People v. Johnson CA2/3

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Filed 12/13/24 P. v. Johnson CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B325013

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA146860
v.

JEFFREY ARDONAL JOHNSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Olivia Rosales, Judge. Conditionally
reversed.

Lise M. Breakey, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Nicholas J. Webster,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A jury convicted Jeffrey Ardonal Johnson of first degree
murder. After the trial, Johnson asked the court to unseal
juror information to facilitate his investigation of possible
juror misconduct. Johnson’s counsel submitted a declaration
recounting her conversation with the jury foreperson.
According to counsel, the foreperson told the other jurors
during deliberations that she had training and experience
in the law, and the legal definition of intent is different from
the common understanding of the term. The foreperson then
conveyed to the jurors that the legal definition of intent is
akin to negligence.
The trial court denied Johnson’s request, concluding the
foreperson’s statements during deliberations did not constitute
misconduct. A different panel of this court conditionally reversed
the judgment. We explained, if the information in counsel’s
declaration were true, the foreperson committed overt misconduct
by introducing extraneous and erroneous law into the jury room.
We directed the trial court to reconsider whether to disclose
the juror information so Johnson may investigate the possible
misconduct.
On remand, the trial court provided the jurors notice of
Johnson’s request, as required under Code of Civil Procedure
section 237.1 Only one of the 12 jurors protested the release of
information. The court, however, declined to release information
for all the jurors, citing the contentious atmosphere at trial,
an outburst by the audience, and incidents recounted in a letter
from the protesting juror.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

2
In this appeal, Johnson argues section 237 required
the court to disclose the information for the 11 non-protesting
jurors. We reject Johnson’s interpretation of section 237. Under
a plain and commonsense reading of the statute, a trial court
may decline to disclose information for non-protesting jurors
if the record reveals a compelling interest against disclosure
or the petitioner fails to show good cause.
Nevertheless, we conclude the trial court abused its
discretion by finding a compelling interest against disclosure
of information for the 11 non-protesting jurors. None of the
incidents the court cited involved Johnson, nor does the record
reveal a reason to believe a protective order would be insufficient
to safeguard the jurors. We also are troubled by the trial court’s
minimal efforts to ascertain whether the non-protesting jurors
consented to the disclosure of their information or desired to
talk to the defense. Accordingly, we again conditionally reverse
the judgment and order the trial court to reconsider Johnson’s
petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The crime and trial
Johnson’s son had a child with Maurice Elston’s sister.
In January 2018, Johnson, Elston, and members of their
respective families got into a dispute over the child, which
escalated into a physical brawl. At some point during the brawl,
Johnson stabbed and killed Elston. Johnson admitted stabbing
Elston, but claimed he was acting in self-defense.
The People charged Johnson with murder (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a)) and alleged he used a deadly and dangerous
weapon during the commission of the offense (Pen. Code, § 12022,
subd. (b)(1)). A jury convicted Johnson as charged. The court

3
sentenced him to 25 years to life for the murder plus one year
for the weapon enhancement.
2. Johnson’s petition to unseal juror information
After trial, Johnson petitioned to unseal identifying
information for the empaneled jurors.2 Johnson argued the
information was necessary so he could obtain evidence to use
in a motion for new trial.
Johnson attached to the petition a declaration from his
counsel that recounted her conversation with the jury foreperson
after the trial. According to counsel’s declaration, the foreperson
said the jurors were split, nine to three, on whether Johnson
intended to kill Elston. The foreperson “then explained that
she had some training and experience in the law, and . . . she
advised the three hold-outs that ‘intent’ had a different meaning
under the law than it does in ‘real life.’ She said she provided
the hold-outs with the following analogy: if a person leaves
their purse in the middle of the room but does not intend to
cause someone to trip on it, they may not have intent to cause
someone to trip in real life, but under the law they do because
they should not have left their purse in the middle of the room.
After providing this analogy, the three hold-outs changed their
votes to guilty.”
Defense counsel said she asked the foreperson for her
contact information so an investigator could talk to her. The
prosecutor, who was present during the conversation, objected
and said it was not appropriate for an investigator to interview

2 Although Johnson referred to the request as a “motion,”
we refer to it as a “petition” to be consistent with the language
in section 237.

4
the foreperson. The foreperson responded that she did not want
to get “in the middle of things” and declined to speak further.
The prosecutor opposed Johnson’s petition on the ground
that he failed to establish a prima facie case of good cause for
the release of juror information. The prosecutor provided her
recollection of the conversation with the foreperson. According
to the prosecutor, the “foreperson stated that the issue of intent
came up when [the jurors] were deciding between first and
second-degree murder. . . . [T]he foreperson did not tell the
defense and the prosecution that there were 3 hold-outs for
Not Guilty. . . . The foreperson did discuss an example being
brought forth during deliberations to explain intent but it did
not evince any issues of misconduct. In none of her statements
to counsel did it appear that any of the jurors engaged in any
misconduct. It appeared to the People from this brief discussion
with the foreperson that all the jurors deliberated thoughtfully.”
The court denied Johnson’s petition after finding defense
counsel’s declaration did not show “misconduct that would rise
to the level of good cause for disclosing” the jurors’ information.
The court noted the foreperson’s comments were “something
that jurors may do in [the jury room], but it doesn’t mean that
the rest of [the jurors] followed . . . .” The court also noted
the jurors requested the definitions of intent and murder, they
returned their verdict shortly after receiving the court’s response,
there is no evidence the jurors were confused by the court’s
instructions, and there is a presumption that the jurors followed
those instructions.
After the court denied Johnson’s petition, he moved for
a new trial based on juror misconduct. Johnson argued the
foreperson committed misconduct when she “drew on her prior

5
legal training to provide the jurors with an inaccurate definition
of intent that likened specific intent to negligence.” Johnson
alternatively asked the court to reconsider his petition to unseal
juror information so he could interview the jurors regarding
the extent of the misconduct. The court concluded Johnson
failed to show juror misconduct and denied his motion.
3. Johnson’s first appeal
Johnson appealed the judgment, arguing the trial court
erroneously denied his Batson/Wheeler motion,3 the jury
foreperson committed misconduct, and the trial court should
have granted his petition to disclose juror information.
A different panel of this court rejected Johnson’s
arguments, except his contention regarding the disclosure
of juror information. (See People v. Johnson (Mar. 30, 2022,
B309104) [nonpub. opn.] (Johnson I).) We held defense counsel’s
declaration established a prima facie showing of good cause for
the release of juror information, as required under section 237,
subdivision (b). We reasoned that, if the information in the
declaration were true, the foreperson committed overt misconduct
by introducing extraneous and erroneous law into the jury room.
Therefore, it was reasonably likely Johnson could obtain
admissible evidence of misconduct if he were to interview
the jurors. Because Johnson made a prima facie showing of
good cause and the court did not find a compelling interest
against disclosure, the court abused its discretion by failing
to conduct a hearing under section 237, subdivision (c).

3 Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79; People v. Wheeler
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 258.

6
We conditionally reversed the judgment and directed
the court to “set a hearing in accordance with . . . section 237
to consider whether to disclose juror information. If, after the
hearing, the court declines to do so, it shall reimpose the original
sentence. If the court instead discloses juror information, it shall
provide Johnson a reasonable amount of time to file a motion for
new trial. If Johnson does not timely file a motion for new trial,
or if the court denies his motion, the court shall reimpose the
original sentence.” We affirmed the judgment in all other
respects. (Johnson I.)
4. Proceedings on remand
On remand, the trial court complied with our directions
and set a hearing on Johnson’s petition to disclose juror
identifying information. At the same time, the court ordered
Central Juror Services to notify the former affected jurors
of the hearing.
A little over a month later, the court informed the parties
that Central Juror Services had sent letters to the jurors. The
court stated it did not have copies of the letters sent to the jurors,
but it would request a blank form letter from Central Juror
Services. The court noted it was “crucial to know whether or not
[the jurors] were advised that by not responding [to the letter] it
would be taken as there is no objection before the court can rule.”
The court stated it had received a letter from one juror
protesting the release of that juror’s information. The letter
recounted incidents during trial that purportedly made the
protesting juror and other jurors uncomfortable. The letter also
revealed personal circumstances that led the protesting juror
to fear being threatened or harassed if the court were to disclose

7
the juror’s information. The court sealed the letter and provided
a copy of it to counsel with the juror’s name redacted.
The court considered Johnson’s petition at a hearing on
September 2, 2022. Defense counsel conceded the protesting
juror’s letter “satisfies the objection requirements under the
code.” Nevertheless, she urged the court to disclose information
for the jurors who did not object to disclosure of their
information. Defense counsel offered to draft a protective order
“to ensure that information relating to any jurors in this case
stays within the custody of counsel and a licensed investigator
and nobody else.”
The court denied the petition on the ground that there
is a compelling interest against disclosure. The court explained
that reading the protesting juror’s letter jogged its own memory
of the contentious atmosphere at trial and the jurors’ concerns for
their safety. The court noted Johnson’s family and the victim’s
family shared a child, which was the cause of the altercation that
resulted in the victim’s death. According to the court, “on a daily
basis it was contentious to separate the two families,” and it had
to admonish the audience on several occasions. The court also
noted there was an “outburst” on the victim’s side of the audience
during the reading of the verdict, which angered Johnson’s side.4

4 According to the reporter’s transcript of the trial, some
audience members were clapping and crying during the reading
of the verdict. The court admonished the audience members to
“[p]lease control yourselves.” After the clerk finished reading the
verdict, the court remarked that it “underst[oo]d [the audience
members’] feelings, but this is not a time to rejoice . . . . [T]here’s
nothing happy about today.”

8
According to the court, the contentious atmosphere led
the jurors to speak out about not being comfortable walking
into the courtroom. The court had to “secure their protection by
bringing them into the jury room” during breaks.5 The jurors
also requested they be escorted to their cars after the verdict.6
The trial court suggested it also was motivated by a belief
that the non-protesting jurors shared the protesting juror’s
concerns. The court noted the protesting juror’s letter described
incidents during the trial that made the juror feel unsafe.
The court stated it could “infer” the protesting juror was “not
the only one that witnessed [those incidents] and felt that way.”
The court concluded, “given the totality of how this trial
went . . . on a day in and day out basis and how the jury felt,
so much that they felt not protected or in danger that they
had to be escorted to their cars after the verdict was reached,
the court feels that there is [a] compelling interest against
disclosure and the court will deny the request to disclose
the jurors’ identifying information.”

5 The trial record shows the court made the accommodation
in response to a single juror’s request. The juror told the court
he repeatedly ran into witnesses and family members outside
of the courtroom, despite his efforts to avoid them. The juror
said the witnesses and family members did not try to talk to him.
Nevertheless, he felt uncomfortable waiting in the hallway.
6 The trial record shows, immediately before releasing
the jury, the court told the jurors, “if you want to be escorted
out into the parking [lot], we can do that.” The trial record does
not reveal which jurors requested the escort or for what reason.
Nor does it reveal how many jurors, if any, took advantage of
the court’s offer.

9
After the court announced its ruling, defense counsel asked
if the court believed a protective order would be insufficient to
protect the jurors. The court simply responded, “Yes.”
DISCUSSION
1. Relevant law and standard of review
Section 237 governs the disclosure of “personal juror
identifying information” after a criminal trial, including jurors’
names, addresses, and telephone numbers. (§ 237, subd. (a)(2);
People v. Munoz (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 143, 165.) The original
version of the statute—enacted in 1992—allowed trial courts
to seal juror information, but only if warranted by a compelling
governmental interest. (Stats. 1992, ch. 971, § 3.)
In 1995, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 508 (1995–
1996 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 508), which amended section 237
to require records of personal juror identifying information be
sealed by default upon the recording of a verdict in a criminal
case. (Stats. 1995, ch. 964, § 3.) The Legislature stated its
intent in amending the statute was “to balance the interests of
providing access to records of juror identifying information for a
particular, identifiable purpose against the interests in protecting
the jurors’ privacy, safety, and well-being, as well as the interest
in maintaining public confidence and willingness to participate
in the jury system.” (Stats. 1995, ch. 964, § 1.)
As amended, section 237 permits any person to petition for
access to sealed juror information by submitting a “declaration
that includes facts sufficient to establish good cause for the
release of the juror’s personal identifying information.” (§ 237,
subd. (b).) If the petition and declaration establish a prima facie
showing of good cause, the court shall set the matter for hearing,
unless “there is a showing on the record of facts that establish

10
a compelling interest against disclosure. A compelling interest
includes, but is not limited to, protecting jurors from threats or
danger of physical harm.” (Ibid.)
If the court sets a hearing on a petition seeking access to
juror information, it must provide notice to each affected former
juror “by personal service or by first-class mail, addressed to the
last known address of the former juror as shown in the records
of the court.” (§ 237, subd. (c).) “Any affected former juror
may appear in person, in writing, by telephone, or by counsel
to protest the granting of the petition.” (Ibid.)
After the hearing on a petition, “the records shall be made
available as requested in the petition, unless a former juror’s
protest to the granting of the petition is sustained. The court
shall sustain the protest of the former juror if, in the discretion
of the court, the petitioner fails to show good cause, the record
establishes the presence of a compelling interest against
disclosure as defined in subdivision (b), or the juror is unwilling
to be contacted by the petitioner. The court shall set forth
reasons and make express findings to support the granting
or denying of the petition to disclose.” (§ 237, subd. (d).)
We review a trial court’s denial of a petition to disclose
juror information for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Johnson
(2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 486, 492.)
2. The trial court was not required to disclose
non-protesting jurors’ information
Johnson argues the trial court was statutorily required
to disclose the information for the 11 jurors who did not protest
the petition. According to Johnson, section 237 allows a juror
to protest the release of his or her personal information, but it
does not allow a juror to protest the release of any other juror’s

11
information. Therefore, he contends, the statute requires a trial
court to disclose information for every juror who does not protest
a petition, regardless of whether the record shows a compelling
interest against the disclosure.
Resolution of Johnson’s argument requires us to interpret
section 237. “When interpreting a statute, a court’s role ‘is to
determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘We begin as always with the statute’s
actual words, the “most reliable indicator” of legislative intent,
“assigning them their usual and ordinary meanings, and
construing them in context. If the words themselves are not
ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said,
and the statute’s plain meaning governs. On the other hand,
if the language allows more than one reasonable construction,
we may look to such aids as the legislative history of the measure
and maxims of statutory construction. In cases of uncertain
meaning, we may also consider the consequences of a particular
interpretation, including its impact on public policy.” ’ ” (People
v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 101.)
The court in People v. Zamora (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1084
(Zamora), review den. Mar. 30, 2022, recently interpreted
section 237 and rejected an argument nearly identical to the
one Johnson makes here. In that case, the defendant petitioned
for the release of juror information, arguing there was good cause
because one of the jurors was overheard saying, “ ‘[L]et’s just find
[the defendant] guilty so we can get this over with.’ ” (Zamora, at
p. 1088.) The court provided notice of the petition to the affected
jurors, six of whom protested disclosure of their information.
(Id. at p. 1089.) At the hearing on the petition, the trial court
found the defendant had failed to show good cause for the

12
disclosure of juror information. (Ibid.) The court explained
the juror’s comments appeared to be a joke, other circumstances
indicated the jurors took their job seriously, and the evidence
of guilt was overwhelming. (Ibid.) Based on the lack of good
cause, the court refused to disclose information for all the jurors,
including those who did not protest the petition. (Id. at p. 1091.)
On appeal, the defendant argued the court should have
disclosed the information for the six jurors who did not protest
the petition. As does Johnson, the defendant asserted section 237
“ ‘only blocks the release of contact information for those jurors
who object to release,’ and the plain language of the statute
requires the court ‘to release the information of those jurors
who did not object.’ ” (Zamora, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1090.)
The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant’s interpretation
of section 237, holding instead that a single “juror’s protest can
support a denial of the petition in its entirety.” (Zamora, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1091.) The court explained that section 237
requires the court to release juror information after a hearing
if none of the jurors protests the petition. “However, where
one or more jurors protest, the court is required to ‘sustain
the protest’ if the court determines ‘the petitioner fails to show
good cause, the record establishes the presence of a compelling
interest against disclosure as defined in subdivision (b), or
the juror is unwilling to be contacted by the petitioner.’ (§ 237,
subd. (d).)” (Zamora, at p. 1091.) The court concluded the trial
court complied with this requirement when—“in response to
the protests of six jurors” and considering the “wider context of
the trial”—it determined the defendant had not shown good cause
for the disclosure. (Ibid.) The court noted this “is precisely what
the statute requires.” (Ibid.)

13
We agree with the Zamora court’s interpretation of
section 237. Subdivision (d) states, if the court sustains a juror’s
protest to the granting of a petition, the court may decline
to disclose the “records . . . as requested in the petition.” (§ 237,
subd. (d).) The statute does not specify that those records
must concern the juror who protested the petition. Nor does
it state that, after sustaining a protest, the court must disclose
the records of non-protesting jurors. Accordingly, under a plain
and commonsense reading of the statute, if a court sustains a
single juror’s protest, it may decline to disclose any or all records
requested in the petition.
This interpretation is consistent with the broader statutory
scheme. (See United Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Coast Iron &
Steel Co. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1082, 1090 [words of a statute must
be read in the context of the provision and statutory scheme as
a whole].) The statute contemplates two distinct stages at which
a trial court may decline to disclose juror information. At the
prima facie stage—described in subdivision (b)—the court may
decline to disclose juror information “if there is a showing on
the record of facts that establish a compelling interest against
disclosure.” (§ 237, subd. (b).) Subdivision (b) defines a
“compelling interest against disclosure” as “includ[ing], but
. . . not limited to, protecting jurors from threats or danger
of physical harm.” (Ibid.) There is no dispute that the court
has authority at this stage to deny a petition in its entirety.
The second stage—described in subdivision (d)—takes place
after notice to the jurors and a hearing. As at the prima facie
stage, the statute grants the court authority to decline to disclose
juror information at this stage if “the record establishes the
presence of a compelling interest against disclosure as defined in

14
subdivision (b).” (§ 237, subd. (d).) The fact that subdivision (d)
expressly incorporates subdivision (b)’s definition of a “compelling
interest against disclosure” suggests the Legislature intended
the trial court to have the same authority at both stages. That
would include the authority to deny a petition in its entirety.
A contrary interpretation of section 237, subdivision (d)
would lead to unreasonable results. Under Johnson’s proposed
interpretation, for example, if a single juror protests a petition
and provides credible information showing all the jurors are
in imminent danger of physical harm from the petitioner,
the court would be powerless to withhold information for the
non-protesting jurors. The court would be required to disclose
information for jurors who did not protest because they were
not aware of the danger, as well as jurors who never received
actual notice of the petition. The latter scenario is particularly
likely given section 237 allows the court to give notice by mail
to a juror’s last known address, and there is no time limit to
file a petition under section 237. (See § 237, subd. (c).) We are
confident the Legislature did not intend to mandate that courts
disclose juror information under those circumstances, as it would
contravene the Legislature’s stated goal of protecting jurors’
safety and wellbeing. (See Stats. 1995, ch. 964, § 1; see also
Townsel v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1084, 1087 (Townsel)
[noting the Legislature intended the current version of section
237 “to maximize juror privacy and safety, while retaining
a criminal defendant’s ability to contact jurors after trial
if sufficient need is shown” (italics added)].)
Johnson’s interpretation also would contravene California
Supreme Court precedent. In Townsel, supra, 20 Cal.4th 1084,
our state’s high court stated the “physical safety of jurors is of

15
paramount concern for the judiciary,” and trial courts have the
inherent power to protect the safety and privacy of jurors. (Id.
at pp. 1094–1095, 1097.) That power includes the authority to
limit the parties’ ability to contact jurors following completion
of the trial. (Id. at pp. 1095–1096.) The court explained nothing
in section 237 “is inconsistent with the existence and exercise
of the trial court’s inherent power to safeguard juror safety
and privacy.” (Townsel, at pp. 1094–1095.) Under Johnson’s
interpretation of section 237, however, trial courts would be
required to disclose information for all non-protesting jurors,
even if the court reasonably believed doing so would put those
jurors at risk of physical harm, threats, or harassment. Such
an interpretation would limit a trial court’s inherent power
to protect jurors, contravening the California Supreme Court’s
statements in Townsel.
Johnson contends the Legislature never intended to grant
a single juror the power to prevent the release of other jurors’
information. He points to a Senate Rules Committee analysis
of Senate Bill 508, which notes the amendments to section 237
“provide that a judge may find reason for confidentiality relative
to the release of a juror[’]s name.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of
Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 508 (1995–1996
Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 14, 1995.) Johnson also points out
that a 1993 amendment to section 237 required notice to “each
affected former juror” and permitted “[a]ny affected former juror”
to protest the granting of the petition. (Former § 237, subd. (c);
Stats. 1993, ch. 632, § 2.) According to Johnson, this shows
the Legislature intended that trial courts would separately
consider the disclosure of each individual juror’s information.

16
We generally agree with Johnson that this was the
Legislature’s intent. However, we do not agree that the Zamora
court’s interpretation is inconsistent with that intent. Although
the interpretation permits a trial court to withhold information
for all jurors if it sustains a single’s juror protest, it does not
require the court to do so. Accordingly, it does not preclude a
court from disclosing some jurors’ information, while withholding
information for others. Nor does it grant a single juror the
power to block the release of other jurors’ information.
Johnson suggests the Zamora court’s interpretation
is inconsistent with section 206, which states a juror has the
“absolute right to discuss or not to discuss the deliberation or
verdict with anyone.” (§ 206, subd. (a).) As Johnson correctly
notes, a court generally may not prevent a petitioner from
contacting a juror who affirmatively expresses a desire to talk.
(See, e.g., Townsel, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1097 [“If a juror
does consent to an interview, respondent court would abuse
its discretion by requiring counsel to make a showing of need
or ‘good cause’ greater than the desire to interview the juror
for a lawful purpose.”].) However, the fact that a juror does not
protest a petition seeking the disclosure of his or her information
does not necessarily mean the juror wants to talk to the
petitioner. For example, it is possible that a non-protesting juror
did not receive actual notice of the petition, failed to appreciate
its significance, or simply did not care enough to respond.
Moreover, as Johnson acknowledges, a juror who declines
to protest a petition is not obligated to talk to the petitioner.
Nor do we agree with Johnson’s suggestion that the
Zamora court’s interpretation gives insufficient weight to the
public’s and defendants’ interest in verdicts untainted by juror

17
misconduct. As compared to Johnson’s proposed interpretation,
the Zamora court’s interpretation more accurately reflects the
Legislature’s careful balancing of the various rights and interests
at stake. It also reflects the fact that trial courts have inherent
powers to investigate juror misconduct, which are independent of
section 237. Therefore, even if a court finds a compelling interest
against disclosure under section 237, the court has other means
to ensure the verdict is untainted by juror misconduct. (See
People v. Tuggles (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 339, 387 (Tuggles)
[section 237 does “not infringe upon the trial courts’ inherent
power to investigate strong indicia of juror misconduct”].)
Johnson argues his interpretation finds support in the
fact that, after a hearing on a petition, the court must disclose
all the requested juror information unless it sustains a juror’s
protest to the petition. We acknowledge this aspect of the statute
is somewhat inconsistent with the Zamora court’s interpretation.
If the Legislature had intended to grant the court authority to
withhold all jurors’ information after the hearing, it is not clear
why it would have conditioned that authority on the receipt of
a protest from at least one juror. Nevertheless, as compared
to Johnson’s interpretation, the Zamora court’s interpretation
is far more consistent with the plain language of the statute, the
broader statutory scheme, a trial court’s inherent powers, and
California Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, this relatively
minor inconsistency does not persuade us to reject it.
3. The trial court abused its discretion by refusing
to disclose non-protesting jurors’ information
Although we reject Johnson’s interpretation of section 237,
we agree with him that the trial court abused its discretion by

18
finding a compelling interest against disclosure of the
non-protesting jurors’ information.7
The trial court did not identify the specific compelling
interest against disclosure that justified its refusal to disclose
information for the non-protesting jurors. However, from its
remarks at the hearing, it seems the court believed disclosing
the non-protesting jurors’ information would expose those jurors
to a risk of physical harm, threats, or harassment. (See § 237,
subd. (b) [a “compelling interest includes, but is not limited to,
protecting jurors from threats or danger of physical harm”].)
In support of its decision, the court cited the contentious
atmosphere at trial and an “outburst” during the reading of
the verdict. The court also noted the non-protesting jurors likely
witnessed the incidents described in the protesting juror’s letter.
From this, the court seemed to infer that the non-protesting

7 The Attorney General contends Johnson forfeited this issue
by failing to raise it in his opening brief on appeal. Generally,
“ ‘[o]bvious reasons of fairness militate against consideration
of an issue raised initially in the reply brief.’ ” (People v. Rangel
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218.) Here, however, the Attorney
General addressed the issue on the merits in his respondent’s
brief, which mitigates any fairness concerns. Moreover,
consideration of the issue will forestall an inevitable claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, to the extent
Johnson forfeited the issue, we exercise our discretion to overlook
the forfeiture and consider the issue on the merits. (See People
v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [“An appellate court
is generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has
not been preserved for review by a party.”]; People v. Crittenden
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 146 [court considered an otherwise forfeited
claim to forestall an ineffective assistant of counsel claim].)

19
jurors shared the protesting juror’s concerns about the release
of their information.
Although the contentious atmosphere, outburst,
and incidents described by the protesting juror may have
demonstrated a risk to the jurors during the trial, they do not
justify the court’s wholesale denial of Johnson’s request for
information. The incidents giving rise to the court’s concerns
exclusively involved witnesses and members of the audience
at trial.8 However, Johnson did not seek to make the jurors’
information public or otherwise accessible to third parties.
Rather, he sought disclosure only for the limited purpose of
contacting the jurors to investigate potential juror misconduct.
The court did not find there was a risk that Johnson would share
the jurors’ information with persons responsible for the incidents
at trial, nor does the record suggest any reason to suspect he
would do so. Although it seems some of the incidents involved
members of Johnson’s family, there is nothing indicating Johnson
directed, encouraged, or even approved of their behavior during
the trial.
Even if the court had reason to suspect Johnson might
personally use the jurors’ information for an improper purpose,
the court had other means to ensure the jurors’ safety and
wellbeing. Section 237 grants a trial court authority to
“limit disclosure [of juror information] in any manner it deems
appropriate,” including requiring “the person to whom disclosure
is made, or his or her agent or employee, to agree not to divulge

8 Although the protesting juror’s letter refers to incidents
involving “[t]he parties,” it is clear from context and the
surrounding circumstances that the juror was not referring
to Johnson.

20
jurors’ identities or identifying information to others . . . .”
(§ 237, subd. (d).) Defense counsel offered to draft a protective
order limiting the disclosure of information to defense counsel
and her investigator. The court rejected counsel’s proposal,
but it did not explain why. If the court had reason not to trust
defense counsel or her investigator to keep the jurors’ information
confidential and use it for a proper purpose, the court should
have stated so on the record. (See § 237, subd. (d) [“The court
shall set forth reasons and make express findings to support
the granting or denying of the petition to disclose.”].)
Nor was it reasonable for the court to infer that all the
jurors shared the protesting juror’s concerns. The protesting
juror’s letter provided legitimate reasons to object to the
disclosure of that juror’s information. However, the incidents
the juror described were not of such a nature that other jurors
who witnessed them necessarily would have objected to the
release of their information. The simple fact that not a single
other juror protested Johnson’s petition—despite presumably
witnessing the same incidents as the protesting juror—is a
strong indication that not all the jurors shared the protesting
juror’s concerns.
The trial court’s inference is further undermined by the
fact that the foreperson spoke to defense counsel after the trial
and seemed willing—at least initially—to provide her contact
information to the defense. According to defense counsel, the
foreperson declined to provide her information only after the
prosecutor said it would be inappropriate to do so. As we stated
in Johnson I, “[t]here is nothing inherently improper about a
juror talking to a defense investigator, and the prosecutor should
not have made that remark. There is a reasonable possibility

21
the foreperson would change her mind if properly instructed by
the court.” (Johnson I.) The court presumably provided that
instruction by way of the notice of Johnson’s petition,9 and it
appears the foreperson did not protest in response. This suggests
the foreperson had, in fact, changed her mind and is willing to
share her information with Johnson.
We also are troubled by the trial court’s apparent failure
to consider the content of the letters that Central Juror Services
sent to the jurors. The court noted it was “crucial” to review
the letters before ruling on the petition. As the trial court
seemed to recognize, it is possible the letters told the jurors that
failure to protest the petition would be construed as consent to
the disclosure of their information. If so, it is possible some of
the jurors failed to respond because they were willing to have
Johnson contact them to talk about the case.
Despite the significance of the letters, the trial court did
not mention them at the hearing on Johnson’s petition. Nor do
they appear in the trial court’s case file or the record on appeal.10
Given their complete absence in the record of the hearing, it is
reasonable to infer the trial court did not consider the letters
before ruling on Johnson’s petition.11 The court’s failure to do so

9 As we discuss below, the record does not include the letters
Central Juror Services sent to the jurors providing notice of
Johnson’s petition. Therefore, we do not know what those letters
conveyed.
10 We asked the parties to augment the record with the
letters. Neither party was able to do so, and Johnson informed us
that the letters are not in the trial court’s case file.
11 We requested supplemental briefing from the parties on
whether the trial court considered the Central Juror Services

22
undermines the reliability of its inference that the non-protesting
jurors shared the protesting juror’s concerns. It also raises the
possibility that the court refused to release information for jurors
who were willing to talk to Johnson about the case. If so, the
court may have frustrated those jurors’ “absolute right to discuss
. . . the deliberation[s] or verdict with anyone.” (§ 206, subd. (a).)
We acknowledge the court may have been concerned that
some jurors did not receive actual notice of the petition or failed
to understand its significance. If so, regardless of the content
of the letters from Central Juror Services, those jurors’ failure
to protest would not reflect their consent to the release of their
information or a willingness to talk about the case. Nevertheless,
to the extent the court had any doubts about the non-protesting
jurors’ intentions, it should have made more of an effort to
contact them. The court sent jurors a single letter providing
notice of Johnson’s petition, without any follow-up with the

letters before ruling on Johnson’s petition. Although the parties
agree there is nothing in the record indicating the trial court
considered the letters, the Attorney General urges us to presume
that it did so. The Attorney General points out that, in “ ‘the
usual case, the fact that a court did not specifically mention
certain evidence does not mean that the court “ignored” that
evidence.’ ” (Quoting People v. Jones (2002) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076,
1092.) Moreover, a reviewing court generally presumes the
trial court considered the evidence presented to it. (Ibid.) Here,
however, there is nothing in the record indicating the letters were
before the court when it considered Johnson’s petition. Indeed,
the letters do not appear anywhere in the record of the hearing,
including in the court’s case file. Because there is no indication
that the court ever possessed the letters, we decline to presume
the court considered them before ruling on Johnson’s petition.

23
11 jurors who failed to respond. Given the significant rights
at stake—including Johnson’s right to an unbiased jury and
the jurors’ absolute right to discuss the deliberations and verdict
—at the very least, the court should have sent the jurors a
second letter or tried to contact them by telephone. (See, e.g.,
Tuggles, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at pp. 353, 377 [court sent jurors
a second letter to clarify their options with respect to a petition
for the disclosure of their information]; People v. Russell (2017)
9 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1056, 1058 [court clerk repeatedly called
and left messages for non-responsive jurors].)
We also remind the trial court that, even if there are
legitimate reasons not to disclose juror information, the “duty
to protect jurors from overzealous attorneys and investigators
does not require an abdication of the court’s obligation to ensure
that the jury trial process is free from misconduct.” (Tuggles,
supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 387.) Nor does it preclude the
court from exploring other options that would give Johnson
access to vital information while ensuring the jurors’ safety
and confidentiality.12 For example, the court could act as an
intermediary between the jurors and the defense by requiring
all communications take place through the court clerk. (See, e.g.,
People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 700, disapproved on other
grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22
[approving order that required all communication between
defense investigators and jurors to go through the clerk].)

12 We acknowledge our statements in Johnson I may have
implied the trial court lacked authority to conduct proceedings
beyond those specifically listed in the disposition. Therefore,
we do not fault the court or the parties for declining to pursue
other avenues to investigate the alleged juror misconduct.

24
The court also could provide access to a shared telephone line,
video conferencing service, or meeting room. Or, if necessary,
the court could order the jurors to appear and testify at
a hearing. (See People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 809
[a trial court “has discretion to determine whether to conduct
an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes raised by
a claim of juror misconduct”]; Tuggles, at p. 387 [trial court
had authority to order jurors to attend an evidentiary hearing,
even if those jurors declined to discuss the case with counsel].)
We appreciate that this would inconvenience the jurors and
the court. However, in the face of such serious allegations
of juror misconduct, the inconvenience may be necessary
to ensure Johnson received a fair trial.
DISPOSITION
We conditionally reverse the judgment and remand
the case for the trial court to reconsider Johnson’s petition
in accordance with this opinion. The court need not reconsider
the petition with respect to the protesting juror. On remand,
the court shall provide the 11 non-protesting jurors new notice
under section 237, subdivision (c). If, after providing notice,
the court remains uncertain whether any jurors are unwilling
to be contacted by Johnson, the court must make reasonable
efforts to contact those jurors to ascertain their wishes. The
court also may take other measures to investigate the alleged
juror misconduct on its own or to facilitate Johnson in his
investigation. The court shall provide Johnson a reasonable

25
amount of time to file a motion for new trial. If Johnson does
not timely file a motion for new trial, or if the court denies
his motion, the court shall reimpose the original sentence.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

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