Hatch v. Cendana CA2/2

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Filed 12/26/24 Hatch v. Cendana CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

DEBORAH HATCH et al., B327911

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LC103648)
v.

INEE CENDANA,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Shirley K. Watkins, Judge. Affirmed.

Klapach & Klapach, Joseph S. Klapach; Law Offices of
Tracey P. Hom, Tracey P. Hom; Stein Law Firm and Jay Stein for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Jeremiah Flores Valdez for Defendant and Respondent.

______________________________
“No one can take advantage of his own wrong.” (Civ. Code,
§ 3517.) Yet that is exactly what Deborah Hatch (Hatch)
attempted to do when she filed this action, along with two
corporate entities, Caritas Home Health Providers, Inc. (Caritas)
and Unified Care Services, Inc. (Unified), against her
coshareholder Inee Cendana (Cendana). We agree with the trial
court’s 152-page statement of decision that Hatch’s unclean
hands bars not only her recovery of any damages from Cendana,
but also any claim by Caritas and Unified against Cendana.
Thus, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This litigation arises out of a dispute between the two
shareholders (Hatch and Cendana) of two closely held
corporations (Caritas and Unified). After their relationship
soured, Hatch and Caritas brought this action against Cendana
and others, alleging individual and derivative claims on behalf of
Unified, which was also named as a nominal defendant.
Cendana responded with a cross-complaint against Hatch and
Caritas.
Between May 2019 and January 2022, the trial court
conducted a bench trial on the operative pleadings.1
Statement of decision
In February 2023, the trial court issued its final statement
of decision. What is clear from the trial court’s detailed ruling is
its disdain for all parties involved in this litigation, and its
repugnance with Hatch’s attempt to recover damages from
Cendana.
Both Hatch and Cendana pillaged the two corporations

1
The trial had many starts and stops due to COVID, illness,
family emergencies, a flood at the courthouse, nonworking
elevators, congested calendars, and other issues.

2
It found: “In this case, the credible and substantial
evidence is that both Inee Cendana and Deborah Hatch
knowingly (individually, and in their roles as officers and
directors of Unified and Caritas) intentionally, and
conspiratorially engaged in conduct which made them both guilty
of unclean hands, including but not limited to: engaging in
improper, unethical, and probable illegal conduct, grossly
financially mismanaging their businesses, making
misrepresentations to government entities and to each other,
taking unfair advantage of their businesses and each other,
treating the finances of their businesses like their personal
money available for personal expenses, charging personal
expenses to the businesses without reimbursement, taking tax
deductions improperly (and then blaming their tax preparer for
it), disregarding corporate formalities, self-dealing to the
extreme, being untruthful under oath, acting in conflict of
interest between their individual interests and the [corporations’]
best interests, violating their fiduciary and ethical duties to each
other and to the corporations of which they were officers,
violating their statutory duties to the corporations and each
other, failing to comply with California corporation laws, and
misrepresenting the financial condition of the corporations.”
“The substantial and credible evidence is that both of them failed
to act in the best interests of the corporations and each other,
failed to act honestly, failed to act lawfully, and engaged in
unconscionable self-dealing. Indeed, Ms. Hatch continued
throughout the trial to engage in self-dealing.”
The trial court continued: “Deborah Hatch and Inee
Cendana did not commit innocent mistakes. The credible
evidence supports the court’s findings that their actions were

3
deliberate actions of disloyalty, self-dealing and gross negligence.
They deliberately engaged in self-dealing and questionable
transactions. They both acted with conscious disregard of the
corporations’ interests. The key factor here that informs the
court’s decision was that these were two persons, acting without
corporate formalities, making decisions about how they were
going to spend ‘their’ money. They never acted like a corporation
(except Deborah Hatch obviously attempted to do so just before
filing suit and in consultation with the plaintiffs’ attorneys in
order to attempt to block Inee Cendana’s rights).”
In fact, there was “credible testimony . . . that they were
both fully cognizant of exactly what they were doing and what
the other was doing with their joint businesses, both agreed with
their own and each other’s conduct and use of business funds,
both took personal loans which were not paid back, both
contributed to inaccurate record keeping, both knew what they
were doing, and have known for years. Both lied in court under
oath.” As a result, the doctrine of unclean hands applied, and
Hatch and Cendana were not entitled to any relief on their
individual claims against each other.
Corporations were not entitled to monetary compensation
The trial court also denied “monetary compensation” to
Caritas and Unified on the grounds that they “were solely under
the control and ownership of Inee Cendana and Deborah Hatch.
Plaintiffs’ unclean hands prevents recovery of monetary damages
against any defendant.” It found “Hatch’s ‘fiction’ of proceeding
on a ‘derivative claim’ when she is the only person whom she
claims would benefit [to be] further evidence of self-dealing and
she proceeded in the face of a substantial conflict of
interest. . . . [Her] refusal to recognize Inee Cendana’s interest in

4
the corporations, acknowledged by her prior to and during
litigation, were fictions created after retention of counsel solely
for the purpose of taking advantage of Inee Cendana and denying
her rights as a shareholder and officer of the corporations.”
“Because of the manner in which Deborah Hatch and Inee
Cendana treated the corporation’s money and bank accounts like
it was their own money, the court finds that the corporation was
a sham. There were no corporate formalities. There were no
corporate minutes. There was no written record of decisions
concerning the company. There were no formal, recorded votes.
Nothing was put in writing about the large expenditures of the
company or loans. Deborah Hatch and Inee Cendana borrowed
money from the business without a written record or without
signing notes. Their conduct was reckless and dishonest. There
were no annual meetings. There were no bylaws which they
followed. Importantly, Deborah Hatch failed in her obligation as
an officer and director to comply with her duty of inquiry and her
duty of loyalty. [Citations.] Deborah Hatch and Inee Cendana
were not disinterested directors; they were engaged in self
dealing.”
In addition: “As Deborah Hatch, a wrongdoer in this case,
held herself out to be the President and Chief Executive Officer of
Caritas[, she] has waived and/or is estopped to claim any damage,
either on her behalf, or on behalf of Caritas, for the alleged
wrongful acts of Inee Cendana.” “[A]t all times, Deborah Hatch
was aware of the acts, acquiesced, and participated in their
commission.” She also failed “to reasonably investigate” any
alleged misconduct. Worse, “[s]he did not show any remorse for
her own actions,” and “[s]he did not accept responsibility for her
own actions.”

5
The trial court also found: “If any wrongful conduct of any
defendant did cause plaintiffs any harm, . . . they are barred from
recovery based on the doctrine of unclean hands in that the
plaintiffs, themselves, acted in breach of their fiduciary duties,
actively engaged in fraud, engaged in probable illegal activities,
[and] changed the financial records of the company so as to cast a
wide net of unreliability over all of the financial records that
plaintiffs use to support their claims.”
Plaintiffs’ claim that Cendana took more money from the
corporations than she was entitled to
“It does not go unnoticed that a prime motivating factor in
pursuing litigation was Deborah Hatch’s belief that of their ill
gotten gains, Inee Cendana got more than she did. First, the
court denies that the evidence preponderates that Inee Cendana
got ‘more money’ than Deborah Hatch did.” In this regard, the
trial court found Hatch’s purported evidence of monies that either
Cendana received or were paid to persons for Cendana’s benefit
“inherently suspect,” given the fact that plaintiffs did not allow
Cendana to conduct her own financial independent investigation
of the corporations’ original financial records.
Furthermore, plaintiffs’ financial records were not reliable,
and their expert testimony were not credible. “As there was no
[proper and provable] accounting done of the amount of money
that Ms. Hatch improperly took, then the numbers attributed to
Ms. Cendana are also suspect. There can be no decision that Ms.
Cendana took more money than Ms. Hatch without a proper
accounting. Plaintiffs’ experts acknowledge [that] they only did
math to calculate Ms. Hatch’s money; there was no determination
as to whether the money was properly taken, whether any money

6
paid to others associated with Ms. Hatch was proper and those
amounts.”
Hatch’s conflict of interest
The trial court was also troubled by the obvious conflict of
interest between Hatch and Caritas in connection with this
litigation. “Ms. Hatch testified that even though the only owners
of Caritas were herself and Ms. Cendana, without consulting
with Ms. Cendana at the end of 2014, Ms. Hatch hired a lawyer
(Ms. Hom) to represent Caritas. This was before Ms. Cendana
was told to not come back to Caritas, thereby creating a conflict
of interest. This conflict was never resolved because Ms. Hom
represented Caritas and then filed a lawsuit on behalf of Caritas
against only Ms. Cendana when the best interests of Caritas was
to sue Ms. Hatch as well. The failure of Caritas to sue Ms. Hatch
for her own wrongdoing shows the substantial conflict of interest
in this case.” In fact, the trial court found credible evidence that
Hatch retained an attorney “for herself personally at the expense
of Caritas,” further violating her ethical and fiduciary duties to
Caritas. The trial court also found that Caritas was paying for
Hatch’s representation in her derivative claims; “Unified ha[d] no
assets other than the loan due from the sale of its assets. This
[was] also a breach of fiduciary duty to Caritas and misuse of its
funds. Hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorney fees, as
acknowledged by counsel to the court, were charged to Caritas
solely for [Hatch’s] own personal benefit.”
Willful blindness
As set forth above, the trial court expressly rejected Hatch’s
claim that she did not know what Cendana was up to. Even if
she did not know, “she acted in deliberate ignorance or willful
blindness of her obligations as an officer, director, and

7
shareholder of a corporation.” “Her claims of lack of knowledge
are a sham and are being used solely to shield herself from years
of her own fraudulent conduct. Her plan was not successful. She
is not off the hook for her own wrongful activities. This is the
classic case in which the doctrine of ‘unclean hands’ applies. She
cannot recover money from her co-conspirator Inee Cendana,
with whom Deborah Hatch jointly raided profits from their
businesses, by com[ing] to court and claiming that Inee Cendana
made more ill-gotten gains [than] she did.”
“Not only does the doctrine of willful blindness have
applicability to Deborah Hatch’s personal claims, but it also has
applicability to the [corporations’] claims as well. Under this
doctrine, a corporation can be held liable for the conscious
avoidance of facts that would otherwise indicate wrongful
activity. If a corporation or its agents strongly suspect that they
are partaking in illegal activities yet fail to investigate, the
corporation may be held liable if the circumstances demonstrate
deliberate avoidance of information. Thus, a corporation cannot
escape liability merely by refusing to learn of the illegal activities
of its agents.”
Winding down of the corporations
Although the trial court found that Cendana was “not
entitled to [any] monetary recovery because of her own fraud and
bad faith conduct,” she was “entitled to have a board meeting
scheduled, she [was] entitled to have her board position and she
[was] entitled to vote her shares. After that the court will order
winding down and dissolution of the corporation after
appointment of a Receiver.”
In so ruling, the trial court relied upon Corporations Code
section 1800 and found all elements met. After all, “the conduct

8
of both directors and officers of . . . Unified and Caritas [had]
been in bad faith, in breach of their fiduciary duties, and
fraudulent. Deborah Hatch [had] been and [was] continuing to
exercise total financial control over both corporations.”
“As to Unified, [the trial court found that] Hatch
. . . divested . . . Cendana of 50% of her shares of Unified without
a documentary trail or corporate action, and . . . falsely advised
the IRS under oath that Inee Cendana [was] not a shareholder.
The court [found] that Inee Cendana [was] a 50% shareholder
with Deborah Hatch. Accordingly, as the corporation [had] an
even number of directors who [were] equally divided and [could
not] agree as to the management of its affairs, so that its
business [could] no longer be conducted to advantage or so that
there [was] danger that its property and business [would] be
impaired or lost, and the holders of the voting shares of the
corporation [were] so divided into factions that they [could not]
elect a board consisting of an uneven number, the court [ordered]
an involuntary winding down and dissolution of Unified. After
entry of judgment, the court will retain jurisdiction for
appointment of a Receiver and supervision of the winding down
and dissolution process.
“As to Caritas, Deborah Hatch . . . had complete control of
the finances of the corporation since Ms. Cendana was asked to
leave and not return in March 2015. However, even she agree[d]
that Ms. Cendana [was] still holder of 40% of the shares of
Caritas. After basically kicking Ms. Cendana out, she conducted
a ‘governing body’ meeting and since then . . . continued to
misuse the assets of Caritas. She . . . acted in violation of her
fiduciary duties to the corporation and to Ms. Cendana. She
. . . acted fraudulently. She ha[d] unclean hands. The Court

9
[found] that any ‘board’ meetings (since Ms. Cendana was told
not to return) [were] illegal and in bad faith. The court [also
found] that any decisions made by the ‘board’ since March 2015
[were] void.”
The trial court continued: Hatch “breach[ed] her fiduciary
duty when she exercise[d] control of the company or [sought] a
personal advantage in a way that [was] unfair, unjust, or
inequitable to Ms. Cendana. Ms. Hatch . . . violated her duties to
Ms. Cendana.” Thus, it ordered “a board meeting as soon as
practicable” and that Cendana was “entitled to retain her Board
position and [could] vote her 40% shares.” The trial court also
ordered a winding down and dissolution of Caritas, including the
appointment of a receiver to conduct the winding down and
dissolution process.
Appeal
Judgment was entered, and this timely appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs raise a host of arguments challenging the
judgment. But we readily affirm as to all three plaintiffs (Hatch,
Caritas, and the derivative claims of Unified) on grounds of
unclean hands.
I. Standards of review
The standard of review is “the threshold issue” for every
appeal. (Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d
605, 611.) It “is the compass that guides the appellate court to its
decision. It defines and limits the course the court follows in
arriving at its destination.” (People v. Jackson (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1018.) Yet the applicable standard of
review is nowhere mentioned in plaintiffs’ appellate briefs.

10
We review the trial court’s decision to apply unclean hands
for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for substantial
evidence. (Aguayo v. Amaro (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1109;
but see Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 265, 274–275
[noting that appellate courts have inconsistently applied either
the abuse of discretion or substantial evidence standard of
review]; Dickson, Carlson & Campillo v. Pole (2000)
83 Cal.App.4th 436, 447 (Dickson) [abuse of discretion]; Kendall-
Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th
970, 978 (Kendall-Jackson) [substantial evidence].) “The
appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court
exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no
authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.”
(Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478–479.)
To the extent plaintiffs’ arguments raise issues of law, our
review is de novo. (Padideh v. Moradi (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 418,
437 (Padideh).)
II. Relevant law
A. Principles of equity
“Equity aims to do right and accomplish justice. [Citation.]
‘“Equity or chancery law has its origins in the necessity for
exceptions to the application of rules of law in those cases where
the law, by reason of its universality, would create injustice in
the affairs of men.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Equity therefore will
assert itself in situations where right and justice would be
defeated but for its intervening. [Citation.] The equitable powers
of a court are not curbed by rigid rules of law, and thus wide play
is reserved to the court’s conscience in formulating its decrees.
These powers are broad enough to address novel conditions and

11
meet the requirements of every case. [Citation.] In other words,
equity recognizes that we live in a changing world and equitable
remedies are flexible, capable of expanding to meet the increasing
complexities of these changing times. Inflexible rules are not
permitted to curtail the power of equity to accomplish justice.
[Citation.]” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1133 (Lickiss); see also ZF Micro
Solutions, Inc. v. TAT Capital Partners, Ltd. (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 992, 1000 (ZF Micro) [“Equity arose to make
exceptions when rules of law would work injustice in particular
cases or to deal with some novel situation not covered by rules of
law”].)
In exercising its equitable powers, courts must consider
“the equities on both sides of a dispute.” (Lickiss, supra,
208 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133; see also ZF Micro, supra,
82 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001 [“When [a court] exercises its equitable
powers, the court weighs the competing equities on both sides of
a dispute”].) “This basic principle of equity jurisprudence means
that in any given context in which the court is prevailed upon to
exercise its equitable powers, it should weigh the competing
equities bearing on the issue at hand and then grant or deny
relief based on the overall balance of these equities. [Citation.]”
(Lickiss, supra, at pp. 1133–1134.)
“‘A court sitting in equity, and having taken jurisdiction,
has broad powers. It may grant relief as varied and diversified as
the means employed to produce the grievance complained of, and
is not bound to the strict legal rights of the parties.’” (Woodland
Cooperative Rice Growers v. Smith (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 926,
930–931.)
B. Unclean hands

12
The equitable defense of unclean hands “has been allowed
as an affirmative defense in legal actions.” (Unilogic, Inc. v.
Burroughs Corp. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 612, 619 (Unilogic); see
also Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. East Bay Union of
Machinists (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 675, 728 (Fibreboard) [noting
that the distinction under common law between actions at law
and suits in equity has been abolished].) It “applies . . . where it
would be inequitable to grant the plaintiff any relief.” (Dickson,
supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 447; see also Kendall-Jackson, supra,
76 Cal.App.4th at p. 985 [doctrine “is an equitable rationale for
refusing a plaintiff relief where principles of fairness dictate that
the plaintiff should not recover, regardless of the merits of his
claim”].) “‘It is available to protect the court from having its
powers used to bring about an inequitable result in the litigation
before it. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Padideh, supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at p. 426.)
“Although the venerable unclean-hands defense has been
described in many iterations, courts have developed and now
consistently apply a ‘three-pronged test to determine the effect to
be given to the plaintiff’s unclean-hands conduct. Whether the
particular misconduct is a bar to the alleged claim for relief
depends on (1) analogous case law, (2) the nature of the
misconduct, and (3) the relationship of the misconduct to the
claimed injuries. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Padideh, supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at p. 426.)
In other words, the doctrine applies where a plaintiff
engages in misconduct “in connection with the matter in
controversy.” (Dickson, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 446.) “The
misconduct that brings the [un]clean hands doctrine into play
must relate directly to the cause at issue. Past improper conduct

13
or prior misconduct that only indirectly affects the problem before
the court does not suffice.” (Kendall-Jackson, supra,
76 Cal.App.4th at p. 979.) “‘The issue is not that the plaintiff’s
hands are dirty, but rather “‘“that the manner of dirtying renders
inequitable the assertion of such rights against the defendant.”’”’
[Citation.] The misconduct ‘must prejudicially affect . . . the
rights of the person against whom the relief is sought so that it
would be inequitable to grant such relief.’”’” (Ibid.)
“The misconduct which brings the [un]clean hands doctrine
into operation must . . . affect the equitable relations between the
litigants.” (Fibreboard, supra, 227 Cal.App.2d at p. 728.) All
that means is that “‘[t]he trial of the issue relating to clean hands
cannot be distorted into a proceeding to try the general morals of
the parties.’ [Citation.]” (Unilogic, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at
p. 621.) If the parties’ alleged “misconduct occurred in the same
transaction that forms the subject of this litigation . . . that is
enough to trigger application of the unclean hands doctrine.”
(Ibid.)
III. The trial court did not err
Applying these legal principles, we conclude that the trial
court did not err in applying the doctrine of unclean hands to bar
plaintiffs’ claims against Cendana.
Regarding Hatch’s individual claims, as set forth in the
trial court’s extremely thorough and detailed statement of
decision, there was overwhelming evidence of her unclean hands.
Her unclean hands were directly related to the claims at issue in
this litigation. (Kendall-Jackson, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at
p. 979.) And, her unclean hands continued through trial. (See
Padideh, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 425 [plaintiffs must come to
court with clean hands “and keep them clean”].)

14
Urging us to conclude otherwise, plaintiffs contend that
Hatch did not have unclean hands because she did not withdraw
more than her proportionate share of the corporate profits;
because her claim was based upon the theory that “Cendana
withdrew more than her fair share of the corporate profits,” the
doctrine of unclean hands does not apply. But as the trial court
aptly noted, there was no evidence to support this allegation.
Hatch’s purported evidence in this regard was unreliable and
suspect, and her expert testimony was simply not credible. We
cannot, and will not, reassess the credibility of witnesses or
evidence. (Reynaud v. Technicolor Creative Services USA, Inc.
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1015.)
Like Hatch, Caritas’s claims and Unified’s derivative
claims are also barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. Hatch’s
misconduct can be attributed to the two corporations: She was
an officer and director of both corporations and one of only two
shareholders. While a corporation is considered a “person” within
the meaning of the state and federal constitutions (9 Witkin,
Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Corporations, § 1, p. 775), it
is not an “individual” with a state of mind. (Cruz v. HomeBase
(2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167–168.) A corporation acts only
through its employees or agents. (AvalonBay Communities, Inc.
v. County of Los Angeles (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 890, 903.) Thus,
when an officer acts on behalf of a corporation, there is only a
single actor—the corporation. (Ibid.) And an officer’s misconduct
may be imputed to the corporation. (See, e.g., Sea Horse Ranch,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456–457
[corporate president’s criminal negligence may be imputed to the
corporation]; People v. Parker (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 86, 93 [“A

15
corporation, of course, can acquire knowledge only through its
officers and agents”].)
Under the circumstances presented in this case, it is simply
nonsensical for plaintiffs to argue on appeal that Caritas was a
mere victim of Cendana’s theft. In fact, this argument begs the
question of why Caritas only sued Cendana—if Caritas was a
mere victim of the malfeasance of its only two shareholders, why
didn’t it sue Hatch?
Plaintiffs argue that the doctrine of alter ego (and/or other
theories of vicarious liability) cannot be applied defensively; in
other words, Cendana cannot use the alter ego doctrine to escape
liability to Caritas. This argument fails for at least two reasons.
First, Cendana was not just a defendant in this action; she was
also a cross-complainant against Hatch and Caritas, and she
alleged vicarious liability against them. While her pleading does
not specifically allege alter ego liability, we can infer from the
trial court’s statement of decision that it broadly construed
Cendana’s pleading (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Fladeboe v. American
Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 59 [if a party fails to
bring omissions or ambiguities in the statement of decision to the
trial court’s attention, then the appellate court will infer findings
to support the judgment]) and found both Hatch and Cendana to
be alter egos of both corporations.
Second, we disagree with plaintiffs’ characterization of
Cendana’s defense. Cendana is not trying to use the alter ego
doctrine to avoid her own liability; rather, she directs us to
Hatch’s misconduct, and Hatch’s misconduct can be imputed to

16
Caritas for the reasons set forth above.2 (See also Casey v. U.S.
Bank Nat. Assn. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1143 [wrongdoing
of fiduciaries can be imputed to the corporation if all relevant
decisionmakers of the corporation are involved in the fraud].)
The cases cited by plaintiffs on appeal do not compel a
different result. Milazo v. Gulf Ins. Co. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d
1528 is readily distinguishable. In that case, “a duplicitous
partner [sought] to obtain indemnification under a partnership
liability policy for the damages caused to his innocent copartners
by his misappropriation of a partnership opportunity.” (Id. at
p. 1531, italics added.) The Court of Appeal rejected his
argument, reasoning that there was no partnership liability for
the dishonest partner’s misconduct; his wrongful acts against his
innocent copartners occurred outside the scope of partnership
business. (Id. at p. 1539)
Here, in contrast, both Hatch and Cendana acted
fraudulently and wrongfully. Hatch was far from an innocent
coshareholder or officer or director. Applying well-settled
equitable principles, under these circumstances, plaintiffs cannot
claim that Caritas (or Unified) was an innocent victim of
Cendana’s misconduct.
In the other cases cited by plaintiffs, the courts rightly
recognized that a person who abused the corporate form could not
invoke that breach to his or her advantage against an innocent

2
In their reply brief, plaintiffs argue for the first time that
liability cannot be imputed to the corporate entities pursuant to
the adverse interest exception. “For obvious reasons of fairness,
points raised for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not
be considered.” (Rubinstein v. Fakheri (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th
797, 809.)

17
third party. (See, e.g., LSREF2 Clover Property 4, LLC v.
Festival Retail Fund 1, LP (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1081;
United States v. Real Property Located at 475 Martin Lane
(C.D.Cal. 2012) 2012 WL 12882013, at p. *4.) At the risk of
sounding redundant, that is not the situation in this case. Here,
it is not that Cendana is attempting to invoke her malfeasance to
avoid liability to an innocent plaintiff; rather, the trial court
found that both Cendana and Hatch disregarded all corporate
formalities and treated the two corporations as their own
personal piggy banks. In light of the trial court’s finding, it
would “work an absurdity” and “promote an inequitable result” to
allow the corporations to pretend they stand as entities separate
and apart from their shareholders. (LSREF2 Clover Property,
supra, at p. 1082.) Exercising its broad inherent equitable
powers, the trial court properly applied the doctrine of unclean
hands to the corporations.
In reaching this conclusion, we find Peregrine Funding, Inc.
v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005)
133 Cal.App.4th 658 (Peregrine) instructive. In Peregrine, a
bankruptcy trustee that had succeeded to the interests of a
corporation used to perpetrate a Ponzi scheme sued a law firm for
malpractice and for aiding and abetting the Ponzi scheme. The
Peregrine court held that the doctrine of unclean hands barred
both the corporation and its successor in interest (the bankruptcy
trustee) from pursuing claims against the law firm. (Id. at
pp. 679–680.) The court reasoned that the individual who owned
and controlled the corporation was the primary architect of the
Ponzi scheme and applied the doctrine of unclean hands to
impute the owner’s fraud to the corporation. (Ibid.)

18
While we are not considering whether corporate misconduct
can be imputed to a bankruptcy trustee, the reasoning of
Peregrine applies squarely here. Caritas and Unified were sham
entities with no corporate identities apart from their two sole
(and crooked) shareholders (Hatch and Cendana). (Peregrine,
supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 678.) They were owned and
controlled by the two shareholders; thus, Hatch and Cendana’s
knowledge and fraudulent conduct can be imputed to the two
entities. (Id. at pp. 679–680.) Any alleged injury that the
corporate entities suffered was “‘as illusory as . . . their corporate
identit[ies].’” (Id. at p. 678.)
IV. Involuntary dissolution of Caritas and United; election and
seat on Caritas’s board
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court “erred in applying
[the doctrine of] unclean hands in an inconsistent and unfair
manner.” According to plaintiffs, if both Hatch and Cendana
acted with unclean hands, then (1) plaintiffs should have
prevailed (at a minimum) on their request for an accounting, and
(2) Cendana should not have prevailed on her request to compel
an election and involuntarily dissolve Caritas and Unified.
The trial court did not err. First, plaintiffs were not
entitled to an accounting as they did not meet their burden of
proof on this claim. (Evid. Code, § 500 [a party has the burden of
proof as to facts essential to his or her claim for relief].) In any
event, the dissolution of each corporation will undoubtedly
require an accounting. (See, e.g., Corp. Code, § 1806, subds. (c) &
(d); Macmorris Sales Corp. v. Kozak (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 998,
1005 [“It is of course an indispensable part of the receiver’s duties
to file an accounting”].)

19
Second, “[t]he dissolution of a corporation is an equitable
action in which jurisdiction is granted by statute, and a court of
equity is to take jurisdiction of the cause, once a requisite
showing is made, and then exercise its discretion in granting or
refusing equitable relief.” (7B Am.Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms
Corporations § 477; accord, Oliker v. Gershunoff (1987)
195 Cal.App.3d 1288, 1306 [“[a] judicial dissolution and
supervised accounting of a partnership is an equitable action”].)
As set forth above, the doctrine of unclean hands is also an
equitable doctrine, and the trial court is vested with broad
equitable powers to “do right and accomplish justice” (Lickiss,
supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133), particularly in “novel
situation[s]” (ZF Micro, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 1000).
After presiding over this matter for years, and becoming
extraordinarily familiar with the unscrupulous players and their
gross misconduct, the trial court properly invoked its equitable
powers to “do right.” (Lickiss, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133.)
Consistent with plaintiffs’ prayer in their operative pleading for
“relief [that is] just and proper,” the trial court came to a well-
reasoned decision as to how to resolve the competing claims
between Hatch and Cendana: In accordance with Corporations
Code sections 600 and 1800, it ordered a winding down and
dissolution of both corporate entities. Nothing in the trial court’s
decision suggests that it used principles of unclean hands and/or
equity to avoid a statutory mandate. (Ghory v. Al-Lahham (1989)
209 Cal.App.3d 1487, 1491; Reliant Life Shares, LLC v. Cooper
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 14, 35.)
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in
“ordering Caritas and Unified to conduct elections for their
boards of directors” and “also ordering that Cendana was

20
[entitled] to a seat on Caritas’s and Unified’s board of directors.”
Plaintiffs have not met their burden on appeal. They do not
explain, with a cogent, reasoned argument, how the trial court
erred. (Dilbert v. Newsom (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 317, 323 [“the
obligation to support points with argument and citations to
authority . . . requires more than simply stating a bare assertion
that the judgment ‘is erroneous and leaving it to the appellate
court to figure out why; it is not the appellate court’s role to
construct theories or arguments that would undermine the
judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness’”].) And they
offer no legal authority in support of their contention that the
trial court ruled inconsistently by finding alter ego liability on the
one hand, yet dissolving the corporations on the other. (See, e.g.,
Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 300 [when
a court disregards the corporate entity, it does not dissolve the
corporation; that is a separate act].) In light of the court’s broad
equitable powers and its factual findings, we see no grounds to
reverse.
V. Moot issues
All remaining issues are moot.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Cendana is entitled to costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

________________________, J.
RICHARDSON

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