People v. Dew CA4/1

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Filed 12/30/24 P. v. Dew CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082583

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. CR61373)

DAVID LEON DEW,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Peter C. Deddeh, Judge. Affirmed.
Shay Dinata-Hanson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Susan
Elizabeth Miller, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant David Leon Dew1 appeals from an order

denying his Penal Code section 1172.62 petition for resentencing of his 1983
second degree murder conviction. This is Dew’s second section 1172.6
resentencing petition. In 2022, we affirmed the trial court’s order that denied
his first petition after an evidentiary hearing, holding substantial evidence
supported the court’s findings. (People v. Love, supra, D078754.) The trial
court likewise denied his second section 1172.6 petition following an
evidentiary hearing. Dew contends the court’s ruling that he was guilty of
murder under current law, including its finding he was a major participant
who acted with reckless disregard for human life, lacks sufficient evidence in
part because the court improperly considered hearsay evidence. The People
respond that because Dew had already raised this claim in his first section
1172.6 petition, he is barred from relief by the law of the case doctrine. They
argue in any event that the court’s ruling is supported by substantial
evidence even without the challenged evidence, which they maintain was
properly admitted. While we decline to apply law of the case, we agree with
the People’s latter contention, and affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The factual background is taken from our prior opinion, in which we
summarized testimony from the joint preliminary hearing of Dew and his

1 Dew is also known as David Love, as indicated in our prior opinion on
Dew’s first section 1172.6 petition. (People v. Love (Apr. 18, 2022, D078754)
[nonpub. opn.].) We refer to him as Dew in this opinion.

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
codefendant, Steven Ragland.3 We also take some of the procedural
background from our prior opinion.
The Killing
“In 1982, Claude County lived in an apartment in Ocean Beach. On the
afternoon of Thanksgiving Day, November 25, 1982, County’s friend George
went looking for County because he had not shown up for his usual morning
coffee for several days and did not show up for a planned Thanksgiving
dinner. George found County dead on the floor of County’s apartment, with
his hands tied behind his back, his feet bound, and a towel over his head.
County’s television, stereo, and two long-necked wine bottles were missing.
George called the police. County’s apartment had been ransacked, and there
was blood on the walls, furniture, a bowling trophy, a bowling pin, and on a
knife with a two-inch blade.
“An autopsy revealed County had bruised lips, broken teeth, breaks
and discoloration on his tongue, a broken nose, and ‘line-like’ injuries above
and behind his right ear and to the back of his head. Although County did
not have a ‘skull fracture, as such,’ there was an area of abrasion, bruising,
and bleeding at the base of his brain. There was vomit in County’s nose,
mouth, trachea, lungs, and stomach. A forensic pathologist determined
County’s cause of death was ‘cardiorespiratory failure, due to the injuries to
his head, which would . . . not only include the blows to the back of his head,
the blows to his mouth, but also the inhalation of the vomit.’ County had not
sustained any fatal knife wounds.

3 In our factual summary, we included evidence admitted and excluded
as to Dew, but considered only the evidence properly admitted as to him in
considering whether substantial evidence supported the trial court’s ruling.
(People v. Love, supra, D078754.)
3
“Two days before County’s body was found, [Dew] drove in his van to a
gathering at his friend Charles’s apartment. An acquaintance of [Dew’s] on
his way to the gathering stopped at the van to talk to [Dew]. County’s
television and stereo were inside the van, and the two long-necked wine
bottles were nearby. [Dew] offered to sell the television and stereo to the
acquaintance for $150, so the acquaintance left to make a phone call to see if
he had an interested buyer. When the acquaintance returned to the van, no
one was there and the items were gone.
“Meanwhile, Charles was returning to his apartment and encountered
[Dew] out front. [Dew] offered to sell Charles the television and stereo, and
Charles bought them both for a total of $90. [Dew] helped carry the items up
to Charles’s apartment. Charles dealt only with [Dew] regarding this
transaction.
“Inside the apartment, a friend named Ramona asked Ragland about
buying the wine bottles. [Dew] interjected and offered to sell them for $20.
[Dew] and [Roy] Patton then argued over which of them owned the wine
bottles, with [Dew] asserting, ‘Those are my mother fucking bottles.’ After
tussling with Patton, [Dew] sold the wine bottles to Ramona for $10.
“During the gathering, Ramona noticed something red on Ragland’s
shoe and asked him what it was. Ragland claimed it was wine from a broken
bottle. But [Dew] walked by and said Ragland had cut his foot and told him
to ‘[w]ash that shit off.’
“The day after Thanksgiving, Ramona overheard [Dew] say to Ragland,
‘You couldn’t even knock him out.’

4
“Shortly after Thanksgiving, Charles sold County’s television and
stereo to a friend for $125. [Dew] drove Charles to the friend’s house to

deliver the goods.” (People v. Love, supra, D078754.)4
Dew’s Guilty Plea and Sentencing
“In April 1983, ‘wish[ing] to avoid the possibility of a 25-[year-to-]life
commitment’ if convicted of first degree murder, [Dew] entered into a plea
bargain under which the prosecutor allowed him to plead guilty to second
degree murder, which carried a maximum possible sentence of 15 years to
life.
“As the factual basis for his guilty plea, [Dew] stipulated to the
transcript of the preliminary hearing and the following statement by the
prosecutor:
“ ‘[O]n November 23rd, 1982, Roy Patton, [Dew], and Steven Ragland
entered the apartment of [ ]County . . . with the intent to steal. Once inside
the apartment, there was a struggle with [ ] County in which all three of the
persons participated. That during the course of that struggle and while
things were taken from the apartment, that is, a television set and a stereo

4 The court excluded the following preliminary hearing evidence as to
Dew, but admitted it as to Ragland: “Ramona testified she confronted
Ragland on the Sunday after Thanksgiving about the red stain on his shoe.
Ragland admitted it was blood and confessed he had gone with [Dew] and
Patton to rob someone. Ragland said he knocked on the door to make sure no
one was home, but the victim answered the door so Ragland hit him on the
head. The victim fought back and grabbed a trophy to defend himself. When
Ragland could not subdue the victim, [Dew] ‘came in and took over the fight.’
[Dew] tied up the victim and told Ragland to ‘[p]ut the stuff in the van.’
[Dew] handed a knife to Patton and told him to ‘finish it.’ When Ragland
returned to the room, the victim was no longer moving. [¶] James C. and
Ragland’s brother testified they were present when Ragland confessed to
Ramona. Their testimony was substantially similar to Ramona’s.” (People v.
Love, supra, D078754.)
5
and two wine bottles, as well as the wallet of [ ] County and other personal
property, . . . [ ] County died. And he died as a proximate result of the

injuries inflicted on him during the course of that struggle.’[5]
“During the plea colloquy, the court asked [Dew], ‘You understand . . .
that if I accept your plea of guilty, I am going to take those facts as being
true. Do you understand that?’ [Dew] responded, ‘I understand it.’ After
confirming with [Dew] that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, the
court accepted the plea.
“The court sentenced [Dew] to prison for 15 years to life.” (People v.
Love, supra, D078754.)
Dew’s First Petition for Resentencing, April 2021 Evidentiary Hearing and
Ruling
“In January 2019, [Dew] filed a petition for resentencing under section
1170.95. He asserted in the petition that the record showed ‘unequivocally’
that his murder conviction was based on the former felony-murder rule, and
that he could not be convicted of murder under the new law. . . . The trial
court issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted. The
prosecution responded to the merits of [Dew’s] petition, arguing he could still
be convicted under the new felony-murder standard because he was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life. (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).)
“In support, the prosecution sought to admit transcripts of the
preliminary hearing, change of plea hearing, and sentencing hearing; and the
probation officer’s report. The prosecution argued these record[s] were

5 Though Dew’s guilty plea purported to be under People v. West (1970) 3
Cal.3d 595, he nevertheless proceeded to stipulate to the preliminary hearing
transcript and facts set out above.
6
admissible because (1) the preliminary hearing and change of plea
transcripts formed the factual basis for [Dew’s] plea; (2) the prosecutor’s
correction of [Dew’s] factual narrative at the sentencing hearing was an
adoptive admission by Dew because he did not object when a reasonable
person would have; and (3) the probation officer’s report constituted reliable
hearsay.
“In reply, [Dew] objected to (1) the hearsay portions of the preliminary
hearing transcript, (2) the change of plea hearing and sentencing hearing
transcripts, and (3) the probation officer’s report. He also argued the
prosecution had not met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he could be convicted under the new felony-murder standard.
“At the outset of the [April 2021] evidentiary hearing on [Dew’s]
petition, the trial court granted some of [Dew’s] evidentiary objections. First,
the court struck the preliminary hearing testimony about Ragland’s hearsay
confession to Ramona. . . . Second, the court struck from the probation
report any reference to Ramona’s recounting of Ragland’s confession. The
court reasoned that because it had already stricken the same statements
from the preliminary hearing transcript, ‘[i]t wouldn’t be right to say,
well . . . , they don’t come in through the preliminary hearing, but they come
in through the probation reports.’
“The court overruled [Dew’s] objections to the change of plea hearing
transcript and the sentencing hearing transcript. As to the latter, the court
found the prosecutor’s assertion that [Dew] handed Patton a knife and told
him to ‘finish it’ was an adoptive admission by [Dew] because neither he nor
his counsel objected.
“As to the merits, the court denied [Dew’s] petition. Although the court
did ‘not find that [Dew] delivered the fatal blow,’ the court found the killing

7
occurred during ‘a residential burglary gone wrong,’ in which Dew ‘was a
direct aider and abettor’ who ‘acted in reckless disregard for human life.’
Among other supporting factors, the court cited that Dew (1) ‘was involved’;
(2) ‘did nothing to assist the victim once the victim was injured’; (3) ‘profited
from th[e] residential burglary after it was over’; and (4) told Patton to ‘go
finish him.’ ” (People v. Love, supra, D078754.)
Dew’s First Appeal
Dew filed a notice of appeal in April 2021. While his appeal was
pending, the Legislature amended section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) “to
clarify that ‘[t]he admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by
the Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence previously
admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law,
including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially
noticed.’ (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)” (People v. Love, supra, D078754.)
This court decided Dew’s first appeal in April 2022. (People v. Love,
supra, D078754.) We acknowledged the change in the law and “assume[d]
without deciding” that the amended version applied. (Ibid.) We looked at the
totality of the circumstances viewed in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling, and applied the considerations set out in People v. Banks
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522
(Clark). Doing so, we held substantial evidence supported the court’s finding
Dew could be convicted of murder under the new felony-murder standard
that he was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life. (People v. Love, supra, D078754.)
Dew’s Second Section 1172.6 Petition
About a month after this court issued its opinion, Dew filed a second
section 1172.6 form petition for resentencing. In their initial response, the

8
People argued because there were no changed circumstances, collateral
estoppel barred Dew from seeking relief. After the court issued an order to
show cause, the matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing in which the
People sought to introduce the same evidence and add this court’s prior
opinion. Dew sought to admit some of the same items, but offered new
evidence: a 1997 declaration from an attorney who had investigated Dew’s
murder conviction, Ragland’s 1992 declaration, a 2005 declaration from
Dew’s original attorney, a 2002 statement from a correctional officer, and

various certificates of accomplishment Dew had received.6
The trial court admitted the proffered evidence over the prosecutor’s
objections, stating it would “not giv[e] [the declarations] an incredible amount
of weight, frankly, given they are not particularly reliable and since the
People don’t have an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the people
that are making these declarations.” The court excluded certain preliminary
hearing testimony that was admitted only as to codefendant Ragland. It
admitted evidence of Dew’s exchange with the court during his change of plea

6 The attorney who investigated Dew’s conviction stated she had
obtained declarations from Alex Landon, an attorney who appeared on Dew’s
behalf for the preliminary hearing, and Ragland. She averred that based on
those declarations, she believed in Dew’s innocence. Ragland’s declaration
sought to give the “true circumstances and events surrounding the killing
of . . . County.” He averred that Dew was under the influence and not in
County’s residence when the physical altercation and robbery occurred but
was waiting outside in a van. Dew’s trial counsel, John Philipsborn, averred
in a declaration that during pretrial proceedings he became aware of a
codefendant’s statement that tended to inculpate Dew. He recounted his
advice to Dew about pleading guilty to second degree murder given the
relatively short period of time they had based on how long Dew’s case had
been pending. He recalled based on the evidence and his memory that Dew
“while involved in the planning of the burglary had driven a van to the
victim’s apartment, and had not actively participated in the struggle that led
to the victim’s death.”
9
hearing, finding his remarks to be adoptive admissions he made when

presented with the factual basis for his plea.7
Thereafter, the court denied Dew’s petition: “I have read and
considered your points and authorities. I have read and considered the
transcript at the preliminary hearing and the change of plea. So I’m . . .
not going to grant relief because I find that he was an active participant in
. . . the robbery; that he acted in reckless disregard for human life; that he . . .
was the provider of the knife, the knife that ended up being used; that . . .
when the victim did not die, that he said—he said his cohorts finish it. [¶] So
he was in a position where he was not actually delivering the fatal blow, but
he was basically telling others to deliver the fatal blow, his co-conspirators
and that he profited from . . . the robbery. And again, he had no regard for
the life of [ ] County.”
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles
“In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437), which altered the substantive law of murder for
accomplices in two respects. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f).) First, with certain
exceptions, it narrowed the scope of the felony-murder rule so that a
‘participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a [specified
felony] in which a death occurs’ can be liable for murder only if ‘[t]he person
was the actual killer’; ‘[t]he person was not the actual killer, but, with the
intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the
first degree’; or ‘[t]he person was a major participant in the underlying felony

7 The court held this to be the case even though the record did not show
that Dew was placed under oath.
10
and acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)-(3).)
Second, it now requires that, except in cases of felony murder, ‘a principal in
a crime shall act with malice aforethought’ to be convicted of murder. (§ 188,
subd. (a)(3).) In other words, ‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ (Ibid.) This aspect of Senate
Bill No. 1437 eliminated liability for murder as an aider and abettor under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (People v. Arellano (2024)
16 Cal.5th 457, 467-468.)
“Senate Bill No. 1437 also created ‘a procedure for convicted murderers
who could not be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek
relief.’ ” (People v. Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 468.) Under this
procedure, the defendant may file a petition with required information
stating he or she is eligible for relief; the court faced with a compliant
petition must decide whether it makes a prima facie case for relief, and if so,
issue an order to show cause. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.)
Absent a “ ‘prior finding by a court or jury that the petitioner did not act with
reckless indifference to human life or was not a major participant in the
felony’ ” or the parties’ stipulation of the petitioner’s eligibility for relief, “the
court must hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears the
burden of proving, ‘beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
murder or attempted murder’ under state law as amended by Senate Bill
[No.] 1437.” (Id. at pp. 708-709.) At the evidentiary hearing, the court acts
as an independent factfinder to determine in the first instance whether the
defendant is guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt under current law.
(People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 123; People v. Garrison (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 735, 745.) “ ‘A finding that there is substantial evidence to
support a conviction for murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter is

11
insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is
ineligible for resentencing.’ [Citation.] ‘If the prosecution fails to sustain its
burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements
attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be
resentenced on the remaining charges.’ ” (Strong, at p. 709.)
We review for substantial evidence the court’s findings following Dew’s
evidentiary hearing. (People v. Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 270; see
People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 111.) “ ‘The scope of our review for
substantial evidence is well settled. The test is not whether the People met
their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [a defendant in a
section 1172.6 proceeding] was ineligible for resentencing, but rather
“whether any rational trier of fact could have” made the same determination,
namely that “[t]he record . . . disclose[s] . . . evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [as
did the superior court].” ’ [Citation.] [¶] ‘ “In applying this test, we review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in
support of the [order] the existence of every fact the [superior court] could
reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] ‘Conflicts [in the
evidence] . . . subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a
judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge . . . to determine
the . . . truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.’ ” ’ ”
(Cody, at p. 111.)
II. Law of the Case
As stated, the People contend Dew’s appeal is barred by law of the case.
Under that doctrine, “ ‘ “when an appellate opinion states a principle or rule
of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the
case and must be adhered to through its subsequent progress in the lower

12
court and upon subsequent appeal.” ’ [Citation.] The doctrine prevents
parties from seeking appellate reconsideration of an already decided issue in
the same case, ‘ “absent some significant change in circumstances.” ’
[Citation.] For the doctrine to apply, the point of law must have been
presented and determined by the court, the issue must have been necessary
to the prior decision, and application of the doctrine must not result in an
unjust decision. [Citation.] But the doctrine does not apply ‘ “where the
controlling rules of law have been altered or clarified by a decision
intervening between the first and second appellate determinations.” ’ ”
(People v. Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994, 1006-1007.)
Thus, in Jimenez, this court declined to apply the doctrine in the face of
a “significant intervening change in the law” (People v. Jimenez, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1006-1007) allowing consideration of a defendant’s youth
as a relevant factor on the issue of malice under current law. (Id. at p. 1008.)
We held it was “in the interest of justice to give the trial court a meaningful
opportunity to consider [the defendant’s] youth ‘as part of the totality of the
circumstances germane to determining’ whether he acted with malice under
current law.” (Jimenez, at p. 1008.)
The People’s law-of-the-case argument is brief; they do not acknowledge
the above-mentioned exception to the doctrine, but merely point out the
similarities in Dew’s arguments in his first and second petitions and assert
our findings in the first opinion are binding on the trial court on his second
petition. We are not persuaded, given the changes in the law referenced in
our prior opinion. As we acknowledged, effective January 1, 2022, while
Dew’s first appeal was pending, the Legislature amended section 1172.6 to
clarify that the burden of proof at a section 1172.6 hearing is beyond a
reasonable doubt and a trial court’s finding that there is substantial evidence

13
to support a conviction is insufficient to meet this burden. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3).) It clarified the standards for the admissibility of evidence at the
evidentiary hearing; section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) now provides: “The
admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code,
except that the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior
hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including witness
testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed . . . . The
prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new or additional evidence to
meet their respective burdens.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
Though in our prior opinion we summarized the intervening change in
the law and presumed it applied, Dew actually took advantage of the
clarification after filing his second petition, proffering new evidence in part
consisting of his counsel’s declarations for the evidentiary hearing on that
petition. (See fn. 6, ante.) As in People v. Jimenez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th
994, we think it in the interest of justice to consider Dew’s arguments, which
account for the impact, if any, of the new evidence he presented. Under these
circumstances, the law of the case doctrine does not apply. We decline to bar
his appeal under it.
III. Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Findings that Dew was a
Major Participant in the Underlying Felony and Acted with Reckless
Indifference to Human Life
As stated, under current law, “[a] participant in the perpetration . . . of
a [robbery] in which a death occurs is liable for murder” if “[t]he person was a
major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life . . . .” (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).) In this case, to deny
Dew relief under section 1172.6 the trial court was required to find these
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Strong, supra, 13

14
Cal.5th at pp. 707-708.) It made those factual findings about Dew’s
involvement after considering the evidence presented by the parties.
In reaching its ruling, the court gave little to no weight to the new
declarations of counsel and of Dew’s codefendant Ragland (fn. 6, ante) that
Dew submitted seeking to establish his innocence or his lack of direct
participation in County’s beating and robbery. As indicated above, on our
review for substantial evidence, we must defer to the court as the fact-finder;
we are without power to reweigh the evidence or reconsider the court’s
credibility findings. (People v. Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5th 989, 1006; People v. Tice
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 246, 256 [“Substantial evidence does not mean
evidence free of ambiguities or inconsistencies [citation], and it is the
exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of
witnesses and the weight to be afforded any evidence”].)
Dew maintains that if we exclude the hearsay evidence from his
preliminary hearing and the prosecutor’s statements at his sentencing that
should not have been treated as adoptive admissions, the original factual
basis remains, but “[t]hat factual basis falls short of showing [his] liability
beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in light of the new evidence [he]
produced . . . in the form of the declarations.” This again asks us to reassess
the trial court’s credibility determinations, which we will not do.
Dew further argues, relying on People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th
967 and People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, that his stipulation to the
facts concerning the robbery and County’s death “did not constitute an
admission to ‘facts supporting liability on any particular theory,’ and the
generic pleading encompassed theories—such as natural and probable
consequences . . .—that did not require the defendant to have acted with
malice.”

15
We disagree with Dew’s view of his guilty plea. When a conviction
results from a guilty plea, the record of conviction includes facts the
defendant admits as “ ‘the factual basis for a guilty plea.’ ” (People v.
Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211; accord, People v. Das (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 954, 961-964 [record of conviction includes stated factual basis
for defendant’s guilty plea, but court could not rely on a factual recitation the
defendant did not stipulate to].) Here this included not only Dew’s
preliminary hearing transcript, but also the specific statement describing his,
Ragland’s and Patton’s actions on the night in question. And the statute
“unambiguously provides that a trial court ruling on the merits of a
resentencing petition ‘may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior
hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including witness
testimony.’ ” (People v. Davenport (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158 [plain
reading of section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) compels the conclusion that a
preliminary hearing transcript is admissible at a section 1172.6 evidentiary
hearing; the statute creates a new hearsay exception applicable to merits
hearings in section 1172.6 resentencing proceedings]; see also People v.
Robinson (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 854, 865.)
When Dew entered into his plea he did in fact specify a factual basis
and theory about his role in the offense—his presence inside County’s
apartment and participation in the struggle leading to County’s death. Thus,
his plea constitutes evidence on his section 1172.6 petition from which the
court concluded he could presently be convicted of murder under new section
189. Dew misplaces reliance on Eynon and Flores, involving assessments of
defendants’ eligibility at the prima facie stage in instances where they did not
enter into similar stipulations. (People v. Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp.
987, 990 [petitioner did not admit or stipulate to any particular theory in

16
pleading no contest to second degree murder]; People v. Eynon, supra, 68
Cal.App.5th at p. 977 [same]; compare People v. Fisher (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
1022, 1030 [defendant at plea hearing “specifically admitted to shooting and
killing two people and shooting and injuring a third person” making him
“ineligible for relief as a matter of law”].)
We conclude, as we did before, that even without the hearsay and
adoptive admission evidence, substantial evidence supports the court’s
findings with regard to the factors under Banks and Clark, which we
summarized in our prior opinion. (People v. Love, supra, D078754.) Our
conclusions there about the evidence showing Dew was a major participant
remain valid: “First and foremost, [Dew] ‘was present at the scene of the
killing, in a position to . . . prevent the actual murder, and . . . his . . . actions
. . . play[ed] a particular role in the death.’ (Banks, supra, 6[1] Cal.4th at p.
803.) As the factual basis for his guilty plea, [Dew] acknowledged he entered
County’s apartment with Patton and Ragland to steal County’s property.
Once inside, the three perpetrators struggled with County. It is reasonable
to infer from the nature of County’s injuries and the presence of a bloody
bowling pin, trophy, and knife, that one of the perpetrators used these objects
to bludgeon and cut County during the struggle in which [Dew] was
participating. [Dew’s] participation in a three-on-one struggle facilitated the
murder by preventing County from defending himself from the assailant
inflicting the deadly blows. Additionally, the fact [Dew] had no fresh injuries
shortly after the offense supports a reasonable inference he did not intervene
to prevent the infliction of deadly blows once his cohort began bludgeoning
County.
“[Dew’s] presence at, and participation in, the underlying felony
strongly supports the trial court's finding he was a major participant. (See

17
Banks, supra, 6[1] Cal.4th at p. 805 [finding, by contrast, that the defendant
was not a major participant in a robbery felony murder because he was
merely the getaway driver and ‘[d]uring the robbery and murder, [he] was
absent from the scene, sitting in a car and waiting’].)
“Second, it is reasonable to infer [Dew] played a significant role in
planning the crime because witnesses later saw the stolen goods in his van
and he was the only perpetrator to sell and profit from the stolen goods.
Indeed, [Dew] directly asserted his ownership vis-à-vis Patton at the
gathering.
“Third, [Dew’s] conduct ‘ “after lethal force was used” ’ (Banks, supra,
6[1] Cal.4th at p. 803) also supports the finding he was a major participant.
We infer from the fact County was still bound and had vomit in his mouth,
nose, and airway when his body was found several days after the crime, that
[Dew] did not render any aid at the scene or call for help after leaving the
scene. (See id. at p. 807 [noting the defendant ‘did not see the shooting
happen . . . and could not do anything to . . . render assistance’].)” (People v.
Love, supra, D078754.)
Equally valid are our conclusions about evidence establishing Dew’s
reckless indifference to human life: “Most significantly, [Dew] was physically
present during the commission of the underlying felony. The United States
Supreme Court has ‘stressed the importance of presence to culpability.’
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619, citing Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S.
137, 158.) Where ‘the murder is a culmination or a foreseeable result of
several intermediate steps . . . , “the defendant's presence allows him to
observe his cohorts so that it is fair to conclude that he shared in their actions
and mental state . . . . [Moreover,] the defendant’s presence gives him an
opportunity to act as a restraining influence on murderous cohorts. If the

18
defendant fails to act as a restraining influence, then the defendant is
arguably more at fault for the resulting murders.” ’ (Clark, at p. 619.)
“As noted, [Dew] acknowledged as the factual basis for his guilty plea
that he was present for, and participated in, the three-on-one struggle in
which County sustained fatal injuries. Additionally, the record supports a
reasonable inference that [Dew] did not intervene to prevent the murder once
one of his cohorts began bludgeoning County. The record also supports a
reasonable inference that [Dew] neither rendered aid at the scene nor
summoned help after leaving County in an extremely vulnerable position—on
the floor with his hands tied behind his back and a towel over his head, with
serious injuries to his face and brain, and with vomit in his mouth, nose, and
airway. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.[ ]4th at p. 619 [noting the United States
Supreme Court and ‘[o]ther appellate courts have considered relevant a
defendant’s failure to provide aid while present at the scene’]; [In re] Scoggins
[2020] 9 Cal.5th [667,] 672 [finding no reckless indifference where, ‘[a]fter the
shooting, [the defendant] walked over to [the victim] and checked if he was
still breathing,’ and then remained at the scene and was ‘cooperative’ with
law enforcement].) These considerations strongly support a finding [Dew]
acted with reckless indifference to human life.
“The duration of the felony weighs slightly against [Dew]. The fact a
struggle occurred, County’s apartment was ransacked, and his property
removed support a reasonable inference that the duration of the felony was
not insignificant. (See [In re] Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 680-681
[finding the duration ‘very limited’ where a planned-beating-turned-fatal-
shooting ‘lasted between a few seconds and three to five minutes’].) But it
was not a prolonged kidnapping during which the victims were moved to a

19
different location before being murdered. (See Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p.
151.)
“[Dew’s] knowledge of factors bearing on his cohorts’ likelihood of
killing also weighs only slightly against him. [Dew] introduced evidence at
the preliminary hearing showing Patton had previously lived with County.
Thus, ‘there was a chance [Patton] would be recognized, increasing the risk of
violence in order to evade apprehension.’ (People v. Proby (1998) 60
Cal.App.4th 922, 929.) And, although nothing in the record indicates [Dew]
had advance knowledge of factors indicating his cohorts’ likelihood of killing
County, a ‘[d]efendant’s knowledge of such factors . . . may occur during the
felony.’ (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 621.) [Dew] would certainly have
become aware of his cohorts’ likelihood of killing County when one or more of
them began bludgeoning County with a bowling pin or trophy and cutting
him with a knife. Yet, the record supports the inference [Dew] did nothing at
that point to prevent the murder or render aid.
“Finally, nothing in the record suggests [Dew] made any ‘efforts . . . to
minimize the risks of . . . violence during the felony.’ (Clark, supra, 6[3]
Cal.4th at p. 621; see id. at p. 622 [finding the defendant less culpable where
he planned for his cohort to use an unloaded gun to rob a store ‘after closing
time, when most of the employees had left the building’].) . . . [¶] . . . We
are satisfied that—even without considering the challenged evidence—
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that [Dew] was a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference for
human life. Accordingly, the court did not err in denying [Dew’s] petition for
resentencing under section [1172.6].” (People v. Love, supra, D078754.)

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

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