People v. Chavez CA2/1

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Filed 12/26/24 P. v. Chavez CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B333242

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA112538)
v.

JOSE LUIS CHAVEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Jr., Judge. Conditionally
reversed and remanded with directions.
Joy A. Maulitz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Defendant Jose Luis Chavez appeals from the judgment
after a jury convicted him of voluntary manslaughter, assault
with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant
requests we review the transcript from the trial court’s Pitchess1
hearing. He also challenges the imposition of a narcotics offender
registration requirement and the trial court’s calculation of
credits.
We conclude the trial court withheld information that
should have been disclosed in response to defendant’s Pitchess
motion. Defendant’s theory at trial was the alleged victim, a
police officer, had used excessive force, including firing his pistol
at defendant, and defendant fired back in self-defense. Although
the officer’s personnel file contained complaints of excessive force
and investigations of prior incidents in which the officer fired his
weapon at suspects, the trial court deemed the information
nondiscoverable because the court determined the complaints
were unfounded and the officer-involved shootings were justified.
Our high court has declared that unfounded complaints are
discoverable in response to a Pitchess motion. (People v. Zamora
(1980) 28 Cal.3d 88, 93, fn. 1 (Zamora).) The trial court therefore
erred by basing its refusal to disclose the information either on
the investigating body’s determination or on the court’s
evaluation that the complaints were unfounded and the shootings
justified. We conditionally reverse the judgment and remand for
further Pitchess proceedings and an opportunity for defendant to
demonstrate prejudice from the lack of disclosure.

1 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531
(Pitchess).

2
We agree with defendant that should the trial court
reinstate his sentence following further Pitchess proceedings, the
court must strike the narcotics offender registration requirement,
which the Legislature has repealed, and award him additional
credits.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We summarize the evidence presented by the prosecution
relevant to this appeal. The defense did not call any witnesses,
and defendant did not testify.
On May 20, 2016, at approximately 11:14 p.m.,
Officer Kenny Benitez of the West Covina Police Department was
on patrol in his police vehicle. Benitez saw defendant and a
woman, and perceived them to be handing items to one another.
Benitez believed they were engaged in a narcotics transaction,
although he did not see any drugs or any money change hands.
Benitez exited his vehicle and asked defendant and the
woman to sit down so he could speak with them. Defendant got
on a bicycle and started to ride away. Benitez told defendant to
stop, but defendant did not.
As defendant attempted to ride away, he appeared to be
reaching for something on the right side of his body. Benitez,
concerned defendant would escape or draw a weapon,
unholstered his baton and struck defendant on the shoulder.
Defendant got off the bicycle and advanced towards Benitez with
his fists clenched as if to fight. Benitez told defendant to stop
and struck him again with the baton on either the side of his
body or legs.
Defendant began to run away. Benitez struck him again
with the baton and again commanded him to stop. Defendant
did not stop and Benitez pursued him on foot.

3
As defendant reached a tree-lined median in the roadway,
Benitez saw him draw a pistol. Benitez drew his own pistol.
Defendant, who was partially behind a tree, fired his pistol at
Benitez. Benitez fired back, then ran for cover. Defendant
continued to fire, and one of his bullets struck Benitez in the
lower back. Benitez fired back at defendant, then ran again until
his “body just gave out” and he fell to the ground. After a further
exchange of gunfire, Benitez saw defendant disappear over a
fence.
Defendant was arrested several days later. He had
suffered gunshot wounds to his left arm and right thumb. A
nine-millimeter pistol located in a bush near the scene matched
the cartridge cases found at the scene, and defendant’s DNA was
found on the pistol.
Several days after the incident, a homeowner who lived
near the scene found bloody pants and a black baggie on her
property. The bag contained methamphetamine.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A second amended information charged defendant with
attempted murder of a peace officer (Pen. Code,2 §§ 664/187,
subd.(a))3, assault with a semiautomatic firearm upon a peace
officer (§ 245, subd. (d)(2)), and possession of a firearm by a felon

2 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
3 If the intended victim of an attempted murder is a peace
officer “engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and the
defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim
was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her
duties,” those facts “shall be considered a circumstance in
aggravation of the crime” when imposing sentence. (§ 1170.81.)

4
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). As to the attempted murder and assault
counts, the information alleged firearm use enhancements under
section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and (d). The information
further alleged defendant was out on bail at the time he
committed the offenses, and that he had suffered a prior serious
felony conviction rendering him eligible for an enhancement
under section 667, subdivision (a), and sentencing under the
“Three Strikes” law.
A jury acquitted defendant of attempted murder and
assault with a semiautomatic firearm upon a peace officer, but
found him guilty of the lesser-included offenses of attempted
voluntary manslaughter and assault with a firearm. As to both
lesser-included offenses the jury found true allegations under
section 12022.5 that defendant personally used a firearm.4 The
jury also found defendant guilty of possession of a firearm by a
felon. Defendant admitted the prior strike conviction and that he
had been out on bail at the time of the instant offenses.
On July 20, 2023, the trial court sentenced defendant to the
midterm of three years for the voluntary manslaughter count,
doubled to six years because of the prior strike. The court added
five years for the prior conviction allegation under section 667,
subdivision (a)(1), four years for the firearm enhancement under
section 12022.5, subdivision (a), and two years for the out-on-bail
enhancement. For the firearm possession count, the court
imposed a consecutive sentence of eight months (one-third the

4 Because the jury acquitted defendant of attempted
murder and assault on a peace officer, he was no longer
eligible for the more severe firearm enhancements under
section 12022.53. (See § 12022.53, subd. (a) [listing felonies to
which enhancement applies].)

5
midterm), doubled to one year four months because of the prior
strike. The court sentenced defendant to three years on the
assault count with an additional four years for the firearm
enhancement, but stayed execution of the sentence under
section 654.
The trial court also sentenced defendant in the case for
which he was out on bail at the time he committed the offenses at
issue in the instant case, case No. KA111445. In that matter,
defendant had been found guilty by way of open plea of violations
of sections 4573, subdivision (a) (bringing contraband into a jail
facility), section 21510, subdivision (b) (carrying a switchblade
knife), and Health and Safety Code section 11378 (possession for
sale of a controlled substance).
On the contraband count, the court imposed one year (one-
third the midterm) doubled to two years because of the prior
strike. The court imposed but stayed a two-year sentence on
the possession count pursuant to section 654, and imposed a
six-month concurrent sentence for the switchblade count.
Defendant’s total sentence for all counts therefore was 20 years
4 months.
The court awarded credits, described further in our
Discussion, post, and imposed fines and fees. The court also
ordered defendant to register as a narcotics offender once
released from confinement.
Defendant timely appealed.

6
DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Erred In Not Disclosing Information
In Response to Defendant’s Pitchess Motion

1. Applicable law
“In Pitchess[, our high court] held that a criminal
defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial and an intelligent
defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible
information entitled a defendant, who was asserting self-defense
to a charge of battery on a police officer, to discovery of police
personnel records.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993)
5 Cal.4th 47, 52, citing Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 535–537.)
“In 1978, the California Legislature codified the holding
of Pitchess by enacting Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, as
well as Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045.” (Warrick v.
Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1019 (Warrick).)
“To initiate discovery, the defendant must file a motion
supported by affidavits showing ‘good cause for the discovery[.]’ ”
(Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019.) “If the trial court finds
good cause for the discovery, it reviews the pertinent documents
in chambers and discloses only that information falling within
the statutorily defined standards of relevance.” (Ibid.)
The “statutorily defined standards of relevance” referred to
in Warrick are found in Evidence Code section 1045. (See
Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019 [citing Evid. Code, § 1045].)
That statute states that the court shall not disclose “the
conclusions of any officer investigating a complaint filed pursuant

7
to Section 832.5 of the Penal Code,”5 or facts “that are so remote
as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit.” (Evid.
Code, § 1045, subd. (b).) At the time of the Pitchess proceedings
in this case, the statute also precluded disclosure of “complaints
concerning conduct occurring more than five years before the
event or transaction that is the subject of the litigation in aid of
which discovery or disclosure is sought.” (Evid. Code, § 1045,
former subd. (b)(1), Stats. 2002, ch. 391, § 2.)6
When requested to do so by a defendant, we independently
review the transcript of the trial court’s in camera Pitchess
hearing to determine whether the trial court disclosed all
relevant information. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216,
1229.) We review a trial court’s ruling on a Pitchess motion for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287,
330.)

2. Additional background
Officer Benitez was a police officer in Montebello for eight
years before joining the West Covina Police Department. In
advance of trial, defendant filed a Pitchess motion seeking
information from Benitez’s Montebello personnel records
concerning, inter alia, incidents of dishonesty and excessive

5
Section 832.5 governs complaints against peace officers
by members of the public.
6 The Legislature removed the five-year limitation effective
January 1, 2022. (See Sen. Bill No. 16 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.),
Stats. 2021, ch. 402, § 1.) The parties do not address that
amendment in their appellate briefing, and we express no opinion
as to how, if at all, the amendment affects the proceedings on
remand.

8
force.7 Defendant in his motion contended he fired at Benitez in
self-defense after Benitez struck defendant with a baton and fired
at defendant without provocation. Defendant stated he intended
to argue at trial that Benitez lied about the circumstances of the
incident and used excessive force, and defendant would use
personnel records concerning dishonesty and excessive force to
impeach Benitez at trial.
At the hearing on the motion, counsel for the Montebello
Police Department conceded defendant had shown good cause to
obtain information from Benitez’s personnel file concerning
excessive force and dishonesty. The court granted the motion as
to those two issues. The court then held an in camera hearing
with the Montebello Police Department’s custodian of records as
well as the department’s counsel, and concluded there were no
disclosable records.

3. Analysis
Defendant asks us to review the transcript of the in camera
Pitchess hearing and the documents reviewed by the trial court to
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in not
disclosing any. The Attorney General does not object to our
conducting this review.

7 Defendant in a separate, earlier motion also sought
Benitez’s records from the West Covina Police Department. The
trial court granted the motion and conducted an in camera
hearing at which it concluded there were no records responsive to
the motion. Defendant does not contest that ruling or request
that we review the transcript of the in camera hearing, and we
therefore do not address it further.

9
As an initial matter, the record before us does not include
all documents reviewed by the trial court. The transcript of the
Pitchess hearing indicates the trial court reviewed documents
pertaining to five incidents. The trial court did not preserve the
documents, and we therefore ordered counsel for the Montebello
Police Department to produce a copy of the documents presented
to the trial court. In response to that order, counsel provided
documents pertaining to two of the five incidents, identified as
11-2074 and 12-3589, both of which were officer-involved
shootings. Counsel also provided a declaration from Lieutenant
David Kim of the Montebello Police Department stating the
documents pertaining to the other three incidents, identified as
14-05, 14-22, and 15-02, “had been purged in the time period
between the in-camera review and my search.”
Of the two officer-involved shooting incidents for which
counsel provided documents, it appears those documents, which
consist of police reports, are not the entirety of what the trial
court had before it. The Pitchess hearing transcript refers, for
example, to a 160-page “investigation book” prepared by the
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department homicide bureau
pertaining to 11-2074, which is not before us. Regarding 12-3589,
the trial court referred to an investigation and its conclusions,
but no document reflecting such an investigation is before us.
The record is sufficient, however, for us to conclude there
was responsive information before the trial court that the court
should have disclosed to defendant. As discussed, defendant
sought information relevant to his contention that Benitez had
used excessive force against him, including shooting at him, and
defendant’s shooting at Benitez was in self-defense.

10
11-2074 and 12-3589 were prior incidents in which Benitez
discharged his firearm at a suspect. The trial court determined
those incidents were not subject to disclosure because, upon
review of the documentation before it, the court concluded the
shootings were justified and did not demonstrate excessive force.
Not disclosing these incidents was error. In Pitchess proceedings,
“Unsustained complaints are discoverable as well as sustained
complaints.” (Zamora, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 93, fn. 1.) The fact
that Benitez had fired at suspects on two prior occasions, whether
justified or unjustified, was relevant to defendant’s self-defense
claim and the court should have disclosed information pursuant
to Pitchess as to those prior incidents.
Reviewing the trial court’s description in the Pitchess
transcript of the incidents identified as 14-22 and 15-02, we
conclude those also were relevant to defendant’s self-defense
claim. 14-22 involved a complaint that Benitez had used
excessive force while handcuffing a suspect. 15-02 involved a
complaint from a jail inmate claiming that Benitez and other
officers had used excessive force in restraining the inmate. The
trial court concluded these incidents were not discoverable
because witnesses and video evidence demonstrated the
complaints were unfounded. Again, that these complaints may
have been unfounded was not a basis not to disclose information
required by Pitchess about those incidents. (Zamora, supra,
28 Cal.3d at p. 93, fn. 1.)8

8 As to the fifth incident reviewed by the trial court,
identified as 14-05, we agree it was not responsive to defendant’s
Pitchess request, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in not ordering its disclosure.

11
We note one other deficiency with the trial court’s Pitchess
review. “[I]n cases . . . where the custodian of records does not
produce the entire personnel file for the [trial] court’s [Pitchess]
review, he or she must establish on the record what documents or
category of documents were included in the complete personnel
file. In addition, if it is not readily apparent from the nature of
the documents that they are nonresponsive or irrelevant to the
discovery request, the custodian must explain his or her decision
to withhold them. Absent this information, the court cannot
adequately assess the completeness of the custodian’s review of
the personnel files, nor can it establish the legitimacy of the
custodian’s decision to withhold documents contained therein.”
(People v. Guevara (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 62, 69; accord, Sisson
v. Superior Court (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 24, 39.)
Here, it appears from the Pitchess transcript the trial court
reviewed only selected records provided by the custodian of
records rather than Benitez’s complete personnel file. The
custodian did not state for the record what other documents were
in the complete personnel file, and therefore the trial court could
not determine whether the custodian properly withheld those
additional documents, nor can we.
The remedy for Pitchess error is a conditional reversal,
remand for proper Pitchess proceedings, and an opportunity for
defendant to establish he was prejudiced by the denial of
discovery in advance of trial. (People v. Wycoff (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 410, 415.) If defendant “cannot establish that he
was prejudiced by the denial of discovery, the judgment shall be
reinstated as of that date.” (Id. at p. 416.)
In accordance with these principles, on remand the trial
court is directed to do the following. First, the court shall hold a

12
new Pitchess in camera hearing in which the Montebello Police
Department shall provide the court with all existing records
from Benitez’s personnel file concerning the incidents identified
as 11-2074, 12-3589, 14-22, and 15-02, including, if available, the
“investigation book” prepared by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department homicide bureau in regard to 11-2074, and any
documents concerning investigation of 12-3589. The trial court
should address in the first instance the Montebello Police
Department’s representation to this court that certain documents
provided in the original Pitchess hearing have since been purged.
Second, to the extent the custodian of records for the
Montebello Police Department does not provide the trial court
with Benitez’s complete personnel file, the custodian shall state
on the record during the in camera hearing what documents or
category of documents were included in the complete personnel
file. If it is not readily apparent from the nature of the
documents that they are nonresponsive or irrelevant to the
discovery request, the custodian must explain his or her decision
to withhold them. Should the court disagree with the custodian’s
decision to withhold certain documents, the court shall request
those documents be produced to the court for review.
Third, the court shall disclose to defendant the records
allowed under Evidence Code section 1045 concerning the
incidents identified as 11-2074, 12-3589, 14-22, and 15-02. If, as
explained in the previous paragraph, the court requests
additional documents from the custodian and determines those
documents are responsive to defendant’s Pitchess motion, the
court shall disclose those records as well, also subject to the
limitations in Evidence Code section 1045. We reiterate that the
trial court should not withhold information about these incidents

13
based on an investigating body’s or the trial court’s own
determination that the weight of the evidence does not
demonstrate excessive force or dishonesty. Even unfounded
complaints are subject to disclosure.9
Fourth, should the Montebello Police Department or
Benitez so move, the court “may make any order which justice
requires to protect the officer or agency from unnecessary
annoyance, embarrassment or oppression.” (Evid. Code, § 1045,
subd. (d).) The court also shall “order that the records disclosed
or discovered may not be used for any purpose other than a court
proceeding pursuant to applicable law.” (Id., subd. (e).)
Fifth, the court shall give defendant a reasonable
opportunity to investigate the disclosed material and
demonstrate prejudice, if any, namely a reasonable probability of
a different outcome had the evidence been disclosed in advance of
trial. (See People v. Fernandez (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 100, 123;
People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 181.) If defendant
demonstrates prejudice, the court shall order a new trial;
otherwise, the court shall reinstate the judgment. (Fernandez, at
p. 123.)

9 We note defendant already has had access to some
information regarding the incidents, because Lieutenant Kim’s
declaration filed with this court summarized the five incidents
addressed in the original Pitchess hearing. Further, when
counsel for the Montebello Police Department lodged the
documents concerning 11-2074 and 12-3589 with this court, the
proof of service indicated counsel also served the documents on
defendant’s appellate counsel. We express no opinion how these
disclosures affect the Pitchess proceedings on remand, a question
the trial court should address in the first instance.

14
B. The Trial Court Must Strike the Narcotics Offender
Registration Requirement
The trial court ordered defendant to register as a narcotics
offender when released. The parties agree Health and Safety
Code former sections 11590 and 11594, which codified the
narcotics offender registration requirement, were no longer in
effect at the time of defendant’s sentencing. (See People v. Pinedo
(2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 608, 613 [narcotics offender registration
requirement repealed effective Jan. 1, 2020], citing Stats. 2019,
ch. 580, §§ 1, 7–8.) Should the trial court reinstate the judgment
following further Pitchess proceedings, we direct the court to
amend the judgment to strike the registration requirement.

C. Defendant Is Entitled to Additional Credits
Defendant argues the trial court miscalculated his custody
and conduct credits. We agree.
Under section 2900.5, a defendant is entitled to credit for
all days spent in presentence custody including the day of
sentencing. (People v. Browning (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1410,
1412 (Browning).) Additional conduct credits are capped at
15 percent of custody credits for defendants convicted of specified
crimes including voluntary manslaughter. (§§ 667.5, subd. (c)(1);
2933.1, subd. (a).) The 15-percent calculation is rounded down to
“the largest whole number of days which d[o] not exceed
15 percent.” (People v. Ramos (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 810, 815;
accord, People v. Jacobs (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 67, 85.)
Here, the trial court calculated defendant’s days in custody
from his date of arrest on May 24, 2016 to his date of sentencing
on July 20, 2023. The court awarded him 2,613 days in custody

15
credit, and awarded him an additional 15 percent of that amount,
or 391 days, in conduct credit, for a total of 3,004 days.
Defendant correctly observes that, including the day of
sentencing (Browning, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1412), the
court should have awarded him 2,614 days in custody credit,
which in turn would entitle him to 392 days of conduct credit
(15 percent of 2,614), for a total of 3,006 days.
The Attorney General does not dispute the trial court failed
to include the day of sentencing in its custody calculation, but
argues defendant’s day of arrest was in fact May 26, 2016, citing
the trial testimony of a detective with the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department.
During sentencing, the trial court stated defendant was
arrested on May 24, 2016, a date the prosecution did not dispute.
The court’s finding was consistent with defendant’s probation
reports prepared February 21, 2017 and July 17, 2023, which also
listed May 24, 2016 as the date of arrest. We conclude the trial
court correctly determined the date of arrest was May 24, 2016.
Accordingly, should the trial court reinstate the judgment
following further Pitchess proceedings, defendant is entitled to
one additional day of custody credit and one additional day of
conduct credit.

D. The Trial Court Must Calculate Defendant’s Credits
for Case No. KA111445
As discussed, the trial court sentenced defendant not only
for the offenses at issue in the instant case, case No. KA112538,
but also for the offenses in case No. KA111445, the matter on
which defendant was out on bail when he committed the offenses
at issue in case No. KA112538. During the calculation of credits,
defense counsel stated he had not calculated credits for case

16
No. KA111445, and asked defendant if he spent any time in
custody in that case. Defendant said, “Probably 50 days.”
The trial court awarded no credits for case No. KA111445,
instead basing the credits award entirely on case No. KA112538.
The court stated, “In the event the court’s calculation is incorrect
given the defendant’s other case [i.e., case No. KA111445] . . . ,
the Department of Corrections can always send us a letter to
correct the custody credits.”
On appeal, defendant argues his date of arrest and the date
he was released on bail in case No. KA111445 can be determined
by examining the “ ‘criminal case access’ ” function on the trial
court’s public website, which he contends demonstrates he is
entitled to 76 days of custody credit and 38 days of conduct credit.
The Attorney General argues defendant is relying on evidence
not before the trial court at the time of sentencing, and suggests
we remand the matter for the trial court to consider defendant’s
calculation and supporting evidence. We agree with the Attorney
General the trial court should determine defendant’s entitlement
to credits in the first instance, and we direct the court to do so
upon remand.

17
DISPOSITION
The judgment is conditionally reversed, and the matter
remanded for further Pitchess proceedings as set forth in this
opinion. If defendant demonstrates prejudice from lack of
Pitchess disclosure, the trial court shall order a new trial;
otherwise it shall reinstate the judgment. Should the trial court
reinstate the judgment, it shall 1) strike the narcotics offender
registration requirement; 2) add one day of custody credit and
one day of conduct credit; 3) calculate and award credits in case
No. KA111445; and 4) forward the modified abstract of judgment
to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

M. KIM, J.

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