People v. Bruno CA3

CourtListener 10298409Calctapp20 de dez. de 2024

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Filed 12/20/24 P. v. Bruno CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C099699

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 98F03946)

v.

NATHAN CLAY BRUNO,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Nathan Clay Bruno was convicted in 1999 of attempted murder, assault
with a deadly weapon, battery with serious bodily injury, and misdemeanor possession of
a dagger. In 2023, pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75, the trial court recalled her
sentence to dismiss a subsequently voided prior prison term enhancement.1 Defendant
further moved the trial court to dismiss her prior strike convictions pursuant to People v.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) and section 1385. She now
appeals from the resentencing, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in denying her
Romero motion. Anticipating we would conclude defendant forfeited her claim on
appeal, she alternatively argues defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel. We disagree and will affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND2
A. Factual and Procedural History of 1999 Conviction
In May 1998, the victim, J.B., was drinking beers with two other people at a table
in a park. Defendant approached and “hover[ed] over” them. They asked defendant to
leave and began arguing with defendant. Defendant and J.B. wrestled on the ground.
J.B. walked away, but defendant grabbed J.B.’s hair with one hand and cut J.B.’s throat
with the other. The cut, which damaged a nerve and severed small blood vessels, was
approximately five inches long and half an inch deep. When J.B. raised his hand to stop
defendant from cutting him again, defendant cut J.B.’s hand, severing tendons in his
hand.
An amended information charged defendant with attempted murder (§§ 664/187,
subd. (a)—count one) of J.B., assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)—count
two), battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)—count three), and misdemeanor
possession of a dagger (former § 12020, subd. (a)—count four). The amended
information alleged a prior strike conviction for assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)) in 1982, a prior serious felony conviction and prior strike conviction for assault
with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)) in 1985, and a prior serious felony conviction for

2 We take portions of the factual and procedural background from the record in
defendant’s prior appeal in case No. C034540, which we incorporated at defendant’s
request.

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assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) in 1995.3 The amended information
also alleged defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury as to counts one, two, and
three.
A jury found defendant guilty of all counts and found true all allegations of
personal infliction of great bodily injury. During bifurcated proceedings, the trial court
found true allegations defendant had sustained prior convictions for assault with a deadly
weapon in 1982, 1985, and 1995.
B. Sentencing for 1999 Conviction
At sentencing, the trial court stated it reviewed the probation report, which
described defendant’s personal and criminal history. Defendant’s juvenile adjudications
included: inhalation of toluene (§ 381) twice in 1980; assault by means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)) in 1980, in which defendant kicked a
victim; and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245) in 1981, in which defendant stabbed a
14-year-old victim in the chest with a knife. In 1982, defendant suffered her last juvenile
adjudication and first strike offense for assault with a deadly weapon when she chased the
victim from a park while armed with a knife, causing the escaping victim to narrowly
avoid being struck by a car. In 1985, defendant was convicted of her second strike for
assault with a deadly weapon based on hitting the victim on the back of the neck and the
back with a metal panel because the victim asked her to leave a club where she was
disturbing the patrons. The report also included the following adult convictions: second
degree burglary (§ 459) in 1989; possession of hypodermic syringes (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 4149) in 1991; and vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851) in 1993. Defendant reported
experimenting with marijuana and methamphetamine five years before she was convicted

3 At sentencing, the trial court determined that the prior conviction in 1995 could not be
used for the purposes of a prior strike or a prior serious felony conviction per the plea
agreement in that case.

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of the instant offenses and denied using any other controlled substances. She also denied
suffering any serious psychological or psychiatric illnesses but reported taking
medications “for nerves.”
Defense counsel requested the trial court exercise its discretion to strike at least
one of defendant’s prior strike convictions. Defense counsel argued both the 1982 and
the 1985 prior strike convictions were remote in time. Further, defense counsel asserted
the court should consider defendant’s mental health issues.
In denying defendant’s Romero motion in the initial sentencing, the trial court
found “disturbing” and “particularly brutal” that defendant had cut J.B.’s throat by
pulling his head back, exposing his throat, and slitting it. The court recounted that in the
1982 prior strike conviction defendant had chased a victim through a park for no apparent
reason, and in the 1985 prior strike conviction, she had struck a victim simply because
the victim didn’t want defendant in the same club. The court concluded, “What’s
disturbing about [defendant] is that [she] has a history for this kind of conduct” and
“minor things can provoke [her].” The court sentenced defendant to the upper term of 27
years to life for count one and a consecutive three years for its attendant great bodily
injury enhancement, a concurrent 100 days in jail for count four, a consecutive five-year
term for a prior serious felony conviction, and a consecutive one-year term for a prior
prison term (former § 667.5, subd. (b)).4
Defendant appealed, arguing defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel in failing to request “expanded” jury instructions on eyewitness identification. A
different panel of this court affirmed the judgment. (People v. Bruno (Apr. 27, 2001,
C034540) [nonpub. opn.] [affirming judgment].)

4 There is an amended abstract of judgment filed on May 4, 2001, modifying the
sentence on count one to 25 years to life nunc pro tunc to July 26, 1999. The record does
not indicate the basis for the modification.

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C. Resentencing
In June 2023, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified
defendant as someone eligible for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75.5 In the
context of that resentencing, defendant again requested the court strike her prior strike.
She asserted her age, participation in rehabilitative programs, and maturation during her
25 years in state prison placed her outside the spirit of the “Three Strikes” law.
Defendant also argued the court should consider any mitigating factors, such as her
learning disability, in considering her Romero motion. In addition to her Romero motion,
defendant requested the court impose 25 years to life on count one, dismiss the prior
prison term enhancement, and stay all remaining counts and enhancements. Defendant
attached certificates of achievement and completion in rehabilitative and educational
courses to her resentencing brief.
In response, the People argued the violence of the instant offense weighed against
dismissing any of defendant’s prior strike convictions. The People attached the probation
report and records of over 20 rules violation reports during defendant’s incarceration.
Four of the violations involved fighting or mutual combat in 2000, 2007, 2011, and 2018.
In the 2007 incident, defendant’s cellmate alleged she tried to stab the cellmate with a
pencil and caused a bloody abrasion on the cellmate’s face. Clinical staff noted that
though defendant had a mental disorder, it did not contribute to the violations. And
although defendant had a low mental function score, the reports did not indicate whether
it contributed to the violations either.

5 Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) added section
1172.75 (formerly § 1171.1) (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12, eff. June 30, 2022), which
requires that, subject to certain inapplicable exceptions, for any judgment including a
prior prison term enhancement pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b), the trial court
shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.

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After reviewing the parties’ briefs and the court file, which included the probation
report, the original sentencing transcript, and the denial of defendant’s original Romero
motion, the trial court heard argument on defendant’s new Romero motion. Defense
counsel submitted on the briefing. Based on the transcript from the initial sentencing, the
court found in the instant offenses, defendant grabbed the victim’s hair, violently pulled
back his head, and viciously sliced his throat, and in the prior strike offenses, defendant
displayed “issues controlling anger” and a “violent tendency or streak.” Additionally,
defendant committed another serious and violent offense that was not used as a prior
strike. Finding defendant “had a long history of extremely violent behavior,” the court
declined to strike any of her prior strike convictions.
The trial court then gave the parties another opportunity to speak before it
pronounced the sentence. Defense counsel asked the court to consider defendant’s
childhood trauma and hardship as a transgender woman as mitigating factors and asked
the court to strike or stay the enhancements. The court acknowledged defendant’s
successful completion of rehabilitative programs but stated her rule violations leading up
to “the most recent serious violation” in 2018 outweighed any mitigating factors. The
court specifically noted some rules violations involved possession of pills, manufacturing
of alcohol, and “allegations of violence including an allegation of stabbing an inmate.”
The court found her coping mechanisms of self-medicating and fighting demonstrated
she would be a danger to the public if she were released. Thus, the court declined to
strike the five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancement.
The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life on count one, plus a
consecutive three years for its attendant great bodily injury enhancement and a
consecutive five years for the prior serious felony conviction enhancement. The court
struck the prior prison term enhancement imposed under former section 667.5,
subdivision (b), and stayed all remaining counts and their attendant enhancements.

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II. DISCUSSION
On appeal,6 defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
consider and adequately weigh relevant mitigating factors, and alternatively argues
defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to proffer evidence of all the
mitigating factors. The People respond defendant has forfeited her claim on appeal, and
regardless, the court did not abuse its discretion. We agree with the People that
defendant forfeited her claim and further conclude she has not met her burden to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel.
A. Forfeiture
As an initial matter, we conclude defendant forfeited her claim on appeal because
she did not argue the trial court’s articulated reasons for denying her Romero motion
were insufficient at resentencing. “[C]omplaints about the manner in which the trial
court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356.) This
applies to claims the trial court cited insufficient or inapplicable reasons in support of its
sentencing choices. (Id. at p. 353, fn. 16; accord, People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363,
406.) When the resentencing court addressed the Romero motion, defense counsel
submitted on the briefing and then did not object to the denial of the motion on the basis
of any mitigating factors. Rather, when the court gave defense counsel an opportunity to
raise any issues before pronouncing the sentence, counsel raised other mitigating factors
in support of dismissing or staying the enhancements. To avoid forfeiture, an objection

6 To the extent defendant argues the provisions of section 1385, subdivision (c), apply to
her prior strikes, she is incorrect. (People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 244
[§ 1385, subd. (c)’s “provisions regarding enhancements do not apply to the Three
Strikes law”].)

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must be “sufficiently specific” so as “to give the trial court a meaningful opportunity to
correct any sentencing errors.” (People v. De Soto (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1, 8, 9.)
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court did not consider or adequately weigh
the mitigating factors at resentencing. However, because defense counsel did not object
to the court’s denial of the Romero motion with sufficient specificity to alert the court to
clarify or reassess its sentencing choice, defendant has forfeited her claim on appeal.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant contends she received ineffective assistance because her counsel failed
to argue for and proffer evidence of all the mitigating factors she now identifies on
appeal. To establish constitutionally inadequate representation, the defendant must show
that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) While defendant
argues there was no tactical reason for defense counsel’s failure, she does not argue there
is a reasonable probability of a different result but for that failure. A reviewing court
may reject a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without addressing both
components if a defendant makes an insufficient showing as to either prong. (Id. at p.
697.) Here, we conclude defendant does not meet her burden to establish prejudice, and
thus her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
To prove prejudice, the defendant “must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)
Prejudice must be a demonstrable reality established based on facts in the record, not
simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of counsel. (People v.
Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 933; People v. Montoya (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1139,
1151.) When a defendant challenges a sentence, the question is “whether there is a
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the [court] . . . would have concluded that
the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances” did not warrant the sentence

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imposed. (Strickland, supra, at p. 695.)
When deciding whether to dismiss a prior strike allegation, a trial court determines
whether the defendant falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. (People v.
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) To make this determination, the trial court
considers (1) the nature and circumstances of the present felony, (2) the nature and
circumstances of the prior strike offenses, and (3) the particulars of the defendant’s
background, character, and prospects for the future. (Ibid.) We review a decision
declining to dismiss a prior strike allegation for abuse of discretion and, in the absence of
an affirmative record to the contrary, we presume the trial court considered all relevant
factors. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375, 378.)
Here, the record indicates the trial court was aware of and considered the pertinent
factors, which included the mitigating factors defendant asserts weighed in favor of
striking her prior strikes. The documents the court stated it had reviewed—including the
original sentencing transcript, the probation report, and the parties’ briefs—indicated
defendant’s youth at the time of the 1982 prior strike, the remoteness of the 1985 prior
strike, her mental illness, her learning disability and low functioning, her history of drug
use, completion of rehabilitative programs, and that her most recent rule violation in
custody occurred approximately five years previously. Accordingly, we presume the trial
court considered these mitigating factors, regardless of defense counsel’s failure to
specifically raise them at sentencing, and the record does not rebut that presumption.
Further, those same documents included a list and description of defendant’s “long
history of extremely violent behavior,” which the trial court referred to when it denied
her Romero motion. Including the offense that led to her 1999 conviction, defendant had
four convictions based on violently assaulting other people, three of them involving use
of a deadly weapon. While in custody, defendant continued to engage in fighting and
attempted to stab another inmate. Although defendant received mental health services
while incarcerated, the administrative rules violations did not indicate defendant’s mental

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disorder or her low mental functioning contributed to the violations. Given defendant’s
history of violence, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding she fell within the
spirit of the Three Strikes law despite any mitigating factors. Because we conclude the
court did not err in denying her Romero motion, defendant has not shown she was
prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to specifically raise and provide evidence of the
mitigating factors. Thus, defendant’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/S/

RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

EARL, P. J.

/S/

BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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