—including an
improper comment of an assertion of a constitutional right—
under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard under
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. (Wood, supra, 103
Cal.App.4th at p. 810.) We “must determine whether it is clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have
rendered the same verdict absent the error.” (People v. Merritt
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 831.)
The error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Davis’s initial refusal to voluntarily provide a DNA sample was
followed by his full cooperation with providing a sample and
fingerprints pursuant to a court-approved search warrant.
Davis’s ultimate cooperation mitigated any hint of earlier
reluctance.
The DNA evidence against Davis was so strong that the
exclusion of the fact that he refused to voluntarily submit a
DNA sample would not have made the jury any less likely to
conclude that his DNA was present in the sperm and epithelial
fractions on the sample taken from the bedspread inside the
motel room. The remainder of the DNA evidence was equally
strong. Part of it even benefited Davis by excluding him from
Chavez’s car. Davis did not submit any expert testimony to
counter Lajoie’s findings. Nor did he present any other evidence
from which the jury could have found fault with Lajoie’s analysis.
42
Additionally, Davis revealed his consciousness of guilt in
other ways that were distinct from his assertion of his Fourth
Amendment right. For example, he falsely denied ever being at
the Spic and Span Motel. He also offered incredible explanations
for his fingerprint being inside the room, such as suggesting that
he touched the door when he was a child, and that the door was
moved from another building which he had occasion to enter.
These statements conveyed a more damaging consciousness of
guilt than the improperly admitted evidence about his reluctance
to voluntarily provide samples. Scientific evidence contradicted
the false statement denying his prior visit to the Spic and Span
Motel and alternative explanations for his fingerprints in the
room. We consider the improperly admitted evidence cumulative
of the properly admitted evidence on the issue of consciousness of
guilt.
We conclude that the evidence concerning defendant’s
refusal to voluntarily provide samples and the prosecutor’s
comment on that evidence did not contribute to the guilty verdict
and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the
comment did not infect the trial with unfairness, nor do we
consider it deceptive or reprehensible to rise to the level of
prosecutorial misconduct under federal and state law,
respectively. (Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 44.)
F. Lost Evidence
Davis contends the trial court violated his due process
right by denying his motion to dismiss for failure to preserve
evidence, his alternative request for an adverse inference jury
instruction, and his motion for new trial. We disagree.
43
1. Additional Background
Prior to February 18, 2018, Detective Lewin discovered
that multiple items of evidence collected from the motel room in
1978 were missing. The prosecutor disclosed this information to
defense counsel prior to trial commencing.
Davis moved to dismiss the case for failure to preserve
evidence. Davis alternatively requested a jury instruction related
to the loss of evidence. The trial court denied the motion and the
request.
At trial, the prosecutor and defense counsel stipulated that
the specific items were booked into evidence and subsequently
lost.10
10 The parties stipulated:
“[T]he following items were listed as recovered
from room no. 2 of the Spic and Span Motel by
Sergeant Latimore in his report, dated June 14, 1978:
item 1, one black and white business card with the
victim’s name on it; item 2, book of matches with the
name Great Western on it; item 3, one empty 12-
ounce Schlitz beer bottle; item 4, one Salem cigarette;
item 5, six dimes in U.S. currency; item 6,
miscellaneous cigarette butts; item 7, one paper sack
with bloodstains containing four full 12-ounce Schlitz
bottle[s]; item 8, one piece of blue and white tape
with the name Q and Q [sic] Publishing; item 9, one
black sock, size 10 1/2 to 11 medium; item 10, one
blue tie with yellow metal clasp; item 11, one
ballpoint pen. [¶] These items were booked into
evidence under [a] case file number with the L.A.
County Sheriff’s Department. A search for the
44
After the guilty verdict, Davis moved for a new trial based
on the failure to preserve evidence. The trial court denied the
motion for new trial.
2. Analysis
The requirements to establish a due process violation for
the failure to preserve evidence depends in part on the
significance of the evidence to the defense. Under California v.
Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, due process requires the state to
preserve “evidence that might be expected to play a significant
role in suspect’s defense.” The evidence “must both possess an
exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was
destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be
unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably
available means.” (Id. at pp. 488–489.)
Failure to preserve evidence that was merely potentially
useful does not constitute a denial of due process unless the
defendant can show bad faith by the police. (Arizona v.
Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, 58.) Bad faith is not required
under Trombetta. (People v. Alvarez (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 761,
773 (Alvarez).)
We review the trial court’s denial of a
Trombetta/Youngblood motion under the substantial evidence
standard. (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 837; Alvarez,
supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) We review the record in the
light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it
discloses substantial evidence in support of the trial court’s
following items revealed they were subsequently
lost: items 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11.”
45
decision. (Montes, at p. 837; People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20
Cal.4th 1, 11.)
Defense counsel conceded that the law enforcement officers
did not lose the items in bad faith. Even if the lost evidence was
potentially useful, Davis cannot prevail because he cannot show
bad faith on the part of the law enforcement agency.
There is also no way of determining if the items were
potentially useful or if they possessed an exculpatory value.
Davis cannot show the lost evidence possessed an exculpatory
value that was apparent before the evidence was lost. No
evidence supports whether a DNA sample could have been
extracted from the missing evidence and whether it would have
been exculpatory if it could have been extracted. We conclude
that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling.
G. Cumulative Error
The aggregate prejudice from the alleged multiple errors
could require reversal even if no single error was itself
prejudicial. (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 844.) Under
the cumulative error doctrine, we must review each challenge
and evaluate the cumulative effect of any errors to determine
“ ‘if it is reasonably probable the jury would have reached a more
favorable result to the defendant in their absence.’ ” (People v.
Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 646.) Reversal is required
when the cumulative effect of errors deprives the defendant of a
fair trial. (Ibid.)
We have determined one error existed with the prosecutor’s
comment and her elicited testimony about Davis’s refusal to
voluntarily submit a DNA sample and fingerprints. As discussed,
this error was harmless and did not deprive Davis of due process
or a fair trial. The prosecutor’s improper comment about the
46
bloody towel was also not prejudicial. We also concluded that no
prejudice resulted even if we assumed error by the prosecutor’s
vague reference to the term cross-racial when discussing Shaw’s
description of the perpetrator. We rejected Davis’s other
allegations of error. We must reject Davis’s cumulative error
argument. (People v. Ramirez (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48, 63.)
H. Presentence Conduct Credits
Davis challenges the trial court’s refusal to award any
presentence conduct credit. But Davis was not entitled to any
presentence conduct credit because at the time of the commission
of the offense in 1978, no statute provided for awarding life
prisoners with conduct credits. (People v. Garcia (1981) 115
Cal.App.3d 85, 113 (referencing former § 190, Stats. 1977,
ch. 316, § 5, pp. 1256–1257).) “Former section 190 provided
sentences of straight life imprisonment only for those persons
convicted of first degree murder” like Davis. (Garcia, at p. 114.)
The trial court correctly denied presentence conduct credit.
47
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.*
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
48
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