People v. Adams CA2/6

CourtListener 10304598Calctapp26 de dez. de 2024

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 12/26/24 P. v. Adams CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B331421
(Super. Ct. No. 23CR01423)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)

v.

JUSTIN CHRISTOPHER
ADAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Justin Christopher Adams appeals the judgment after a
jury convicted him of assault by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury (Pen. Code,1 §§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1) and
battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count 2). As
to count 1, the jury found true the allegation that Adams caused
great bodily injury. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) The trial court found
true that Adams suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds.

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
(d)(1) & (e)(1); 1170.12, subds. (b)(1) & (c)(1)) and a serious prior
felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). The court sentenced him to nine years
in state prison.
Adams contends the trial court erred by imposing
unreasonable time limits on jury voir dire, admitting evidence of
two prior bad acts, and denying his motion to dismiss his prior
strike. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Tristin Bartlett was a security guard for a private
company. He was patrolling an area in Isla Vista when he
contacted Adams and his girlfriend, Jenna Bennett, who were
sleeping under a gazebo in a park. Bartlett told them, “You need
to pack up your shit, and you need to go.” Adams “became very
aggressive, got up, . . . and started cussing, yelling, threatening.”
Adams threw a shoe at Bartlett. Bartlett then attempted to
pepper spray Adams, but the spray malfunctioned.
Bennett began yelling at Bartlett. She said Bartlett told
her, “Shut up or I’ll spray you, too.” Adams then “rushed”
Bartlett, punched him in the jaw, and tackled him to the ground.
Adams pinned Bartlett stomach-down on the ground and placed
him in a headlock. Adams repeatedly said, “You’re done.”
Bartlett managed to flip Adams on his back and placed him in a
chokehold. Bartlett released Adams after he indicated he was
“going to stop.”
Bartlett called the police. He had visible injuries to his
face, appeared to be in pain, and seemed “shaken up.” A CT scan
revealed Bartlett’s jaw was fractured. He required oral surgery
to remove an impacted wisdom tooth and his jaws were wired
together for about six weeks.

2
At trial, the prosecution presented evidence of two prior
bad acts—Adams’s prior conviction in 2012 for aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon (a knife) in Texas and an
uncharged assault in 2019. The evidence was proffered for the
limited purpose of proving motive, knowledge, lack of mistake, or
accident. The court gave a limiting instruction. The prosecution
presented certified records of Adams’s 2012 conviction, which
showed that he pleaded guilty to “intentionally or knowingly
caus[ing] bodily injury to [a person] by stabbing or cutting him
with a knife” and using a knife in the manner “capable of causing
death or serious bodily injury.” As to the 2019 offense, the
prosecution called Steven Goodvin to testify about an incident in
which he got into an argument with Adams over a bicycle and
Adams punched him in the jaw. Goodvin said he did not threaten
Adams. Adams broke Goodvin’s jaw, requiring emergency
surgery.
The jury found Adams guilty on both counts and found the
great bodily injury allegation true. The trial court denied
Adams’s Romero2 motion to dismiss his prior strike. It sentenced
him to nine years in state prison, consisting of six years on count
1 (the middle term of three years double for the prior strike) and
a consecutive three years for the great bodily injury enhancement
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The court stayed punishment on count 2
pursuant to section 654 and stayed the serious prior felony
enhancement (§ 667, subdivision (a)).

2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.)

3
DISCUSSION
Jury voir dire
Adams contends the trial court violated his Sixth
Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury when it imposed
unreasonable time limits on jury voir dire. We conclude
otherwise.
1. Relevant background
At a pretrial hearing, the trial court advised the parties
that it intended to give the parties 30 minutes on their initial
challenges for cause and then 15 minutes for each additional
round of voir dire. The court also told the parties, “I’ll also give
you the opportunity if you need an extra five minutes, you can
ask me for more time during any one of those, and I’m happy to
consider giving that [too]. [¶] And as long as you’re being efficient
and . . . things are going smoothly, I’m happy to give you time.”
The court clarified the parties would have “over an hour in total”
for voir dire and that it would take other factors into
consideration for extra time allowances.
a. First round of voir dire
Jury voir dire began on July 5, 2023. Before jury selection,
the trial court provided a questionnaire to prospective jurors.
After the first group of 18 prospective jurors were selected, the
court asked follow-up questions to anyone who answered “yes” to
any of the questionnaire. Both parties then had an opportunity
to ask questions subject to the time restrictions.
Defense counsel asked questions regarding homelessness,
security guards, and self-defense/defense of others. When
counsel’s 30 minutes expired, the trial court allowed counsel to
continue questioning a juror. The prosecutor then used her 30
minutes to ask the panel about witness credibility, self-defense,

4
security guards, and bias. The court gave the prosecutor “the
same extra two minutes” it gave defense counsel.
The trial court heard the parties’ challenges for cause
outside the presence of the jurors. Defense counsel challenged
three jurors for cause, two of which were stipulated to by the
prosecution. The court denied the three cause challenges because
it had “not heard enough” to excuse the jurors, and would allow
the parties to ask them additional questions. Defense counsel
replied, “I also do not think we’re getting enough time from Your
Honor. I think that the reason we’ve not been able to follow up is
because there’s not enough time.” The court responded, “I think
there’s different ways of conducting voir dire, and when you have
a time limit, it just frames the questions in a different manner.”
The prosecutor then challenged one juror for cause, which
the court denied. The court said, “And the next round, if you ask
it, when I say five minutes left, if you ask me for another five
minutes, I will most likely grant your request. But I’m not going
to give an unlimited hours after hours of examination, but if you
ask for more time, I will certainly consider it and most likely give
you extra time when you ask for it.”
Defense counsel again argued, “I believe that . . . currently
there is an inflexible or arbitrary time limit.” The court
responded, “Well, as I told you, you can ask for more time. I gave
you an extra two minutes and you didn’t ask for any extra time.
So there’s no inflexible policy. Had you asked me for more time, I
would have given you more time. But you didn’t ask for any.”
b. Second round of voir dire
When the jury returned, the parties exercised their
peremptory challenges, including one to excuse a juror the
defense had unsuccessfully challenged for cause. The court called

5
seven more jurors to the panel. After the trial court asked the
new prospective jurors some questions, the attorneys had 15
minutes each to ask questions. The court reminded the
attorneys, “if you’d like to ask for more time, go right ahead.”
Defense counsel asked the new prospective jurors some
questions and also asked one juror from a previous round
follow-up questions. Counsel requested more time, which the
court granted. The prosecutor was also given 20 minutes for
questioning.
c. Third round of voir dire
The next day, defense counsel again argued there were
unreasonable time limits in voir dire. Counsel asserted that
because of the court’s denial of the for cause challenge to a juror,
counsel used a peremptory challenge they would not have
otherwise used. The prosecutor agreed, arguing that “[b]oth sides
are not getting a fair trial, given that we cannot question the
jurors in detail.” The trial court denied these arguments and
concluded the parties were receiving a fair trial. The court
reasoned, “We’ve had all day to conduct voir dire yesterday.
Defense has had 52 minutes of questioning. People have had 52
minutes of questioning. We’re not finished with voir dire. By the
time we’re finished, both sides will have had over an hour of
questioning, in addition to the Court’s multiple hours of
questioning. That is far and above any—any discretionary terms,
length.”
Defense counsel challenged another juror for cause, and the
court granted the request. After another round of peremptory
challenges, the court called more jurors to the panel, and the
court and parties questioned the new jurors. When defense

6
counsel’s 20 minutes elapsed, the court allowed two extra
minutes.
d. Fourth round of voir dire
The court excused one juror for cause. The defense used
three additional peremptory challenges, including two to dismiss
jurors unsuccessfully challenged for cause. The court called
additional jurors to the panel, who were questioned by the court
and the parties. The court gave defense counsel 25 minutes for
questions. Defense counsel asked the jurors whether Adams’s
prior conviction would have an impact on their ability to fairly
assess the facts. The following colloquy occurred between defense
counsel and juror number 7:

“[Juror number 7]: . . . I think that . . . it would
affect my opinion of how I’m feeling about Mr.
Adams, probably, and that could . . . affect how I
would end up viewing the situation that he was
in . . . if the rules were to not [allow] that, I feel
like I could separate it. But I worry I wouldn’t
be able to. I worry it would tinge my opinion of
Mr. Adams, and therefore, it would affect how I
view everything he did. I worry that I wouldn’t
be able to separate out past actions from who he
is now. [¶] . . .[¶]

“[Defense counsel]: So even if the Judge were to
give you an instruction to say otherwise, . . .
would your gut tell you, “I still—it’s hard for me
to keep these two things separate right now”?

“[Juror number 7]: I would hope I would be able
to follow an instruction to disregard that. But
again, it’s hard . . . for me to know if that would
be tinging my current opinion. Like I could

7
assume an opinion I’m currently having is
formed purely by the facts and the current
situation. But that opinion is obviously tinged
by whatever I know about Mr. Adams. [¶] . . .[¶]

“I assume that’s a normal situation to be in,
where . . . everything we view or have opinions
on is in some way tinged by experience . . . . I
would hope I’d be able to separate them, . . . but
I can’t guarantee that because I don’t really
know how my mind works.”

When defense counsel asked if there was anyone concerned
about whether they could be fair and impartial, juror number 7
said, “[T]o the implicit bias point, I think I can. But . . . I don’t
know what I don’t know about myself. . . . I would try to strive to
be the fair juror I imagine I would want.”
Jurors number 8 and 10 also agreed that they did not know
if they could be fair and impartial because of implicit bias, but
they indicated they would do their “best.” During the
prosecutor’s questioning, jurors number 7, 8, and 10 indicated
they could follow the judge’s instructions.
Defense counsel challenged jurors number 7 and 10 for
cause. The trial court denied the challenges, noting they
indicated they could follow the court’s instructions. Defense
counsel used their last peremptory challenge to excuse juror
number 12. Juror number 7 was seated.
Outside the presence of the jurors, the trial court stated for
the record that it “complied with Code of Civil Procedure Section
223. The Court set a reasonable time limit. The Court was
flexible. The Court granted every request for additional time.
The Court provided the timelines before trial, advised both

8
counsel that they could ask for additional time. Only one time
. . . counsel asked for additional time, and the Court granted
that.” The court further stated, the “voir dire lasted over almost
two complete days, consisting of over eight hours of court time.
Only 38 jurors were interviewed. The Court granted 135 minutes
to both sides. The defense did not use 1 minute and 30 seconds
they had remaining . . . . The People had 5 minutes and 30
seconds . . . that were unused.” The court also noted it provided
questionnaires to the jurors and conducted “substantial voir dire
for hours to provide more information to both sides.” The court
also reviewed Code of Civil Procedure section 223, subdivision (c)
and noted “the defense only requested one additional time that
was granted by the Court. The trial does not present any unique
or complex legal items or factual elements. It’s a simple case
with simple charges. The length of the trial is short in
duration. . . . [I]t’s a one-defendant case. And the number of
witnesses is also low. . . . [T]he Court’s allocation of time is
appropriate based on the facts of this case.”
2. Analysis
A criminal defendant has a right to an impartial jury.
(U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) Code of Civil
Procedure section 223 governs jury voir dire and provides that
after the trial court’s initial questioning, “counsel for each party
shall have the right to examine, by oral and direct questioning,
any of the prospective jurors. The scope of the examination
conducted by counsel shall be within reasonable limits prescribed
by the trial judge in the judge’s sound discretion . . . . During any
examination conducted by counsel for the parties, the trial judge
shall permit liberal and probing examination calculated to
discover bias or prejudice with regard to the circumstances of the

9
particular case or the parties before the court.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).)
“The trial judge shall not impose specific unreasonable or
arbitrary time limits or establish an inflexible time limit policy
for voir dire. As voir dire proceeds, the trial judge shall permit
supplemental time for questioning based on individual responses
or conduct of jurors that may evince attitudes inconsistent with
suitability to serve as a fair and impartial juror in the particular
case.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).)
In exercising its “sound discretion,” the trial judge shall
consider: (1) The amount of time requested by trial counsel, (2)
any unique or complex legal or factual elements in the case,
(3) the length of trial, (4) the number of parties, and (5) the
number of witnesses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 223, subd. (c).) The trial
court “has a duty to restrict voir dire within reasonable bounds to
expedite the trial.” (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 536.)
It has “considerable discretion in ‘the manner in which voir dire
is conducted.’ ” (People v. Debose (2014) 59 Cal.4th 177, 194.) We
review a trial court’s limitations on voir dire for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1246.)
In our view, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing time limits on voir dire. For each panel of prospective
jurors, the trial judge provided a questionnaire and conducted the
initial examination of the prospective jurors “to provide more
information to both sides.” (See People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th
569, 589 (Leon) [no abuse of discretion in setting time limits
where oral questioning was brief, but, combined with the jury
questionnaire, gave the defendant adequate information to make
informed decisions on peremptory or for cause challenges].) After
the initial examination by the court, the court granted both
parties 30 minutes for the first round of voir dire and about 20

10
minutes for each subsequent round. In total, it granted 135
minutes per side for voir dire. Jury selection lasted almost two
full days with four panels of prospective jurors.
The record reflects the trial court’s time limits were not
capricious. It repeatedly told the parties that if they needed more
time, they could request it, and the court would likely grant it.
Defense counsel was granted an extra five minutes upon request.
The court also granted counsel additional time even though it
was not expressly requested. (See People v. Avila, supra, 38
Cal.4th at p. 536 [the court’s “willingness to permit additional
time for counsel-conducted voir dire upon a showing of good cause
ameliorated any potential concern that the limitation would
somehow be unfair or violate the right to an impartial jury”].)
The trial court also considered all the factors under Code of
Civil Procedure section 223, subdivision (c) in setting the time
limits. The court considered and granted additional time
requested by the defense, the case did not present any unique or
complex legal or factual elements, the trial was short in length
(five days excluding voir dire), it was a “one-defendant case,” and
the number of witnesses were “low.” We conclude the court’s
time limitations do not fall outside the bounds of reason.
Adams nevertheless contends the time restrictions resulted
in the exhaustion of his peremptory challenges and accepting a
jury that was not fair or impartial. He asserts that juror number
7, who indicated bias based on Adams’s prior conviction, was left
on the jury because of the unreasonable time limits. But, as we
concluded, the time limits for questioning were not unreasonable,
arbitrary, or inflexible. The trial judge allowed sufficient time for
the parties to conduct an “examination calculated to discover [a
juror’s] bias or prejudice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 223, subd. (b)(1).)

11
After each voir dire round, the parties made several challenges
for cause, some of which were granted. And, when a challenge for
cause was denied, the parties were allowed to ask additional
questions with the option for extra time.
Even if the time limitations on voir dire deprived Adams of
the ability to fully probe juror 7’s purported bias or prejudice,
Adams must show such deprivation resulted in a miscarriage of
justice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 223, subd. (g).) “ ‘Unless the voir dire
“is so inadequate that the reviewing court can say that the
resulting trial was fundamentally unfair, the manner in which
voir dire is conducted is not a basis for reversal.” [Citations.]’
[Citation.]” (Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 589.) Adams contends
his trial was fundamentally unfair because juror number 7
remained on the panel. But Adams does not demonstrate juror
number 7 was biased. Juror 7 stated they could follow the
limiting instruction about prior convictions, stating, “I know I can
follow instructions.” Voir dire was also adequate as counsel
extensively questioned the jurors, including juror 7, regarding
Adams’s prior conviction and its impact on their ability to fairly
assess the facts.
The court rejected Adams’s challenge for cause because it
found that juror 7 acknowledged their implicit bias and engaged
in a “fairly philosophical, hypothetical, kind of academic
discussion” of it, but the juror ultimately said they could follow
the court’s instructions. Adams does not contest the court’s
ruling on this for cause challenge, nor do we find error in the
court’s reasoning. Adams also does not suggest any further
questioning of juror number 7 was necessary or that he had
inadequate time to question them. (See People v. Asbury (2016) 4
Cal.App.5th 1222, 1230 [there is no miscarriage of justice if the

12
defendant does not explain what additional questions over and
above what he already asked would have ferreted out bias].)
Based on this record, we conclude there was no miscarriage of
justice.
Prior bad acts
Adams further contends the trial court erred when it
admitted evidence of Adams’s 2012 prior conviction for
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and a 2019 uncharged
assault. Even if the court erred, we conclude that any such error
was harmless.
A trial court’s evidentiary errors do not require reversal
unless it is reasonably probable that the defendant would have
obtained a different result absent the errors. (People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; see People v. Johnson (2022) 12
Cal.5th 544, 611 (Johnson) [admission of uncharged crimes
evidence]; People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 227 [admission
of evidence under Evid. Code, § 352].) No such reasonable
probability exists here.
The prior bad acts evidence was not a significant part of the
prosecution’s case. (See Johnson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 611.)
The evidence of the 2012 prior conviction consisted only of a
five-page court record, and the prosecutor did not mention it
during closing argument. (See People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th
346, 371 [evidence not unduly prejudicial where the evidence was
presented quickly, and the parties did not dwell on it].) The
testimony regarding the 2019 uncharged assault on Goodvin and
the prosecutor’s discussion of the evidence in closing argument
was also brief. (Ibid.) The prosecution largely focused on
Bartlett’s testimony as well as the inconsistencies of Bennett’s
testimony and Adam’s self-defense theory.

13
Moreover, the trial court gave a limiting instruction on how
the jury could consider the prior bad acts evidence (CALCRIM
No. 375), reducing the danger that jurors would be misled. “ ‘We
must assume, contrary to defendant’s theory of prejudice, that
the jury obeyed the express language of the instruction not to use
the other-crimes evidence to establish defendant’s character or
his disposition to commit crimes.’ [Citation.]” (Johnson, supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 612.)
The evidence of Adams’s guilt was also overwhelming. (See
People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 439.) The evidence
supported the prosecutor’s theory that Adams “snapped” and
reacted out of anger rather than self-defense. When Bartlett told
him to leave the park, Adams got angry and aggressive. Bartlett
testified that Adams “rushed” him and punched him in the jaw
with such force that it broke and required surgery. Furthermore,
evidence that the pepper spray malfunctioned undercut Adams’s
claim of imminent danger justifying self-defense or defense of
others. Bartlett testified the pepper spray deployed a stream less
than a foot in length, and Adams was standing further away.
The deputies also did not detect the odor of pepper spray on
Adams nor any visible signs of it on his clothing or eyes.
Accordingly, we find no reasonable probability the verdict would
have been more favorable to Adams had the court excluded
evidence of the prior bad acts.
Senate Bill No. 81
Adams also contends the trial court should have dismissed
his prior strike pursuant to section 1385, as amended by Senate
Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). But Senate Bill No. 81 applies
to enhancements, not an alternative sentencing scheme such as
the Three Strikes law (§ 1170.12). (People v. Burke (2023) 89

14
Cal.App.5th 237, 242-244.) We agree with Burke and conclude
Senate Bill No. 81’s amendments to section 1385 do not apply to
sentences imposed under the Three Strikes law. (Burke, at pp.
242-244.)
Romero motion
Adams contends the trial court erred when it denied his
Romero motion to dismiss his prior strike for the 2012 aggravated
assault conviction. He contends the trial court did not properly
consider all the relevant factors in favor of dismissing the strike,
including his mental health issues. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s exercise of discretion to dismiss a
prior violent or serious felony conviction for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374.) “[A] trial court
does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at
p. 377.) Dismissal of a strike is warranted if “in light of the
nature and circumstances of [the] present felonies and prior
serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of
his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be
deemed outside the scheme’s spirit.” (People v. Williams (1998)
17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) We conclude these factors did not mandate
dismissal of Adams’s prior strike conviction.
The record demonstrates the trial court was aware of its
discretion and considered mitigating factors. The court
considered Adams’s sentencing brief, the parties’ oral arguments,
and the probation report. Adams argued mitigating
circumstances, including his mental health issues and childhood
trauma, warranted a dismissal of the strike. The probation
report included Adams’s criminal history and information about
his mental health and substance abuse issues. It also set forth

15
all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in this case,
and it recommended imposition of the upper term for a total of 16
years. The court found five circumstances in aggravation: that
Adams engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger
to society, his prior convictions were increasing in seriousness, he
served a prior prison term, he was on probation at the time of the
offense, and his prior probation was unsatisfactory. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1)-(5).) It found three circumstances in
mitigation: that Adams was suffering a mental condition that
significantly had an effect on him, there were multiple
enhancements alleged in a single case, and his prior conviction
was over five years old. (Id., rule 4.423(b)(2), (11), (13).) The
court remarked that it hoped Adams would “express more
remorse and more concern for the victim.” In balancing all the
circumstances, the court denied the motion to dismiss the strike
prior, but stated that it would give Adams “some leniency” by
selecting the middle term, staying the five-year prior, and not
imposing the requested maximum sentence of 16 years. On this
record, we cannot say the court abused its discretion.
Adams contends the strike, which was 11 years old at the
time of sentencing, was too remote in time. In considering a
Romero motion, the court may consider the age of the prior
offenses. (People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1141.) But
remoteness in time is an insufficient basis to dismiss a strike
where the defendant has not had “a crime-free cleansing period of
rehabilitation” but instead “has led a continuous life of crime
after the prior.” (People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809,
813 [reversing dismissal of 20-year-old strike]; People v. Pearson
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 740, 749-750 [strikes 24, 15, and 10 years
old properly imposed].) Here, after his prior strike conviction,

16
Adams received probation, violated it, and was sent to prison.
From 2017 to 2022, he also committed eight misdemeanors. He
was also on probation at the time he committed the present
offense.
Adams also contends the trial court failed to consider his
youthful age (22 years old) at the time he committed the strike
offense. But we presume the court considered all relevant
factors, even if it did not expressly mention them. (People v.
Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.) Moreover, Adams’s
youthful age does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance
that places him outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law,
especially considering his continuous criminal history. (See
People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th 378-379.)
Lastly, Adams contends the trial court impermissibly
considered lack of remorse as an aggravating factor. However,
because Adams did not object at trial, the contention is forfeited.
(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353.) But even on the
merits, the court’s consideration of Adam’s lack of remorse was
permissible. “In deciding whether to strike a prior felony
conviction, a court must consider factors that are intrinsic to the
Three Strikes law’s sentencing scheme, including the defendant’s
‘background, character, and prospects,’ but it may not consider
factors extrinsic to the scheme, like ‘the mere desire to ease court
congestion or . . . bare antipathy to the consequences for any
given defendant.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Nunez (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 362, 372.) Here, it appears the court considered
Adams’s lack of remorse “as relevant to his character, future
prospects, and improbability of rehabilitation, not as a result of
any sort of antipathy toward [Adams].” (Id. at pp. 372-373).

17
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

CODY, J.

18
Michael J. Carrozzo, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.