CourtListener 10295557•People v. Steve CA5
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Filed 12/17/24 P. v. Steve CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F085851
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F09903732)
v.
LEVITICUS IVORY STEVE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Houry A.
Sanderson, Judge.
Paul Stubb, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General,
Eric L. Christoffersen and Christina Hitomi Simpson, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Poochigian, J. and Meehan, J.
Defendant Leviticus Ivory Steve contends on appeal that the trial court’s order
denying defendant’s motion for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.751
must be vacated and remanded for resentencing because his section 288, subdivision (a),
conviction is not a disqualifying prior conviction under section 1172.75, subdivision (a).
The People disagree. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On March 11, 2010, the Fresno County District Attorney filed an amended
information charging defendant with first degree residential robbery (§ 211;
counts 1 & 2). The information further alleged defendant personally used a firearm
within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b). The prosecution further alleged
defendant had suffered a prior conviction within the meaning of sections 667,
subdivisions (b)–(i), and 1170.12, subdivisions (a)–(d), to wit, a February 2000
conviction for violating section 288 (lewd act on a person under 14 years of age).
On May 27, 2010, a jury found defendant guilty on counts 1 and 2 and found all
enhancements and prior convictions true. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of
31 years eight months in state prison.
On April 27, 2012, defendant was resentenced, and the trial court exercised its
discretion to strike the one-year eight-month term for the prior enhancement as to
count 2. (§ 667.5, subd. (a)(1).)
On October 8, 2021, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) was passed,
invalidating all section 667.5, subdivision (b), one-year prison prior enhancements
imposed prior to January 1, 2020, except for prior convictions for sexually violent
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
2.
offenses as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, subdivision (b).
(§ 1172.75.)2 It was effective January 1, 2022, and states:
“The Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the
county correctional administrator of each county shall identify those
persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that
includes an [eligible section 667.5, subdivision (b)] enhancement .…”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (b).)
On July 11, 2022, defendant filed a motion for resentencing pursuant to
sections 1170, 1171, 3051, 4081, 1385, 1393, Evidence Code section 352, and Senate Bill
Nos. 483, 567, 260/261, 136, and 81. The trial court appointed counsel to represent
defendant. The People filed a brief arguing defendant was ineligible for relief under
section 1172.75, subdivision (a).
On January 27, 2023, defense counsel filed briefing arguing defendant was
entitled to relief as his conviction did not meet the new criteria for the sentencing
enhancement and the change in the law was retroactive.
On March 1, 2023, after the parties agreed defendant’s prior conviction for a
violation of section 288, subdivision (a),3 was a violent sexual offense, the trial court
found the same and denied defendant’s motion for resentencing.
On March 2, 2023, defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
On October 17, 2023, we ordered the record be augmented with “[a]ny document
filed or lodged demonstrating the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation [(CDCR)] identified [defendant] as a person serving a term for a judgment
2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1117.1 was renumbered to section 1172.75.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.)
3 The first amended information does not specify whether the violation of
section 288 was without force or fear. However, the nonpublished opinion in People v.
Steve (Oct. 20, 2011, F060660), and the pleadings of both parties in the instant case refer
to the “nonviolent” subdivision (a) of that section.
3.
that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 1172.75,
including the date any such document was filed or lodged.” Defendant’s name was on
such a list from CDCR.
FACTUAL SUMMARY4
When defendant was 18 years old, he had sexual intercourse on one occasion with
a 13-year-old girl. The intercourse resulted in her pregnancy. Defendant claimed to have
believed the girl was 15 or 16 years old, and that she was in eighth grade because she had
been held back in school, not because she was only 13 years old. The girl’s mother did
not want defendant to be charged for the offense, but defendant’s non-pregnant girlfriend
at the time had a confrontation with the pregnant 13 year old, which led to the
involvement of law enforcement.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court’s order must be vacated and remanded for
resentencing because a violation of section 288, subdivision (a), does not involve the use
of force or fear, so a violation of section 288, subdivision (a), is not a disqualifying prior
conviction under section 1172.75, subdivision (a). The People disagree. We agree with
the People.
A. Background
On January 5, 2023, defense counsel filed for sentencing relief, arguing that
resentencing of defendant was mandated by section 1172.7, subdivision (d)(2), the fact
that defendant’s case was properly reopened as a result of his inclusion on the CDCR list,
and the fact that numerous ameliorative statutes applied to defendant’s reopened case.
On January 11, 2023, the prosecution filed a brief arguing defendant was ineligible for
resentencing based upon his prior conviction for violating section 288, subdivision (a).
4 The facts for the underlying offense are taken from the probation officer’s report.
4.
The trial court held that defendant’s inclusion on the CDCR’s list only prompted the
hearing to determine defendant’s eligibility and did not reopen defendant’s case or
otherwise mandate resentencing.
B. Law
“ ‘ “When we interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur fundamental task … is to determine the
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory
language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning .… If the language is clear, courts
must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in
absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits
more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’ [Citation.] ‘Furthermore, we
consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme
of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an
act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th
982, 989–990.)
C. Analysis
Here, the imposed section 667.5, former subdivision (b), enhancement that was
stricken pursuant to section 1172.75 was for defendant’s prior violation of section 288,
subdivision (a), (lewd and lascivious act upon a child under 14 years of age). In his
section 1172.75 petition for resentencing below, defendant acknowledged that the
section 288, subdivision (a), offense was the basis for the imposed prison prior
enhancement, but he alleged it was not a “sexually violent offense” because there was no
evidence it was committed by force or fear. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (b),
[listing acts that are a “sexually violent offense,” including a felony violation of § 288,
“when committed by force, violence, duress, menace, fear of immediate and unlawful
5.
bodily injury on the victim or another person, or threatening to retaliate in the future
against the victim or any other person”].)
However, a violation of section 288, subdivision (a), involves the commission of a
lewd or lascivious act upon a child who is under the age of 14 years old, and Welfare and
Institutions Code section 6600.1 provides, “If the victim of an underlying offense that is
specified in subdivision (b) of [s]ection 6600 is a child under the age of 14, the offense
shall constitute a ‘sexually violent offense’ for purposes of [s]ection 6600.” Thus, a
section 288, subdivision (a), violation is necessarily a sexually violent offense “for
purposes of [Welfare and Institutions Code] [s]ection 6600” in light of the express
language of Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600.1. (See generally People v. Lowe
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 678, 682, fn. 2 [noting “[a] violation of Penal Code section 288
against a victim under 14 years old is a ‘sexually violent offense’ as a matter of law”].)
However, defendant argues that Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600.1 does
not apply because it is not mentioned in the text of sections 1172.75, subdivision (a), or
667.5, subdivision (b). He contends there is nothing in the language or legislative history
of section 1172.75, subdivision (b), to support the conclusion that the Legislature
intended that Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600.1 would apply for purposes of
determining the validity of sentence enhancements imposed under former section 667.5,
subdivision (b). We disagree.
Section 6600.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code expressly broadens the list of
crimes qualifying as sexually violent offenses “for purposes of [s]ection 6600.” (See
People v. Superior Court (Johannes) (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 558, 569 [Welf. & Inst.
Code, “section 6600.1 modifies section 6600, subdivision (b)”]; see also People v. Carlin
(2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 322, 328, fn. 3 [“Proposition 83 broadened the category of
convictions that constitute a sexually violent offense”].) And, “[t]he Legislature is
presumed to be aware of all laws in existence when it passes or amends a statute.”
6.
(In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 407; accord, People v. Licas (2007) 41 Cal.4th 362,
367 [“ ‘[T]he Legislature is deemed to be aware of existing laws and judicial decisions in
effect at the time legislation is enacted and to have enacted and amended statutes “ ‘in the
light of such decisions as have a direct bearing upon them’ ” ’ ”].) Accordingly, when
the Legislature drafted section 1172.5 to reference Welfare and Institutions Code
section 6600, it is presumed to have been aware of and incorporated the related law—
Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600.1—which necessarily informs of the
definition of a sexually violent offense as contained in Welfare and Institutions Code
section 6600. (See People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 199 [“We
do not presume that the Legislature intends, when it enacts a statute, to overthrow
long-established principles of law unless such intention is clearly expressed or
necessarily implied. [Citation.] Rather, we must assume that … the Legislature was
aware of existing related laws and intended to maintain a consistent body of rules”].)
Accordingly, we conclude the imposed prison prior enhancement, based upon a
violation of section 288, subdivision (a), is still valid under amended section 667.5,
subdivision (b) because it was for a sexually violent offense. Thus, because there is no
legally invalid prison prior enhancement, the trial court did not err in finding defendant
was not eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
7.
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