CourtListener 10298408•People v. Dillard CA3
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Filed 12/20/24 P. v. Dillard CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C100658
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CR62963)
v.
ROYE DILLARD,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant Roye Dillard guilty of the 1981 first degree premeditated
murder of G.T. after kidnapping her from a convalescent hospital and raping her with a
foreign object. He received life without the possibility of parole, and this court affirmed
the judgment on appeal. (See People v. Dillard (Apr. 11, 1985, C012988) [nonpub. opn.]
(Dillard).)
Defendant now appeals an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6 (statutory section citations that follow are to the Penal Code unless
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otherwise stated) at the prima facie stage after the trial court concluded defendant was
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because the jury’s verdicts and the jury
instructions showed defendant was the actual killer who acted with a premeditated and
deliberate intent to kill. Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, asking this
court to independently review the record to determine if there are any arguable errors that
would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.
Defendant filed a supplemental brief arguing: (1) that insufficient evidence
supported the jury’s burglary and kidnapping special circumstance findings; and (2) that
the special circumstances did not preclude section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law.
We note that appointed counsel’s brief also states that defendant appeals from a
request for resentencing under section 1172.1. The notice of appeal, however, states only
that defendant appeals from the “[d]enial of resentencing under Penal Code section
1172.6.” Neither counsel nor defendant argue the court erred under section 1172.1, and
we can locate no such request in the record on appeal. We therefore do not address
section 1172.1 further.
Having considered defendant’s supplemental brief in accordance with Delgadillo,
we affirm the trial court’s order.
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
We summarize the pertinent facts from our prior opinion in Dillard, supra,
C012988, affirming defendant’s conviction. We do not rely upon this factual summary in
reaching our decision, but instead paraphrase it to give context to our discussion.
A. The Crimes and Convictions
In 1981, defendant worked the day shift as a cook at a convalescent hospital where
the 92 or 93-year-old victim, G.T., was a resident. (See generally Dillard, supra,
C012988.) At the time, defendant lived with J.G., a nursing assistant employed at the
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same hospital and she let him drive her car, a 1972 Chevrolet. Defendant abruptly quit
after being seen one night around 1:30 a.m. in street clothing in the hospital walking
towards the south hall where G.T.’s room was located.
On the morning of November 8, 1981, defendant drove J.G. to the hospital in her
car. J.G. quit later that morning and had to walk home after she was unable to reach
defendant for a ride. After dropping J.G. off, defendant had driven to visit another
woman, P.L. Defendant and P.L. spent the day together. That afternoon, defendant called
J.G. several times to tell her he would be home later, at one point claiming he had locked
the keys in the car so he would be late. Defendant dropped P.L. off at her home sometime
between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m. and left shortly thereafter. Around that same time, defendant
called J.G. and told her he would be on his way soon. J.G. went to bed after receiving
defendant’s last phone call.
Sometime between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m., a nurse’s aide at the hospital heard a
sliding glass door open and she saw the hand of a black person moving the drapes. She
reported the incident to another nurse. While checking the hospital for intruders, another
aide observed a car, which she believed looked similar to a 1968 Chevrolet, leaving the
hospital parking lot with its lights off. At approximately 10:20 p.m., staff heard screams
from the direction of the south hall and heard a fire door slam shut. G.T. had been
abducted from her room; the perpetrator had gained access to the room through an open
window. After hearing the screams, several aides observed a car leaving the parking lot,
and the aide who had seen the car earlier after the “hand incident” said it was the same
car that left both times.
Around 11:00 p.m., J.G. awoke to defendant washing himself in their bathroom.
He left again to get cigarettes and was gone for about 20 or 30 minutes; when he
returned, he had no cigarettes. Defendant went to bed and was awakened when police
investigating G.T.’s disappearance came to his apartment door around midnight.
Defendant denied knowing anything about her disappearance. Although J.G. told officers
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her car had not been driven, officers noticed that the car, which generally matched the
description of the car seen leaving the hospital parking lot, was still warm and an interior
dome light was on. A rag seen inside the car appeared to have a blood-like substance on
it. Officers returned to defendant’s apartment, but neither defendant nor J.G. would
answer the door. According to J.G., defendant prevented her from opening the door.
Defendant eventually opened the door and he and J.G. were arrested. A few hours later,
G.T. was discovered dead in a vacant lot near defendant’s apartment; she had been
severely beaten and the inside of her vagina had been penetrated by a blunt instrument
that caused tears or lacerations.
Latent fingerprints found on the window screen as well as on G.T.’s window
matched defendant’s and a footprint on the windowsill matched the pattern of the shoes
defendant had been wearing the night of the crimes. Hair consistent with G.T.’s was
found in J.G.’s car and a blood stain soaked in the car seat was consistent with G.T.’s
blood type; blood found on the shirt defendant was wearing that night matched G.T.’s and
fibers from defendant’s shirt were found on G.T.’s hospital gown. Defendant later
attempted to have both J.G. and P.L. change their statements regarding the times he
dropped P.L. off and returned home to J.G. the night of the murder. At trial, defendant’s
defense was diminished capacity; he claimed he drank and smoked marijuana and could
not remember the incident.
A jury rejected the diminished capacity defense and found defendant guilty of
committing premeditated and deliberate first degree murder (§ 187). It also found true
the special circumstances that defendant committed the murder during a robbery and
during a kidnapping (§ 190.2, subds. (17)(ii), 17(vii)). Defendant was also found guilty
of first degree burglary (§ 459), kidnapping (§ 207), and rape with a foreign object
(§ 289). Defendant admitted having three prior felony convictions for which he had
served two prior prison terms. He received life without the possibility of parole for the
murder consecutive to a determinate term of 10 years for the remaining offenses.
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B. Petition for Resentencing
In October 2022, defendant petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6,
asserting he could no longer be convicted of murder after changes made by Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) to sections 188 and 189. The court
appointed him counsel.
The People opposed the petition, arguing defendant was ineligible for relief as a
matter of law because the record of conviction showed the jury found he committed the
murder with premeditation and deliberation and was not instructed on aiding and abetting
or the natural and probable consequences doctrine; thus, the jury necessarily found that
defendant personally committed the murder with malice aforethought and malice was not
imputed to defendant. They attached copies of this court’s opinion in Dillard, supra,
C012988, as well as jury instructions from its own files (apparently the majority of the
trial court’s files had been purged), including CALJIC No. 8.20 regarding premeditation
and deliberation.
In reply, defendant argued he had made a sufficient prima facie case to proceed to
a show cause hearing. Defendant also objected to the court relying on the factual
summary in Dillard, supra, C012988, at the prima facie stage of review.
The People filed a supplemental response that attached an excerpt of the reporter’s
transcript in which the trial court directed the clerk to read to the jury the information
charging defendant in the case. Defendant filed a supplemental reply arguing that it was
unclear whether the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.20, and that the trial court
could not rely on Dillard, supra, C012988, to conclude the instruction had in fact been
given; the only permissible use of Dillard, according to defendant, was to consider its
procedural history of the case.
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C. Prima Facie Hearing
At the prima facie hearing, defense counsel argued that the jury was instructed on
the felony-murder rule, making defendant prima facie eligible for relief, and that whether
CALJIC No. 820 on premeditation and deliberation was given was a factual question that
the trial court could not resolve at the prima facie stage. Defense counsel’s argument
centered on the fact that the copy of CALJIC No. 8.20 submitted by the prosecution from
its own files (since the trial court’s records had been purged) did not include any check
marks showing it was “[g]iven,” “[g]iven as modified,” [or] “[r]efused.” (Internal
capitalization omitted.)
The prosecution argued that the decision in Dillard made clear that CALJIC No.
820 was given at trial as the parties argued about the premeditation and deliberation
instructions and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s finding on that point.
Moreover, the information, as read by the trial court clerk to the jury, showed that
defendant was the lone perpetrator charged with G.T.’s murder and that he proffered a
diminished capacity defense, which would only apply to a person who actually killed the
victim.
After taking the matter under submission, the trial court issued a written ruling
denying the petition. In doing so, the court relied on Dillard, supra, C012988, as part of
the record of conviction, but noted it would not engage in improper factfinding based on
the opinion. According to Dillard, the jury specifically found the murder was committed
with premeditation and deliberation after being instructed with CALJIC No. 8.20. Under
CALJIC No. 8.20 as given, the jury was told in part that if it found G.T.’s killing was
“preceded and accomplished by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to
kill, which was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been
formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other
condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it is murder of the first degree.” Thus,
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based on the instructions given and the jury’s verdict regarding premeditation and
deliberation, the trial court determined that the jury found defendant was the actual killer
who acted with a deliberate intent to kill, making defendant ineligible for relief as a
matter of law.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
The independent review procedures outlined in People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d
at pages 442 through 443 are not constitutionally required in an appeal from a
postconviction order denying a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing. (People v.
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 222, 224-225.) But where, like here, a defendant has
been notified that his appeal may be dismissed pursuant to Delgadillo, and he files a
supplemental brief raising various issues he wants considered, we must evaluate the
specific arguments presented in the defendant’s supplemental brief. (Id. at pp. 228-232.)
However, we are not required to independently review the record, although we may
exercise our discretion to do so. (Ibid.)
A. Applicable Legal Principles
Before turning to the issues defendant raises in his supplemental brief, we briefly
outline the statutory scheme governing resentencing petitions. In its current form, section
1172.6 applies to those convicted of murder based on a felony-murder theory, the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory of imputed malice. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a).) To be eligible for relief, the petitioner must make a prima facie showing that
he could not presently be convicted of murder under changes to these theories of murder
liability made effective on January 1, 2019, by Senate Bill 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.).
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) “As relevant here, Senate Bill 1437 significantly limited the
scope of the felony-murder rule to effectuate the Legislature’s declared intent ‘to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
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with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted
with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-
708 (Strong).)
At the prima facie stage, the trial court may deny a resentencing petition only if
the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708.) This is a pure question of law we review de novo. (People v. P.L. (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) While the trial court may look to the record of conviction after
appointing defense counsel, the prima facie inquiry “is limited.” (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 971-972.) At this early stage, the trial court should not engage in
factfinding that involves the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion. (Id. at
p. 972.) “ ‘However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts
refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a
credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 971.) An appellate
opinion is generally considered to be part of the record of conviction, although it may not
supply all answers. (Id. at p. 972.)
With these principles in mind, we consider the arguments contained in defendant’s
supplemental brief.
B. Analysis
Defendant first asserts insufficient evidence supports the jury’s true finding on the
burglary-murder and kidnapping-murder special circumstances. This issue was already
decided adversely to defendant in Dillard, supra, C012988 and, in any event, defendant’s
sufficiency of the evidence claim is not cognizable in an appeal from an order denying a
resentencing petition under section 1172.6. (See People v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th
428, 438 [section 1172.6 “does not permit a petitioner to establish eligibility on the basis
of alleged trial error”].)
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Defendant next asserts that under our Supreme Court’s decision in Strong, the
jury’s pre-Banks1 and pre-Clark2 special circumstance findings do not render him
ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. (Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 710 [“[f]indings issued by a jury before Banks and Clark do not preclude
a defendant from making out a prima facie case for relief under Senate Bill 1437”].)
While this statement may be true, it is irrelevant.
Here, the trial court did not find defendant failed to make a prima facie case based
on the jury’s pre-Banks and pre-Clark special circumstance findings. Instead, the trial
court found the jury’s express finding that defendant acted with premeditation and
deliberation conclusively showed that it found defendant guilty of first degree murder
after finding that defendant deliberately intended to kill, and did kill, the victim. As the
actual killer who acted with a premeditated and deliberate intent to kill, the trial court
rightfully concluded defendant was not entitled to relief as a matter of law. (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 707-708; People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233
[record of conviction showed the defendant, who was the actual killer and the only
participant in the killing, was not entitled to relief under section 1172.6].) The court,
therefore, did not err in denying the petition.
1 People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 [clarifying “under what circumstances an
accomplice who lacks the intent to kill may qualify as a major participant so as to be
statutorily eligible for the death penalty”].
2 People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 [clarifying what it means to act with reckless
indifference to human life].
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DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.
HULL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
DUARTE, J.
WISEMAN, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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