Paige v. Nolan CA2/5

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Filed 12/13/24 Paige v. Nolan CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

JEAN PAIGE, B322162

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. PC056813)

RONALD NOLAN,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Melvin D. Sandvig, Judge. Affirmed.
Mark Carton for Plaintiff and Appellant.
DiDonato Law Center and Peter R. DiDonato for Defendant
and Respondent.
________________________
Plaintiff and appellant Jean Paige refused a settlement
offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, but after a jury
trial, judgment was entered in favor of her former attorney,
defendant and respondent Ronald Nolan, in this professional
negligence action. Paige appeals from a portion of a post-
judgment order denying her motion to tax expert witness fees.1
On appeal, Paige contends the trial court failed to consider her
inability to pay costs, and the evidence supporting expert witness
fees was insufficient because the records did not list the hours
expended for different tasks. Nolan filed a cross-appeal from a
portion of the same order denying his motion for attorney fees.
Nolan contends he was entitled to an award of attorney fees as
the prevailing party under the parties’ contingency fee agreement
We conclude the record is inadequate to review the trial
court’s discretionary rulings, because there is no reporter’s
transcript or suitable substitute for the hearing on the motion to
tax costs and the motion for attorney fees. Even if we were to
find the record adequate for review, however, no abuse of
discretion has been shown, and therefore, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In January 2016, Paige filed the instant action against
Nolan for professional negligence. On November 14, 2017, Paige
filed the operative second amended complaint alleging causes of
action for breach of contract, professional negligence, breach of
fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, equitable estoppel,
and declaratory relief. She alleged that she engaged Nolan to

1 At oral argument on appeal, Paige withdrew a challenge

to the portion of the order awarding photocopying costs.

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represent her in trip and fall matter, but he failed to file a
personal injury lawsuit on her behalf before the expiration of the
applicable statute of limitations, then resigned as her attorney.
She signed a legal services contingency agreement, but Nolan
failed to sign the agreement or provide a copy to her. She
alleged, however, that Nolan ratified the agreement by signing
other documents stating that he was acting as her attorney.
Paige attached to the operative complaint a copy of the
contingency fee agreement that she executed. The agreement
contained an attorney fees provision stating that if it became
necessary “to commence legal proceedings for the collection of any
sums due us from you under this Agreement, you will pay our
reasonable attorneys’ fees, court costs, and other reasonable costs
of collection.” After the client signature lines, the agreement
stated, “This retainer shall not become effective until Attorney
has signed and dated this agreement. Client shall have no right
to enforce this agreement or employment of Attorney without a
signed version of this agreement by Attorney.” The signature
lines for the attorney were left blank. Paige also attached
documents Nolan signed as her attorney.
On September 23, 2019, Nolan offered to settle under Code
of Civil Procedure section 998 for payment of $3,000 to Paige,
which Paige declined.
The first phase of trial commenced on January 10, 2022.
Nolan’s accident reconstruction expert Jeffrey Hughes testified
over two days. At the conclusion of the first phase, the jury found
Paige could not have proven liability against the alleged
tortfeasors in a personal injury action. The court entered
judgment in favor of Nolan on January 13, 2022.

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On January 27, 2022, Nolan filed a memorandum of costs.
Among other items, he requested $15,476 for expert witness fees.
In support of the expert witness fees, he included a list of the
total hours expended by Hughes’ employer at different billing
rates. He also submitted several invoices from Hughes’ employer
listing the tasks completed in connection with Hughes’ testimony,
as well as a list of the people and departments, their billing rates,
and the total amount charged for each. The invoices did not list
the amount of time spent for a particular task or which
individual performed the task. Nolan also requested attorney
fees in the amount of $60,657.
On February 15, 2022, Paige filed a motion to tax costs.
She argued the expert witness fees were excessive and the
documentation was insufficient because it did not specify the
amount of time spent on each task or the specific cost of each
task. Paige asserted expert witness fees in the range of $4,500 to
$6,500 would be more reasonable, but she did not support this
assertion with any evidence.
Paige opposed the request for attorney fees on the ground
that fees were not authorized by statute or contract. She argued
the fee agreement was not signed, and therefore, was
unenforceable under Business and Professions Code section 6147.
In addition, the attorney fee provision of the agreement was
limited and inapplicable to the present litigation. The agreement
was unenforceable for failing to disclose that Nolan did not carry
malpractice insurance, and Nolan was judicially estopped from
arguing it was enforceable by his prior arguments.
Nolan filed an opposition to the motion to tax costs. On
March 2, 2022, he also filed a separate motion for award of
attorney fees in the amount of $60,657.50 based on the written

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contract and Civil Code section 1717. He attached the
contingency fee agreement that Paige had signed, but that he had
not signed. Paige opposed the motion for attorney fees.
On May 19, 2022, a hearing was held on the motion to tax
costs and the motion for attorney fees. No reporter’s transcript or
suitable substitute has been included in the appellate record.
The trial court took the matter under submission, then issued a
minute order with the court’s ruling later that day. As to expert
witness fees, the court noted that Paige complained there was no
breakdown of the time spent on different tasks for four hours of
testimony, but the court noted that it was her burden to
demonstrate the costs were unreasonable. The number of hours
of testimony during trial was not sufficient to show the costs were
unreasonable. Regardless of the time allotted to each task, Paige
did not identify any tasks that were not necessary. In opposition,
Nolan had noted the costs were necessary to review documents
and depositions, visit the scene of the alleged accident, and testify
at trial. The trial court found the expert witness costs were
reasonable.
The court found the attorney fee provision of the agreement
applied solely to a legal proceeding commenced to collect
outstanding balances from clients. The instant action was not a
fee collection matter. Nolan was not entitled to attorney fees
because the contract did not provide for fees under the
circumstances of this case. The court denied attorney fees.
On June 21, 2022, the trial court entered a revised
judgment, noting that Nolan’s motion for attorney fees had been
denied, and including an award of costs to Nolan in the total
amount of $24,474. Each party filed a timely notice of appeal
from the judgment.

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DISCUSSION

I. Standards of Review and Inadequacy of the Appellate
Record

We conclude that in the absence of a reporter’s transcript or
suitable substitute for the hearing on the motion to tax costs and
the motion for attorney fees, the appellate record is inadequate to
demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to tax costs for
abuse of discretion. (Coastline JX Holdings LLC v. Bennett
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 985, 1013.) An appellate court will not
disturb discretionary rulings of the trial court unless appellant
can demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion amounting to a
miscarriage of justice. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2
Cal.3d 557, 566.) Discretion is abused only where it appears that
the trial court “exceed[ed] the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances before it being considered.” (Loomis v. Loomis
(1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 345, 348−349.)
The trial court’s ruling on a motion for attorney fees is also
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Soni v. Wellmike Enterprise
Co. Ltd. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1477, 1481.) “However, the
determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney
fees and costs have been met is a question of law for our de novo
review. [Citations.] As for any disputed factual issues, the trial
court’s findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence rule
and must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence.
[Citation.]” (Ibid.)

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A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed to be
correct, however, and an appellant bears the burden of
overcoming this presumption by affirmatively showing error on
an adequate record. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122,
1140–1141.) Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b), “[i]f
an appellant intends to raise any issue that requires
consideration of the oral proceedings in the superior court, the
record on appeal must include a record of these oral proceedings
in the form of one of the following: [¶] (1) A reporter’s transcript
under rule 8.130; [¶] (2) An agreed statement under rule 8.134; or
[¶] (3) A settled statement under rule 8.137.”
In an appeal involving the abuse of discretion standard of
review, a reporter’s transcript or an agreed or settled statement
of the proceedings is often indispensable. (See, e.g., Vo v. Las
Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 448
[“The absence of a record concerning what actually occurred at
the trial precludes a determination that the trial court abused its
discretion”]; see Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5
Cal.App.5th 476, 487 [without reporter’s transcript or suitable
substitute, appellant cannot demonstrate an award of attorney
fees constituted an abuse of discretion].)
In this case, both parties elected on appeal to proceed
without a reporter’s transcript or a suitable substitute. The trial
court’s order must be affirmed because the record provided by the
parties is inadequate to show the trial court abused its discretion
in finding the requested costs were reasonable and in declining to
award attorney fees. We cannot presume the trial court has
erred. “The ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value
of professional services rendered in his court, and while his
judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed

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unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.’ ”
(Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) The absence of a
record concerning what actually occurred at the hearing
precludes a determination that the trial court abused its
discretion.

II. Motion to Tax Costs

Even were we to find the record adequate, however, no
abuse of discretion has been shown. In her briefs on appeal,
Paige contends in a single sentence that the trial court awarded
costs without considering her ability to pay, but she provides no
further analysis through citation to the record or any relevant
case law on the issue of a party’s ability to pay costs. “The
reviewing court is not required to develop the parties’ arguments
or search the record for supporting evidence and may instead
treat arguments that are not developed or supported by adequate
citations to the record as waived.” (Meridian Financial Services,
Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 684.) Any contention
concerning the trial court’s assessment of Paige’s ability to pay
costs is treated as waived.
Paige also contends there was no substantial evidence to
support the award of expert witness fees, because the invoices
submitted did not show the time spent on each task, only the
total amount of time expended and a list of tasks performed. Her
analysis is incorrect. Nolan substantiated his request for expert
witness fees with invoices showing the total amount that he was
charged for expert witness services, as well as the tasks
performed. Paige did not persuasively argue or provide evidence
that the amount was excessive or unreasonable. The trial court

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was in the best position to assess the reasonableness of the
expense in light of the testimony that was presented at trial. No
abuse of discretion has been shown.

III. Motion for Award of Attorney Fees

Even were we to conclude the record is adequate to review
the trial court’s ruling denying attorney fees, we would find no
abuse of discretion. Nolan contends he was entitled to an award
of attorney fees as the prevailing party in an action on a contract.
We disagree. The attorney fee provision at issue in this case did
not provide for the recovery of fees in these proceedings.
The gravamen of Paige’s causes of action was her claim for
professional negligence: Nolan agreed to represent her, but failed
to file a timely action. A claim for professional negligence sounds
in tort. (Loube v. Loube (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 421, 430.) An
action for professional negligence is not an action “on the
contract.” (Ibid.)
The attorney fees provision in this case was narrowly
drawn to provide a right to recover fees in “legal proceedings for
the collection of any sums due us from you under this
Agreement.” It did not provide for the recovery of fees in any
action arising out of the retainer agreement, which would have
encompassed both tort and contract claims. It did not even
provide for the recovery of fees in any action to enforce the terms
of the agreement, which would encompass any action on the
contract. The provision was specifically limited to proceedings
concerning the fees due under the agreement. Had the
allegations of the complaint concerned the fees due under the
agreement, then by operation of Civil Code section 1717, the

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prevailing party would have been entitled to an award of attorney
fees. Paige’s causes of action, however, are outside the limited
scope of the attorney fee agreement in this case. We agree with
the trial court’s finding that the instant action for malpractice
was not a proceeding concerning the fees due under the
agreement, and therefore, was not covered by the attorney fee
provision. The trial court properly declined to award attorney
fees and no abuse of discretion has been shown.

DISPOSITION

The June 21, 2022 judgment is affirmed. The parties are
ordered to bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

WE CONCUR:

BAKER, Acting, P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

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