CourtListener 10297321•People v. Quintero CA2/8
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Filed 12/19/24 P. v. Quintero CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B333564
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA092417)
v.
MANUEL QUINTERO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Tomson T. Ong, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded with directions.
Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
In 2022, over seven years after his judgment of conviction
became final, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
notified the superior court that defendant and appellant Manuel
Quintero may be entitled to a recall of his sentence pursuant to
Penal Code section 1172.75 (former § 1171.1) following passage of
Senate Bill 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). As relevant here, Senate
Bill 483 invalidated one-year sentence enhancements pursuant to
section 667.5, subdivision (b) (commonly referred to as prison
priors), except for certain sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2021,
ch. 728, § 3.) Defendant’s sentence included four prison priors,
none of which was for a sex offense.
At the resentencing hearing in 2023, the trial court struck
the prison priors, recalculated custody credits and denied
defendant’s requests to modify his sentence in ways unrelated to
Senate Bill 483. Defendant contends on appeal the court erred in
failing to strike the four-year gang enhancement imposed on
count 7 pursuant to Penal Code section 186.22. Defendant
contends that because his original sentence was recalled and he
was resentenced, the amendments to section 186.22 effected by
Assembly Bill 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) applied to him and
required the gang enhancement to be vacated.
Pending further guidance from the Supreme Court, we
agree with the majority of courts who have concluded the
amendments to Penal Code section 186.22 apply retroactively at
a resentencing hearing following recall of a sentence. We
therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
In 2013, after a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of
15 felony counts: four counts of possession for sale of
methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; counts 1, 2, 3 &
2
6), five counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code,
§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); counts 4, 9, 10, 11 & 12), and one count each
of sale/offer/transport of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11379, subd. (a); count 5), possession for sale of cocaine
(§ 11351; count 7), possession for sale of concentrated cannabis
(§ 11378; count 8), possession of an assault weapon (Pen. Code,
§ 30605, subd. (a); count 13), possession of ammunition (§ 30305,
subd. (a)(1); count 14), and possession of brass knuckles (§ 22010;
count 15). As to counts 3, 6, 7, and 8, the jury found true that
defendant was personally armed with a firearm (§ 12022,
subd. (c)). The jury also found true as to all counts that the
offenses were committed to benefit defendant’s gang (Pen. Code,
§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)).
In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the
prison prior allegations, as well as the allegation defendant had
suffered two prior convictions for serious or violent felonies
within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law. (Pen. Code, § 667,
subds. (b)-(i), § 667.5, subds. (b) & (c), § 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).)
The trial court sentenced defendant to 39 years in prison.
Defendant’s sentence included four 1-year prison priors and one
4-year gang enhancement on count 7. Defendant was awarded
489 days of presentence custody credits (408 actual/81 conduct).
In 2015, this court affirmed defendant’s conviction in its
entirety. (People v. Quintero (Mar. 16, 2015, B250025) [nonpub.
opn.].)
Following the enactment of Penal Code section 1172.75 in
2021 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3), the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation referred defendant’s case to the trial court for
review. The case was assigned to Judge Tomson T. Ong who had
presided over defendant’s 2013 trial. The court set a hearing
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date and defendant filed a resentencing brief. Defendant
requested a full resentencing and several modifications to his
sentence based on recent amendments to the sentencing laws,
including the striking of the prison priors and the gang
enhancement.
On August 29, 2023, the trial court held a hearing at which
defendant was present and represented by counsel. The court
struck the prison priors from defendant’s sentence due to the
statutory amendments invalidating those enhancements. The
court denied defendant’s other requests to modify his sentence,
imposed an aggregate prison sentence of 35 years, recalculated
custody credits (4,896 total days) and prepared a new abstract of
judgment.
This appeal followed. Defendant’s request for judicial
notice is denied.
DISCUSSION
The issues in this appeal are (1) whether defendant is
entitled to the retroactive application of Assembly Bill 333,
notwithstanding the fact his judgment of conviction became final
in 2015, and (2) the scope of the trial court’s authority at the
resentencing hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75.
Assembly Bill 333, effective January 1, 2022, made
substantive and procedural changes to Penal Code section 186.22.
(People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206 (Tran).) The
Supreme Court has concluded that the rule of In re Estrada
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 applies to statutory amendments, like the
ones made by Assembly Bill 333, “ ‘which redefine, to the benefit
of defendants, conduct subject to criminal sanctions.’ ” (Tran, at
p. 1207.)
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There is no dispute that if defendant’s case was nonfinal
when Assembly Bill 333 went into effect, defendant would be
entitled to the benefit of the amendments to the statutory
scheme, both substantive and procedural. (Tran, supra,
13 Cal.5th at pp. 1206-1207; see also People v. Mitchell (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 1127, 1130, 1137-1140, review granted Feb. 21,
2024, S283474; People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 663-667
[finding “the presumption of retroactivity applies to laws that
change the substantive requirements for an enhancement in the
defendant’s favor,” therefore the defendant was entitled to the
ameliorative benefits of Assem. Bill 333].)
Defendant argues the trial court’s recall of his sentence
operated as a vacatur—his judgment of conviction was no longer
final and he was entitled to a full resentencing and the benefit of
all ameliorative changes in the law, including the changes
effected by Assembly Bill 333. While the law on this issue is
evolving, the weight of authority appears to support defendant’s
argument.
When “part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand
for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is
appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing
discretion in light of the changed circumstances.’ ” (People v.
Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893-894 [approving of full
resentencing rule when sentence is subject to recall and
resentencing].) Application of the full resentencing rule is not
limited to cases remanded by a reviewing court. Courts have also
applied the rule where, as here, a sentence is recalled for
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75. (See, e.g.,
People v. Montgomery (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 768, 773-777,
review granted May 29, 2024, S284662 [§ 1172.75 requires full
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resentencing for recall of sentence following a plea agreement
and any reduction in sentence does not provide a basis for the
prosecutor to withdraw from the plea]; People v. Carter (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 960, 972-976 [same where the defendant agreed
to stipulated sentence]; People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th
393, 402 [“By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full
resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly
‘invalid’ enhancements.”].)
In People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 163, the
Supreme Court said that “once a court has determined that a
defendant is entitled to resentencing, the result is vacatur of the
original sentence, whereupon the trial court may impose any
appropriate sentence.” (See also People v. McKenzie (2020) 9
Cal.5th 40, 46 [“In criminal actions, the terms ‘judgment’ and
‘ “sentence” ’ are generally considered ‘synonymous’ . . . , and
there is no ‘judgment of conviction’ without a sentence.”].)
People v. Salgado (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 376 (Salgado)
involved a similar procedural posture to this case. There,
Salgado’s conviction had become final following a direct appeal.
(Id. at p. 379.) In 2018, more than a decade after Salgado’s
judgment had become final, the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation referred his case to the superior court for review
and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1). While Salgado’s appeal from the resentencing
hearing was pending, Assembly Bill 333 went into effect.
(Salgado, at p. 378.) Salgado concluded resentencing under
section 1170 operated as a vacatur, quoting the language from
Padilla above, and Salgado was therefore entitled to the
ameliorative changes effected by Assembly Bill 333. (Salgado, at
p. 380.) Salgado’s substantive gang offense and gang
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enhancements were reversed, and the case was remanded for
further proceedings, including the right of the People to retry
Salgado on the gang allegations. (Salgado, at pp. 380-382.)
The reasoning of Salgado was followed in People v. Trent
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 33, review granted December 20, 2023,
S282644. Trent concluded the defendant there, who had filed a
successful petition pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 and
obtained vacatur of his murder conviction, was “entitled to
retroactive application of Assembly Bill 333,” irrespective of the
previous finality of his judgment. (Trent, at p. 44.)
We note two cases have declined to follow Salgado, but they
are both distinguishable. Neither case involved the recall of a
sentence and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.75.
In People v. Lopez (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1110, review
granted November 15, 2023, S281488, Assembly Bill 333 went
into effect while the defendant was awaiting resentencing
following remand of his direct appeal. (Lopez, at p. 1113.) Lopez
concluded the ameliorative benefits of Assembly Bill 333 did
apply because the defendant’s appeal was not yet final. But
Lopez nevertheless held that because it had reversed on direct
appeal “solely with respect” to the defendant’s sentence and had
remanded only for that purpose, the trial court was bound by the
scope of the remittitur and “did not have jurisdiction to
reconsider the gang enhancement. Assembly Bill 333 was simply
irrelevant to anything the trial court had jurisdiction to do” at
resentencing. (Lopez, at p. 1114.)
People v. Esquivias (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 969, review
granted October 2, 2024, S286371, involved review of a petition
for habeas corpus. Esquivias held “that a trial court is not
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obligated to revisit a defendant’s entire sentence on habeas
corpus review merely because it grants review to revisit a portion
of that sentence.” (Id. at p. 976.) The court explained that under
the law regarding habeas corpus review, “[a] trial court has
discretion in deciding how to exercise its habeas corpus
jurisdiction and may limit a grant of habeas corpus review to a
‘specific claim or claims’ presented in a petition.” (Id. at pp. 976-
977.) The court found that the defendant’s sentence had not been
vacated or recalled but “remained intact and final except to the
extent the trial court granted habeas corpus review of the firearm
enhancements.” (Id. at p. 980.)
Pending further guidance from our Supreme Court, we
follow the weight of authority which has concluded that a full
resentencing is warranted when an otherwise final sentence is
recalled pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75, and defendant
is therefore entitled to the ameliorative benefits of Assembly Bill
333.
Defendant argued in his brief that assuming we conclude
Assembly Bill 333 applies retroactively to him, then we must
reverse the four-year gang enhancement. The People failed to
address this argument in their brief to this court, but they did
concede that Assembly Bill 333 “significantly modified [Penal
Code] section 186.22.”
We agree. As defendant points out, the jury’s finding on
the gang enhancement here was made prior to the substantive
changes to Penal Code section 186.22 and without the benefit of
jury instructions that embodied those changes. We cannot find
on the record here that those omissions were harmless. (Tran,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1207, 1209 [finding omissions in jury
instructions that did not reflect changes to gang statute
8
implicated Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and application
of harmless error standard of Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18, 24].) The four-year gang enhancement on count 7 is
therefore reversed.
On remand, the People shall be given the opportunity to
retry defendant on the gang enhancement, after which the court
will proceed to a full resentencing hearing. If the People elect not
to retry the enhancement, the court shall conduct a full
resentencing hearing. We express no opinion on whether
defendant is entitled to any modifications in his sentence at
resentencing.
DISPOSITION
The four-year gang enhancement imposed on count 7
pursuant to Penal Code section 186.22 is reversed. On remand,
the People shall have the opportunity to retry defendant and
appellant Manuel Quintero on the gang allegation, after which
the superior court shall conduct a full resentencing hearing. If
the People elect not to retry the gang allegation, the court shall
conduct a full resentencing hearing. After imposing sentence, the
court shall prepare and transmit a new abstract of judgment to
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment
of conviction is affirmed in all other respects.
GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J. VIRAMONTES, J.
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